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This thesis sets out to account for .South African economic change 
fr?m about 18700 The period covers the emergence of a capitalistic, / 
~rbanized, industrialized and integrating society from pre-capital-
ist, la::..~gely self-subsistent, nomadic, 11astoral communities. . 
The argument involves an interpretation of a changin. g social order I 
more than a record of event. The appropriate theoretical model, it is 
claimed, is interaction theory that evaluates the contribution made 
by various social processes and factors to the evolving economy. The 
'meta-theory' chosen is the social system or action theory of Talcott 
Parsons which identifies four working-needs of the total system 
to operate ·without breakdown. Each of these functiop.al, imperatives 
is associated with a sub-system. 
This thesis is particularly concerned ·with the articulation of the 
goal-attainment sub-system, the polity, and the adaptive sub-system, 
the economy. 
In South African history.the dominant factor in the polity is 
Afrikanerdom with its institutionalized value-orientations to maintai· 
White civilization. Afrikanerdom is identified as the 1 political 
factor' in continuous interaction with the nrocess of ·economic 
development that through its urbanizing, in~egr~ting effects· on the ~ 
African ~and non-\'Jhite) population threatens unacceptable change 
to the ethos of Afrikanerdom. · ~ .·~ 
From 1870 the South African experience is of slow economic trowth 
that significantly quickens :from about the 1930s. Tl.J.is I:!lat"l .. ITing J 
industrial and capitalistic society exerts an integrating adaptation.~ 
on the total social system. Such a process provokes resistance from 
the belief-system of Afrikanerdom, identified with .Apartheid, which 
through its control of the polity strives to contain and structure · 
economic change to preserve- that belief-system tl:1rough 1 separate 
development'. 
The thesis endeavours to provide the substantive account of major 
trends and releV.ant detail. Cf.1he substantive account is drawn largely 
from a published book The Poli ti cal .Gconomy of South Africa •. G:.1iJ.is 
work is" entirely my own authorship-and permission has--been-given 
for the inclusion of material from it. The empirical evidence has 
been obtained by independent investigation of primary and secondar:. 
sources and the interpretation is presented as an original applicat-
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This thesis aims at an interpretation 0£ social change 
in south Africa as the interaction 0£ the political :factor 
and economic development. In the modern political history 
0£ South Africa, British imperialism or the imperial factor 
1 has generally been accorded a special place, whereas it :ls 
the argument o:f this thesis that interaction between the 
political :factor and economic development more signi:fi-
cantly elucidates the country•s social process during the 
century £rom 1870. 
The genesis of the period selected £or study is the 
impulse that the diamond-gold discoveries gave from about 
1870 to the modernization 0£ the hitherto pastora1-agri-
oultural, traditional soc~.ety of South A:fr:loa and the evo-
lution o:f a market- or exchange-economy. Not only had the 
previous decade been one o:f acute depression but the stag-
nation is well brought out by de Kiewiet: 
••• £or a whole decade not another s1eeper was 
added to South Africa's railways.· The truth 
was plain to see. Neither the wool 0£ the Cape 
and the Orange Free nor the augar which NataJ. 
found it could grow, we~e enough to pay £or the 
imports and public works needed to keep South 
Africa abreast of an industrial and connnercial 2 age. Some other source 0£ wealth was needed ••• 
That other source was the newly uncovered mineral wealth 
and the capital investment it attracted began to establish 
the pre-conditions Cor the take-off into econom:lc dynamism 
and social change. The thirty year :from 1870 to the turn 
0£ the century are a critical era in South A£rica•s politi-
cal economy, distinguished - it will be argued - not by the 
workings out of Marxist inevitability but by the intensified 
interaction of economic development and the political factor 
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as much as by the imperial £actor. 
South Af'rican,s are so given to claim the 'uniqueness• 
0£ their country's problems, it is perhaps necessary to 
make the point that its social proces.s is distinctive only 
in the sense that the interchanges between every society 
and its particular situation are unique. Nor does South 
Africa necessarily provide a more interesting case-study 
than any other society. There are aspectst however, 0£ 
its record of interaction that are empirically instructive 
both for social. theory and economic development theory. 
Economic development is part o'f' the stream of' events. 
' 
To describe it is to' attempt to give a .coherent account of 
'the changing network of economic relationships, the e:ff'ect 
on values in the economic sense of changes in ends and 
changes in the technical and social opportunities for 
realis:t~ them•. 3 In this thesis •economic development• 
is not used in the conceptual definition of.' Schumpeter, 4 
which confines development speci:fically and solely to the 
carrying out of.' new combinations of' productive means through 
the innovator-entrepreneur. 
Economic development is used to include both what 
W.W. Ro stow describes as the si.x key propensities in his 
Process of Economic Growth 5 as well as what Arthur Lewis 
describes as the old-fashioned meaning of.' economic output 
6 in his Theorx of Economic Growth. Economic deve1opment 
perhaps more than economic growth covers both the endogen-
ous and the exogenous influences, comprehending both quali-
tative and quantitative aspects of social change. 
The •political £actor' is Afrikanerdom with its insti-
tutional.ized belief-system in the appropriate relationships 
between White and non-White peoples. In our own times 
this belie:f-system has entered the universal language of.' 
the United Nations as Apartheid and the very universality 
of' this Af'~ikaans coinage of' a political and spiritual 
:faith is in itself' a remarkable proof of the real.:i.ty of' 
the •political factor•. It is, .:i.n the argument of' this 
thesis, an h.:i.storical reality no less identif'iable and 
sigtdt"icant than the 'imperial f'actor• of nineteenth-
century Britain. 
A belief'-system that becomes a :formulated communal 
consciousness emerges out of' long, complex shared exper-
ience. It usually acquires the charismatic character 
of a national memory and ultimate ideology because of' a 
traumatic •time of' troubles•. It will re~lect the depths 
and heights of' emotion and will be recollected and recorded 
in emotive, symbolical language. Such langUage by its 
very character expresses moral judgments not merely 
colourlessly favourable or unfavourable but passionately 
invocative and evocative. It is subjective and involves 
evident problems when it appears in an academic thesis. 
Yet it is equally evident that no account of the South 
·African social system can avoid language that carries 
tonal value-judgments, . when such language is the creative 
instrument of' the belief'-system of' the actors • major and 
minor. 
The very word •Afrikanerdom•. has acquired so much 
meaningfulness U South African history as to be hardly 
capable of' neutral expr4ssion. l'.t bears a banner of 
pride and a burden of' prejudice that may arouse misgi.vings 
in the mind of' a non-committed reader, whil.e 'Apartheid' 
has inescapable normative identification. 
Although the thesis confines itself' to those aspects 
of' interaction that relate to politica1 authority and 
economic development, the Pareonian model that is thought 
to be most instructive gives related significance to other 
variables. These variables that can be grouped as 
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institutionalized culture or ethos in the context of' 
contemporary South Africa have such pejorative images 
that any reference to their evolution a.lso can hardly 
hope to avoid a sense of' non-academic commitment - in 
reader and writer alike. The Pa.rsonian ana1ysis of' the 
South African social system necessarily requires an expo-
sition that will re:flect the emotive socio-psychological 
elements. 
Although Apartheid enters the language of South A.:f'r:ioan 
and world politics only after the Second World War, as a 
'£actor' or '£'unction• in the social process o:f the geo-
political life of' Southern Af'rioa it is of' much earlier 
origin. It goes back to that stage where the second 
British occupation of' the Cape in 1806 begins to trigger 
the Gre.at Trek of' Af'rikanerdom - to the mani:festo o:f Piet 
Retief as a declaration of' values so deeply held that it 
must be pursued, if necessary, even into the wilderness o:f 
Afrikaner desti.ny.7 It might be succinctly identitied as 
•the maintenance of White civilization• through whatever 
semantic changes it passes £rom •trusteeship' to •segre-
gation• to •separate development•. 
The P:let Retie£ mani:festo was the first f'ormu1at.ion of 
the norms and values of' the originall.y Dutch-speaking :i.nhabi-· 
tants.who, un1ike the Huguenots with their skil.ls in inten-
sive agriculture, found nomadic pastoralism more to their 
way of life. They preferred to trek rather than to settle 
so th~t land· aeq\Ured an almost· mystica1 symbolism f'or the 
trekkers. Whereas the trekker, however, attached absolute 
social. status to the size of his individual land-holding 
(with six thousand acres encompassed by a day•s horse• 
riding as a minimum range for his cattle), the similarly 
nomacli.c, pastoral Bantu-speaking peoples believed no less 
passionately in communal ownership of land :for the cattle 
that in the.ir subsistence economy served both as a medium 
of money and a bride-price. 
Though the land was vast, climate and the culture of 
trekker and tribesman soon made it scarce. The never-
ending quarrels of the trekkers and the tribesmen over 
their unbranded cattle and the water-starved grazing 
pastures regularly escalated into 'Kaf"fir Wars•. Inside 
the hastily-assembled fortification of the circle of their 
ox-wagons, the White trekkers survived the terror of the 
tribesmen whose aseegaia were apparently inexhaustible 
and who made the ground tremble with their stamping black 
feet and their death-defying cries of war. 
The wave-like onslaughts of black-skinned, near-nude 
enemies with their tactics of encirclement and leaping, 
ear-shattering terror sometimes got through tho enclosure 
of ox-wagons and sometimes did not. But they always 
exacted their quota of white blood. It needed on1y the 
historical incident 0£ Dingaan•s preventive, tr~acherous 
striking down of Piet Retie£, and the consequentia1 deci-
sive con£rontation between the heathen tribesmen and the 
Calvinistic trekkers (making their Covenant with God if 
he would but give them victory at Weenen• the place 0£ 
weeping) £or the evolv:lng imperatives of Apartheid to 
impose their peoul*ar dynamism on social progress in 
South Africa. 
In the lonely laager of their mutual self-preservation, 
the Afrikaner people internalized their experiences. In 
their isolation their patois became a language and then a 
literature. In their particular caivinistic puritanism 
they did not respond to the lure of capitalistic oalli.ng 
until, after two •:freedom Ware• against the Uitlanders 
and cosmopolitan pursuit of the flesh-pots, Afrikaner 
poor-whiteism threatened to become indistinguishable from 
A£rikan poor-blackism. Afrikaner nationalism became 
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Af'rikanerdom and purity of' race a messianJ.c eompu1afon 
no non-Af'rikaner could be expected truly to understand. 
Only Afrikanerdom could preserve Afrikanerdom. Between 
the volkswil and the grond-wet there must be consummated 
a marriage that neither whi.te E:nglishmen nor 'black 
Englishmen~' could ever truly share in. 
That there is a landless class of' black proletariat 
and a stratified society in South -Africa today and that 
this bas emerged from a form of feudalism is hardly deni-
able. Yet a Marxist model of' class and conflict does 
not really 'fit•. Economic development conforms so 
neatly into the t stag.es• o:f economic growth o:f Ro stow 
£rom pre-conditions ·Of take-off into take-off and towards 
maturity, and is so patently injected with Sohumpeterian 
entrepreneurship, that a simple Marxist model of surplus 
value is inadequate. Nor is it particularly illuminating 
to see .in an •unwritten al.liance' of' A:frikaner government 
and English-American mining interests the key explanation 
of political history in South Africa 8 - there is too much 
evidence that the Chamber of Mines has been as .powerless 
as even the ~reatest multi-national. corporations against 
the determined authority of' the most petty nation-state.9 
Furthermore• the conflict between Boer, Bantu and 
Britain is not real.istically accounted for as stratifi-
cation of class plus race. There are too many extra-
economic norms and values that have been cri.tically deter-
minist in the historical record to be ignored as inconse• 
quential. 
Though the Parsonian model of social inteJ:-action may, 
as its critics allege., gloss too easily over conflict in 
general and con:flict .in white-black South Africa in parti-
cular, a social system theory of intera~tion gives more 
insights into South African social process. The writings 
of Ta1oott Parsons, often in collaboration with others, 
are at a level of' abstraction sometimes so abstruse in 
language and of' such length as to be f'orbidd.i.ngly rare-
f'ied. They introduce a ~ethodology and a tenninology 
hardly less intimidating than the hieroglyphics of' 
econometrics. 10 Yet the Parsonian formulations of' 
interaction are, it is contended, illuminating if' one 
but perseveres to f'ind the light. 
Socia1 system theories, such as those of' Talcott 
Parsons, are not concerned with the concrete f'actors of' 
change but with the process o:f change. An empirical 
study such as this thesis is not therefore put forward 
as a •proof' of' a particular theory. It does no more 
than try to utilize what are deemed to be its help:f'ul 
concepts. In interpreting history the disputed va1ue 
of' theoretical models and the need f'or factual caution 
11 is recognized. 
The two works on sooial system theory of' special 
vance for this study are Towards a General Theory of 
edited by Parsons and Shila, and Economy and Society 




A social eyetem is any eyetem of interacting relation-
ships of a number of' persons; i.e. of a plurality 0£ indi-
vidual actors. Specifically: 
A social system is the system generated by any 
process of interaction, on the socio-cultural 
level, between two or more 'actors•. The actor 
is either a concrete human individual (a person) 
or a collectivity of' which a plurality of persons 
are members.15 
A social system ia thus the swu of' any particular set of 
human interactions. 
A society, eo defined, is the type of social. system 
which contains vi.thin itself all the essential prerequisites 
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:for its maintenance as a sel'f'-subsistent system. Among 
the more essential of' these prerequisites; .Parsons lists 
(1} organization around the foci of' territorial location 
and kinship; (2) a system for detennining :functions and 
allocating :facilities and rewards, and (3) integrative 
structures controlling these a1locationa and regul.ating 
conf'licts and competitive processes. 16 'I'he f'unct.ional 
problem ·Of social systems may, therefore, be summarized 
as the problem of' allocation and integration. 
A society, that is, to remain in being as that society 
must organize itself within a geographical area through 
concentrati.-ig f'actot>s of af'f'iliation and affinity. J:t 
must establish meoh~sms which will allooatl;) activities, 
the means to carry out such activities and the rewards f'or 
so doi.ng. Such mechanisms must link the process of allo-
cation, and distribute the means and the rewards so as to 
co-ordinate a perpetuating process. The al ternat:lve 
possibilities of such linkage-mechanisms are the market 
economy or the admi.nistered economy. The former is a 
social system of competitive, private initiative and the 
latter is a social system of' hierarchical instruction 
' tending towards a col1eotive ovnersbip of property.. The 
interaction bet1feen these a1ternatives is more :f'ully 
' examined in a later chapter: The Po1ity versus the Economy. 
'Thie determination of £unctions and all.ooation and 
integration of' roles. personnel, facilities and rewards in 
a soc.!laJ. system' write Parsons and Shils 'implies a process 
of selection in accordance with the standards of' evaluation 
applied to characteristics of' the objects.~ 1 7 They then 
speeif'ically warn against :interpreting this statement o~ 
determination and selection as meaning that the 1 plan1 of 
a social system is de1iberate1y or necessarily worked out 
by anyone. 
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It is not so worked out. But it is not possible :f.or 
the choices of the persons, or actors, to fai.1 at random 
and still :form a coherently organized and f'Unction:lng 
social system. A co-ordinating mechanism of choice, 
either :free or controlled, is essential.;, Free choice 
I 
implies a market economy, and controlled choice is expressed 
in an adminl.stered economy. 
The structure of' the social system in this respect 
may be regarded as the cu.mulativd and balanced 
resultant of' many selections of many individual.a, 
,stabilized and re-in:forced by the institutional-
ization of' val.ue pat.terns, which legitimize 
commitment to certain directions of' selection and 
mobilize sanet~ons in the support of resultant 
orientations.1 · 
The structure o:f a society is the re.fl.ection of' its 
changing combinations ·Of' choice, expre.ssing the ethos of' 
its membership. It is that ethos .. that in.sti tutional-
ization of value patterns, in Paraonian terminol.ogy .. which 
stabiJ.izes the trends and gives amoving equ.ilibri.wn to the 
changing combinations of choice. I.f the changing oombi• 
nations are expressed in a market economy, it is because 
the social ethos f'avours the .flexibility of' decentraliza• 
tion and the freedom of' per.sonal risk-taking. I:f the 
changing combinations are expressed .in an ad.ministered 
economy, it is because the social ethos pref'ers the sense 
of continuity and .security from hierarchical decision. 
If' choice is handed over or abandoned to a eollectirtst 
economy., then the social ethos has never emerged f'rom or 
has succumbed to totalitarianism. 
There are two fundamental tendencies of selection -
seeking and avoidance. Choice is the process o:f striving 
f'or states of grati:fication, including negative gratifica-
tion or avoidance. Such goal-attainment or achi.evement 
of' aims takes place ·within a situation or environment. The 
critical elements involving the individual person or 
plurality o:f''persons in choosing are motivationa1-
orientation, value-orientation and the structure of' the 
situation. 
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In less technical language, choice o:f' aim is governed 
by motives, belie:f's and the environment. 
Choice or selection is an essential component o:f' action. 
Action in a social system necessitates evaluation o:f' alter-
native paths o~ action, and then commitments to those 
particul.ar alternatives which have been chosen. Thus 
choice is a :runotion both of goal-orientation and of 
dif'f'erentiation o:f' the situation. It involves criteria 
of vaJ.:l.dity :for the choices and these criteri.a of validity 
give :tundamental independent signi:f'icance to value standards 
in the social system. 
Again, expressed in more f'amiliar terms, action is pre-
ceded by choice. Choice is the response to aims and it is 
also the establishment of ·wha.t is unique in the context in 
which the choice is exercised. Choice re:f'l.eots criteria 
that sanction the decision and suoh criteria are institu-
tiona1ized so that they acquire independent, compelling 
authority of their ovn. 
Mises, too, explicitly acknowledges that the theme of 
praxeology is action as such, and choosing determines all 
human decisions. 'In malcing his choices man chooses not 
only between various material things and services. All 
human values are o££ered £or option ••• nothing that men 
aJ.m at or want to avoid rema:Lns outside o:f' this arrangement 
into a unique scale of gradation and pref'erence.• 19 And 
many years ago Lionel Robbins in his Essay on the Nature 
and Significance of Economic Science o1ari£ied the subject-
matter of economics as essentially a series of relation-
11. 
ships - •re1ationships between ends conceived as the 
.Principal objectives of' conduct, on the one hand1 and the 
technical and social environment on the other,• 20 
Whether, as Mises and Robbins have insisted, a wertf'rei 
economic analysis is an achieved technique or whether it 
remains an aspiration, there oan hardly be dispute that 
economic policy unavoidably involves valuations, Still 
more the actual record of' economic deve1opment, the reflect-
ion of and response to policy, can be understood only by 
identifying and giving due weight to the criteria of 
validity that governed choice, which in turn, has deter-
mined action. 
The attempt must bo made to establish such criteria 
of' validity or the sanctions ~f' the endorsements for action 
of' all the important individual and groups of actors in the 
21 social system. The stream of events, which is the histo-
rical record, compounds these criteria of validity for 
action with the course of the developing situation. 
The major vaJ.idating criteria for action of' the more 
important persons and groups in the modern economic develop-
ment of' South Africa will be suggested as the text proceeds. 
The conceptual usef'ulness of social. system theory 22 is 
that it makes it easier to relate the criteria for action -
the sanctions and endorsements • to the changing structure 
of the social. environment. Particularly, it relates the 
extra-economic aspects to the economic aspects in both the 
criteria for action and the structure of' the economy .• 
lt has become a usef'ul too1 of' analysis to represent 
the structure 0£ the economy in the f'orm of' a modo1. A 
major source of disagreement or non-a,greement about the 
model i~es in the assumptions about data. 23 Such data 
must ~nclude the extra-economic assumptions, i.e.the moti-
12. 
vations and values o:f individuals and groups of persons. 
It must include, more broadly, the aspects of' human 
behaviour that are relevant on the one side and the 
environmental aspects, the social. and techno1ogical. situ-
ation, on the other side and the interacting consequences 
between behaviour and situation. 24 
Thus no model, static or dynamic, of the economic 
development of' South Africa that is any sense contemporan-
eously realistic could exclude Apartheid, the critical ele• 
ment of' the political factor and increas:i.ngly the political 
factor itself; as a key variable. What weight to give to 
Apartheid in the data, what assumptions to make of the 
interacting consequences in an econometric model or .:1.n. a 
sooia1 system paradigm would almost certainly be disputed 
• 
between any two South African economists or social . 
scientists. But no serious analyst could exclude Apartheid, 
could leave out the political :f"actor from the record of' the 
mod4rn economic development of South A:f'rica. 2S 
Hence, the usef'ulness of' concepts and theories which 
help to interrelate the extra-economic and the economic. 
Hence, it is submitted, the insights of'f'ered by soc:ial 
system theory. 
T- E d s . t• 26 p d s l t t .1.n conolJ!Y an oc•e tt arsons an me ser se · ou 
·to establish a model which will locate the extra-economic 
area in social system theory, and also to locate the economy 
as a sub-system of the total social system. l:t must be 
stressed that an economy is not in itself a collectivity -
it cannot in itself' be an •actor•, though exposition some-
times personalizes it and endows with behaviourism. An 
economy is a sub-system of' the total social system. 
A social system ... whether the total system or the sub-
system - is, to repeat, any system genera.tad by the .inter-
action ·Of two or more persons or groups of' persons, that 
:ls, individuals or c'olleotirtties. There are, according 
to the general theory 0£ social systems, four major, inde-
pendent f'unctional imperatives to which process in every 
system or sub-system is subject. :u· the system is to 
continue in equilibrium or existence, the system must meet 
these four imperatives. Put another way; if' the.society 
is to perpetuate itself, it must meet the needs of' four 
distinctive working-compu1sions. 
They are as follows: The social system·• s f'irst 
t'Unctional imperative, or working-need, is to maintain the 
~tegrity of its characteristic values, which in due course 
are institutionalized into a value system. The process 
of' maintenance of' the institutionalized value systems 
means its stabilization against pressures to change e.ither 
:from oul tural sour(;es of change or motivational sources of 
change. The Greek concept of' •ethos' seems to express 
more :fami.liarly the sociological concept of' '.institution-
alized value system'• 
Pressure f'rom the cultural sources of' change are met 
by the 'pattern maintenance £unction•; and pressures from 
the motivational sources of' change which arise from persons 
or the social situation, are met by the •tens.ion management• 
:function. That is, to perpetuate .itself', when subjected 
to forces of' cultural change• the system needs a mechanism 
to maintain its characteristic patterns of' behaviour; and 
'When subjected to :torces compelling change and arousing 
conflict in its activating inf'luences, the system ·will 
require to manage the resulting tension. 
Because arery social system £unctions in a situation 
that is de:fined as external to it, there are proce.sses o:f 
interchange between system and situation. The inter-
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changes concern or involve the goal attainments or aims of' 
the society (the second functional imperative) and the 
.adaptation 0£ the system to achieve the goals or aims (the 
third functional imperative). 27 
To maintain sol.idarity in the relations between the 
units of' the social system, which may be either mutual1y 
supportive or mutually obstructive, there is the f'ourth 
imperative of the integrative function. 
So the :four .f'tuidamental imperatives (or working-needs) 
wMch every social system must meet to operate without 
breakc!lovn are (i) pattet'n maintenance includ.ing tension 
management (maintaining a c~nsistent pattern of behaviour 
anq managing the resultant tensions), goal atta!lmnent 
(achif'lvemen~. of aims), adaptation (t~e mechanism of' change), 
and integration (the mechanism of' co~ordination). Any 
system of' socia1 action can be described and its processes 
ana1ysod in terms of' these :four basic imperatives or 
working-needs. l.n turn. each 0£ these f'Unctional impera-
. 28 
tives becomes a sub-system. 
The need f'or articulation arises out of the tendency of' 
the total social system to dif'f'erentiate into sub-systems, 
which are specia1ized by each of these four functional 
imperatives. The economy is the primary sub-system related 
to the adaptiVc."j f'Unction. The other three societal sub-
.systems cognate with the economy are a goa1 attainment sub-
system, identi.f':ied with the po1ity; an integrative sub ... 
system; and a pattern-maintenal'lce and tension-management 
29 sub-system. 
. 
The :focus of' the adaptive .sub .. system is the economy. 
The economy is the .sub-system of' the society, which is 
dif'f'eren.tiated with primary reference to the adaptation 
working-nec!d of' the society as a who1e. l:ts primary 
1.5. 
f'un.ction is to serve as the mechanism or process of change 
and it is in that sense that the economy may be regarded 
as a f'unctional sub-system of the total social system, and 
in an advanced society its most important f'unctional sub-
system. 
The focus of the goal-attainment sub-system of a society 
is the polity. Again• it is the polity which serves as the 
primary, not sole, working-need to achieve the total social 
aims. Polity embraces the political f'unctions exercised 
by all the ' actors• .in the society., individuals or groups• 
Polity is not a single organizational unit oo-terminous 
with government or the state. It includes as units with 
political ftlnctions all governmental agencies, political 
parties, business and labour organizations, firms, indivi .. 
duals. Government, though not co-terminous., would in any 
politically-advanced society constitute the major unit or 
•actor• in tho polity. In thi.s thesis there will be a 
general identificatbn 0£ polity with the government. 
The polity has as its £unction to maximize the capacity 
of the society to attain its collective goals or achieve 
its common aims. It is power rather than wealth• though 
wealth is an ingredient of' power. 
The integrative sub-system of' the society serves to 
relate the cultural vaJ.ue-patterns of' the total society 
to the motivational structures of the individ.ual persons 
or groups of the society. In more :famil.iar language, it 
is to harmonize the social. ethos with tho personal moti-
vation £or action so that the total social system can 
f'unction without excessive conflict or f'aiiure of co• 
ordination. The so•called social controls of' custom and 
tradition maintain in being the institutionalized values 
or ethos of' the society. :Ct is in this integrative sub-
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system, f'oeusing on the 'solidarity• agenf:cies in the society, 
that operates to 'bring into line' disrupti.ve tendencies or 
,e1ements and to promote condi t.ions 0£ harmonious oo-
operation. 30 
The f'our primary :f'unctional. sub-systems of' a society -
the economy, the polity, the integrative sub-system, and 
the pattern-maintenance and tension-management sub-system -
are related to one another i.n that each constitutes part 
of' the situation :for each of the others. From the point 
of view, f'or instance, of the eco.nomy, the cognate social 
situation or environment consists of the other three.30 
It is the inter-relationships and inter-connections 
and interactions of' the economy, the polity, the ethos and 
the endowment (the integrative social controls and the 
institutionalized. culture) which would constitute the com-
plete~racing out 0£ totai social process. One can con-
ceive the possibility of' tracing of' social system theory 
as a kind ·of programming of every actor's actions in every 
role, and then the processing of' the data through the ulti-
mate electronic computer,. The record that would be printed 
out might be history or might be noti 3 1 
However; the empirical study of' a soci9.l .system must be 
infinitely more modest,. The 1imits, and limitations, of' 
empirical. application of' social system theory are obvious. 
No more than an aspect of social process can be compre-
hended and recorded,. The oconomic deve1opment of' South 
Africa over the last century can be conceived in terms of' 
social system theory but it can be recorded on1y in much 
more simple exposition. Xts study becomes an attempt to 
account for the f'unctiona1 interrelationships and inter-
connections 0£ the sub-systems - the economy, the polity, 
the integrative social controls and the institutionalized 
culture ·or South Af'rica. 
Economists f'rom Adam Smith on have, of course, always 
been fully aware of the significance of the polity - more 
particularly when it is treated as co-terminous with 
government .. to the problem of productivity and to the 
course of' economic development, short-term and secular.32 
The desirable rol.e of gove~ent - the input of the polity -
has been the core .of' the Great Debate beginning with the 
f'irst treatise in poli tioal economy. 3:3 was only partia.1.ly 
interrupted when Principle.s ·Of Economics was subs ti tnted . 
£or Principles of' Polit:i.cal Economy as the standard title 
and now continues stridently through all the latest tomes 
on economic development. 
The role of polity is exercised through the right to 
interv"enc. This intervention will be exercised to secure 
the collective goals of' the society and ·wil1 be exerted by 
the agents 0£ the polity, of' whioh government is obviously 
the most powerf'ul and strategic. The co1lective goals are 
the institutionalized value-patterns. They a.re well pre• 
sented. by Edward Shils1 
The' political conceptions which are expressed 
in the prevail1ng notions of' economic •• •' 
development rest on a deep-lying image of the 
nature of society and the ~ight orddring of life. 
l:t is an image of' the concentration of' charisma 
in those who rule the nation • •. What are called 
•economic motives• are distrusted because :i.t is 
believed that no intrinsic val.ue resides in the 
economic sphere - in the way in which the reli-
gious and political. spheres possess the intr:i.ns!i.c 
value connected with sacred things. The only 
truly respected motives are those respected by 
authority, the exercise of that sovereignty, 
religious or political., which e#~ails communion 
with the sacred.34 
In the Transvaal Republic 0£ President Kruger at its 
underdeveloped stage, there was certain1y no esteem 0£ the 
uitlander-entr~preneur and bis ways. The related distrust 
0£ •economic motives' has persisted throughout more than 
seventy years 0£ considerable economic growth 0£ South 
A:rrica as part 0£ the dei£ication 0£ tYhite Civi.lization' • 
White civilization has hypnotised the collective goals 
0£ the polity throughout South African history. Its pre-
servation in relation to economic development is not in 
theory and bas not been in practice a simple matter. The 
relationship between deism and materialism is so complex 
and ambiguous as to have been the unending source 0£ 
sectional and party political conflict. 
Economic development simultaneously promotes and 
£rustrates the goa1-attaimnents. At times this frustra-
tion soems to extend beyond immediate aims and to threaten 
the inetitutional.ized culture itself. At this point of 
throat, the integrative sub-systems: of maintaining patterns 
of behaviour and 0£ resolving tensions! exert irresistible 
pressures on the polity to contain what now appear as the 
destructive, and no longer merely disruptive, forces 0£ 
economic development.35 
Economic development located in the adaptive sup-system 
must at this stage itself adapt. 36 The economy must adapt 
to the other three f'unctional imperatives of a self-sub-
sistent social system or these three imperatives must adjust 
to the economy. Where, for instance, the charisma or the 
institutionalized culture i•poses beliefs 0£ doctrina1 com-
pu1sion on the polity, then the polity will prove inflexible 
in the exercise of the power to secure adaptation by the 
economy. The opposite process is where the economy, or 
economic development, operates so strongly as actively to 
-., 
t~ans£6rm the environment and influence both the polity 
and the institutionalized culture to the point where the 
belief's either loosen their hold or their compulsion is 
overthrown. .The former shows itself in peaceful change; 
that is, the total society subsists. The latter is mani-
fested in revolution so that a new society with a radi.-
cally dif':f'erent institutional.ized culture and pol.ity 
emerges as dominant.37 
in South African economic history not the least of' the 
complexities of' the interrelationships between the goals of 
lfhite civilization and of eoonomio development has been 
that-the championship o:f Uhite civilization has been almost 
exclusively identified with the value-orientations, or aims. 
of' the Afrikaner section of the White populat~on. :Ct i.e 
their institutionalized values which seemed capable of 
realization only through tho economic development of their 
own underdeveloped section of' the volk, the poor Whites. 
But simultaneously their institutionalized values were most 
threatened by the very processes of' such economic develop-
ment involving alien motivations and agencies that did not 
share the charisma of' the volk. 
Economic growth, which raised the socio-economic status 
of' the Afrikaner Poor llhites and thereby preserved and pro-
moted the value-orientations 0£ White civil.izationt simul• 
taneously raised the socio-economic status of' the Poor 
Blacks. This latter process of' advancement of the Poor 
Blacks, i~onjunotion with a radically changing external 
situation, stimulated the value-orientations of' the Blacks 
towards an African nationalism that seems now to threaten1 
the overthrow and ruin of *White civilization•. 
Furthermore, the major actors. or collectivities of' 
actors, in promoting economic developments were English-
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speaking. Soutlt Africans and other immigrant groups. 
Their institutionalized culture, less openly and aggress .. 
:i.vely identif'ied with 1fhite civilization, seemed to them 
to be more ef'ifectiveiy t:1ecured and promoted. through the 
most rapid rate of' economic growth. This rate was to be 
achieved only by the steady integration of' Black labour 
with 'White capital and entrepreneurship.. J:n the process 
of' economic development such integration of' Black labour 
wi.th Wh:j,.:te entrepreneurial capital appeared po.sitively 
correlated so th.at any interruption of' that .integration 
eonst:tt_uted a threa:t to eoonomte growth .• 
The same ·correlation of' economic growth and integration 
of' Black labour• however, appeared with increasing sharp-
ness to A:frikaans-spoaJ~ing Sont'b. .Af'rica to make the process 
of economic development .itself' a threat. Uncontrolled 
economic development was patently compe11ing the aq.aptation 
'·of' the institutionalized culture of ,Af'rikanerdom to a stage 
ot: tmenciurable transformation. Rather than accept thi.s,, 
the prooes.ses o.f' economic gro·wth had to be brought under 
the d;i.rection - and if' needs be the dictate .. of' the·po1ity";138 
Social sy,stetn theory provides, it .is suggested, more 
rea.l!at:tc insights into the process of' economic development 
in South A:f'r.ica than either:' the crude or the more· sophisti-
cated interpretations of' Marxism,, Capitalist and prolet• 
arlat cannot be simply equated with -Vb.ite and Blaok and the 
sooial prooess presented as an uncomplicated class struggle 
'between White capitalist and Black proletariat that will 
.explain all. 
There is no uncomplicated dichotomy of class conflict· 
or even White-Black conf'J.ict. There are 1 'Without doubt, 
.special, even perhaps unique, :features in the Q.eve.lopment 
of' the total. society of' South Af.rica,. and social ,system· 
' 
theory rather tha:n.' Marxism appears to of'f'er the more 
inf'ormative elues .• 39 Within the total society of South 
A::rr.ica,. economic ,grottth has imposed. severe strains of' 
adaptation on value-orientations and institutiqnalized 
· culture, as rapid eco.nomic growth has indeed on .every 
society. Wb.att perhaps; gives South African eoop.omic 
history its special character has been the particular 
interaction between economy and.polity. 
How was the incipient dissolution of' the social system 
to be avoided? ·How were the :four fundamental imperatives 
of' a self'•subsistent socaal system - the goa1.s o.f' the polity, 
the adaptive :f'unotion ·O£ the economy, the patterns of' 
personal and collective behaviour; the inst.itutionalized 
. lfO 
cultures ... to be sustained? 
.In:fluentia.1 English-speaking South Af'ricans tended,..,. 
and increasingly as the Engl.ash became a political m!nori ty · 
in ·the White electorate .;. to see the answer 3.n economic 
growth as such• Eeonomio development was to be the Great 
Conciliator of' conflict.. Economic deve1o{'ment would 
•modernize' not only the environment but the value ... or!lenta• 
tions and the institutionalized culture of' .Af'rika:rter 
nationalism and Af'rican tribalism .• 
Af'rikaans-speaking South Af'ri.ca - or in the more express-
! Ve t·erm of' Af'rikanerdom with its o·vertones of' purposef'ul · 
national. cohesion p;er:force id.ent.if'ied the deus ex ma.china 
with the polity. ln the schema o:f' action or social 
system theory• power .is .located . :i.n the polity and wealth 
:tn the economy. 41 Af'rikanerdom did not possess wealth 
but it might claim power.. Whether in ,the old Transvaal 
Republic, where· the gold was physically located, or in the 
Union .of' South A:f'rioa, •which :the Transvaal. cou1d either 
make or break, A:frikanerdom· could at least amalgamate i.ts 
more numerous voters with its more powerfUl charisma o:f' 
nationalism to win power. 
Control of the polity - every agenc.y of the polity 
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f'rom central government to local. authority, f'rom teaching 
profession to civil service ad.ministration - became the 
avowed objective of' Afrikaner nationali.sm•42 ln the polity 
are f'ocused the •rights to intervention' over society and 
Af'rikanerdom never rested until it had secured control 
over the polity, Once such control was secured, it could 
be made complete only by subjecting the processes of 
economic growth to its value~orientations and institution-
alized culture I> 
The threat of economic growth went much further than 
the undern1ining of' the Afrikaner way of l:f.:f'e in its less 
sophisticated pattern. Insof'ar as that way of' life was 
:identified with the value-orientations o:f a simpler, 
pastoral and essentiaJ .. ly non ... urban env:i.ronment the guardians 
of' that tradition - the Dutch Re:f'ormed Churches, the 
A:frikaner cultural societies - ste1-nly res±ated the influ-
ences of' urbanization and industr:Lal:i.zation. Although 
these guardi.ans still achieve occasiona1 successes as in, 
f'or instance• censorshi.p over literature and art and pro-
hibitions over Sunday leisure-aotiVities, the cosmopolitan• 
izing of' vaJ.ucs that accompanies economic development is 
no .longer seriously resisted. 43, 
The critical element in oconomic development • critical. 
in its destructive and even revolutionary implications :for 
the beliefs-system of Af'r~kanerdom - was, and is, in 1ts 
integrative inf'l.uence on the val.ue-orientations of' the Blacks. 
The tempo and nature o:f economic development had been 
changing since the ni.neteen-thirties and was given major 
impetus by war- and post-war industria.lizatiori. The 
processes of' urbanization and industrialization intensif'ied 
the processes o~ datribal1zation. The rapid increase in 
the nwnbers of' detribalized,- permanently resident urban 
A:fricans was transf'orming the institutiona1ized culture 
.of' the Af'ricans. More· and. more that institutionalized 
culture was assuming similar values to that of' any urban-
ized-industrialized peoples, so that more and more i't 
appeared as a penetration of the White Man's• and more 
pa.rticular.ly, the Af'rika.ner' s way of' lif'e. 44 
Economic development seemed to be integrating the 
Africans so rapidly and so completely that, i:f' allowed to 
proceed without control, the value-orientations -of' tribal 
Af'ricans would become those of' *Black Englishmen•, This 
in itself' was repugnant to Af'rikanerdom. But the addi-
tion of' Af'rican nationalism to the value-orientations of 
an urbanized-industrialized proletariat, expressod in the 
cfomands for a lllliversal franchise, was wholly unacceptable. 
It implied goal•atta.inments by the Africans in the polity. 
which few A~rikaners and f'ew White South Africans would 
regard as even the subject-matter of discussion• let alone 
concession. 
Hence A:fri.kanerdom once in complete control. of' the 
polity, f'rom about 1948 on, was impelled into an ambivalent 
view of' economic development. This ambivalence is one of' 
the distinguishing :features of' public pol:toy :i.n South Af'rica 
during tho postwar years of: Nationalist Party government. 
On the one hand, Afrikaner domination of the polity 
provided wide scope for those encouragements and direction 
of the economy by the polity, which would promote the eco-
nomic advancement of Afrikaans-speaking South Africa and 
their 'share' in the expanding economy. State-directed 
investment not only promised valuable opportunities ~or 
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the growing stream of' Afrikaner inat~tutioual savings but 
also f'or the expanding numbers of' Af'rikaner managerial and 
technological skills emerging from the Afrikaans univer-
sities. Furthermore, such state-directed investment 
secured to the (Afrikaner) polity many of' the •commanding 
heightst of' the economy. 45 
On the other hand, economic development, in as much as 
it resulted both from the polity's direct encouragement 
through massive state-investment and its indirect encourage-
ment of a very rapid rate of' industr~a.lization by way of 
tariff' protection and import controls, would have to be con-
trolled to slow down and ultimately reverse the integration 
of' the Africans. 
There was a phase when some of' the most influential 
members of Af"rikanerdom urged that economic advancement 
itself' should be sacrificed rather than the process o:f 
African integration be al1owed to accelerate. 46 In the 
f'ace of opposition to such a far-reaching change of' social 
process and o:f the practical diff'iculties to reversing the 
mounting econom:l.c dynamism of' the post-war years, a new 
policy was evo1veci. The aim of' this policy was not to 
reverse, stop or even check economic growth but to direct 
it. 
Economic growth was to be directed by a complex of 
controls exercised by the polity so that economic develop-
ment was to be restructured geographically. Economic 
devellopment involving the employment 0£ large masses of' 
African workers was so :far as possible to be con£1ned to 
the so-called border areas, i.e. adjacent to the tribal 
habitations o:f the Af'ricans. J:ndustrialization was to 
be permitted but not the accompanying urbanization. 
The detribalizing of the Africans with its dissolution 
o:f the institutionalized cu1ture of' the Af'rieans as ethnic 
groups was to be halted. The integration of' Black labour 
with i:.'hite entrepreneurial-capital - the vital amalgam of' 
the process of economic growth - would continue but geo-
grapl:dcally separately.. By such geographical separation, 
the process of' African integration .into the sub-system of 
the economy would not, it was believed, become a process 
of' integration into the total social system. The nine-
teenth century 'Native Reserves' would translate .into the 
twent.ieth century •Bantu liomelands'. 
Interpreted in accordance with social system theory, 
the geographical separation o:f the Af'ri·can majorities and 
their continued attachment to their own ethnical cul.ture 
would halt the interchange between the sub-system of' the 
economy and the polity by way of tho changing value-
patterns and goal-attai:nments 0£ the African. The counter-
part of' such geographical separation (through 'border-area• 
development adjoining the •Bantu homelands' of' •J.abour ... 
intensive' manuf'acturing industry) i.s the f'unctional 
separation of White and non-Whi:le in the economy .• 
Broadly, the pol.icy conceptio.n was :for occupations of 
superior ski11 to be reserved f'or Whites. ".{'he hi.gher 
level.. of' earning attached to such superior sktl1s wou1d 
also he.lp to praserye the inviolability of' value-orlenta• 
tions of the Whites through the pattern-maintenance sub-
system. Differentiation o:f incomes and earnings is at 
the individual level the most ef'.f'ect:i.ve .mechanism :for 








The political factor in South African history is 
certainly not a single element of unchanging form. It 
has had and has, however, a motivation, that allows it to 
be given an identity. Though it may in the course of 
time have assumed many guises, that political factor 
remains an always recogrrl.zable embodiment of beliefs and 
objective. It is a consistent, persistent factor of 
South African reality. Through the successive guises 
of' trusteeship to segregation to Apartheid to Bantustans, 
the Rolitical factor remains the unchallengeable, unalter-
able control of South African society in general and the 
south African economy in particular by its White peoples. 
This is the political factor in the record of a politi-
cal economy, which can be written as economic history be-
cause it has a pattern of relationships that are both con-
tinuous and interconnected. There is not only chronology 
of event but a seeming compulsion of choice, which links 
the polity to the economy. 
There is no historical inevitability. On the contrary, 
chance and unforeseen, unscheduled good fortune have marked 
the ~ntire unfolding of economic events. So much so that 
a noted South African economist, haunted throughout his 
academic career by the Cassandra syndrome, was finally 
driven ~n the point of his retirement from propheQy of 
woe to attribute the perennia11y astonishing economic 
. 1 
development of South_Af'rica to a series of miracles. 
It is not then any undeviating, progressive purpose 
w~ch provides the record of South African economic develop-
ment. There is much more happening than p1anning, more 
serzure of opportunity than processing of possibilities, 
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more entrepreneurship than management. But political 
action bas been a ltl.ghly conscious pursuit of idea1ized 
objective by the most politically-conscious, cohesive 
group in South African society. 
Afrikanerdom•s awareness of politics and political 
power may have been the fruit of bitter, earlier experience 
of lack of power, that drove Afrikaners repeatedly to trek 
from the confines of others• jurisdiction. Their original 
drive always to move on, away from political. control, was 
not - at least until the 1s7o•s - restrained by any material 
benefits deriving from governmental authority. But ·once 
economic development caught up with Af'rikaner isolationism, 
once the need for political sopltl.stication overcame the 
wish and the will to· trek beyond into escapism, in brief 
once gold was f'ound in the Transvaal, th.en Afrikanerdom•s 
political consciousness became compulsively positive 
instead of compulsively negative. 
Afrikanerdom thenceforth was determined on achi.eving 
political authority, indeed unfetterd sovereignty - deter-
mined not only on ejection o:f the imperial factor from the 
Boer republics but on republican status for the whole of 
South Africa. Af'rikane~dom•s political consciousness 
was no less an inflexible assertion of the prerogative of' 
political. authority over the course of economic deve1op-
ment. As such deve1opment intruded into and undermined 
Afrikanerdom's concept of the South African way 0£ 11£4, so 
insistence on political sovereignty over the economy hard-
ened. As market forces o:f choice and co-ordination of 
choice apparently challenged the valuations o:f Afrikanerdom, 
so Afrikanerd.om intensified the political control of eco-
nomic change. 
To Afrikanerdom, the imperial factor was the enemy of 
its existence and economic development the trouble-maker 
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of its tradition. The imperial £actor would enforce 
unacceptable adjustments from external in:fluences, and 
economic growth would impose intolerable consequences of 
market behaviour. The free market would <liotate its 
•purely economic' values, formed by the exercise of' im-
personal choice, that ignored the predetermination of' 
Af'rikanerdom to personalize White and non-White as of 
di:ff'erent biblical origin and hence never to mix •in 
Church and State•. Onlly a politically united, politi-
cally dedicated Afrikanerdom could both overcome the 
imperial factor and also subjugate· the apolitical market. 
Furthermore, the imperial. factor and economic develop-
ment appeared as Tweedledum and Tweedledee - a twin mani-
festation of' a single threat to Afrikaner sovereignty 
over South Africa. They were to Af'rikanerdom not however 
the comic figures of an English imagination but the horri-
f'.ic double-image of' British inspiration• · Xmpr~gnable in 
its Calvinism, Afrikaner nationalism nonetheless saw its 
being on the South Af'rican veldt in terms 0£ Greek tragedy. 
To Af'rl.kanerdom was given the task of' Sisyphus. On1y 
complete political power, a monopoly of' authority in every 
sphere of the nation's lif'et might enable it to attain the 
brink of security, and perhaps immunity from being thrust 
into the extinction of' Afrikaner-existence. 
It is this compelling political consciousness of' 
A:rrikanerdom that constitutes the political factor in both 
the political and the economic history of' South Africa. 
l:t did not by any nieans embrace all A:f'rJ.kaners in a united 
wish and will: £ar f'rom it. Some of' the greatest of' 
Afrikaner leaders supported by their personal followers 
were in almost J.if'elong opposition,. and exercised govern-
mental power f'or cruc:l.a1 periods. General Smuts, in non-
Afrikaner eyes the greatest Afrikaner leader of them al1, 
saw from shortly a.:fter the Treaty of Vereeniging 2 -
which carried with it the seeds of union while passing 
on the legacy of disunion - both the imperial factor end 
economic development in a Holism that transcended 
Af'rikanerdom. 
:In a larger sense, smuts was a decisive political 
factor in his own person while political forces and events, 
much. wider than the narrowed designation of the political 
factor of Af'rikanerdom, operated powerfully on the South 
African dconomy. It was, however, those holistic forces 
to which A.frikanerdom was implacably opposed and in the 
narrower sense, Smuts was not part of the political factor 
except inasmuch as he was for long years successf'ul in 
frustrating it. 
The opponents of Smuts indeed soon came to question 
almost his claim to be an Afrikaner and violently denied 
his right to represent Afrikanerdom. He was to Afrikan-
erdom the lackey of British imperialism as much as the 
handmaiden of Hoggenheimer, that cartoon conception of 
profit-seeking acquisitiveness. The political factor 
always pictured Smuts and Hoggenheimer in an unholy alli-
ance against it, combin:f.ng to denature its White national-
ism. If White nationalism was to endure and subdue such 
opponents, then it could onl.y be by total control of the 
polity and, from the 1930 1 s, by an authoritarian concept 
of the role of the polity. 
Afrikanerdom never wavered in its determination to be 
the polity and never conceded that there was any limita-
tion. legal or moral, on the sovereign power of the 
Afrikaner polity other than the •volkswil'.3 The area 
of permissible choice, whether by private individual or 
group collectivity, was to be rigidly delimited by the 
polity and increasingly the boundaries o~ such areas were 
demarcated \Ulder its direction. 
As choice is expressed in and by the market-economy, 
so the polity came into conflict with the market. Inso-
far as the market impersonalized choice, :insofar as it 
ignored colour and racial categories and even home-
languages and party.political 1oyalties, inasmuch as it 
did not acknowledge the authority of'. the polity's prefer-
ences, market choice was a rivalling, and fatally under-
mining, sovereignty of' decision-taking. And insofar as 
market forces determined economic development, so economic 
development was suspect • a source of' infection of the 
South Af"rican way of' lif'e, as evolved by non-economic moti-
vations. The infection could be arrested and a 'healthy' 
economic development guaranteed on1y by placing the economy 
under the supervision of' the po1ity. 
The market does more, however, than impersonalize choice: 
it allocates and co-ordinates resources in accordance with 
such choice. Xt is a mechanism or linkage. Xt works 
through a process of integrating disintegration and dis-
integrating integration. The social change, thereby 
effected; conditions the pattern of human relationships -
between individuals and among ~oups. The pattern is 
never fixed because choice is not fixed, at least in a 
f'ree society. It is a pattern which is always evolving, 
but in its evolution, the complexity of linkage intensi-
fies the inter-dependence of' its increasing specialization 
of function and division of' labuur. Sociologically, the 
market integrates human relationships more and more widely 
and more and more intimately. 
Economic development need not proceed necessarily nor 
solely by way of market choice and market forces. The 
allocation and co-ordination of' the factors of' production 
may not be initiated by private choice and decentralized 
initiative, but by collective choice and a centralized 
initiative. If collective choice and centralized initi-
ative prevails, then the economy and its development be-
comes the increasingly administered economy. The market 
comes under hierarchical instruction. If' the Authority -
if' the hierarchy - is in:fused with a mission, yet chained 
to its traditions and engrossed with its ethos, an admini-
stered economy will emerge f'rom the adndnistered society. 
The drive towards etatism is hastened by the adndni· 
stered society• s own inner compulsions. The area of' indi-
vidual choice and private initiative, the freedom of the 
market, will be increasingly encroached upon by the polity •. 
If, on the other handt development progresses by way of 
market f'orces, it tends to proceed without regard to the 
motivat.ions that lie behind the political :factor. The 
economy, and economic development, become as it were 
apolitical. This was the case with South Africa•s early 
economic growth. Development in South Africa came in 
response to private entrepreneurial. e££ort, and the economy's 
subsequent market-orientation, structured by the Rand's 
goldmining industry, progressively integrated all the 
elements of the South A£rican social system. 
The pull and push of the Rand's mining market was 
exerted intensively and extensively; it was this market 
whose development dynamic was to make a market-economy 
out 0£ all tho hi*herto largely self-contained, self-
su:fficient sub-systems of South African society. The 
udning market~s ~h~i~es ~onditioned the responses in ever-
widcning sectors of the economy, intogr,.ating them out of 
their sel:f-subsistent isolation. Xts decisions and 
actions w4re governed by its market-consciousness, by 
:I.ts economic rationality in substituting lower-cost for 
higher-cost £actors o:f productions. The resultant 
co-ordination of' productive f'aetors aimed at the 1east-cost 
combination, through and towards economic rationality. 
Labour was the critical cost-factor of' gold production. 
:It was through its substitutions and its combinations of' 
.1abour,, there:for, that the goldmilling industry• s co-ordi-
nation of' its own growth and of' the overall expansion of' 
the economy exerted most vi.gorously the market process of 
integrating di.sintegration and disintegrating integration. 
Its employment and deployment of 1abour, White and African, 
in numbers :far exceeding those of' any other single industry 
:in co-operation wi.th very large sums of capital, and uti-
lizing great quantities ·of stores, made the Rand goJ.dmines 
the heart (and the heartland) of the South African economy -
the most signi:f'ioant. sing1e integr.ating influence in the 
South African social system. 
it was the total social change, which the goldmines of 
the Rand and their decision-taking, profit-seeking uit-
lander-entrepreneurs implied :for the pattern of' human rel.a-
tionships in South Af'ri .. ca• that was wholly unacceptable to 
the political f'.actor. Hence, the long hate between the 
Chamber of Mines and Af'r:lkanerdom. :tn the mines' :f.irst 
phase of'. development, it was their capital imperatives, 
linked to the :l.mperia1 f'actor, that were seen as the mortal 
enemy ,of' the A:frtkanera' way of' lif'e. In the South African 
or Anglo-Boer War, the poi.:l.tical factor was nominally 
defeated though Af'rikanerdom found invincible inspiration 
in def'eat. Then, in the later phase of' the mines• develop-
ment, it was the labour imperatives of' the Chamber of' Mines 
that came to be seen as the mortal enemy of' the White man's 
way of' l.it'e. J:n particul.ar, it was those l.abour impera-
tives that pushed the economic rationality of' least-cost 
combination into a cruc:lal challenge to the colour-bar 
restraints on mining productivity. 
Again, it was in the Rand goldmining industry that 
there originated the second major confrontation between 
economic development and the political f'actor. The 
1922 Rand Strike, fought on the issue 0£ the colour-bar 
in mining employment, was the moment of' truth ~or t~e 
South Africanpolitioal economy. Economic rationality, 
the least-cost ~o-ordination of the factors of production 
to maximize productivity, won the syndicalist battle . 
against the White trade· unions. The Chamber of Mines 
briefly triumphed against the industrial colour bar but 
very shortly af'terward·s lost this minor civil war to the 
' 
political factor. 'lb.e Chamber of' Mines lost to the un-
varying belief and unchanging objective of' the political 
factor - that the unchallengeable, unalterable control of' 
South African society in general and the South African 
economy in particular sh.ou1d remain with its White peoples, 
as represented by Af'rikanerdom • 
. 
In the 1924 General E1ect:lon, Smuts-Hoggenheimer was 
pilloried to defeat and Hertzog-Cresswell propagand:lzed 
to victory. White supremacy held hence.forth the source 
of' u1timate power and the market economy steadily gave 
way to the administered society. Hertz.og represented 
nineteenth-century Afrikaner nationalism and Cresswell 
represented nineteenth-century British trade unionism. 
Their Pact formed a Government :ln 1924 to represent 
eternal White civilization in South Africa. 
Xt was above all, a pact against market co-ordination 
of' resource-utilization and in f'avour of' an administered 
society. It was against the impersonalized choice of' a 
competitive market that ignored and overruled the raison-
d1etre of the political factor - that economic development 
should never be allowed to alter Whi.te-Black relationships 
advantageously to the politico-social statue of' the non-
Whites and disadvantageously to the politico-social status 
of' the 11hites. Economic development might bring material. 
gaini to both but economic contro1s were ideolog.lcally 
imperative to perpetuate the dif'fererftials of' racial status. 
This crucial motivation of the polity drove the Pact 
Government and the post~1948 South African governments to-
wards etatism. The administered society rigidif'ied wider 
and wi.der areas o.f the market. On1y the Second Wor1d War 
and the Smuts Government restored mobility to the labour 
market and .intensified economic.development to meet the 
insatiable demands of' war-time markets. But Smuts and 
the Second World war were the very antithesis of' messianic 
Afrikanerdom in South A:frioan history. With the political. 
factor restored to parliamentary power in the 1948 General 
Election, Dr. Malan set hlis entirely Af'rikaner Government 
to the complete realization of its objective. 
The conflict between the polity and the economy broadened 
and deepened. The cho:J.ce.ts of' the economy were over-ridden 
by the pre£erences 0£ the polity. The linkage mechanism 
of' the market was interrupted at more and more points and 
it was forced into that process of adjustment to non-market 
values, which the mechanism•s limitless flexibility permits 
but which inhibits its productivity. 
Economic development after 1948 becomes more and more 
a forced growth, an administered direction of resource-
employment and a spreading area of nationalization. Xn 
propagandist or leftist description, the South Af'riean 
pol.:itical economy is so identified with capitalist exploit-
ation that the extent of' nationalized enterprise tends to 
go unperceived. Xn f'aot. South African governments took 
possession of the •commanding heights• of the economy 1ong 
before the concept was born in the Br~tish Labour Party 
pamph1eteering enthusiasm. 
Railways were sta.te•ow.ned, from :i;he start, and from 
the earliest days there were voices, aotnetimes :vociferous 
though never re.ally power.f'ul. 1 that f'a.v9ured the national-
4.zation .o.f the goldmining :tndustry. The Pact Government 
·of' A:trikanerdom and Labour Party under.· iiert·z¢'0g-Cresswe11 
f'J:iom 1924 on directed itself"., however,· not to the take• 
.over of' the goldmines but to administering the ·shape and 
. rate of economic development.. . The re•entrenbhntent ,Gf" 
the· eolour-bar in 'mining employment by the Mines and Works 
.Amendment Act of 1926 established beyond ohall~nge that 
the South Mrtcan ethc::-:s and not economic rationality would 
<U.ctate the -ultimate determinants of' goidminin.g costs. 
Xnsofar as goldmining was then th~ sum and substance of. 
economic achievement, the Pact Govenunent determined to 
control the sum and to·seek alternative substance.· 
. . 
But if' national!tzation of the goldmines never became 
a serious, political issue, the Labour ·tail ,of' the Pact 
Government was absolutely insistent that the strategic 
iron and steel industry should be under state oontro1~ 
The political battle to make :tscor, the Iron and.Steel 
Corporation 0£ South Af'r.ica, a state ·underta1d.ng led to 
the flrst cirownvent:f.on, by way 0£ Senate manipulation• 
of' the Act o:f' ·Union 0£ 19·1 o • Thought it was not al ways 
the governments ~f' Af'r:tkanertiom that initiated the .legi.s• 
lation, it was Afrikanerdom that structured the.vis:i.on 
and d:lrected the subsequent motivat.ion. l:t !lntensi:f'i.ed 
direct and indirect state'author!ty by way of' publ.ic uti.• 
li'ti.es., .massive i.ttvestment in the publ.ic sector• . and 
through the chosen instruments of the Land Bank and the 
Industrial. Develop~en.t Corpoi-ation, the .lDC. 
llitate f'inance promoted agricultural oo-o;i>eratives and 
co.ntrolled-marketing of' crops 1.Ulder bureaucratic direction, 
and wholl.y-owned or held majority control. of major 
- ,..;....._ -· -·- -- -
industrial enterprises. The 100,, a.f'ter A:trikanerdom had 
1"'ecovered Cabinet authority :from Smuts• war•time ad.mini• 
, ' 
stration, became the State•s f'inanoier f'or such heavily• 
. capitalized undertakings as Sasol (oil•from ... coal and petro-
ohemioal,s) and .Fo.skor (phosphate f'erti.lizers) as pttbl:Lc 
corporations:. Nominee directors o'£ the J:D(! 02 a number 
·of major. industrial compani,es served to represent govern-
ment money and government policy • 
. In South Af'rican experiences not al.l f'armers were pol:i.• 
'ticiane but from the beginning nearly all. pol:i. tic.ians .'.were 
This ensured that col1ective ownership ot the 
means .of' produotion.,, starting 'W'i th the. land, never became 
a serious issue ,of South A.f'rican politics. Ii; guaranteed, 
however, that the administration of' the market economy was 
go'V'ern.eci by £armer-politicians; acutely mindf'ul. of' poli-
tically•consoiou.s £armer,s. This reality, too, has been 
very much part.of' the political f'actor in the ~conomic 
deve.1opment ,of: South A:fricia,. Forced industrialization, 
that would expand employment t'or Afrikaner votes pushed 
and pulled o£f: the f'a.rms by the nature o'f: eoonond.o growth, 
also became .a major objective o:f Af'rikanerdom·• a poli tioa1 
economy. 
1'he ad.ministered economy did not replace the. market. 
economy in south ft.£rica but .it ~teadl.ly displa~ed it. The 
market economy is capable of' adaptation. to non-market 
interference and will t;t.bsorb such interf'erence. Actual 
iparket coll.apse or market elimination wi11 take place only 
wi. th the abo.li tion o~ p~i vate contractual f'reedom under 
totalitarianism or· the ,seizure 0£· property under Communism. 
But the market :ls otherwise resilient,. Given any manoeuv-
ring room., it wiJ.l manoeuvre. Give~ any area of' .freedom 
t'o~ its operat~ons; :i.t will str~ve to expand. that area. 
Le:ft a breath of' 1i.f'e, the market w'i.ll revi.talize·~ It is 
'f" then the turn of the political f'actor to accommodate and 
adapt to the choices of the market, or be impelled towards 
anc unchallengeable sovereignty. 
This social process is the general e:xper:tence o'f' all 
societies. It is the common reality because social real-
ity is politi6al. economy and not econometrics. There is 
always the political :factor, which economic sc.ie·nce may 
:tor purposes of' classroom a.n.a:tysis usefully ignore but 
cannot helpfully exol.ude even:tn academic debate. 
Is it legi titnate to :ldentify in South African social 
reality something called the •political :factor' with 
Afrikanerdom? 'Is there an •ethos• c~ Af'rikanerdom or is 
this mere jargon? Of' course, during all the years, there 
were governments. power:ful political. parties and politi-
cians, who greatly inf'J.uenced events and who were not 
Af'rikaners or not accepted as part of' Afrikaner nat:i.onaliem. 
Of' course,there lferc Botha and.Smuts, 1oved and hated by 
their f'ellow•Af'rikaners, who between them reconciled 
English-speaking and .Af"rikaans-speaking to a South 
Af'ricanism. Of course, there were English-speald.ng pol:I.-
tioians and 'English• groups, especial.ly trade unions, lhO 
wer~as much devoted to White leadership. superiority, 
supremacy as were Afri.kaans-speak:i.ne politicians and 
A£rikaans groups. 
Of' course, theref'ore., the influence o:f politics and 
govdrnment in South Africa bas not.been wholly and exc1u-
sively Af'r:l.kaner nationalism. Nor is it suggested that 
other powerful realities, which have had .nothing to do 
wi.th •politics•, have not beEln of major importance to the 
country's economic development. 
But t'rom the present·vantage po:lnt has not Af'rikanerdom 
more than any other single 1nf'1uence made contemporary 




a. •polity• ... a people acquiring a. language, a ·religion, 
a set of ideas and aims so much in common as to drive 
them to seek and ho-ld power in eyery key point of.' autho-
rity& in Parliament,. in the c.:i.vil se.rvioe., in teaching, 
in the Universities .• in trade unions, in the great state 
atld semi-state enterprises• in every type 0£ separatist . . 
or.gaui.sation .. 'from an 1(Atrikaans) ·Chamber . .o.f.' commerce to 
an (A£rikaatt$) Boy Scout movement.? .Do not ai1· such 
sources of' influence and of power add up to .a •pol.ity• 
and do not the deliberately-sought and co.nsciQusty ... 
achieved controls become an identif'iabl.e •pol.i tical , 
:factor•? 
For almost ahundred years Af'rikaner nationalism has 
written·and spoke~ o'f: its •lifeblood• ... the preservatlon 
qf what in. time it came to call the Christian Nationalism 
ot the vo.lk,., May this not be described as .something more 
than a standard manifestation of patriotism - .:ls it jargon 
·to call it. t the e'thos of: Afrikanerdom''? 
This thesis argues tha.t there has been such a political 
factor of At'rikanerdom. It argues that the South African 
economy has been dec:!sivel.y shaped, and perhaps determined, 
·not .merely by the.kind of pol.itioal intervention and 
, ino:reased government acti'V'ities. which are the common 
experience of' most, countries 0£ the western tforld, but by 
an overpowering purstd.t 0£ ideals• or ideology. As such 
South Af'ri.ca has been made :into a very different society 
f'rom any other in the West or the East and its way of l:ti.:f'e 
a.rouses. passionate d.et'ence and denunciation. The South 
Af'rican economy - the dist.inc ti. ve f'eatures ·Of.its economic . . 
development - are the outcome and the expression of' i.ts way 
.of' lif'e. 
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There has been, on this contention, . a political :factor 
in the economic development of' South Africa which is 
Af'rikanderd~m. There has been an Af'rikanerdom which . . .., 
relentlessly, if' not inevitably, took over the political 
factor - the exercise of' dominant power for the achievement 
of' dominating aims. 
, 11.} 
The historict_record o~ modern economic development in 
South Africa exhibits.no planned scheduling. Its social 
process was not programmed. Its chain 0£ interaction was 
not "reconceived. Indeed, social .systems theories help 
to explain1 that social reality is more o:ften than not the 
. . ·4 
results of' the unintended consequences of' action. The 
network o'f: South A:frioan economic activities and events, 
which after the mineral di-scoveries moved f'rom acqUiescent 
stagnation to self'-,suatained growth, certainly had no pre• 
determined development conception to give it is particular 
The moves were errati.c and o:ften eccentric. There 
has been no scheduled path of' choice, no programmed allo-
1 
cation of' scarce resources, nothing indeed resembling an 
economic plan. Yet there is a traceable network 0£ eco• 
nomic development, in which the .selt'•eJC:pression of' market 
f'oroes has come to terms with the motivations of the polity. 
South Af'rican economic development has been very muoh 
the response to tnarkat !'orces, external. perhaps even more 
than internal, which after long years of' hesitation became 
increasingly f'avourabl·e to growth. Market-linkage or 
resouree .. utilization adjusted. to and combined with admini-
stered-li.nkage.. The allocation of' resources may in conse-
quence have been l.ess than optimum in terms of' output, or; 
more precisely in consumers• pref'erred output as re:flected 
in free market choice. Economic development has nonethe-. . 
less continued. .:rt has continued with an increasing · 
measure of' state interf'erence. But it is the argument of' 
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this thesis that the economic history of South Africa is 
moro than an account 0£ state interference into private 
enterprise. It is a record of the interaction of a 
political economy in wh~ch the political factor, Afrikan-
erdom, in or out of Government, has always had an ultimate -
a way of life to preserve and to promote. The polity has 
always sought its ideal and its ideology .. the White man's 




.:THE SOUTH AFRICAN wAY OF LIFE 
.PART Z • CHANGING AlfD. UNCHANGING 
CHAPTER 3 
THE SOUTH AFT:ICAN WAY OF LIFF 
PAHT I - CHANGING AND UNCHANGING 
4.3. 
The Great Trek of Boer frontiersmen from the Eastern 
Cape in 1836 may be regarded as an organized withdrawal 
from all political controls at a time when unchanging 
economic stagnation exercized hardly any integrating 
int'l uence s at all. \.s such it may not at t'irst sight 
seem the most appropriate starting point f'or an account 
of the political :factor in the modern economic development 
of South Africa. Yet the network o:f interaction of a 
political economy, in which A£rikanerdom as the political 
ractor sought to preserve and promoit White South A:frica•s 
way o:f life, reaches back to the exodus ~rom the :fringes 
of a self-subsistent economy - the exodus that in time 
evoked the national ethos of A:frikanerdom. 
It has recently been argued with persuasive evidence 
1 by an A:frikaner historian that Afrikaner nationalism was 
not in fact born until some years after the Great Trek. 
It was only during the times o:f trouble :for the scattered 
trekker republics in the years 1868 to 1881 that the 
•national self-awakening', :first in the Orange Free State 
and considerably later in the Transvaal Republic, in re-
action to British pol.itical. pr.:.s~ures grew into a clearly 
identifiable national.ism. Such a pol.i tical awakening to 
a shared destiny had been prece<led in th€ old Cape Colony 
by a cultural awakening to a common heritage. 
But the Boer frontiersmen of the Eastern Cape, organ-
izing the f'irst major mass-movement in the long-continuing 
dispersion of the original Dutch colonist-settlers, had 
more grievances than cultural mission. 
grievances that spurred their emigration. 




grievance.$ and their emigration yielded a group-conscious-
ness, increasingly :fostered as a def'enee mechanism in an 
unf'riendly environment of' African tribesmen, British 
imperialism and economic stagnation. That defence mecha• 
Jrl.sm was sharpened into a positive awareness of' nationhood• 
'lthen the trekker republics had to take up arms to safeguard 
their republic independence. 
It took shape whe~ British coloirl.alism appeared to side 
with African tribesmen to encircle the republican sovereignty 
of the Free State beyond the Orange River during the Basuto 
Wars and the Diamond Fields Dispute in the late 1860•s. 
It took further cohesive form when British Imperialism 
allegedly intervened to destroy the independence of' the 
disintegrating South African Republ.io across the Vaal in 
the late 1870•s. It took f'inal form when the Imperial 
Factor provoked the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
into a common resistance to the extinction of' their inde-
pendent Af'rikanerdom in the South Af'r.ioan or Anglo·Boer 
War of' 1899-1902, which soma Afrikaner historians identify 
as the Second War of Independence ·Or Second Froedom war. 
The Voortrekkers were a group·, which legend no less 
than history :forged into a nation. Group consciousness 
only much J.ater became a national self'-consciousness but 
the :former.as much as the latter contributed to the poli-
tical factor that conditioned the course of' modern economic 
deve1opment in South Af"rica. The network of the modern 
·south Af'rican political economy stretches back to the Great 
Trek ... to more than thirty years be:fore the mineral. dis-
coveries of' diamonds in the 1870*s and gold in the 1880's 
created the preconditions :for an economy of' increasing 
division of labour and specialization of' activity. It 
stretches back to a pre-market era, to the long. uninter-
rupted decades when awareness of' 1.and as the onl.y f'actor 
• 
of' production in a sel:f-contained subsistence ms the 
dominant motivation of both Af'rikaner and Af'rican conduct • 
The group consciousness of the Afrikaner stockf'armers, 
particularly on the disputed borderlands o:f self'-subsistence 
of the Eastern <ape, was abitter, despairing :frustration 
that government; whether the old Dutch East India Company 
in 1795 or the British Colonial Office of' Glerielg in the 
1830t s, was not willing to support their land-rights and 
land-claims against the Af'rican tribes. Frustration as 
much as consciousness, grievances as much as if' not more 
than purposiveness sent the Trekkers in search of' the 
White man's untrammeled control over South Af'r:i.ca•s only 
significant, contemporary economic resource. Land :to.r 
cattle .. 
In the nearly one hundred and fifty years since the 
Dutch East J:ndia Company had by. occupation pre•empted the 
Cape as a strategic station and supply source on the long 
route o:f. seventeenth•century European economic development 
to the East, no significant exchange.economy had evo1ved 
from the dispersed settJ.ement. Even a.f'ter the British in 
their turn of pre-emption by occup~tion in 1806 had pushed 
the dispersion .into further settlement eas't and north, no 
progressively integrat.ing market economy had been gener-. 
ated,. The Europaan points of' settlement were somethi.ng 
more than primitive trading communities and Cape Town itself 
could count its merchants and craftsmen with i t.s hinterland 
oC wine-growers and produce-gardeners. There were market-. 
oases of' concentration scattered over a great expanse of' 
territory but a market economy of' developing special:Lzation 
and increasing capital accumulation cou1d not really be 
said to have come .into being. 
No econolni.o development of Schumpeterian entrepreneur-
ship had got under way or was to start on its career of 
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innovating investment until af'ter the mineral discoveries 
of' the 1870's and 1880's uncovered the markets of' capital-
istic enteJ?prise. Until then the repetition of' stagnation 
was merely carried further and f'urther by the migrant stock-
f'armers into the ·territories demarcated by geography and 
rainfall. Whether the causes of such f'ailure were to be 
.f'ound in the inhibiting isolationism of' the country's 
physical environment, the imposed isolatiori.ism of' its 
, ... 
political neglect or the induced isolationism of its 
cultural inability to generate capital m;i.d cap.italists, 
the vitalizing expansion of markets -. sustained by capital 
accumulation and diversi:fying innovating-investors -
emerged only after those markets had been sparked by the 
diamond and gold discoveries of' the last quarter of the 
nineteenth .century. 
Until then cattle-land remained the only meaning£ul 
resource in> the social systems of' White and Bla:bk pastoral-
ists. Meeting on the Fish River, £or years they clisputed 
for the omttle land up to the Kei River. Con£rontation 
escalated into continuous conflict. Two basica1ly opposed 
concepts of' land own~rship • private property and tribal 
collectivity • could not reconcile two basically similar 
practices of' land utili.zation. 
Land utilization reflected the absence of' those crucial 
determinants of capital and market demand that induce inten-
sive agriculture. Both Af'rican tribesmen and Dutch 
pastoral.:lsts were propelled into that never-ending search 
for more and more territory of' less and less productivity. 
Self'•subsistence f'or men was equated with sustenance for 
cattle and both; therefore, with land that by these twin 
tokens constituted the only f'orm or wealth~ In conse• 
quence though the territorial vastness 0£ South Africa made 
land plentif'Ul, the virtual Cailure to develop an exchange 
economy 0£ income-generating specialization made land 
simultaneously scarce. 2 
Boer stock£armers and Bantu cattle-raisers met on the 
f'rontie·t>s of> their chase f'or the shadowy substance that 
they both identified as.wealth. When the Boers :found 
that the alien English polity, omnipresent whether nearby 
in the person of Dr. Philip 0£ the London Missionary 
Society OJ:' far away in the person of Lord Glenelg of' tho 
British Colonial Office; was not prepared to protect and 
promote their land-µeeds against the land-needs of' Black 
tribesmen, they departed on their Great Trek. It was a 
trek in search of uncontained space, :free from marauding 
tribal tradition and of' uncontrolled room free from inter-
.. f'ering missionary .zeal. 
interference. 
Xt was an escape into non-
The Trekkers were seeking not to f'ind a new way 0£ 1if'e 
but to continue an old way of' lif'e in what they hoped was 
unoccupied territory beyond the interest and concern of' any 
polity, other than their own rudimentary organizations f'or 
mutual support in their l.and-<lllOcupation .• · Xn their pene-
tration of' the interior, they took with them this :fllnda• 
mental rejection of' outside interference. They also took 
the unsought possibility that this vast interior would yield 
other resources than cattle-grazing self'•subsistenca. 
When indeed the land :1n the undeteX'lllined and 1ndeter• 
minate occupation of' a Griqua chief, lYaterboer, disclosed 
diamonds, the outside interference of' English missionary 
col.onialism avidly aided by capitalists, with and without 
cap:ltaJ., returned.in f'orce. And when the land further 
north in the absolutely determined occupation of the B~ers 
disclosed goldt outside inter:f'erence f'r.om Br.i tish imperial.-
ism and Uitlander capi.tal was a force, in Afrikaner eyes, 
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to be met with :force. 
In the half-century f'rom 18.50 of' reaction to outside 
inter.f'ercnce, designated the Imperial Factor by the histo-
rians, there was born and bred the national.ism o:f Afrikan· 
erdom. In the quarter-oontury :from 187.5 of the mineral 
discoveries, there was established the f'irst stages for the 
take·•o:f'f' into an exchange economy and :for the stimulating 
interactions of a market economy. As economic development 
in the person of' a Sehwnpeterian colossus, Cecil John 
Rhodes.; wrapped up in his cloak of' colonialism., pushed 
f'urther' and further on to the soenet the political f'a.ctor 
o:f Af'rikanerdom reacted and acted. In the po1itical eco-
nomy of' disintegrating integration and integrating ~s­
integrati on, the ethos of' Af'rikanerdom began to institu-
tionalize itself. 
In that new ,ordering of' the veldt, the South A:frioan 
way of' li:fe was compelled to change. But in changing,, 
both Afrikaner and Af'rican olwig to wichange. Above all., 
they cl.ung to land and their traditional utilization of' land. 
Economic development .. the mines and their derivative 
markets ... :from the 1870's and 188o•s began the pull and the 
push of'f the land and its extensive expl.oitation by stock-
farmers. The transC~rmation of the South Af'rican way 0£ 
life was under way - the interrelationships of land and 
labour were beg:!.~ng their market-moves and market-moti• 
vations. Al.ong.side land-occupation,. labour utilization 
. became the source o:f conflict. Lai1d and labour became 
the single theme o:f South African political economy. The 
network of' economic development, under. the entrepreneurial 
management of the White Man, was in the course of' being 
traced. The .sequential activities of' the market and the 
consequential responses of' the polity were beginning to 
-
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constitute the.modern economic history of' South Af'rica. 
And the starting-point vas land-utilization and labour-
deployment. 
In the f'irst days of' tho Cape., a loan system 0£ 1and 
tenure had been tried to sottlo farmers temporarily on the 
J.and as pastoralists moving- on to new regions. Later 
permanent title by perpetual quit-rent or freehold condi-
tioned the settlement of' tho C~pe and Natal. In the case 
of' the trekker republico of the Oronge Free State and the 
Tranovnal, each trekker-settler wao given permanent 
pas.session of as much land as he could ride round in a day .• 
Such a day's ride generally encompassed bet~oen 6,ooo and 
8,000 acres and if the land did not have natural winter 
pasturage., then the trekker-settler 't1ould also claim and 
secure title to another holding. of' land '\1hich had such 
pas tura.ge • :3 
Since such land-occupation and utilization was not only 
the dominant but .indeed the only form of' productive endeavour 
oC the Afrikaner trekkor-se.ttlor. and since the self;.. 
subsistent exploitation of'. the land prov1ded almost the 
only f'orm o:f' l.i:fe and l:lvine for the Transvaal Boer in 
particular, the major objective of' the polity tras to pre-
serve scope f'or future trekking. Tho Transvaal burghero 
'demanded access to .nc~ areas where they could live the 
only kind of' agricultural lif'e ffhich thoy understood.• 4 
Hence the con:rrontation vhich Cecil J.ohn Rhodes, aided by 
his imperial f'actor, and his policy of' tcrri.torial con-
tainmont and res-ource-exploitation, prosentod in due course 
to Pau1 Kruger, president 0£ a trekker republic "1hose 
soc:l.al syot·em • .its economy, its pol.ity and its insti.tu-
tionalized culture .. was predicated on indef'inite trekking. 
l:n tho trekker repub1ic.s there was not only an a.bsonce 
-~--, 
ravel that social system by way of' segregation, apartheid 
or separate development a mortal threat to its continuation. 
Among the triba.lized .At"ricans; there was at an early 
stage no ownorship as such of' land: 
.Land among them was owned by no one : neither 
by .individual nor by f'amily., nor by tribe. 
It was the duty of' the chief to procure the 
use of' land to the natives who,, as members of' 
the tribe, were entitled to ask his protection. 
Although there was no ownership, an elaborate 
system of' rights in land had grotm up ••• • · 6 
This highly elaborated system of rights in land. consti-
tuted the interconnection betwedn the economy and the polity 
of' the tribe. It served as the basie institution for a 
self-subsistence; mutual-help economy and the key to power 
in the polity. 'lb.us, writes Goodfellow; the real political 
' 
power in each tribe rested with the authority who could 
give tribesmen the right to land; either an :indi:vidua.1 
right to ofiltivate certain l.ands or a right-to the tribe 
as a whole to pasture :its cattle and to protect them against 
the cl.aim o.f' other tribes. 7 Loyal.ty to and acknowledge-
ment of' political sovereignty; whether tribal. chief or White 
man's suzerainty, was consequently correlated to the power 
to tmderwrite the economic organization by the power to 
enforce land-rights .. 
lt :may be ·that the gradual,acceptance by A:frican tribal 
chief's of the authority of' the Great White Queen, either 
.indirectly in the caso 0£ British Kaf'f'ra.ria or directly in 
the case of Basutoland and Swazi.land, .is best interpreted 
as the unwi.lling but eventual recogni.t~on by the triablized 
- - . - . ,,. -.. - . 8 ecbnomy of' the ultimate po11t1oal power of' Queen. Victoria. 
Without doubt the pre:ferences of' the tribal chief's :for the 
authority of' the Colonial Of'£ice 6,ooo miles away rather 




that the former was disposed to continue to guarantee 
rights in land, while the colon:i.sts - and more particul.arly 
those who must forever be a-trekking - were resolutely 
determined on a take-bver bid that was composed of' very 
much take-over and very little bid. 
The most sophisticatdd politician among the tribal 
chief's, Moshesh, deployed his assets with an unexcelled 
bargaining skill, so that the success£ul bidder was the 
British Crown. Indeed the terms secured by Moshesh pro-
vided that though the new board of' directors might be 
nominated in Downing Street, the assets of' Basutoland 
would in the f'ulness of' time revert to the original share-
holders - which given the nature of' the political economy 
of' the Basu to were co-incident with the original triba1 
J.ando'Wil.ers. 
In the social system of' the tribe, the interconnections 
between economic organization and political authority also 
involved the institutions of' marriage and .family. The 
rights to land included cultivation of a private garden. 
patch f'or each wi~e, who was responsible by her own labour 
f'or its cultivation (i.e. agriculture)., and rights to 
pasture cattle, being the responsibility 0£ the man-husband 
on common land. The more wives a man had, tho more garden-
patches or privately cultivated land he could lay claim to; 
but to obtain a wif'e he must cont~J'm to the marriage-custom 
o:f' lobola or the exchange of' cattl.e to the woman• s :rather. 
An increase in canttle-ownership increased the capacity to 
control the number of' garden-patches through more wives 
and thereby the personal share 0£ :foodstuff's f'rom the 
garden-patchP-s. But, because lobola compelled the surrender 
of' a given number of cattle for eaoh wif'e, the excessively 
polygalllous would have to diminish his private stock of 
cattle. Hence cattle not onl.y constituted a currency bu~ 
regulated the terms of' trade between agriculture (with 
private land rights} and pasturage (with common land 
rights). 
Finally the rights of inheritance supported the mainten-
ance of' the system. On death the man•s lands (i.e. rights 
in respect of' garden-patches or agriculture) were in charge 
of the widows under obligation to support the sons until the 
latter should acquire rights to land on marriage and accord-
ing to custom £rom the tribal. chief', as the source of power 
in the polity • 
. Clearly the syatem not only placed '3normous emphasis ,.,n 
institutionalized culture but was critically dependent on 
tribal authority over an unchecked t~rritoria1 expanse 0£ 
appropriate land. Where White authority or ownership, 
ef'f'ectively exercised, brought the extension of tribal land 
holdings to a ha1t, there was not only a source of' Black-
llhite conflict but an inevitable disruption and ultimate 
destruction of the triP,a.l social system. Broken at any 
imperative • loss of' political power by tribal chief', break-
down of' the exchange relationship between private and common 
land-rights through the terms of trade in respect 0£ wives 
and cattle, decay of the institutional culture through 
erosion of' lobola - the vital interconnections of the entire 
system wouJ.d be disrupted and the tribal. social system begin 
to disintegrate. 
In the case of the old Cape Colony and the Natal Colony, 
it was White authority which increasingly succeas:fully 
checked the movement of .Af'~icans in response to needs of 
wider tribal lands. ~n the case of the trekker republics, 
but more especially the Transvaal, it was trekker occupation 
of' land that compelled a change. Th.us in the Cape, the 
Master and Servants laws (originally a part of' the Roman-
Dutch law to regulate rights and ob1igatilbns between 
apprentices and employers) were appl.ied to Africans to put 
I 
a stop to their continuous movement and to secure a perma-
nently fixed supply of African farm workers for Whitc-
ot\'lled farms. 
In the Transva.al, the White trekker having been con-. 
f'irmed in his title to his 6,ooo to 8,000 acres (sometimes 
double if both sunnner- and winter-grazing was necessary) 
would discover considerable number.s of' tribal Africans 
either al.ready in occupation or moving-in. The White 
farmer with the assistance of' his neighbouring White 
farmers - and occasionally help :from the Veld Cornet as 
the respmnsible government of'f'ioial - would attempt to 
clear his land of' the unwanted Africans. This was not 
always possible since thP- Africans tended to return re• 
peatedly and, in any event, their presence might on occa• 
sions be useful to the White 01mer. In the Transvaal (and 
to a lesser extent in Natal) Africans who had lost rights 
in tribal lands, simply settled without permission on Crown 
(or Government) or :f'armer•s lands as squatters either to be 
turned of':f or made to pay rent at will or, at the other 
extreme, to be conceded virtually the same status as White 
bywoners. 
Whether aa squatters or bywoners or as dwellers, the 
Africans lived on White farms in every kind 0£ informal 
9 yotm.g 
and undefined way. Many such Africans were WllDarried/men 
who served as migrant farm labourers £or part of' the year 
and then returned to tribal lands, perhaps to marry, :for 
the rest of the year. Others were Africans who, with 
their wives and children, had lost a11 e:ff'ective rights 
and connecti$ns with their own tribal. lands and became :farm 
labourers. 
Such latter groups stayed on :f'arms f'or long periods, 
o:f'ten :f'or lif'e. :In return :ror certain customary. rights of' 
55. 
cultiYB:tion to provide the f'anily with subsistence, the 
African fami1y as a unit would be ob1igated to provide the 
White farmer 1vith whatever :farm and domestic labour he 
required. Occasional1y there would be a money wage of' £1 
t . 10 per mon h. 
The major dif'f'erence between the White byWoner and the 
African bywoner was that the lat·ter was required - with his 
family - to provide some labour service, while the former 
Indeed tbe White bywoner might 
with a certain amount of Black 
was very def'initely not. 
well expect to be provided 
labour assistance himself' f'or the harvesting o:f his crop. 
This customary attitude to labour was in time to have :far-
reaching consequences. 
The method of land settlement in most of' South Africa 
throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century did 
not encourage production for a market, and the absence of' 
such market domand pro1onged the traditions of a static 
economy. The newly discovered mineral. wealth o:f Kimberley 
and the Rand did not have any major impact as a market for 
South African :farming until after the Anglo-Boer lfar, accord-
ing to the economic histor:ian D.M. Go_odf'ellow., Goodfellow 
makes the important point that because there was so slow 
and so 1i ttle specialization of farming for market demand, 
1 the value o:f nearly a11 the land was unknown. 
No agricultural survey had ever been made. 
The land bad never been traversed by skilled 
:fanners of the type which was to be :found i.n 
Australia and Canada. No official stimulus 
by way of education, or scientific research, 
or :financial. assistance, or scientific land 
settlement had every been applied except in 
a f'ew minor eases •• • 11 
Economic calcu.lation only came to be emphasized as the 
possibilities of' commercial £arming :for markets - in.itial1y 
:foreign rather than domestic - began to be recognized through 
the example of' innovators. .i'addock:Lng and fencing on 
sheep f'arms to make i?<!ssible selective breeding and recuper ... 
ative vegetation ·o:f f.allow lands were only introduced in the 
late nineties in the more fertile Eastern Cape Province. 
Financier Cecil John•Rhodes with the heJ.p of American exper-
tise and the substantial capi tal.ization of' hi.s :famous Rhodes 
fruit farms pointed up the potential of the export markets 
in Britain. Tb.e market f'or ostrich feathers certainly inten-
sif'ied commercial :farming near Oudtshoorn, where actual con-
servation and :furrow irrigation were first introduced. The 
coastal :farmland& of' Natal were developed under company 
ownership as tea and sugar plantat:f.ons to exploit specific 
market potential, and the unw.illingne.ss of Natal ts African 
tribesmen to accept plantation labour service led to the 
introduction o:f' labour as well as. pl.ants and seeds f'rom 
India. Hence f'rom 1876 to 1900 the number of' Ind:i.ans in 
Nat31 increased f'rom 10,000 to 65,000. 
:In the Free State and in the Transvaal. the ear1y ef'f'ects 
of gold-mining d1.scoveries were to encourage transport• 
riding as a :f'onn of' l.ivelihood among Whites rath4r than any 
significant specialization of' .farming :for the new markets• 12 
:In the 'l'ransvaal the landless bywoner class ·Of Whites and 
the landless class, of African f.'arm occupants, bywoners and 
l.abourers not only became a source 0£ continuing trouble 
but :from the methods of' trying to meet these troubles, 
there arose certain customary attitudes which have consti• 
tuted a conditi.oning f'actor in South Af'rioa•s sociai system 
to the present day.. 
,Generally, says Goodf'el.low, there is no evidence that 
agriculture in the interior of South Af'rica showed any pro-
gress in.the nineties. The exceptions were certain agri-
cul.tural .regions within easy reach of' the Witwatersrand and 
wool-producing regions in the Eastern Cape Province and some 
,· 
parts of the Free State. In the Transvaal itself, the 
response to the Rand mining-market by the farmers was to 
se11 their lands to land companies and to take to transport-
riding 'which suited their natures better'. It became a 
commonplace• and a true commonplace, says Goodfellow, that 
the Transvaal scarcely rospondedat ail to the demand f'or 
f'oodst~f'f's created by the new ind.ustry. 13 
The marketing •system' was the country storekeeper, whose 
functional significance to both White farmers and Black 
:farmers has never been given due recognition except in the 
work of the specialist economic historian. .At an early 
stage, the country storekeeper came to provide the vital 
introduction to an exchange economy, though 'f:or many years -
and indeed down until recent times • the exchange was a 
matter of 'barter. Generally it was a barter transaction 
of' farmer•s produce against farmer's needs 0£ cof':fee; tea, 
sugar and cloth. The introduction of' a money exchange 
came only with the gradual growth o:f the export trade; 
more particularly in raw wool. Not only was the country 
storekeeper very much part o~ the South African way o:f lif'e 
but he might be regarded as n humble member of' the Schumpeter-
ian innovator class and a contributor to the pre-conditions 
f'or Rostow•s take-off. 
Country storekeepers bought the :farmers' wool. by bale 
and •the bale was a collection of' wool and dirt and possibly 
even stones, which was the conventional standardt. The 
sheep :farming districts were not yet highly developed eno~gh 
to d.emand a more eompl.ex system than tha't of' the store-
keepers, and on the other hand, wool producing methods 
could not hope to improve until some better commercial. 
service was obtained.
14 
For many decades South A'f:rica.n 
woo1 £or export was classi£ied either as ordinary or good 
merino and only within recent times were finer classifica-




expertise when wool auction-sales were begun by pioneering 
private merchants. 
Among the tribal Africans the Fingos set the example 
of cultivating maize for sale to venturesome country 
traders, who established themselves in appropriate trading 
stations. Under tho stimulation of 'maize exports' from 
tribal territory, the Fingos began to adopt individual. 
tenure of land. It was, however, individual. life-tenure 
and not individual ownership. Prompted as much by the 
Fingo example as by the White traders, the Transkei Africans 
generally followed this example. 15 
But perhaps an even more significant :function in the 
economic development of the South Africn economy by the 
country storekeepers was their contribution to the recruit-
:Lng of African labour for the goldmining industry. 
It was the technique of monoy advancaa by the White 
traders to tribal Africans, especially in the Transkei and 
to a much lessor extent in Natal, which served d.s a key 
i~centive in persuading young, unmarried males to venture 
from the relative security of t~aditional. self-subsistence 
on tribal lands;. The traders themselves were almost all 
:r·ecrui ters of' Af'rican labour f'or. the gol.d mines. Not only 
did they introduce the stimulation of' exchange but also 
the stirrings of' cons~icuous .expenditure (especially the 
so-called tribal. blanket which was imported f'rom British 
mills and whose distinctive •tribal designs• were conceived 
, in those mills by aclilt.el y fas tion-conscious de signers)• 
The critical incentive to the African tribesman to venture 
into the exchange.economy seems to have been the •advance•. 
Goodfellow•s account is illuminating and informative: 
The trader-recruiters soon discovered one way in 
which nearly all natives could be brought under 
the necessity of earning money and of spending 
it. This was to make advances in the f'orm of 
goods or cattle and to tell the native that he 
could repay by going out to work. The advances 
system appear.s to have been the f'irst eff'd.ctive 
instrument in introducing the new economy to 
native ndnds. The traders sometimes f'ound it 
prof'i table to advance even more to a native 
than he could possibly repay by bringing back 
the whole of' his earnings :from a period of' work 
in the mines. 
The reason for this was that the trader in 
his other role of' recruiter would get a capita-
tion fee which would more than recoup him. 
Advances to natives, especial.ly of' cattle, were 
quite irresistible, and the system soon became 
one of' widespread grievances ••o 
So gre.at did the advances evil become that 
late in the nineties advances were limited by 
law, f'irst to a total of £5 and then to a total 
of £2, being the amount necessary to provide the 
native with equipment f'or his journey. This, 
however, did not prevent the family from running 
into debt during the boy's absence, and. the only 
real remedy for this
6
was the improvement of 
native agriculture.1 
The labour tax introduced by the Glen Grey Act, 1894, was 
probably less important as a stick than was the trader's 
advance as a carrot • The tax was to be paid by every 
. young, able-bodied African who could not show the magi-
strate that he had been actively engaged in some economic 
operation for part of the year. Generaliy married Af'ricans 
could evidence such ac~ity and thereby evade the tax. 
But young· adolescents could not and their parents, liable 
for the tax payment, were in theory supposed to encourage 
them to go out and seek Wo't'k in the White man's economy 
and more particularly on the White man•s mines. 
However effective the stick or carrot in .inducing a 
supply of' African labour f'or the mines, the who1e :force of' 
tribal traditional economy operated against a permanent 
abandonment of land rights by the family as a uni. t and 
hence of' a settled, pennanently resident A£rican labour 
f'orce in the mining areas. Migrant labour for the gold-
mines appears to have met the social system needs of the 
tribe as much as the poli t:f.cal wishes of' the Wb.i te polity -
at least until the slow disintegration of' tho tribal eco-
nomy began to break up the whole tribal social system. 
1 
Af'ricans • the great majority in the begiru£ing being 
young, unmarried.males f'rom the Transkei - accepted a six-
month contract period of mining work but very rarely longer 
without a. return home. This return was ~mperative i:f the 
young man was to retain at least a tenuous hold on land 
rights, which generally involved marriage or on-the-spot 
inheritance. Heboe the success of' recruiting in, for 
instance, the Transkei depended upon the practicable capa-
city of' the tribal chief or headman to guarantee that 
'lands woul.d be reserved f'or the natives returning f'rom the 
mines, as it al.ready was f'or natives returning from war or. 
17 from hunting expeditions•. 
When Rhodes as premier and minister of' Native Af'fairs 
of' the Cape Colony, as well. as mining-entrpreneur.. intro-
duced h.is'Glen Grey Act of' 1894, the major aim was to en-
courage the process of' westernization among the tr±bal. 
' . 
Africans. The •way of' li:fe' of' tribal se1f'-sub.sistence, 
under-written and safeguarded - at least until the critical 
supply of'. land was directly and indirectly restricted - by 
the institutional culture and polity of' the tribe, was not 
indeed revolutionized by the Glen Grey Act. 
That Act operated to encourage change rather than to 
del.ay or. to hold up change. J:ts detail certainly invol.ved 
almost every aspect of' tribal economic lif'e - land tenure, · 
inheritance, agricultural methods, even a1coho11c habits. 
But it did not c·reate economic ca1oulation in tribal 
organization and institutionalized culture. As already 
made plain, the tribal economy had a high degree of eco-
nomic rationality, but it was not oriented to wage-earning 
activities or a money-exchange economy. Rhodes; however, 
whether as the .innovator of new combinat:ions 0£ diamond-
marketing through the creation of' the central selling 
organization of De Beers and with Alfred Beit, of new 
techniques of' gold-mining :rinaneing or as the statesman 
pioneering legislation to transform traditional economic 
organization, stimulated the opportuni~ies :for wage-earning 
labour and hastened the individualizing of money-motivation 
.in tribal. agriculture. 
The shadow of' Rhodes f'ell east as well as north in 
1;3ri ti sh A£ri·Ca and under .it, whether as lightness or as 
darkness, the modern ~abit of' mind began its inexorable 
process 0£ slow disintegration o.f one social system and 
slo'W' integration of' another social system. 18 
The Transke:L (.and Natal where recruiting o:f A.f'rican 
labour f'or the mines was at one Feriod.prohibited by Natal 
eolonial law)' could not however remotely satisf'y the labour 
needs 0£ the gold-mines. This seems to have been due as 
much to the relatively high recruiting cost as to .any other 
:factor.. For various reasons, but more especially the 
ef'£ecti Ye protection o.f' his cap1 ta ti on :fee by the country 
( . 
storekeeper-trader. it proved :i.mpossible f'or the Transvaal 
Chamber of' Mines to apply J.ts new cost-reducing organiza-
tion of' Af'rican labour-recruJ.tment to South African sources 
of' supply with the same ef'.f'iciency as to sources of' supp1y 
;in Portuguese East Afriea. 
Almost :fr.om the beg:lnni.ng of the proclamat:i.on 0£ the 
Witwatersrand go1d £'.ields, the mining companies attempted 
to come to agreed conditions o.n the recruitment and remuner-
ation of African labour. In the r.~rst few years these 
attempts broke down under the ~ntense competition for 
62. 
labour but as the system of group control of operating 
mines evolved, a co-ordinating body - the Witwatersrand 
Chamber of Mines - was established in 1889. Its major 
objective was to reduce the mining industryts labour cost. 
This was sought through limiting competition in recruit-
ment (which in the early stages resulted in recruitment 
cost being perhaps double the actual wage b~11) and fixing 
wages and working conditions, including the length of 
serYice-contract, on a uni.form non-competitive basis. 
Such a monopsonisM.c position was not completely 
achieved tmtil about 1913. But recruiting was organized 
by the Rand Labour Association (1897), which became the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (1901), as: sole 
recruiter f'or mines :from territories outside the borders 
of South Af'rioa. i.e. East Africa, including the Portuguese 
territories, and the British High Commission territories. 
The sister organization, the Native Recruiting Organization 
(1912), acted as a centralized body (though without so1e 
rights) for African labour recruitment inside South Africa. 
The co .. ordination of: monopsonistio recruitment and 
employment conditions proved easiest of' accomplishment in 
respect of' Portuguese East Africa. The Portuguese Govern-
ment exercised tota1itarian control and was prepared to 
deploy it in return for rail traffic guarantees through 
to its Mozambique ports (as elaborated in the later text). 
Between 1890 and 1899 the number of' African workers on the 
gold mines increased :from 14 1 000 to 97,000 o:f wlUch from 
one-half' to three-quarters appeared to have been recruited 
from extra-South African sources by the lffl'LA. 19 
The early detail of' African mine labour supply and 
demand is germane only to the extent that it finaJ.ly 
evolved into the pattern 0£ monopsonistic buying of such 
labour on behalf 0£ tho entire gold-mining industry from 
about the time 0£ Union. The essen~e of this unique 
organizational structure :for the supply o:f labour was that 
al1 intra-ind~stry competition was eliminated. In its 
place was established the industry-wide uni:formity o:f wage 
and working conditions :for contract labourerst who as 
migrant workers were housed in compounds and who never 
acquired permanent rights of residence or freedom of' asso-
ciation f'or collective bargaining or even individual choice 
of occupation:. 
The Chamber of' Mines was and has largely remained an 
organi.zation for obtaining and allocating undi£:ferentiated 
labour-units among employers, who are mutually couvenanted 
to the 'maximum average .t • This maximum average arrange-
ment appears to have been introduced in 1902 and fixed the 
average earnings of' all African mine-workers on any and 
evory mine as not to exceed a maximum average. This has 
meant that wh~re piece-rates have been tried to increase 
the individual worker's productivity, piece-ratos for 
groups of the more productive workers have had to be cut 
20 to restore the. average. The maximum average was how-
ever also applied, where piece-rates were not the form o.f 
remuneration. 
A whole aeries of government commissions has reported 
on the consequences 0£ the operation of' this ma.:x:imum average 
method as a barrier not only to the greater use of' piece-
rates to stimulate earnings of the individual. African mine-
~orker but to increased producitivity and concomitant 
reduced costs of mining gold. 
vlusion is: 21 
Dr. van der Horst's con-
Actual1y, a power~ul motive preventing the exten-
sion of' piece-work is £ear lest it should 1ead to 
increased competition f'or Native labour between 
mine managements and to a rise in average wages. 
Tlrl.s is clearly demonstrated .in .~ memorandum 
by the Chamber of' Mines. to the Native I~conomic 
Commission ( 1932) whl.eh •••. states that •. • j.t 
would lead to a 'certain amount of' pi·rating of 
natives as between mine and mine• and to 'an 
increase in the general level of' wages without 
any corresponding advantages' .• 
64. 
The ·d~tennination •Of' Wages, Working conditions; range of 
jobs and fields of' employment by custom rather than by 
· C·ompetition became f'rom early on the characteristic 
f'eature of the labour market. lt,is the single most 
itnportant and most enduring f'act in the economic develop-
ment of South Africa. 
It w-as perhaps as much.responsible as a.ny other. single 
'f'! 
.invariable :for the near•static economy of' the country :from 
its beginnings.in the mid-seventeenth century until the 
exploitation of min.er.al wealth in the 1880'~• Indeed, 
as will be shown in later chapter.a, it cor:.tinued :for an:• 
other half century to be the inhibiting co:t).di tion., imposed 
by the politic al ·:factor.; to the rate o.f'. increase: .in . 
national ·output· per head in South Af'rica. This measure 
of economic growth showed little of' the ~ow'j;h that. might . 
: - . ' 
otherwise have been anticipated· .:troni, ·the discovery of' such 
i • 
fabled natural resources as the g~eatest diamond- and 
gold-mines in'f~corded history.. Only when the :forces of' 
competition broke through the rc~stl."aints of' custom during 
the. 1930' s was ·the rate 0£ growth espoc1.ally noteworthy.; 
From then on,. and especially .:from 1948, Af'rikanerdom 
obsessed itself' to control compEtttion and to :fix.f'or a11 
t:S:me thE) socio•economic d:i.f'f'erentia1s of' White-Black status. 
But competition for labour was too powerful to be entirely 
f'rus.trated by the political f'actor and such compe.tition in 
the labour market energized the economy to unprecedented 
rates o.f' development'•..i 
Because of the domination of' custom over labour-
util.:tzation, and the rel.ated land-util.ization, the kind of' 
•economic development' which Schumpeter de:fined, i.e. only 
such changes in economic lif'e as are not f'orced upon it 
from without but arise by its own itiative f'rom within, 22 
was for a generation curtailed in South Af'rica. Customary 
allocation o'f: labour-supply and-utilization was f'or gener-
ations the unchanging condition o'f: the labour market. 
But competitive :forces released by war-time demand pressures 
penetrated that hard crust of' custom to bring about new 
combinations of' productive resources, more especially in 
manufacturing industries. Until that happened, develop .. 
ment was slow and growth of' output per head (and income 
per head) unremarkable. 
The inunobilizing of' the resouroet.' .of' African labour as 
determined by tradition and custom was at an early stage 
reinf'orced by the polity, The f:i.rst pass laws may be 
dated back to 1857, when the Colonial Government of' the 
CaPe in Act No,2.'.) of 1857 made it an o:ff'ence, Under penalty 
o:f up to twelve months' imprisonment ·with hard labour;. for 
a native :from British Kaf':frar.ia to enter the Cape Ool.ony 
without a. pass. The mi.ning industry was especially con-
cerned to secure the power of' the law to reinforce its 
short-term contractual recruitment 0£ migrant labour• In 
1895 the Volksraad of the Transvaal passed Law No.23 of' 
1895; draf'ted by the mining employers; which provided that 
on entering a gold-f'ie1d proclaimed a labour district; an 
. . 
African had·to secure a District Pass authorizing him to 
seek employment f'or three days and subsequent extension on 
:fee payment, When ,employed, the employer held. the District 
' ·.Pass and retain~d. it unti1 the A:ft"icat'l was discharged. The 
Af'ri·can himself' had to carry an Employer• s Pass without 
wMch he was l.ciabl.e to arrest and imprisonment. :It was an 




The history and complexity of' the pass laws and regu-
1 ations governing tho movement· of Africans in South Af'rica 
probably defy complete recording. ·Their general purpose 
and significance have however remained :f'undamentally un-
changed - to re-inforoe custom by law in restricting the 
competitive :forces of' supply and demand for African labour 
so as, f'irstly, to curtain and direct its mobility and, 
secondly, to control the range and terms of its employment. 
The early ~ass laws may be regarded as primarily con• 
ccrned with directing the supply 0£ African labour, the 
later pass laws f'r()m the 19.50's with directing the demand 
for African labour. They are so pervading, however, as 
to constitute not only one o'f' the major influences on 
economic growth but the administrative aeus ex mach1na for 
the perpetuation of the stratified South African socia1 
system under the control of the White polity. They were 








POOR WHITES AND BLACK PROLETARIAT 
The interaction between land- and labour-ut~lization 
would determine status relationships and was therefore 
the continuing concern of the White polity. The South 
African way of lif'e in respect of' its White peoples grew 
out of' its isolation and insulation from change and the 
extraordinarily extensive character of' its land settle-
ment. A striking feature of' this form of settlement 
was f'or centuries and as late as the 1920's the attitude 
to work and effort. 
The significance of' this factor is stressed not in any 
sense of' derogation of the Afrikaner people. Dislike of' 
manual work and effort and consequential unwillingness to 
change certainly became part of' Afrikaner behaviour but 
that behaviour has rep~atedly shown an indifference -
perhaps not unrelated - to hardship and danger which has 
made the Af'rika.llers most tough and daring fighters. The 
Afrikaners never lost DtJ.tch courage though, settling .in 
the vast territory of' South Africa and among large numbers 
of 'tribal peoples offering virtually cost-less labour, 
they lost Dutch tenacity f'or economic exertion and entre-
preneursMp. 
In conse~uence from the 1880~s indigency among the 
Afrikaans-speaking Wldte population proliferated into the 
national problem of the 'Poor Whites•, which only began to 
yield to the amelioration of the rising temp> of economic 
growth in the 1930' s. Not only did the •Poor l·.1hi tes' 
eons.titute the country's critical sociological problem 
for a half-century but the votes of their overwhelming 
numbers controlled the course 0£ the lfhite polity through 
the history of the South African Republic (which was the 
nineteenth-century Transvaal.) until it re-emerged revolu-
tionized in its economy but hardly changed in its insti-
tutionalized character~ sixty years later in the Republic 
of South Africa. 
The absence of a money economy, the failure to evolve 
a commercial tenancy for agriculture, the slow response of 
famning to market demand in the trekker republics have 
already been noted. Zt was in the Transvaal, even more 
than in the Orange Free State, that resistance to change -
in land•cult:lvatio~, land-tenure, land-inheritance ... began 
to produce a problem of over-population which expressed 
itself in rural indigency and, then, urban indigency. 
The Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission T.G.13-
1908 is the classic documentation of early indigency. It 
recorded the facts of farms averaging 7,700 acres, the 
failure· even to farm to supply ~ome-grown rounded diet, 
the late-coming bywoners, the excessive sub-division of 
land among children, the preference £or hunting for food 
rather than crop-cultiavtion, the alienation of patrimony 
to companies in return for easy option-money. 
This Report, too,makes :Lt.clear that .the Anglo-Boer War, 
while it may have aggravated, certaJ.nly did not originate 
the indigency of the Tran1JVaal. Afrikaner. 
Even before the outbreak of' war in 1899 a great 
portion of the agricultural population were de-
clining into indigency and from this date begins 
the drift of poor whites into outlying parts of 
larger towns ••• In itself the war was not, as 
many witnesses have thought, the primary cause 
of the existing indigency ••• the second effect 
of the war was that it swept into the to'11tls from 
the country, in a destitute condition, a very 
large number of those who did not possess land 
of their own, and1who had previousl.y been sink-ing into poverty. 
The Transvaal Bushveld and Lowveld was a large area of 
poor vegetation.and unf'avourable climate. But it contained 
plenty of game and opportunities for free-booting among 
resident and migrant African cattle-owners. White inhabi-
tants of this part of' the Transvaal. early developed a taste 
for the life of the pioneer rather than the settler and 
became wholly unable to adapt to regu.1ari ty of' any occu-
pation whatsoever, even of farming. 
A iarge proportion of the indigent developed from among 
the group, originally known as bywoners. The bywoners, it 
will be recalled, were the late-comers among the trekkers, 
who found that the farms had ~ready been taken up by those 
vho had spent the day riding around their domains as the 
qualifying title to ownershi.p or who were too shiftless even 
to exert themselves to take up a land-holding. So long as 
the original. farmer-owner had no wish nor incentive to 
develop his estate, bywoners were undisturbed in their occu-
pation. But as the desire or the opportunity showed itself 
I - . 
to improve the land-holding by paddocking for sheep or 
cultivation of a money-crop (or where sub-division to meet 
the claims of inheritance operated),·so the bywoner became 
a liability. 
Tlrl.s was especial!~ the case of the White bywoner as 
compared with the African occupier, who might have almost 
a bywoner status. The Bl.ack man and his f'amily owed an 
obligation to contribute labour. But no Af~kaner acknow-
ledged an obligation to labour f'or a fellow Afrikaner in 
return for occupying a portion of his lands. Even more 
unthinkable was that his Wif'e and children should render 
any labour-servi.oe. Economic rationality - the substitu-
tion of cost-reducing !'actors of production - clearly dic-
tated that while the African byvoner might :f'or a while be 
an asset, the ~1hi te bywoner and his often-numerous family 
had no use-value at all. 
··7· 1 . .. 
· Hence the displacement and disposse.saion ot the White 
bywoner became part of a people's "tragedy.. It was not 
only the bywoner who lost his place on the land,. Of'ten 
the owner himself was only too wil.ling to be dilspos.sesaed. 
' 
by the of'f'er of ready'cash as option-money by the land• 
a.cquis.:I. ti on eompanie.s, which .in a remarkably short time 
af'ter gold was first found came to control a ~jor part of' 
the Transvaal. These companies tended to accept the con-
tinued presence on the land of' those willing to work rather 
than those i<Who regarded all manual labour as. 'kaff'.ir's 
work''• 2 
' 
So the •kaf'f'ir• at least w·a.s of'f'~red and generally 
aocepted.work, wtdle. the.Vb.ite man drifted into idleness in 
between the ~ccasional Opportunity to earn a little as a 
~ ... . 
transport•driver or keep himself' by his beloved rifle by 
shooting either game or• during 1899 .... 1902, ·British •rooi-
. neks * • · His shoci'~ing capacity was undoubt.edly highl,Y 
developed but hunting 8.nimals or hunting the enemy 1a. ·not 
really a form of' economic development. The.re are people · 
who certainly make money out of' wart and. war o:ften promotes 
economi.c.grodb. Bu~ the ·mo~ey•makers are not the soldiers 
An the f'ield and the Boers turned gUerillas came back to 
' find their':ra.rms a very much wasted asset. 
The AnglO•Boe.r War made :l ts contribution fa> human · 
misery as all wars. do. . ~ct., 'again., 'lilt~ . all other wars' 
·:t t produced its f':ighters who could not ;Or ~uld not· re-adjust 
when they tound their occupations gonei.>q No doubt the ye are 
of ·h~dship and exhti~ation of' veld•vegters induced even 
more f'irmly the belief o.t what was 'White man•s work and 
;,hat was • ka:f'fir • .s . Work • , 
.. The Transvaal .l:ndigency Commission listened to pred:lkant 
after predikarit and soc:i.al work.er af'ter poli tied.an tell the 
same story of the Af'rikaner•.s aversion to manual work as 
beneath his dignity. 
The early settler in the Transvaal and, indeed, 
the whole South' African-born white population 
up to nearly the middle of the nineteenth 
century, had grown to maturity in the belief 
that the normal and proper relation of White 
to Coloured (i.e. Non-White) was the relation 
of master to slave or ser:f. They regarded it 
as the natural province o:f the White man to 
supervise the native and to direct his energies, 
and the duty o:f the native to perform :for the 
White man the rough manual labour, which was 
required :for cultivating his land and tending 
his stock. Despite the abolition o:f slavery 
this ttta.dition remained, mid has continue~ to 
govern the relations between White and Coloured 
races to this day.J 
And a littl.e later in the same Reports 
The system o:f slavery has simply given way to 
the system o:f oaste ••• We have been impressed 
with the frequency ld.th which it has been 
stated in evidenoe that the unskilled labour 
was 'kaf':fir•s work' and as suoh not the kind 
o:f worlc. which a White man shou1d perform ••• 
This attitude o.f' the white man has greatly 
a.f':fectdd his efficiency as a labourer. He 
has never regarded unskilled labour as an 
ordinary field o.f' employment ••• 4 
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On the land the White bywoner ref'used to become a farm 
labourer and in the towns •any white man••• who has not 
the.knowledge or the training to qualify him f'or doing 
skilled or semi-skilled work is almost certain to become 
indigent•. 
The Commission commented at length on 'the very high 
standards o.f' living adopted by the white man in the Trans-
vaal as compared with the ordinary standards of' white work-
ing men in similar positions elsdwhere •••'.5 The establish-
ment o.f' this customary standard of living and related wage• 
expectation by White men was a prime cause, in the Commission~ 
opinion, o:f urban unemployment and resultant indigency 
the 
am_?ng White persons "- and especially/A£rikaans•speald.ng 
with 1little or .no eduoati.ott and training ·• .in South At'rica 
and i11 the Transvaal in particular. This :foreshadows 
Ke}'ne1s distinction between vol~tary and involun.tary un-
empl~yment. No •small rise in the price o:f wage-goods 
r.eJ.a.tively to the money-wage' would hf:lve brought about any 
incrc~se ·in the ·•.aggregate ·supply of' [~hi ta] labour wi.lling 
to work .:for the current wage•., 
'Tlle "Voluntary un~rnployment .in South African economc 
history .must.be regarded as not so much unique but as an . . 
uttUStta1ly ·p.ervasive pre:f'erence or motivation; which has 
probably ~~~n a signit'ieant :factor in the relatively slow 
rate o-t: economio
1
growth of ~utput (and income) per head 
• , 'Wit:ll very recent decades. -It i.s well characterized and 
classi.f'ied by Hutt in hi.s Theoa of' ldle Resouroe.e as 1pre-
f'erred i.dl.ene.ss t • In respect of' the tribal Af'r.ieans and 
Co1oureds (though.possibly not among the Ind:tans), there 
has always·been a marked leisure-pref'e~ence which for many 
decades inhibited their productivity {and the co•opera:thg 
capital) hut which seems· now to be changing with growing 
f:onsumpt:l.on-oonsc*ousness. In respect of" the •Poor Whites•, 
·the accc:iptanoe of' a categocy ·of'. work or a wage ... tevel iden ... 
t.ified with 'kaf'f'i·r• s ·work t lfa.S so deeply wounded to racial 
pride as to be one o.f' the major .in.f'luences .in the special 
character of' the country's poli.tical economy,. 6 
As early a.S 1908 the Transvaal J:nd!i.gency Commission 
was to be only the f'ir.st of' repeated Commi,ssions• which 
rejected eit~er minimum wage legislation or spec.ial job 
proteQtion as the sol.ut1on to the White man.•s (and.woman•s 
·and child's) value•orientat:l.on to ka:f:fir.-work. The rele• 
vant passage .f'rom the Report merits quotation at· length 
because at expresses.the non•polltical rtewpoint that 
despite its reiteration down the decades by almost all 
I i 
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similar non•poli~ical opinion was al.ways rejected by the· 
p~lit:icianst 
• •'~' thd seco.nd eugge.stion f'Ot' protecting the posi-
tion of the white man in the econom:lo world is that 
legislation· should b& passed .f'ixing a ratio between 
the number 0£ white and coloured (i.e. N.on-Vhite) 
men engaged in any industry employing more than ·a 
certain number .o:f hands. This pr<>posal we also 
think impracticable. No ulliform ratio cou.ld be 
laid doWn which would suit every industry. More• 
over, i:f' the .state did attempt to f'ix a unieorm 
ratio f'or all trades either the ratio would have 
to be put so high as to be of' no praotic.al ·use, 
or :so low. as to result in the closing down of many 
industries now ~ ving em.pJ.,oyment for whi. te men •. 
On general grounds; however, and a.part :from the 
d.if'i'icttlties in the way 0£ carrying out these pro-
posal.s, we are opposed to any Government action 
which is de<signed to protect the white man against 
reasonable eompetition :trom the Coloured races. 
·In the' f'irst place, we are oppo.eed to it f'rom the 
point of view ot the native • •'.•~.it wouJ.d, in ef'f'ect. 
be an attempt to protect.the position of the white 
man by preventi:ng the native .f'rom making t'Ul.1 use 
of those qualities and po.,;.,ers with which he is 
~nd.owed .• 41·. the' white and b1ack races have to live 
together .in South Af'rica, and ttme and their re• 
spective qualities and oapacities al.one will deter• 
mine the relations Which are to .subsist among them • •,, 
To p:totect the white man :trom native competition 
at this stage is simply to bolster up tb.e aristo• 
cratic tradition f'or·a :tew years longer, without 
doing anything to qualif'y the white man f'or the 
U1 timate bu~ inevitable struggle f'or economic 
superiority With the native • ,,p 
. 
But to 'bolster up the ~ristocratic tradition' :for a. :few 
·years longer and indeed, for all. tim~ was the dominant 
motiv,ation o:f the Whites to which all else, especially 
least-cost substitution or economic rationality, must be 
' 
subordinated.• The ideology of the unbridgeable gulf' be-
~weett ka.ff'ir 1 s work and Wh~ te man• s work' was steadily 
instittttionaJ.i.zed not only thr.,ugh custom.-thought and 
p,ower•thought but in. a body of' elaborated legislation and 
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reSUJ.ation unique to any industrial nation in the twentieth 
century. 
Legi:J. enforcament of the aristocratic tradition, this 
categorization of' ka£fir•s work and White man•e work, this 
peculiar f'orm of preferred idleness.or voluntary unemploy-
ment, this institutionalization of the dominant motivations 
of' the dominant is of' course achievable through the polity. 
And only through the polity. Necessarily, therefore, the 
polity had to be and remain f'or . al.l time a White polity. 
F'Urthennore, though such concepts of' •work• and •non-
work' were held as tenaciously by English-speaking trade 
unionists as by Afrikaans-speaking Poor Whites, it was 
English-speaking capitalists who pursued profitability by 
way of' least-cost substitution of labour resources. 'lbe 
political economy that pursued productivity in disregard 
and disruption of' the past was the creation and the creature 
of Smuts-Hoggenheimer, as anathemized by A.frikenerdom. 
Its po1itios was 'imporialist• and its economy was •capital-
ist• and a White polity of' imperia1istic profit-seekers 
(of Smuts~Hoggenheimers) coul.d not be entrusted to safe-
guard the South African way of life. 
As early as 7 December 1912, Genera1 J.B.M. Hertzgog, 
walking out of the f'irst Cabinet o:f the :f:l.rst Uni.on Parlia-
ment to f'ound the National or Nationalist Party, declared 
at De Wildt: 
The time has come when South Africa can no longer 
be ruled by non-Afrikaners, by people who have no 
real love :for South Africa ••• that Z place so 
much emphasis upon the feeling of national.ity o:f 
my Dutch-speaking fellow-Afrikaners is because 
they have a deeper realisation of it than the 
majority of' the English, and that is because their 
ancestors came here two hundred years earlier ••• 
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The more capitalistic rationality acted,· the more :tena-
ciously the pol.:l tieal :fact.or reaot~d. J:n its :first phase, 
·the nationalism o:f Af'rikanerdom was anti the capitalists 
but the sacro.sanctity o:f land ownersl'd.p ensured that it 
never became anti-capitalist. Afrikaner nationalism 
eagerl.y embraced the·work-f'und theories and restrictionist 
practices of English trade-unionists and readily entered a 
·Pact with an English-led South African Labour Party against 
Smuts-Hoggenheimer • against :imperialist capitalists who 
l:l.nked the CitY: to the Chamber of: Mines by way of' Downing 
Street. In the latter phase, a:fter the embrace with 
English trade•unionists had become a take•over of the trade 
unions by the Bl.ankewerkersbeskermingsbondt~ the political 
_:factor pursued an exclusive Af'rikanerization o:f powd.r. 
Power was not only control over the polity but control 
of the instruments of' economic development • over state 
direction of' capital investment but not socialization ·0'£ 
the means o:f production. The process 0£ black proletarian-
ization 9 ·was the consequence o:f suchipolitico-economic 
change• Proletarianization is a concept so o-ver .... toned in 
Marxist and agitationist literature as almost to have lost 
ill objective use:fU.lness. Yet it is a social process 
clearly recogrdzable in respect of' the detribalization of' 
Af'ricans :t.n South Africa. 
The chief' causes :for proletariani.zation, as elaborated 
by either Marx or Sombart, is exclusion of' the massee of 
the peasants :f"rom the land. Marx stre$sed the e:x:prupri-
ation of' peasants f'rom their ind:lvidual holdings by the 
.statutory enclosure of' commons land• :forced sales and bank-
ruptcies. Sombart, while ·Crit:ical .of the Marlti- inter-
pretation which would make proletarianization a purely 
English phenomenon, also :found land spoliation and .land 
restrictions as a major :factor. 
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The interconnection·between l.and•utili.zatiott and la.bour-
:supply in re.speot of' tribal Africans has already been exa ... 
' . 
·mined, but ~.t: is so muc11. cause and effect in the evol vi,ng 
South African po.litical economy that it must be f'urther 
elaborated., The reports ~d evidence of' numerous of'f'icial 
I 
connnissions of enquiry are invaluable source material .• 
;Such goverriment commissions and the testimony tended to them 
reflect.as clearly as any other evidence the characteristics 
;():f' custom.thought and powe:r ... thought contemporaneously' domi ... 
nant ~n a society. They highlight· motives and aims, the 
value ... orientations of sociological cla.saif'ication,. in a 
manner which make such reports and testimony primary re:fer-
ence material. 
One of the·most note,wortby and 'f"urldamental. 1 Of' such 
commissions., accepted by South Af"rti.can historians, is the 
South. Mrican Native Mf'a,irs Commission, 1903•5 (Cd .• 2399 ... .. . .. . 
1905, Vols. t-5), The Commission was appointed• af'ter the 
Br.itish 'def'eat of the Boers; by Lord Milner, British High 
'" . . 
Commissioner., at a ·time When the .four eol·onial go'Vernments 
.were nominall.y a.n.d legally who11y separate authorities. 
:Its membership comprised. the nominees of' all the co.lonial. 
governments (:lnoludilng Rhodesia and B.asutoland) and i. ts 
pol~cy clearly s·ignified that there should be a .,common poli.cy 
on the relationships o.f Whites and. Af'ricans in south Africa, 
trrespecti:va of' political. boundaries. Furthermore., the 
Commissioners, under· 'the chairmanship of' Sir Godt'rey .Lagden.1 
were almost all Native Administrators of' great e·xperience 
. 1· . . c 10 and not po it:i.el.ans • 
. Rights to land were the prime concern of the Commission. 
The f'irst ~ tem 'of' reference 1 and perhaps .. the most important, 
. it reported, :ls land tenure, . 
From it there is a common origin of' many serious 
Native problems; It dominates and pervades .every 
.. 
other question, it is the bed.rock .0£ the Native ts 
present economic position; and.largely a.f':f'ects 
bi.s so9ial system. It was clear from the mass 
ot evidence tendered that the public at.tention 
to a great extent ,centred round· it. 1 '1 . · · 
. . 
The faots, as.establishd.d by the Commission, were: i.n 
the Cape Colony, ttricans lived in reserves or locations set 
~, . 
. apart f'~r ~frican occupation·; as servants in continuous 
employment 0£ landoWn.ers; as holders of' individua1 titles 
in freehold or le~sehold or under quitrent tenure; or in 
urban locations• Thexe were 1:3t.440,.000 ti.Crea ;;f J.and 
reserved f'or At~icans with a population of 1,057,6tO or 50 
per Sq •. mile• In Natal, the greater portion of land was 
Vested in the Crow and occn pied by Atr.ieans communally but 
. ' 
more A,.tr.icans lived on private lands under White ownership 
than ii\ '1ocations and mis.sion .reserves combined. ln the 
' ' ' • "\ • I ~ 
. 07.ange Free eel:.otty; Africans 11 ved in locations or re serves 
set a:PEl.rt for Afrio.an ooeupatio:n, as servants in· continuous 
. . 
employm~nt of'. landowers; as squatters and .labour tenants 
periodically employed as £arm-workers,, and in urban loca-
tions•· ·:rn the Transvaal· similariy the Africans lived in 
locations or reserves set a.part for African. occupation, on· 
lands o'tmed by. Af'ricans .1 on other private lands, on crown 
lands and in urban locations• l':t was estimated tba.t in 
the Transvaal .about one-half' of' the Af'ricana were domiciled 
' 
on occ~pied a.nd·unoooup:led lands under White ownership~ 
The Commission expressed !i.tsel:f in f'avour of' encouraging 
individual.ization of' land tenure where •native.a exhibit in . . 
sut;fioi·ent numbers a desire to secure and a ca.pao:tty to 
ho1d and enjoy individual rights to arable plots and resi• 
dentia.1 sites on such lands -.•' 1·2 But.the Commission 
was much more concerned w.ith the two critical issues of' 
•:free tra:f't'io !i.n land' and. •squatters ·~j 
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lt asked what e.ttects could be expected to f'ollow if' 
the Af'ricans were, allowed f'ree tra:rf.ic in land. And this 
was the answer tho.. Commi.ssion .supplied.; 
No. emphasis· is required in .stati:ng that, wher ... 
ever Europe.ans a.re living; repugnance j,s sh.own to 
the invasion o~ their neighbourhood by Natives f'or 
residential purposes.. lrarnter$ resent the intru• 
si.on among them o:f Natives O'lm.ers of' land •. • 
The capacity (of' Natives} to purchase (l.and) by 
collective process.if' necessary ts.to ... day in 
e.xcess of' what !l t was f'ormerly. Furthermore, · 
there is a mahitest eff'ort on the part o:f Nat:lVtUJ 
to-day beillg made to possess land; which is not 
. counteracted by any re!ucta.nce on the part of' 
European holders to dispose of' it,, so long as 
the sell.era _are not themselves bound\ t() live in 
prox.:i:rnity • .i .. l .3 . 
And then· follows the classic assertion of' non-economic 
values and norms against ec:;:onomic determinants:· 
Zt ... this process g0es ont while at the same 
time restrictions exclude Europeans £rom pur ... 
ohaS3ing within Native areas, :Lt is inevitable 
that at no very distant date the amount of 
land .in Native oocupat:f.on will be undesirably: 
extended. Native ·wage.a and· earnings, are · 
.greater than they used to be 1 ' their· .wants a.re 
:f'ew, and their necessary el\penses small,. They 
will buy land a.t prices above its otherwise · 
ma.rke'"t 'vall,le:. ae thei:l:r habits and standard of' 
1!.vi.ng enable them to exist on land that is 
impos"sible f'.or Europeans to £a.rm on a. small 
scale. There wi.11 be nt3?1Y acl.ministrative 
·_.and sooial di:ff'icultie.s cre.ated by the multi• 
· plication of.' .a number of' N.a.tive lands scattered 
··through a lfhi te popul.ation and ownl.ng the land 
of' the country equally with them • 
. lt will be :f'.ar more d.i.£:f.ioUlt to prese:rVe 
the a.bsolute.:ty necessary politi.cal and social 
d:i.stinct:Lons, ·if. t~e growth of a. mixed rural 14 Po,Pulatio11: o.t' land. ... o~ers .is not discouraged ••• 
It is hardly possible to over-emphasize the signi:fi-
-oanoe of this f'ind:lng by the Commission, a,nd its;; consequent 
recommendation and ·the subsequent legislation, to the po1i-
< I ' 
so. 
oal history or, South A:frica in the :fo.llowing decades .. · 
Throughout nearly .seventy years, the major (White) po1i.-
tica1 parties 15 have held as an inoont~overtible truth 
that the Union• s land legislation preserved the Af'ricans 
f'rom being dispossessed of' their land by the superior . 
economic power of' the White•• Yet the evidence, as 
advanced by the South Ai'rican Native Affairs Connnis.sion., 
~ . -· , 
was that ·the p:r'ooess of' economic. development was :facili• 
tating .Af'rioa.n .acquisition of' Whi te"".~wned land. 
At the time the Commission was investigating, 1905, 
only a minority of' White land .... occupi.ers had ef'f'e<;tively 
responded to 'market•demand f'or :foodstuf'.fs or i.ndustrial. 
crops.· This was especially the case in respect o:f the 
Transvaal, despite th<il coming into being <!f' the Witira.ters-
rand mining-market f'or f'oodstttf'fs twenty years baokr; 
Africans in suf':tio.1.ent numbers, according to the Commission's 
concern, had ho·wever responded to the new tempo of' economic 
development by acquiring the appropriate liquid. resources 
througJ:+ saving to be able to inve&t :1n European-owned land. 
Perhaps the Connniss:1on ,over-stai.tled ·the contemporary 
realJ.ties yet the.ir conclusion inters that the Africans 
showed keen insight :into the £unction o:r capital and the 
market und~r the procoss of' economic developm.ent. Vb.ether 
or not there was an accurate estimate by the Commission ·Of' 
the relative rates of: response by Africans and Wh:f. tes to 
the new market ec.onomy; ushered in by the discovery of' gold 
and investment ~n the gold ... m:i.ning industry. the Commi.ssion 
was :flatly opposed to leaving the working-out of' land• 
' ownership and utili2at.ion to the f'orces of' competition .. 
The Commission preferred to place it.s f'ai th in the , 
very personal f'oree of. the Whi'te polity and not .in the 
impersonal anonYlll:i.ty o·f the market economy.. It theref'ore 
unanimously r,ecommended: 
·• . 
that it i.s nece.ssary to sa£eguard what is eon-. 
ceived to be the .interests of' .the. Europeans 0£ 
this country• but that in so doing the.door 
should not be entirely closed to deserving a:nd 
progressing individuals among the Natives ac• 
.. quiring 1 and • ,.-- · 
and resolved: 
· · (a) that purchase (of land) by Natives ·should 
in future be limited to certain areas to be de-
fined by legislative enactment 
(b) that purchase of' land which m~y 1ead to 
tribal, communal or collective possession or 6 . . 1 occupation by Natives should not be ·permitted. 
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Xt was not ~nly in relation to land ... utilization that this .. 
key Connnission was to propose a political .Solution to what 
seemed to the Commissl..oners an essd.ntial.ly administrative . . 
problem of the .social system. A similar non•awareneSSt· 
perhaps even more than an 1gnoranoe, of the economic aspect 
distinguished their analysis of' the related labour-utili ... 
-~t·i - 17 za, :on,. 
The Comm:tssion .attempted to e,stablish ,the •total number 
ot male· (natives] who may be expected to work. at any ,one 
time• and arrived at a .figure of' 350,177. On the other 
side, J.t te,stimated the number required' at 7.52,000· f'-or the 
four colonies of' South A:f'r:ica. Hence the shortfall between 
- -· . 4--· o-o 18 supply and demand was some 00;· -o. 
· Xt then noted that labour bad to be imported f'rom other 
parts of' .Af'rioa• f'r~m Xndia and :fr.om China. The Commission's 
calculations of demand and. supply show .no recogniti.on o"f' 
wage-rates as the price of' labour. Demand t'or and supply 
0£ N.ati.ve labour are treated as absolutes. This unconscious 
or conscious ealcul.ation of numbers of' African workers with• , . 
out regard to the wage or price f'aotor of their labour might 
f',a:f.rly be noted as part o.:f' the South :Afri.oan trad!Lti.on. 
1'be reasons for labour •di.:f:f'iculties'• the Commission 
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concluded, were not idleness (which·it rejected) but that . . 
.the Af'rican population had always been pastor.al and agri-
cultural people;_ that the l".'ap~d increase in demand. for 
labour f'ound the A£ricans to a. great ex'tent unprepared to 
me.et the new conditions which surrounded them; that the 
: - ,. - • .. . - . i. . - . 
'tra<liti,onal mode of life of Af'rica.ns unaccustomed them to 
the regular! ty of daily labour.; that the inexpensiveness 
c>f :their living and .limited wants led to a comparative 
absence of' incentive to labour; w:td,., lastly, the terms on 
.which o~cupied land was worked did no~ encourage work• 
The supply available from local. sources is 
capable of' being increased and the Commission 
has given attenti.on to suggestion.a as ta how· 
this.is to be done. Any recommendation as to 
higher wages 1..s quite out of' place.· in the , 
f'irst place• any departure f'rom the principle 
that the rate o:f wages must be a matter of' free 
qontract between employer and employee is un-
sound, nor ia .any relief' f'roni prese.nt diff'i• 
cul ties to be found in such a measure. To 
ra.1.se the rate of' wages in one local.ity might. 
have the effect of' attracting labour to that 
particular qq.arter at the expense -of' other 
industri.es, but· thatwould not alter the general 
situation. Fllrthert it ha.s been stated, and 
the Commission feels there is a measure of' truth 
in the suggestion• ·that 'wh!le increased wages 
might have the effect o:f tempting a .larger 
·n.umber of .labourers in to the.market, on the 
other. handt _such increased gains woUld. enab1@ 
them to remain :f'or a longez: period at their 
own homes• 19 · 
'l"he Comm.ission, theref'ore, made no recommendation on tte 
subject of A:frioa:n wages. . J:t al~$O reje.cted any measur~s 
of comptt!slon on' the A:f'r!c.an ;inoludin.g the indir~ct compul-
sion -of' a labour ta:x. It :favoured rather the general ere-. 
ation 0£ a climate· or opinion f'avoura:b1e to the A:friearis 
becoming.more :l.ndustrious~ 
Speoif'ica.lly, and signif'i.cantly, it recommended posi-
tive implementation of existing laws against t squatting•, 
the impos.:ltion of' rents on Af'ricans living on Crown lands, 
the en:rorcement 0£ anti•vagranoy laws, the encouragement 
of' higher standards of' wants through education and traimng. 
The Report of the South African Native Af'f'airs Oonnni-
ssion of 1905 h~ been examined at some length. Not only 
is the view· justi:fied that this Report has provided the 
blueprint f'or muoh .subsequent Native pol.icy• 20 but it re•· 
vea1s strongly the continuing characteristics of' tho opera-
tion of' the South African sociat system" Always there is 
the in£luence of' the ~ustomary val.ues of' the Uhites ~ 
directing the White polity to restrain and inhibit the . . 
market economy as the determinant of' economic development. 
:tt expre.sse.s and exemplifies the persistent subordination 
of' market choice to :institutionalized imperatives .. 
It is instructive to compare the Commission•s views on 
the cause.s of' dif'ficulties in respect. of African labour• 
ut:i.iization with·sombart•s analysis of' proletariani.zation. 
Sombart, as alr~ady noted; regarded land spol,.::tation and. 
restrictions· as a major causative inf'luence but he also 
emphasized other :factors leading to the break-up of' medieval· 
. . ... 21 ' society .• 
At the same time, observed Sombart; that complaints of 
•universal vagabondage' were being voiced, the early capital-
ist entrepreneurs were lamenting the f'act that they qou1d 
not procure enough 1abour. Sombart traced this 'curious 
coincidence• of' abundance and shortage of' labour to three 
causes: the bad organization ot' the labour market., which 
prevented interlocal and interregional adjustment between 
supply and.demand; the empirically traditional and non-
rational character o.'f: production; which was inimical. to 
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the migration of' labourers f'rom overcrowded to less 
orowded occupations; th~ hosti.tity of the early prol.et:.. 
arians to ·the needs of' capitalist production. 
He further noted the static, corpora.t~ character of 
medieval economic life with production f'or traditional 
demand instead o.f :for unli~:lted gain as revealed in the 
.nwnerous holidays and the many rest periods du.ring the 
working day,., This sharply contrasted With the workers 
in the early f'a..etories with uninterrupted labour for in-
tolerably long hours; severe discipline and restriction to 
one detail of' the production process. There. is a. good 
deal of agitational misrepresentation of' the facts o.f 
later factory employment .in the Br.ita.in of the Industrial 
ReVQlution. 22 . But urbru;lizing change undoubetedly caused 
severe problems of' adaptation for the influx o:f landless 
poor, as capita1istic org~zation first undermined and 
then overwhelmed the medieval .self-suf'f'icieney • 
The paral.lels between thi.s proces.s of' proletarianization 
·in Ve.a tern Europe 1 more particularly Britain; ·between say 
1650. and 1850 and ·the process of' proletarianization in 
South A:f'rica :from 1880 on are close and augges·t:f.ve,. Further-
more .in .respect o:f South Africa., the impact of' change was 
concentrated into a much shorter·period of time in an era 
of' extraordinarily intensi Ve and e.xtertsi ve change:.~ 
The traditional economy of' the Atrloan_tribal society 
has obvious. resemblances to the static economy o:f medieval. 
Europe with its pronounced leisure-preference and corporate 
rather than indiv:i.d.ualis.t motivation for ef'f'ort and gain~' 
Similarly economic devel,opment t1hich simUl taneously pro ... 
moted an ~anized-industrial.ized market.and intensi:fied 
population pressures on la.rtd brought about an internal 
migration f'rom country· to cfty; which·in South Af'rica 
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reflects in striking dctai1 the similarity 0£ process in 
Europe and Britain. Both landless Whites and landless 
Blacks in South Africa were drifting into the towns and 
cities,be~nning with the early phase of economic stimula-
tion through investment sparked by the mining discoveries. 
But while the 'Poor Whites• could use their votes to 
compel ~otion by. the White polity to mitigate the effects 
of their proletarianization, the •Poor Blacks' were denied 
virtuall.y any in:fluonce in the polity. The Af'ricans• pro-
letarianization proceeded apace and indeed the rlhite polity 
actively - though not always consciously - promoted the 
process among the Blacks in the mistaken conviction that 
this was the path of salvation for the •Poor Whites•. 
The credo of' the Whitest as the country acquired in-
creasingly the motivations of a market economy under the 
rising tempo of economic development, fastened on, firstly, 
that no White man shall do 'kaf'fir•s'work' and, secondl.y,that 
those who •squat' do not serve society. 
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CHAPTER S, 
N'E:tTHER.SQUAttEa, NOR SKILLED 
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CHAPTER 2 
NEITHER SQUATTER NOR SKILLED 
The tel.'"111 t squatter' was gcnera.11y applied to Africans 
living on Crown land, to Atricans renting White-owned lands, 
and often also to labour tenants. :rn Dr. van der Horst•s 
study of Native 1abour in South Africa, the f'irst reference 
to legislation against squatting is Ordinance No.2 of' 1855 
of the Natal Legislative Council (significantly one of the 
earliest legislative enactments of the partly•olet:ted 
White settlor polity). It was an •ordinance to prevent 
the unlicensed squatting, and to regulate the Occupation 
of' Land, by the Natives•. 1 The owner or occupier of' any 
land on which more than three African families res:t.ded was 
required to make a return of the numbers and a subsequent 
hut-tax law exempted Af'ricans in effective employment of' 
the. lJhi te £'armer. 
This appears to have been the earliest of the Squatters 
Laws, and .like all its suoce ssors it very soon became a 
dead letter. Natal made repeated attempts to impose rents 
and taxes on African squatting on Crown 1and, while in the 
Cape the Location Acts had partly the same purpose. In the 
trekker repub1ics the burghers had acquired practicaliy all 
the land by.virtue of' the claim to title in a day's en-
compassing horse-ride or other assertion 0£ right. The 
Cape Labour commission Report of' 1894 noted the complai.nts 
against the squatting system wlU.ch, it was sai.d, reduced the 
supply of 1abour by enabling Africans to live without work-
ing f'or lvhi te s. :tn the Transvaal Law No.21 of' 1895. the 
•squatters• 1aw 1 was passed limiting to f"ivo families the 
number of' Africans alloved on any :farm or portion of farm. 
Xt proved unenforceable :from the beginning. Zn the Orange 
Free State a similar •squatter.a• law• o:t." 1893 repeated the 
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sacrosanct number of' :f.ive African :f'amilie.s permitted per 
llhi.te-own.ed :farm. 
I I • 
it too could,not be effectively enf'orced. 
White opinion was largely in agreement as t.o the causes 
.of' the f'ailur.e of' African labour supply to measure up to 
(White) demand.. The Views of' the South African Native 
Af:f'.airs Commission have already been quoted. In the Trans-
vaal Labour Commission of' <1903 (majority report), farmer 
witnesses were unanimous that Af'ricans living on: Government 
:farms,, on unoccu~ied :farms and on 1ooations could not be 
induoed to come out to work and favoured strict enfor.eement 
of' the Squatters• Law and a break-up of' the locations .• 
·'!'his latter Commission reported: 
A£ter hearing the evidence .of' a great number 
of' witnesses, we have f'orpied the opinion that 
the .scarcity of labour is due; :f.irst and mainly• 
to the fact that the A£rican native tribem are, 
for the most part• primitive pastoral or agri"'" 
cultural commtmities, who possess exceptional 
f~cilities .f'or the regular and full supply of' 
theJ.r animal wants• and whose standard of' eco• 
nomi.c needs is extremely low •• ·~· Sitting in 
1894 the .Labour Commission of the Cape Govern• 
ment stated that '1 the fundamental cause f'.or the 
insuf'f'icieney of' supply available f'or farm work 
and,, to some extent, :f'or .a11 other work., inclU• 
ding that of' <bme si;ic servants, lies in the con,;;, 
di tion o'f' iif'e and population in South Africa. 
The mere ne·cessaries of' existence a.re :few and 
obtainable with litt:1e2exert1on in tW.s new 
and sunny country •• •' 
And again: 
The rise of' industries in.south Af'rica has 
:i.n £act created a demand £or 1.ndustrial workers. 
- among nomadic or pastoral peop1®::; 1 who until 
the Europeans came into contact with them were 
ignorant of' the uses of' money and who therefore 
cannot be dragged suddenly into the industrial 
labour market by the operation .of' the ordinary 
law of' supply and demand • •. the only press.ing 
needs of' a savage are those of' ;food and sex, 
and the conditions of' native life in Africa 
are such that these are, as a rule, easily 
supplied • • • 3 .· 
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If' •squatting• is a sociological category, it is 
patently the kind of' symbolization that can evoke emotiona1 
respob.se. The image projected by •squatting• suggests 
hwidreds of' thousands of' Af'ric.ans sitting on their haunches 
in the sun on the lands of the Europeans, while these latter 
are working away to build a modern market economy for the 
benefit o'f: al.l. What were the realities - the social and 
economic realities? 
Tho •ethical' justification £or private ownership of 
land is beyond the scope of' this analysis. The •economic' 
justiCication would appeat.t' to be optimization of' product-
:l vi ty in response to market demand.. The disposal of common-
or Crown-land has throughout history taken place under a11 
kinds of' land-settlement and land-tenure arrangements. 
Those al.ready deta:iled :in an earl.ier chapter in zra.spect of' 
the several states of South Africa can be dup1icated in the 
experience of' many other countries. 
Whether the Whites or tho Africans of' South Af'rica have 
the 'better• title to the land can be determined in one of' 
two ways • by superior power or superior productivity. 
This implies allocation either by the polity or by the 
economy. If' al.location and title are to be determined by 
the economy - or more specifically by the social contro1 
of' the market • this of necessity means tthe free traffic 
in land 1 • Such a 'f'reo tra:f:f:ie in land' or, in more 
f'a.nd.J.i.ar terms, the continuing marketability of' land by 
sale and purchase might be expected to tend towards an allo-
cation, and continuing re-all.ocation, of' avail.able land 
among those current occupier-owners, who believed themselves 
able to optimize its productivity as determined by prevail-
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ing market factors,. 
The bolour of' the occupier .. ow.ner 1rou.J.d ·as such be irre1e..: 
vant.. Also irrelevant would be the occup1er-owner•.s custom-
ary standard of' living or reserve.a or lo'tf levels o:f wants j.n 
·. . .. 4 
determining the market price of' land. .I.t was indeed the 
apprehension ot the south .African Nativ';'? Oo~ssion. that in · 
a growJ.ng number of instances Af'ricans were being motivated_ 
by the market more than Whites. The awareness led the 
Commission to make its epochal and decisive recommendation 
against the •.free traf'f'ic in land' as betwet!n White and. 
Black. · 
l:n due course, this recommendation was to be given the 
force of' law, so that heno.e:f'orth land .. occupation as between 
lfhite and Black was to be determined by the poli.ty and not 
the market., The manner of such div:lsion will be examined 
later,. For the moment the critical consideration is that 
land-utilizatio.n liaS developed rather more by custom and 
rather les.s by marginal productivity with the probable con• 
sequence that the rate of' ·economic growth was signi:ficantly 
slowed. .It :is part of the .south Af'r.J.can conviction that 
Whites per. ae employ land more productively than A:fri.cans - . 
9e:r; _se.. Nonetheless; the S·outh Af'r:i.can Native Af'f'airs 
Commission es•tablished that, in the f'i.rst decad~ of' this 
century., tribal A:fricans were buying land. :from White owners 
and White owners had to be stopped by law ... by the action 
of: the poJ.:lty ... :from alienating- land t'o the Af'ricans., 
Prohibiting the sale.of' 1and to the A:fricans was only 
one .arm .of tho pincers aim~d at restr.icting 1and-utiliza-
tion by the Africans so as to increase labour-utilization 
0£ the Africans.• The other arm was positive action on 
squatting. The South Af'r:ioan Nat3.ve Af'f'airs Commission 
had gone on record that •unrestrained.squatting ot Natives 
/ 
on private farms,. tihether on terms or otherwise• is an 
evil and against the best interests of' the country• and 
.should therefore be energetically controlled • 
.. Thia, however, was an_ assertion. ,At the time there 
w:as no evidence that A:frioan t squatte?l'.'S • were l·ess bene-
ficially utilizing the land on which they •squatted' than 
were the White· 'bywoners t utiliz~.ng the land on 1'1hich theY: 
'lived-alongside'•. · Some evidence J.ndeed. suggests the 
contrary and from one aspect o:f relative productivity, 
Af'riean 'squatters·• «>ccasiona11y contributed labour while 
White bywoners on principle did not. 
Few (White) .witnesses to the Various commissions that 
repeatedly investigated ways o.£ .increasing the number o.f 
A:fr.ican work-seekers in and on the White man• s mines., 
industries• businesses• rai1ways and :f.anns, failed to 
press strongly t'or rigid enforcement of' the provisions o:f 
the .squatters• and related laws. Generally f'i ve African 
:famiJ.i.es per Whi'tc.~ :f'arm came to be regarded as the f'air 
and proper number and· all those in excess of' f'ive were 
somehow to be forced o:f.f to find work with some other 
White employ~r. I.t >tdlll be noted that throughout these 
decades there was never any .suggestion ~ at least f'rom 
the lihi:te men - that there . should be t separate development• 
or •segregation• or •apartheid' between the two races, Which 
might in any way make it more dif'f'icul t f'or more lfhi.te 
-
*masters t t·o have availabl.e more Black t servants t. 
On the contrary the Transvaa1 Labour Comm:i.mi.on of' 1 ·903 
no·ted that a considerable part of' its time was taken in 
l.istening to w.1.tnesses making sugges·tions to :i.mprove labour 
supply which igenerally :fal1 under. the head of' compUl.si<>n; 
either direct.or indirect, modi.:fications of' the native 
tribal. system or cha.ttges in .native land tenure'• The 
Commission duly reported that: 
••• the testimony of' many witnesses ••• indicate 
that they were in f'avour o:f measures which would. 
compel the natives to work either by requiring 
f'rom him a certain measure o:f' labour annually or 
by such drastic changes in his condition as 
would have the same ef'fect • .5 
The Commission itself opposed such ideas as impractical 
and also pregnant of' •social problems of' the utmost magni-
tude'• Though it, like all the other Commissions that 
busied themselves with the 'Native labour problem•, advo-
cated .strongest application ot: the laws against squatting, 
such direction of.' labour against the South African real-
ities of' land-settlement and land-utilization· proved about 
as ef':f'ective as price controls in a period of continuing 
inf'lation. 
Land restrictions and squatting curtail.ments aimed at 
exercising a push ·eff'ect on .African labour supply. What 
was the White man• s opinion and po1i.cy :in relat:io.n to the 
pu.11. f'actor of' wages? It wi11 be revoll.ected that the 
South African Native Af'f'airs Commission could be said not 
to have acknowledged that wage rates were a f'actor. The 
Transvaal Labour Commission o.f' 1903 showed greater soph.i.-
stication at least on this aspect. 
:It recorded the painf'ul. awareness of' the Transvaal 
Chamber of' Mines that African labour-supply exhibited a 
degree of elasticity at least as between one mine· and an-
other, which .showed up a marked economic rationality or 
acquisit.ive.ness (according to aemantic sensiti.v:i.ty) among 
per.sons not supposed to be acquainted with a money economy 
or having more than animal wants. It quoted :from the 
' annual Chamber 0£ Mines Report f'or 1889 that eagEr compe ... 
ti ti on be tween mine managers f'or l.abour: 

has in some cases taken the regrettable f'orm.
0
o:f 
overt attempts to bribe and seduce the employees 
o:f neighbouring companies to desert their employ-
ers. Even without resort to actual attempts to 
bribe, a manager finding himself short of' labour 
which is urgently required, has, standing alone, 
scarcely any other remedy than that of' raising 
his rates of pay. The result has been a steady 
rise of' wages all round, which is adding a very 
heavy additional expense to the working of the 
mines ••• 6 
The Commission then went on to record one of the minor 
articles·of' belief' among White ~mployers, and more parti• 
cularl.y mining employers,on the so~called backward•s1oping 
demand curve for .A.f'rican labourt 
.~. it was held by many witnesses that the effect 
of' high wages is, ultimately, to re•act disadvan-
tageously on the supply, as the limited nature of 
the natives• wants enabled them to be more easil.y 
satisfied when wages are good, thus inducing them 
to withdraw from employment at an early date. It 
w~e however maintained by.others' that high wages 
improved the supply, the majority stating that the 
reduction of wages on the mines af'ter the war had 
prejudicially af'f'ected the supply. 
7 
This co®lU·· 
sion appears to be well•f'ounded • • ~ 
Two members of this Commission in a Minority Report made 
some pertinent comments on Af'ri~an labour. Mr. J.w. Quinn 
and· Mr. P. Whitside noted that the first major demand :for 
industrial labour was following the discovery of' diamonds 
and added: 
••• it seems to your Commissioners a remarkable 
fact that to-day• after a lapse of less than 4o 
years, in addition to those engaged as herds and 
in a.tJrioulture, at least 250,000 [natives] are 
engaged in industries to a large extent unknown 
to them prior to the commencement of' this 
period ••• 8 
The same two Commissioners observed there was no evi-
dence that the Kimberley diamond mines were ever short of' 
labour and, f'urther,that: 
••• the Native•s wants are so f'ew that unless 
special inducements are held out to him, he has 
no desire to enter the 1abour market; and 
certainly one of' these inducements and, perhaps' 
the most ef'f'eetive, is a high rate of' wage ••• 
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The incentrovertible fact is that• af'ter most strenuous 
effort, the gold-mining companies through the Chamber of' 
Mines finally adopted its unique monopsonistic policy in 
respect of' Af'rican labour with the sole purpose of' elimi· 
nating mark·et competition on the demand side. :rt is a 
reasonable inference that what the mining employers really 
feared was too keen rather than too blunt a sensitivity of' 
tribal labour to· <l;if'ferential wage-rates and too highly 
10 
dev~loped a consciousness of' money as a medium of exchange. 
l:ndedd almost simultaneously with the never-ending com-
plaints about the unwillingness of' the Africans to acquire 
the working habits and wants of' the industrial and indust-
rious world of' thf,l llhi te man, other and increasingly v.iolent 
protos:tations were being vo:ioed that the rising tide of' 
Af'rican work~rs were depriving White men of' their inherent 
right to the jobs which 'civilizat:ion•, not to say custom 
and trade unionism; assigned to White men only. 
This f'ear, which in a short time was to become the dis-
tinguishing national phobia, pervades much of' another land-
mark Report in South Af'rican political economy - that of the 
Mining Industry Commission, 1907-s. 11 The chairman was 
Andries Stockenstrom but its most important commissioner 
was Frederic Hugh Page Creswell. Col.l Cresswe11 as aide 
to General Hertzog fifteen years later was to he1p establish 
a rarely challenged mastery of' the polity over the economy 
and to compel the social system of South Af'rica to cling 
more tenaciously, and ultimately, perhaps f'atal.1y, to the 
credo. of' nineteenth-century Dri ti sh trade-unionism and the 
ethos 0£ Afrikaner isolationism. 
This Mining Industry Connnission of' 1908 was broadly 
charged With investigating the ~ossibilities of' mechani-
zation and other means ·which would increase the employment 
0£ tfilite labour in the mines. Its Report is a docwnent 
0£ great significance and interest, sharpened by a pungent 
repudiation of' its objectivity by a dissident mi:uority of' 
one Commissioner. 
Inded.d the emotive intensity of' the Ma,1ority Report's 
peroration suggests some doubt as to whether the Conunission 
had not already reachod its recommendations in advance of' 
hearing the evidence. 12 Nonetheless, that evidence got 
. to grips with the realities of' colour competition in mining 
labour in a manner that half' a century 0£ subsequent mi.s-
repre se~tation now makes difficult to recognize. 
The Report noted - but emphatically did not accept -
the •accepted view' and •orthodox theory• that there was 
and is something pe:rmanent and stable in the demarcation 
0£ the respective spheres of the Vhite man and the African 
and in the dependence of' the White man on the African. 
The native was, according to the orthodoE theory, 
a muscular mach.1.ne doing unskil1ed work only, 
He was not in any sense a competitor with the 
lihite man, who was to have a monopoly of all 
skilled work; and he was regarded. as' a ne(:es-
sary adjunct to enable. Whit·e 0 mcn "to be employed 
at remunerative wages.1j 
But, it went on, such views and theories must 
be set aside as inconsistent with the f'acts ••• 
The theory that the native is a •mere muscul.ar 
machine' must be discarded • • • experience has 
shown that be can no longer be looked upon as 
debarred by lack of' brain and industrial train-
ing f'rom interfering with the lfu.i te man• s 
opportunities of' employment and as merely an 
aid to enable tho White man to earn wages to 
keep him in contentment. It is clear f'rom 
the evidence that the position as between White 
man1 and native 1.s one of very unstable equi1i-
brium. •• • and the tendency to-day is for 
Coloured labour to be employed in an increasing 
proportion and with the ef'f'ect of displacing 
White labour. 14 " . 
The Commission repeatedly stressed that there were no 
natural limitations to the competitiveness of' African 
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.labour at almost any level ·Of.' occupation - at least in 
those parts of' its Report; where it wished to drive home 
its conviction ~hat '~'bJ.te and Black labour were in no 
ways complementary but directly competitive. Thus: 
Upon the evidence bef'ore us we can come to 
no other conclusion than that tbe generally 
accepted idea that by increasing the supply 
and efficiency of' coloured labour the country 
is at the same time increasing the f'ield o.f' 
permanent employment for white labour on the 
mines, is f'ounded upon a quite erroneous con• 
ception of' the limitations of' the natives and 
of his industrial .position in relation to the 
white man • •. 
The truth 0£ the matter is, probably, that 
the capacity of' the average unskilled native 
as he comes to tll.e mine.s; is very :limited. Dut 
it is undoubtedly the case that among the large 
numbers of' natives working upon the mines under 
existing regu.lati·ons and contro1, an i11creasingly 
large proportion of' them are,by long ee;Mfi;eenand 
continued.practice, acquiring all or noariy all 
the sk:i.11 .requi:red to do a very great deal 0£ 
work which in the past has necessitated the 
employment of white men ••• . 
• •. the mines authorities are :fully alive 1m 
this f'act; and that, as is but natural, every 
effort ·Will be made to trai.n the natives to do 
mere and, more skilled or semi-skilled work; 
and to take ful.l advantage of' each increase i.n 
the capacity of 1ow-wagcd •seiceted' natives 
to do such work ,., • • 1.5 . 
Opinions and e.xperi.enee of' the skill! potential of' 
A:frican (coioured) labour under.standably dif':f'ered ·widel.y·• 
Generalizations are patently dubious, though the proclivity 
to generalize in this field 0£ (very) human relations is 
not to be inhibited by any doubts 0£ validity .• 
Th.us Mr. Webber, genera1 manager of: Rand Mines, sai.dl 
Having skilled, or rather e.xperienced, coloured 
labour we have been able to go on and man our 
drills and do fairly decent work ... about as good 
as befbre , .. and it proves the who1e matter to our 
view that it is possible to run our mines with 16 
much less labour and cheapen our working costs ••• 
And a sub-committee of the Chamber of' Mines General Com• 
mittee in their evidence on underground. transport said: 
Xn some cases where mechanical appliances have 
been introduced; we find them erected and run 
entirely by nat:i.ves and so sa.tiiU'actorily as 
to obviate the extended employment of' white 
labour on economic grounds ••• 17 
Followed by Mr. Petersen, general manager of the 
Geldenbuis Estate Gold Mining Company, who said inte~ alia: 
We have some of' the Kaff'irs who are better 
machine men than some of' the white men; X 
have boys who have been working on the mine 
:from 12 to 15 years, and they are better 
machine men than many on the Rand nowadays 
••• they can place holes, fix up the machine 
and do everything that a white man can do, 
but of' course we are not allowed to let them 
blast ••• X do not think [that they could 
blast with safety], I: feel sure about :it. 
I have had experience with natives since 18 1879; and l know what a native can do ••• 
There was indeed even the proof' of' operational exper• 
ienoe that the Africans' skill-potential. could1 when cir-
cumstances demanded, be readily deployed. The Report 
noted that the coa1 mines offered a striking object less~n 
as to the degree to which the Af'rican could render un-
necessary the services o:f White men. 
In one mine where the man.8.ger inf'ormed us that 
he has natives who have been with him in every 
case f'or over ten years• we f'ound that practi• 
Cally the whole. oJ' the work was done by these 
·natives. who may be looked upon to all intents 
and purposes as being Kaf':fir colliers ·••we 
:found that underground the only white men em• 
ployed were six overseers, while on the surface 
natives were employed driving such engines as 
the law permitte~ and reqfiring in f'act hardly 
any white supervision ••• 9 
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The Commission disclosed a widely-known but rarely-acknow• 
ledged practice - that the actual operator of' the drill 
machines was; and al. ways had been, the t kaf'f'ir labourer' • 
This was stressed by a number of' mine m'ana~ers and engineers, 
who observed that the White machine-operator has a1ways 
been merely a supervisor and urged that the cheapest work 
would be got by increasing to the practicable limit the 
number 0£,machines under each White man•s supervision. 20 
In another context, the Commission ref'erred to 
an object lesson ••• furnished by the miners 
strike in. May, 1907, when although 50 per cent 
of' the underground white workers were on strike 
for several weeks the operations of the industry 
were hardly at all hampered thereby ••• They 
[the owners] were able to do this because the 
bUlk of' the work was and is done by indentured 
coloured labour, which could be kept at work 
f'or the time being by utilizing as supervisors 
the members of' the permanent white staf'f's of' 
the mines, and a number of' skilled and unskilled 
white men hastily recruited. 21 
The Commissio.n made a resolute attempt to establish in 
which direction economic rational.! ty, ·Or leas~-oost combi-
nation and allocation of' productive resources lay. It 
set out to provide actua1 cost data in respect of, for 
instance, (a) the utilization of coloured labour for all 
classes and categories of' mining work :from the unskilled 
roughest tramming and shovelling of broken rock and 
99. 
varriage to the shaf't, to the semi-skilled job of' opera-
ting underground machine drills f'or breaking ground, in-
cluding shaf't sinking, development and stoping (one of' 
the critical cost-operatio.ns) to skilled artisan-type 
jobs both underground and on the surf'ace, (b) the uti• 
lization of White labour f'or all similar classes and 
categories of' mining work but proceeding from the most 
skilled to the most unski~led, (c) varying combinations 
including machine drills of' dif'f'erent capacities ranging 
f'rom one miner to one machine to one White {or •selected' 
Coloured) supervisor per ten machines. 
It is beyond the scope of' this contoxt to examine the 
detail 22 but it was a thorough-going e:f'f'ort a.t anaJ.ysis 
of' perhaps the single most important £actor, determining 
the rate of' economic growth of' South Af'rica thon (and now). 
Give.n the overwhelming significance of' the gold-mining 
industry to South African economic development - on any 
theory of economic development ... nothing oou1d,• and even 
now no doubt can, compare with ea:tabli.sh:l.ng the current 
.least-oos'.f; combination of' factors of production in mining. 
Patently the optimization of productivity in gold•mining 
af'f'ects pro:fit-rates, hence savings .. investment rates, in 
all sectors of' the economy.· 
It can be argued that all. ~ ;eriori ca1culation in 
working costs is invalidated by the subjectivity 0£ the 
very concept of cost as the lost, alternative opportunity. 23 
Nonetheless the Majority Commissioners tried. their best 
and the 'f'acts• they report range widel.y. 
Mr. Ross Browne of' Rand Mines Ltd. made h!i.s •estimate 
of' Rand costs on the basis of' the most fa~ourable condi-
tions 1 , 1. .• e • carrying the coloured labour employment to 
practicable limits and arrived at a figure (f'or the year 
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1907) of' 15s. per ton against a ruling' 21•3s. per ton, 
24 or a reduction of' 30 per cent. The Commissioners 
after re-interpreting Mr. Ross Browne's assumptions con-
ceded that working costs might be reduced by 27 per cent 
as 'the average ••• for tho whole industry which ••• may 
possibly be arrived at, by persistence in the coloured 
labour policy under ideally favourable conditions and f'or 
no increase in output above that of 1906-7'• 
Then the Commissioners proceeded to establish their 
estimates of' working costs on the basis of the adoption 
of the White labour policy, a policy of employing White 
unskilled and skilled labour in virtual total replacement 
of' non-White labour throughout the mining industry. Their 
compar~tive standard of' labour ratoo and efficiency was the 
'all-wh:ilte' labour in the Californian minos. 25 On that 
key assumption (and others in regard to reduced rail and 
customs costs) which implied that the total working force, 
Whites only, would be one-fourth of the then working f'orce 
of' l:hites and Coloureds, the working costs of' the mining 
industry would be reduced by an almost identical 27 per cent 
as in the proposal by Mr. Ross Browne. 
But perhaps the modern management accountant would 
f'inally identify himself with Mr. C.H. Spenser, :Ln his 
minority of one, who scathingly commented: 
Tho Majority Report goes on to discuss at 
somo length the relative benefits accrt:dng to 
the country from the employment of' White or 
Coloured labour on the gold mines, but I do 
not intend to follow them into this academic 
discussion ••• i should like in the f'irst 
place to ref'er to an answer given by one of 
the engineering witnesses ••• to the ef'f'ect 
that a mine cannot be worked according to 
arithmetic f'o:nnulae. This is a f'act, and 
it seems to me that it is a fact which takes 
away most of' the value from such calculations 
as those contained in the Majority Report• 
until they have been confirmed by practical 
experience. 
In the second place, I should like to point 
out that nearly al.l the evidence quoted by the 
Majority Report in order to show that the costs 
of' working id. th White 1abour would be no greater, 
or less, than those of working with coloured 
labouv is obtained by picking certain parts of' 
the evidence of practical men, mine managers 
and engineers, who had themselves come, in 
their whole experience, to exactly the opposite 
conclusion.26 
And then Mr. Spencer becomes even more pointcds 
It seems to me a very dangerous method of 
reasoning, to take isolated pieces of' evidence 
on isolated departments of mining work, given 
by mine managers who all affirm that the sub• 
stitution of' white for coloured labour would 
mean a great increase in working costs, and 
to endeavour to prove £rom these pieces 0£ 
evidence, and from nothing else, that the 
witnesses were wrong in their main concl.usion. 
This could only be justified i:f' it was asswned 
that all the technical witnesses wore either 
incompetent or dishonest ••• But un1ess some 
such assumption is made, the use which this 
part of the Majority Report makes o:f' the 
technical evidence seems to ine to be, from 
a practical point of view, absurd,27 
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Although the Majority Report proved to its own 'ati$-
f'action, i:f' not to Mr. Spencer's and in due course/the 
Government of' the day, that •assuming the most fa.vourab1e 
conditions for low working cost, whether on a coloured or 
on a white labour basis, the figures show that so far as 
can be at present. :f'oreseen the ultimate attainable leve1 
of cost is for all practi6al purposes the same in both 
cases, 28 the Commissioners were more concerned to prove 
that the extra-economic case £or an all-White labour force 
in the mining industry was overwhelming and decisive. 
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With which policy (continuation 0£ the Coloured labour 
policy or White labour policy) does the balance 0£ advan-
tage liet the Commission asked itself'. It detailed at 
length 29 all the manifold and manifest gains from a White 
labour policy, claiming that its :full application would 
be •of' the nature of a chemical addition affecting the 
whole industrial organization and changing many of the 
£acts and possibilities of' the position•. The Commission 
itself' was opposed to any statutory demarcation 0£ work or 
job classification as between l·.'hite and Black. It dis-
missed all such specific colour bar reservations as im~ 
practicable and undesirable. It stood completely £or 
'the adoption of' the white labour policy [which] necessi-
tates the f'inal and complete abandonment of.' the coloured. 
labour policy' and (as already quoted) •upon this may be 
said to depend ·•• whether the vast expanses of.' South A:frica 
••• shall be the home of.' a great white people or be the habi-
tation' and breeding place of' masses of natives and other 
coloured people of mixed races. in a11 degrees 0£ semi. 
barbarism and semi-civilization'•30 
The emotive echo rings responsively and contemporan-
eously across the divide of the decades. 
Despite the ideological appeal, backed with as much 
economic calculation as could be pressed into service, of 
the Majority of the Minint!' Industry Commission of' 1908, the 
Botha Government of the Transvaal Colony did not accept 
its unequivoca1 recommend~tion of' an all-White J.abour force 
for the mining industry. Perhaps an exhaustive examina-
tion might establish why Botha and Snn.its (who had appointed 
the Commission, selected its members and drafted its terms 
of reference) tprned it down. 
vide a reasoned explanation. 
Conjecture can however pro-
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The Commission had proposed that its all-lfhi te pol.icy 
could be made effective by the simple action of ~ixing 
f'o:r:thwith a maximum limit to the number o:f Africans :from 
outside British South A:frica who might enter the Transvaal 
to serve indentures on the mines. This maximum shou1d be 
diminished automatically and periodically, say, every six, 
or, at the outside, twelve months, 'until importation is 31 
entirely stopped at a date not later than three years ahead'• 
But Botha, now prime minister o:f the Transvaal Colony, 
was no doubt still mindful o:f the key weapon which the 
railway agreement with the Portuguese gave hj_m in relation 
to the governments of the Cape and Natal, with whom he must 
soon sit down at the table of the Nationa1 Convention. 
Smuts, right-hand man o:f Botha and now supercharged with 
his vision and mission of unification, assuredly would. not 
have countenanced tho scrappJl.ng of' his bargaining bludgeon 
over all other representatives at the Convention by tearing 
up the modus vivendi with Mozambique. 
The Mining Industry Cottmlission was obviously being un-
realistic in expecting the Botha-Smuts combination to pro• 
hibit the indenture of' Portuguese African labour, wreck 
their rail-1ink to Delagoa Bay and sit down - stripped of 
the f'our aces and joker - to play the poker-game f'or the 
unification of' South Af'rica.32 
Perhaps, too, Botha and Smuts, whose contacts with the 
Transvaal-born 'Whites were much closer than those o:f the 
members of' the Commissj,on (and their trade .... unioni.st support-
ers from Britain), were unpersuaded by a11 the assurances 
that some thousands o:f Whites were onl.y too eager to accept 
manual labour underground in the mines. Some of' the most 
doubtf'ul rationalizations of the whole argument of the 
Mining Industry Commissioners, and o:f former mtiine-mana.ger 
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Cresswell in particular, relate to the wil1ingness of 
Whites to undertake 'ka:f'fir' s work'. Thus, inter ~t 
they said: 
We cannot regard any of the general objections, 
based rather upon a dying local prejudice than 
upon any reasoned argument, as being sufficient 
justification for continuing a policy otherwise 
und.esirable. 
The future leader of the South Af"rican Labour Party, 
Col. Cresswell, was not however able to persuade two future 
prime ministers, Generals Botha and Smuts, that the f'ate 
of South Africa as •the home of' a great White people' would 
be decisively determined by the adoption of his passionately 
recommended Whi to labour policy for the mining industry .• 
To have hazarded the profitability of the Transvaal Colony's 
greatest industry at this pre ... Union climactic would have 
been to hazard unification itself'. Botha, and assuredly 
Smuts, had a larger vision of what would secure the· posi-
tion of' the lfhi te man in South A:frica. It was control of 
the new greater polity of the Union .of' South Africa. 
Reporting, however; some f'ive years later the Bconomic 
Commission, 1914, found the local prejudice £ar from dying. 
On the contrary one of' the most disturbing realities tMs 
Commission noted was an unwillingness of White youths to 
enter the employment of' the mihes in either a skilled or 
unskilled capacity. It wrote: 
Very f'ew of the younger generation seem to 
seek employment in the mines. The supply of 
•en undergoun.d, apart from immigrating miners, 
is largely kept up by learners who do not go 
through a regular apprenticeship and are not 
all young ••• In view of' the very high earnings 
on the Witwatersrand, the fact that so f'ew of' 
the younger generation seek employment there 
may cause some surprise. No doubt the miner's 
phthisis disclosures form the c~ef item in 
I • 
•\ 
the explanation. But probably.another itehi of 
some weight is the almost universal South A:fri• 
can prejudice against manual ltork, which extends 
even to the work of' directing and supervising 
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CHAPTER 6 
LEGACY OF DISUNION 
The integrated society, which the mining markets of 
the Witswatersrand was forcing on the peoples of South 
Africa, had indeed no pol.:ltioal entity in South Af'rica in 
the 189o•s. From 1886 when the Witwatersrand goldf'ields 
were proclaimed lllltil 1910 when the Union of' South Africa 
was proclaimed, it is possible to see clearly the compul-
sion exercised by the economy on the po1ity. Resistance 
to economic integration into a unified South Africa by 
Kruger's republican polity developed into the Anglo-Boer 
War. But the Anglo-Boer War was itself' only an inter-
ruption in the compelling process of' integration conse-
quent upon ~arket that was being centred on the goldmining 
industry through the developmental consequences of' that 
industry. 
The history books have nruned it the Anglo-Boer War.of' 
1899-1902. This tends to obscure the real element of' 
civil war, which mani:fests the £ailure of' a single society 
to subsist as an entity. Politically there were four 
separate governmental units in South Africa in the last 
quarter 0£ the nineteenth century - the Cape Colony, the 
Colony of' Natalt the Transvaal Republic and the Orange 
Free State. But from 1886 the Rand•s gold was forcing 
the single society into being. It was the Rand market 
which made separation of' polit.ical authority unrelated to 
the new integrating phase in social process exerted by the 
mining industry. 
The element of' civil war was the consequence of politi-
cal responses to market reactions, as South A:frica was 
pushed and pulled into a single society. The war was not 
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only bettreen the Boers and the British, not on1y between 
Kruger and Steyn on the one side and Chamberlain and M.ilner 
on the other. It was also between the Transvaal.-Free 
State and the Cape-Natal and the quarrels were as much 
over railways and customs revenues of' the several govern-
mental units of' South Africa as over the strategical impera-
tives of' Downing Street. The clash between the patriarchal 
Kruger and the f'inancier Rhodes is not really compreheuded 
by the stereotype of economic imperialism of Marxist ortho-
docy or of' Afrikaner national.ism. 
The Britislbhistorian A.J.P. Taylor asserts that the 
British problem in South Af'rica was essentially strategic 
and political, not economic. The British, he writes, 
needed a united white South Africa in order to have strate-
gic security at the Cape - the lynchpin of the British 
Empire. 1 . The naval station at the Cape was doubtless 
more important to the •imperial factor• in the 1890's 
than Simonstown in the 197o•s. Doubtless,, too, as the 
South African historian, J.s. Marais, puts it, 'in the eyes 
of ·British statesmen a united South Africa - like a united 
Canada and a united Australia - would be a source of addi-
tional streng~h to the British Empire instead of' a source 
of' expense.' 2 
Yet the •causes• of' the Anglo-Boer uar, however ex-
haustively sought in the moves and motives of' Chamberlain, 
Milner, Rhodes and Kruger, should not exclude the critical 
examination of railways and customs policies of' the f'our 
South African governments from 1886 on.3 
The duality of political power, or will, in South Africa, 
was, says Prof'essor Marais, the real origin of' the Anglo-
Boer War. 4 The political federation of South Af'rica may 
not have been a 'historical necessity• and historical 
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determinism may not e:xp.JUn ;the War, as Marais argues. l:t 
is undeniable that new urgency was given to the problem o:f 
duality o:f power by the proving of the vast potentialities 
o:f the Witwatersrand gold:fields by 1895. But the politi-
cal uni:fication o:f South .Ai'rioa, hcnoe:forth, was the mani-
:fe st destiny of an ineluctable customs union and separately 
nationalized railway systems.5 
In 1896 Lord Selborne, the the11 Under-Secretary wrote 
to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, as :follows1 
In a generation the South African Republic will 
by its wealth and population dominate South Africa. 
South A:frican politics must revolve around the 
Transvaal• which rill be the only possible market 
:for the agricultural products or the manufactures 
o:f the Cape Colony and Natal. The commercial 
attractions o:f the Transvaal will be so groat 
that a Union o:f South African states with it 
will be absolutely necessary :for their prosperous 
existence. The only question in my opinion is 
whether that Union will be inside or outside the 
British Empire. 
The prea:oience o:f Lord Selborne is re:flected by the out-
come in 1961 o:f all the twists and turns of six decades of' 
subsequent South African history and social process. Be-
fore the Transvaal's dominance of' the South A£rioan poli-
tical economy would some sixty years later come to recon-
stitute the Union as the Republic of' South Africa outside 
the British Connnonwealth-Empire, the republican Transvaal. 
(or South A:f'rican Republic of the 1890's) was first to be 
defeated in the Anglo-ao~;rwar. The extraor~inary rapid-
ity, however, with which the post-war colonial Transvaal 
re-asserted its dominance over the political re1a~ionships 
of the four states of South Africa! was proof that the 
economic development the Rand gE..neratcd from its gold-
mining industry exercised an irrestiblo compulsion on the 
economies of the separate units to accept the Transvaal's 
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political leadership, first in the Union of South Africa 
and then decades aftdrwards in the Republic of South A:f'rica. 
The tough seed of Krugerism flowered into the political 
factor of Afrikanerdom. Afrikaner consciousness had 
scattered and sown itself in thd wilderness, which the un-
covered gold transformed into a market - the first truly 
dyhamic, integrating market in Southern Af'rican geopolitics. 
The interacting stimulation given by the mining industry of 
the Transvaa1 Republic to the railways and ports of the 
Cape Colony and the Colony of Natal became the most powerful. 
f~ctor in the economic development of the whole territoria1 
complex of South Africa. Inescapable problems of political 
sovereignty arose. 
Perhaps bebause it tends to disfigure some of the 
emotional images of the 1899-1902 South .African conflict, 
for wb.J.ch the significant preferred name in some Afrikaner 
writings is The Second Freedom War• the element of civil 
strife as among South Africans themselves is generally mini-
mi zed. But Jean van der Poel•s examination of' the railway 
and customs policies of the four separate governments, a.f'ter 
the gold discover~es of the Transvaal magnetized the inland 
market for the coastal colonies, makes it plain that there 
were irreconcilable conClicts of material interest among 
South Africans thdmselves. 
The nature of capitalization of a railway system, parti-
cularly on its inauguration and initial development, with 
its very large investment in absolutely speciCic track-
laying and long-lived assets, makes i~ crucially important 
for the investors correctly to forecast future demand for 
the rail services. The significance of such capitaliza-
tion on the costing and pricing of rail services and on 
competitive forms of transport will be examined later. 
The decision, which is not only a crucial but may even 
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prove crucifying :for the promoter-investors in a railway 
system., is what certainty attaches to the projected demand. 
In a sense they seek a guarantee of' progressive stability 
in the market which their railway is planned to serve. 
The importance of' established expectations in respect 
of' market demand f'or large lumps o:f :l.ni.tiating and develop-
ing capitalizat:i_on expl.ains why most railway systems are 
monopolies, generally with o:f:ficial sanction and often 
encouragement. 
and politic al• 
The implications o:f risk are both economic 
Market demand may fail to meet projections 
:i.n that the purely market :factors determining growth may 
change adversely. But in addition to this market or eco-
nomic risk, there is also the political risk. The o:f:fi-
c:lal, i.e. governmental, sanction and encourageme.nt of' 
monopoly expectations may be amended adversely. 
When a railway system is state-owned, the market risk 
and the political risk may be minimized within tbe terri-
tory of' state sovereignty. .l:.f' the state-owned system 
se.rvee a territory outside its jurisdiction and subject to 
anothet- state•s sovereignty, both market risk and political 
risk may be maximized. The particular market conditions 
and capitalization conditions of' the railway systems of' geo-
graphical South Africa in the last quarter of' the nine• 
teenth century exacerbated both market and political risks 
to the point of' being a cr.i tical cause of' the civil war 
element in the Anglo-Boer War. 
After the f'irst 60 miles of' rail track had been pioneered 
by private initiative under of'f'icial f'inaneial guarantees, 
they were •nationalized' by the Cape Government in 187' as 
the starting point f'or a developing Cape Railways to serve 
the growing dry diamond-diggings of' Kimberley both irom 
Cape Town and f'rom Port Elizabeth. Not to be outdone in 
linking its ports to the interior which now glittered from 
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the mounting diamond excitement, the Natal Railways al.so 
under government ownership set out f'rom Durban. 
So both Cape and Nata1 treasuries began to raise loans 
in Europe, the debt servicing of which was to be their 
major preoccupation for years to come. The cost of' •econo-
mic development' comes high, if economic development is 
measured in replacing ox-wagons with steel rails and engines, 
to serve vast expanses - more particularly if' the oxen f'ind 
their consumable stores always to hand• while iron monsters 
have to be f'ed on coal that has to be shipped all the way 
from Wales. 
By the beginning of 1884 Cape' railway debt was 
£12 1 000,000 and 50 per cent of' a half-million pounds of' 
interest had to come :f'rom a revenue which f'ell be1ow expendi-
ture by £672,000. Not ·to be outdone, the Legislative 
Assembly of' Natal raise.d its public debt to a total of' 
£5 1 000,000 when its total revenue for all governmental 
purposes was £700;0oo. 6 
This, however, was nothing to the intensification of 
'economic• or railway development, and its oost in debt-
servicing, when the market-demand moved further into the 
interior and began to glitter with Witwatersrand gold and 
not merely Kimberley brilliants. Both the Cape and Natal 
governments recognized that ineipient bankruptcy could be 
forestalled only when their respective rail lines reached 
right into the heart of the Witwatersrand, that market 
whi.ch by the 1890's a1ready so dominated the whole of South 
Africa as to establish a ,2!, ~acto economic unity. 
In the Transvaal. Republic, however, the government was 
President Paul Kruger. Isolationist and tradition-minded, 
Kruger was very much more concerned with his 2!, jure politi-
ca1 sovereignty. He was determined to maintain it against 
outside economic development, whether originating :from 
Uitlanders, or Cecil John Rhodes, or the Afrikaner Bond 
in the Cape, or even his :fellow-Afrikaners :ln the neigh-
bouring republic of' the Orange Free State. The social 
system of' the Transvaal Republic was not going to permi~ 
its way of life to be changed by any external entrepreneur-
i.al dynamism. So Kniger; checked in his attempts to ex-
tend his polity geographically to secure Ms O'W'l'1 link to 
the sea at Kosi Bay, was resolute in his turn to :frustrate 
both the Cape and. Natal. His answer to encirclement was 
a competitive rail line which, with the nerve-wracking co-
operation o:f Portugal and of' some of' 'Europe•s trickiest 
' :financiers, woUld run f'rom the Rand to Delagoa Bay in 
Mozambique. 
Kruger, .moreovert could at .least in this instance claim 
that economic rationality and sovereignty ran parallel in 
the more direct and shorter rail line between the Rand and 
Delagoa Bay as compared with the longer rail line from the 
Rand to either Port Elizabeth or Cape Town or to Durban. 
But railway costing - and rating - has its own impera• 
' tives. A rail line to reach its market hundreds of' arid 
miles away costs millions to lay. And a rail line which; 
by fiat c>:f the government in poli tica1 control o:f that 
market, is then .stopped short on1y 50 mi.les of' that market, 
imposes even more compelling imperatives. Waiting :for 
Kruger• s author! ty to extend the Cape Railways and the Natal. 
Railways into Johannesburg itself' did not encourage good-
wi.11. only when Kruger was sure that his Netherlands 
Company which he controlled would fi.nally achieve the compe-
tj tive link to Delagoa Bay did the Transvaal. President allow 
the Cape Railways to close the gap of the last 50 miles over 
Transvaal territory and also extended his indispensible 
sanction to the Natal Railways to comp1ete :J. ts service. f'r.om 
Durib1an to the Rand itself'. 
\ 
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For a· brief' year during which the Cape Railways was the. 
onl.y line· with a termin~ :Ln Johannesburg Ltsel:t,, by now tbe 
centre ·Of' a golden ree:f extending 30 rrdles either side 0£ it, 
this monopoly p()si tion proved that even a. high-.eost rai11ray 
l.ine could pay. With 85 per cent of the lucrative Trans-
vaal trade in 1893 9 the annual reports of the general 
manager o"£ the Cape Railways reported ,gratifying traffic 
records. · By 1895 :total imports through the Cape• s harbours 
·reached R13'k millions and the Cape Rail\1ays made a prof'it of 
£800.9 000.1 af'ter paying about £730,000 intere$t ·on 
e20,ooo,ooo capitalization.' . ' 
Durban, ho\!!ever; was much nearer:Johannesburg than Cape 
·Town or than· Port Ellzabeth. By permit.ti1?-g a ra!.1 line 
fro.m Durban• Presideni; Kruger had ensured that customs 
tariffs on :Lmpo:rts f'inally destined :for his own political 
terr:I. tory ... Md the .Raiu:l' s propensity "to consume anything 
from mining sto;res to the conventional necessities of' Rand• 
1ord plutocracy was gratif'y.ingly high - woul.d be the subject 
. .., '/- ·. 
0£ bilateral competition between the Cape Government and the 
Natal Government. ' ... , -He-also ensured that his ~ans.Vaal 
government would indirectly benef'it :from ·the rail revenues 
.acrruing to the longer section of' railway line under the 
administration of' the Nethez-land.s Company., 8 which completed 
the vital link ':rrom the Natal terminal, than f'rom the equally 
vital. link of'. the Cape terminal.~ 
The Rail.way convention between the Transvaal. and Natal 
1 .in· February 1. 894 S:Cknowl.edged Matal * .s i.ntere sts vis-a-.v1is . 
- . 
the Cape -and simultaneously a.okrlowledged the econondc real:i.-
tie s of' the shortest rail ·l:Lnk and least-cost railway charge 
,, . ' of' them all;- i.e.f':rom Portuguese D,elagoa Bay t~ the Rand's 
I ", ; ~ market-heart of' Southern Africa. Natal agreed to share the 
. \.'-;," Transvaal .. tra.££ic with Portugu.e se Del ago.a Bay ti· The appro·.;. 
. ~~- . ' 





written into the railway convention between the Transvaal 
and Natal concluded in February, 1894. Meanwhile the 
Orange Free State and the Cape Colony had already after 
·much difficulty set up a Customs Convention in 1889, which 
gave the Free State a fiscal stake in channelling its im-
ports through the Cape ports and hence over the Cape ra.1.1· 
ways to the Froe State section o:f the line. 
The con:frontation of the Tranevaal-Natal railway con-
vention and the Cape-OFS customs convention, with an agree-
ment between the Transvaal and Portuguese East Africa to pro-
vide a labour supply from Portuguese East Africa for the 
Rand mines in exchange :f'or a guaranteed share o:f the rail 
market demand of the Rand to Portuguese East Africa, and 
with a defensive political alliance between Krugdr's Trans-
vaal and Reitz•s Free State in anticipation of a future 
republican :federation (that also made provision for cdrtain 
duty reciprocity on tram.sit trade} provides some highly 
instruot~ve material for the economic theory of monopoli-
stic competition for a singlet dominant market. 
But the bewildering tactics of pricing of rail-transport 
services and customs-duty entry that constitute the story of 
Jean van der Poel's Railways and Customs Policies o:r South 
Africa had their extra-economic iapact. The political 
ploys of monopolistic competition introduced their over-
tones of ideological irreconoiliation. A 'final confer-
ence• in April, 1895, of all governments was held in Cape 
Town to reconcile politics with economies and both with 
market realities. The Cape Railways substituted alterna-
tive ox-wagon transport to carry goods off-loaded at the 
Dri:f'ts, SO miles short of Johannesburg, to counter Kruger•s 
tact:tc of sharply raising the rail rate on this last .50 
miles (which came under his controlled Netherlands rail 
company). 
indeed. 9 
The slide towards civil war became slippery 
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President ICru.ger responded to the -cape Railways econo-
mic tactic with his own political move. The Cape Rail· 
wa.y.s, as noted above, bad countered Krugb,er• is highly di.a ... 
•· . . . 
criminatory :rail rate on the l~st 50 miles :from Viljoens-
·dri:ft and Zand Drif't into Johannesburg by olf'f'•loadtng their 
rail freight at the Dri.f'ts f'or o?'-wa.gons·to complete :final 
delivery.. Kruger promptly ordered the closing of' the 
Drifts as ·ports of' entry f'or goods into the Transvaal • 
. From thi~ deliberately hostile act against the Cape to the 
even mo.re deliberate and more hostile J.ameson raid against 
the Transvaal, the · tragedy moved. to ultimatum and to wa.r .• 
Whether the causes of' the Ang.lo-Boer 'liar are to be f'ound 
:b1 the strategic :µeeds of B~i tain and the determination of' 
the British Colonial Of'f'ice to i.mpose its supremacy over 
the · T.ransvaa1 Republic, or whether they are to be found in 
the ideological i.niperatives of' Krugerism and Kruger's 
kra.gdadigb.eid never to accept less than complete sovereign 
, I 
republ.ic:an inc:Iepel1dence, the economic development set 0£'£_ 
throughout the territori,al area of South Africa by major 
capital investment 'in the .Rand mining industry ·was patently 
promoting a· single economic system .• This indeed was roeog-. 
nized - and perhaps· by none more clearly than President 
Brand ot the republican Orange Free State .. · in the attempt 
to establ.ish a customs union. Such a customs union J.ogi-
ca.ll.y led to some :form ot: :federal or unifying po1i tioal . / 
authori. ty. 
An economic heartland exercisds polit:ioa.1 magnetism•· 
'· A 2011 V"ere:ln, a customs union, a 
ward to an empire• a .federation., 
a.utbori ty. ... or the single market 
common market must go ::f'or» 
a community o'f' centralized 
will be broken up. 
Because the motivations and aims of' the political actors 
; ,_.,,_ in South A:trioa'in the bedevilled situation of' the 1890•$ 
¢,o_uld not be accommodated to .the imperat:ives of' the eeonomyt 
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a single polity could not be established until a. war had 
been fought, lost and won. The Anglo-Boer War in a sense 
settled nothing.. Political authority was of oours tra.ns-
:formed.· President Kruger departed to die in Switzerland 
and the Br.itisb High Connni.ssioner, Milner, .moved f'rom Cape 
Town to Pretoria. The •imperial :fac,tor• was now in un• . . 
f'ette.red political authority. But even imperial ideology 
consummated in. a Milner,.;chamberla.in .joint-will had to adapt 
i.tself' to the even .more imperious adaptive demands of' eco...: 
nomic rationality. 
Despite Milner•s pressing desire to federate all four 
territories under the temporary control of' the war-time 
British ·High Commis·sion Authority, ho was h~dly in Pretoria 
be:tore he was compelled to take even. more pre,ssing action 
to .s,art up the g~ld mines as the pr.ime mover of the tot~ 
Sotith Af'ri·can society• As early as Dec'ember, 1901 ,, bef'ore 
even the guer!i.lla stage of' the War had been ended .and. peace 
si€.'J'.led at V!9reeniging.· Milner signed his modus .vivendi with 
the Portuguese Government .• It allowed the mining companies 
to recruit :Af'racan labour :fr.om Mozambique !.n return for a 
railway rating agreement. ·which would gU.arantee a minimwn 
50 per Qent to .5.5 per cent ,olf' the Rand •competitive area• 
through Lourenco Marques on Delagoa Bay•' 
Del.agoa Bay by the f'acts of economic· geography remained 
as much the •rational• port o:f :1.mportationfor the Transvaal 
as a colony as it had been f'or the Transvaal as a republic. 
Constitutional changes sometimes change 1.i ttle more than 
constitutions. The rail lines of the Netherlands Company 
were now government property and the interests 0£ the 
Tran_svaa! colonial treasury were still best s~rved by the 
revenues .:from the rai.1 line of longest route within its 
territory and under i.ts own state ownership .• 
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Even more oompelline were the labour needs of the ndnes. 
From 1890 to 1899 it was estimated that the number of Afri-
cans employed on the gold-mines rose from 14,ooo to 97,000. 
In 1897 about half of these were from Portuguese East Africa, 
according to estimate. In 1904 the pe~ccntage of At'rican 
1abour from Portuguese East Africa on the Transvaal gold-
and coal-mining was officially put at 66 2/'J per cent in-
creasing to.just short of 70 per cent through the next :tour 
years and :tluctuatinb around SO per cent right down until 
1929. 
10 
The Peace of Vereeni.ging ended the hot war between 
republican independence and the i•perial factor but the 
cold war of railway rates and customs tariffs continued to 
presage an economic debacle and a renewal of the civil war. 
. . 1 1 . 
Even replacement of the hated Milner by the conciliatory 
Lord Selborne as the 'imperia1 factor' could not <lissolve 
the •railway factor• as an integrator of economic develop-
ment and the disintegrator of political separatism. 
l:ndeed the dominance of' the Transvaal. mining-market was 
strengthened by Nilner•s £usion of' the pre-war republican 
in1and railway systems (of' the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State) into the Central Railways. The maritime colonies 
of Natal. and the Cape attempted to overcome the to them 
financially disastrous drain on the Transvaal's railway 
traffic market f'rom the competitive rates of' Delagoa Bay. 
They of'fered rebates to Transvaal merchants importing 
through their respective ports of' Durban, Cape Tow.n and 
Port Elizabeth and transporting over their respective Natal 
and Cape rail lines. But the Natal and Cape railway and 
political authorities were met by a threat from Lord 
Selborne of countervailing rail rates over the in.land 
Central railways under the latter's control.. 
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The Cape _.and Natal were f'oroed to yie1d to His Majesty's 
High Cmnmiasioner Selborne 1 s bargain1.ng strE!ngth ,.,. depl.oyed 
in a manner hardly di.f'.ferent from .its use by Republican 
Presidential Kruger be:fore him,. The basic problem of' acco-
nnnodating the adaptive e:xigenoies o'f' economio development 
within a non•unif'ied polity rema:inedi Either the ci.v.il war 
li'OUld b:i"eak out anetf' or ·some form of' po.1.i. tical £ederation 
would have to be brought about~ As Jean van der Poel put it: 
A commercial crisi-s which might easily have ended 
in civil war had thus been temporarily a:verted, but 
the danger of such a viol.ent outcome -of the pre• 
vaili.ng quarrels was.by no means over. One cir-
.. c'Wnst.a.1foe a.hove all other.s had given the contest ... 
ants pause and tempered their jealousies with a 
discretion that-was threeparts f'ear, namely, 
the imminent grant of se1£-government to the 
wealthiest colony in south Africa ••• South 
African statesmen, contemplating the probable 
results of a separatist policy on the part of 
the'new 'rransvaal. shrank f'rom the prospect of' 
chaos which it threatened• Bi 1;ter experience 
of' a recent past made such a course unthinkable .• 
Once that conv:i.ction had been reached, the reali-
zati-on that .nothing but politioai f'ederation 
coul.d ensure the future peace of' South Ai'rica 
began to impress itself' more and more strongly 
on the minds of' tMnld.ng people _. •• 1.2 
Meanwhile economic growth. .itself' appeared to have ground 
to a halt. After the usual inf'J.at:ionary war ... time boom.• a 
trade depression beginnin~ in 1902 -went on year after year. 
The depression itself' both encouraged the pol.i.tio.al separa• 
tism of.' the idE!lo1ogioally ... motivated and, on the other hand, 
the recogniti.on by int'luent:tal business interests that the 
return -of prosper.ity a-waited a political se.ttlement of' uni-
f'.ioation. 
Statesmanship in the persons of' Smuts, Botha and Merriman 
.no11 began to operate decisive1y in favour of' a \tni.f'ied po1:l-
. ' 
ti.cal system for the f'our separate polities. Thompson's 
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1:3 definitive account of the birth of' the Union of South Africa 
le-aves a strong impression that it was an act of' political 
will achieved by men who were essenti8l.ly concerned with 
politics ... and their farms. 14 The unifying in:fluence 0£ 
economic development had hitherto been unable to produce a 
zollverein or customs union or common market as the pre-
cursors of' a political federation. The aspirations of' 
the Boers and the British respecti-vely were too conflicting 
to contribute towards the realization of' a single polity 
until the tragedy of' war and its aftermath had exercised 
its l.eavening influence on that elite which dire,cts social 
change. 
Botha,, Smuts and Merriman among the South Afri.oans and 
Lord Selborne and the Milner Kindergarten (especially Li:onel 
Curtis) among the •imperial.ists• constituted just such an 
elite. But they wer~ men of' politics. That is politi• 
cians, not in the now pejorative sense of' ':fixers•, but as .. 
practitioners or. Aristotle ts 'master-.soience' amo.ng men. 
They saw politics, as Bernard Crick weii puts it, as arising 
f'rom accepting the :fact of' the simultaneous existence of' 
dif':ferent groups, hence·dif'ferent; interests and dif'f'erent 
traditions, within a territorial unit under a common rul..e. ·15 
To Smuts especia1ly politics was the master ... science in the 
sense •not that it includes or e%plai.ns all other sciences 
but in that .it gives them some priority, some order in their16 
claims on the always scarce resources of' any given community•• 
So when the next and crucial Intercolonial Conference 
was called at Pretoria in May, 1908, of' the £our South 
African governments with avowed object .of' arriving at a 
definitive railways and customs agreement, before even the 
details of economic negotiation were tabled, Smuts moved 
his w:o.ppo.sed motion in favour of a National Convention to 
draft a constitution for a united South Africa. And Smuts 
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·' 
as Tb.omps,on* s history makes clear, :was the principal. 
architect of' the Act of Union of' 1910:. On its la.st day, 
· · thi.$ Intereolonial Con:f'erenee passtj.d. Merriman• s resolution 
admitting •it was a practic.al impossibility under e~~sting 
conditions ft t,o reconc.:i.1e •the financial requirements and 
economic policies of'the various South African ~vertunents•. 1 7 
From~he ~time that the gold-rich market of' the Rand was 
f'.irst proved in 1886t the economic development .:Lt generated 
began to unif'y all South Africa and al.l South .Africans• 
English-speakiz1:g and Afrikaans-speaking, White a;nd non•Wh:l.te,. 
urban and rural; financier and :farmer, merchant and manu• · 
:facturer, republican and ool.onialist, poor White and.poor 
Black ... in a single social system. But the economic 
deitelopment was not in itself' capable o:f reconciling be..:. 
lief's; motives and aims. Only political ·will could br:lng 
into being the single pol:i.ty that wou1d henoef'orth interact 
with economic development to 13ustain a single aoeia1 sy.stem "" 
and when almost exac.tljt hal.f' a. century later the '·never-
.subdued ethos of' .Af'rikanerdom compell:ed republ.ican inde-
pendence, it was the· political. f'actor that impo.sed tlte 
Ilepubl:lc of'· South Afri.ca. 
At the Nationai Convention to bring ·:about Unionj the 
· political will was· ·ex.pressed pi-imarily through Smuts and 
Merriman. The motivating ambitions of' the man who in due, 
cour:se was to· give new intens.i:fied purposiveness to A£rikan-
e·rdom, General J .B.M. Hert.zog. ·key delegate of the Free 
State, were :for the pre sent· conc<intrated on J.anguage re cog• 
nition.; Mertzog indeed 'Was one of' those 1-rho saw clearly· ... 
more -,clear1y than most .- that the keys to the control o:r 
the polity were possessed by teache.rs as much as by poli.ti-
cians, and by:both combined more eff'ectively than by busi-. 
ness men• 
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Chapter III of Thompson's The Unification of South Africa 
is headed: the origins of the principal features of' the 
South African consti tuti.on. He discusses (i) the personal 
factor (ii) the form of' the constitution (iii) political 
rights (iv) the eltl!'Ctora1 system {v) language. These in-
deed were the issues of the National Convention and it was 
the.ir political aspects and not their economi.c aspects that 
absorbed the time and thoughts of' the Convention. 
The constitution that emerged was decisiveJ.y shaped by 
the political. philosophy of' Smuts and Merriman. The two 
critical questions of th.eir concern related to the f'orm of' 
the constitution • :flexible or rigidf unitary or f'ederal-
istic. Merriman favoured an Wlitary constitution because 
he thought four federal parliaments an unnecessary extrava-
gance and he was opposed to the idea of judicial review. 
Smuts, af'tor exploring a modified f'orm of f'edera.li.sm in his 
18 f':irst •suggested Scheme•, became convinced of the need 
for a concentration of centralized power in a un.ion that 
woul.d adapt itself to future change. 
Nothing in Thompson•s st~dy suggests that e.ither Merriman 
or Smuts, or indeed other critical thinkers such as Lionel 
Curtis and R.H. Brand, gave much thought as, to wbJ.ch form 
of constitution • unitary or federal, flexible or rigid -
would promote the most rapid rate of' economic growth. Even 
R.H. Brand seemed to accept that the coming togother in a 
s.ingle polity - and not the form of that polity - was the 
essential condition for the resumption of' economic growth. 
:It is not possibJ:e to consider this interest.ing point but 
the thought may be ventured that while federalism may have 
curtailed state interventionism and.thereby promoted econo. 
mic growth, it may also have made the political settlement 
of' the rail.ways and customs factor in the f':J.nanc.ial and 
:fiscal problems of' the several f'ormer colonies more stubborn 
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and have served as a continuing source o:f future conflict. 
It is true that the National Convention was to leave 
rai1way and tari£f policy part of the legacy of' disunion 
that carried on beyond tho Act 0£ Union. But the actual 
settl.ement of the economic f'aetor that had so bedevilled 
political relationships., from the moment that the Rand'* s 
mining-market had exerted its .integrating irresisti.bili.ty, 
was disposed of' with remarkably little di:f':ficulty. 
The f'inanci al and rail ways chapters of' the cons ti tu ti.on 
11ere largely those provided :for in the programme Which the 
Transvaal delegation. (expressing the chief' bond between 
Government and Opposition members of' the Transvaal delega-
tion) took to the National Convent:lon. 19 Signif'icantly 
these propo.sals had been worked out by the members of the 
Mi1ner Kindergarten, who constituted the civil service of' 
the Transvaal Colony. 20 The Union acquired colonial 
government assets and ooDonia.1 government debts. More 
particularly all rai~ways and harbours became the national• 
ized property of the Union Government, administered by a. 
specially oonstitutad South African Ra.i.1ways and Harbours 
Board. 
Of' the total publi~ debt of' all f'our ·colonies as at 
, 1910 amounting to £113 mi11ion, 46 per cent was the burden 
of' the Cape; 27 per cent o:f the Transvaai, 19 per cent of' 
Natal. and 7 per cent of the Orange River Colony. (or orange 
Free State}. The net deb.t per head of' White population was, 
in round :figures, £90 in the Caj>e Colony., ·£73 in the Trans-
vaal, £221 in Natal ·and £47 in the Orange River Colony. 
The ·principal.' capital assets f'or which the major portion 
of' this indebtedness had been incurred were the railways and 
harbour.s; which were vaiued at £8.4 mil.lion 1n re.speot of' the 
four colonies. But the valuation of capital assets, 
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especially such highly specialized assets as railway 
systE!DB and harbour installations, is very directly related 
to their net earning capacity. The table overleaf is 
therelfore informative of' the bargaining strength and weak-
ness of the representatives o:f the assembled treasuries at 
the National Convention. 
The weakness of the Cape and of Natal· is obvious :from 
the major proportion of total receipts that came from their 
railways (and customs) and the ominous re•occurrence o:f 
annual deficits on their current budgets in an era when 
budgetary arithmetic was interpreted with Gladstonian 
nicety rather than Keynesian contempt. Not only did the 
railway and customs receipts of the Cape (and to a lesser 
e%tent Natal) fail to come up to the expectations on which 
the original capital investment decisions had been made but 
the real capital valuation of the assets was much more re• 
lated to the marke~ authority of the Transvaal Volksraad 
than to tl}.e accounti.ng procedures o'f' the Capo Par1iament. 
The financial cards at the Convention table were cer-
tain1y stacked against the coastal colonies of the Cape and 
Natal. The assumption 0£ liabilities of the individual 
colonies by a Union Treasury more than counter-bal.anced the 
take-over of colonial assets in so far as the Cape and Natal 
were concerned, and they readily acqui.esced in the not un-
generous proposals of' the Transvaal.. As far as the Trans-
vaal was concerned, tho quid Ero quo for accepting the 
major share of :tinancia1 obligation for the Union•s finances 
was the acceptance of the Transvaal's proposals for the 
:f'uture administration of the South African Railways and 
Harbours. 
These.- largely drafted by Philip Kerr as a supplement 
to the Selborne Memorandum - provided for the Railways to be 
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·Table showi!!S Ordina:.:I Revenue 1 Ordina!l: Ex~enditure and Net 
Balances of' the Four Colonies 1202l2 to 1202L10 
All figures in millions of pounds 
CAPE COLONY 





1902-3 5•617 11•701 1.1 .197 +0.503 
1903-4 5•120 9•91:3 10•862 -0•949 
1904-5 4•033 8•472 9•149 -0•677 
1905-6 )•940 8•236 8•231 +0•005 
1906-7 3•662 7•701 8•)49 -0•648 
1907-8 3•091.f. . 6•981 7•973 -0•991 
1908-9 3•065 7•312 7•681 -0·.'.369 
1909-10 3 • 14;3 7.747· 7·611 +0.136 
Cumulative -2·991 
NATAL 
1902-3 2•286 4•.'.334 5• 102 -0•767 
1903 .. 4 2· 1~99 4•160 4•071 +0•088 
1904-5 1·884 '.)• .'.384 3.• 81 l~ -0•429 
1905-6 2.085 3·665 3·673 .. 0.008 
1906-7 1 ·881 3·471 3·681 -0•209 
1907-8 2·019 3•510 3·689 -0·179 
1908-9 1·989 .'.3•.569 3•530 +0•038 
1909-10 2•409 4•29'.3 3•530 +0.763 
Cumulative -0•70.5 
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Table • Continued 
TRANSVAAL 
Year Ordinary Revenue Ordinary Surplus 
Expenditure or 
Mining Tota1 Total Def':1oi t 
TBJl'ation 
1902-:3 0·508 5•427 4•273 +1 -154 
1903.4 0·720 5•33:3 4·318 +1•014 
1904 .. 5 0•791 li•411 4•018 +0•393 
1905-6 0•983 4•670 4•2j6 +0•433 
1906 ... 7 1•236 4•651 li·41.5 +0•236 
1907-8 1•068 4•670 4• 118 +0•551 
1908-9 1 ·436 5•735 4.553 +1 • HJ2 
1909 .. 10 1 •340 5•585 4·792 +0•792 
Cumulative +5•7.58 
ORANGE RIVER COLONY (o.F.s.) 
Year Ordinary Revenue Ordinary Surplus 
Expend! tu:f:e or 
Customs Total Total 
Receipts 
1902-3 0•288 0•956 0•839 +0• 116 
1903-4 0•419 0•87.5 0•807 +0•067 
1904-5 0•298 0·786 0·780 +0•005 
1905-6 0·.305 0•759 0•759 +0•000 
1906-7 0•310 0•787 0•774 +0•012 
1907-8 0•285 0•740 0•727 +0•012 
1908-9 0•283 0•91.5 0•952 -0·037 
1909-10 0•:342 0•952 0•957 -0•004 
Cumulative +0• 173 
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administered as •commercial undertakings' and.not used •as 
instruments of taxation• t while rates were to be kept as low 
as possible with no unreasonable preferences. Commercial 
and industrial inte.rests in the Transvaal. strongly favoured 
these principles. With minor modif':i.cations, they £ormed 
the relevant sections of' tho Act of' Union. 
The actual wording of Sections 128, 129 t 1 :'}0, 1 :31 , 132 
and 1.33 provided, however, :for just that degree of ainbign!ty 
which enabled subsequent politicians to render nurgatory the 
.intentions 0£ the Selborne Memorandum to free the future 
railways of' Union and i.ts rating policy :from political 
jobbery and influence. The removal of' all impediments to 
internal free trade was, of courso, implicit in un1.£ication. 
In the course o"f: time the Un:ion• a external customs tariff' 
policy was to become a major cause of' dissension but the 
conflict of' interest was not int.er-colonial or .inter-
prorincial. 
In the financial and redlway <li.scussions of the Nationa1 
Convention, it was reuognized that the Tl.~ansvaal held.all 
the a.ces. Trouble started oniy when the Transvaal. produced 
the joker in the pack. This was the guaranteed share of 
the Rand railway traf'fi.c f'or the rai.l line through Lourenco 
Marques at Delagoa Bay. The Transvaal. Government had been 
negotiating with the Portuguese authorities £or a new 
Mozambique Convention to rep1ace the old modus vivendi of 
Milner. The new treaty provided that Lourenco Marques 
would be assured of at least 50 per cent of.' the gross ton-
nage of commercial seaborne traffic destined for the Wit-
watersrand. 
The reaction of the Nata1 and Cape delegates; when 
Botha requested. that the Mozambique Convention be accepted 
as binding on the forthcoming Union of South Afri.ca. was one 
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of' the keenest disappointment that unif'ication was not to 




again, however, it was the turn of' the economic 
exercise its imperatives over the newly emerging 
The continued supply .of Af'rican labour :from 
Portuguese East Africa was vital to the gold-mining industry, 
more especia11y as the last of the indentured Chinese labour 
were being repatriated. Over 50 per cent of' the unakil1ed • 
African - labour employed by the Transvaal. gold-mining 
industry in 1910 came f'rom Portuguese territory by agreement 
with the PortugUese Government. By 1910 the gold output 
o"f: the Transvaal. mines had reached tho then post-war record 
:figure of over 7f million ounces, val.ucd at nearly 
£32,000 11 000 and rapresenting ,34•20 per cent of' total world 
output. 
Without the labour supply from Portuguese ~ast Af'rica, 
which kept the average Af'rican mine-worker's monthly wage 
at /.i.8s.7d. and tbo aver.age Uhite mine-worker's monthly wage 
at 456s. ~ gold-mining costs would have critically ~duced 
the marginal. grade of" ore and theref'ore tota1 gold output. 
A oubstantial reduction in gold output would have heavily 
cut the volume of' imports d.nto the Witwatersrand and hence 
the totaJ. quantum o:f tho Vi te.l traf'f'ic market f'or Natal's 
and the Cape' e rail ways and habours • In addition Natal t s 
and the Cape• s own agricultural trade ,.,i th the Rand· would 
have fallen Rarri E,assu with the Rand's diminishing gol.d. 
output. 
The coming constitution of' the single pol.ity of the 
Uni.on of' South A:f'rioa did not give absolute power to that 
polity to minimize gold-mining costs through the continued 
supply of' the appropriate numbers of' 1mskillod Mr:f..can 
workers., This depended no less on the external. polity of 
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the Portuguese, who woul.d exercise it in f'avour of' the 
Transvaal gold-mi.nee only in return :for the minimum guar.an-
. teed 50 per cent share of' the rJj. twatersrand rail tra£f'ic 
through Lourenco Marques. 
Hence the Capo and Natal had no alter.native but to 
accept that the Mozambique Convention in its entirety was 
in the interest ·Of the Union of' South Af'rica and all. its 
provinces.• as much indeed as it al.ways had been in the 
interests of the four separate colonies, though the coastal 
colonies had not hitherto realized the obvious. The 
Transvaal-Mozambique Convention, now binding on the Union, 
had its related undertakings to secure a minimum 50 per cont 
of the Witwatersrand tra:ff'ic through Lourenco Marques, )0 
per cont through Natal ports and the remaining 15·20 per cent 
through Cape ports by appropriate modif'ication of' railway 
rates. This was to add one more insolub1e problem to the 
task of' tho Union's Railway and Harbour Board in its consti-
tutional. injunction to administer its state-owned under-
takings 1 on business principles' and to fix railway rates 
at a vague.ly-dof':i.ned cost. 
The interpretation and misinterpretation of' these 
sections of the Act of' Union have ;from 1910 onwards been 
one of' the main restrictive influences on the economic 
dcvelopr.ient o:f the new political economy of' South Af'rica; 
a political economy at l.ast uni:fied, after previous abortive 
attempts, in a definitive instrument of the pol.ity. 
The :finance and railway provisions of' the Act of Union 
of' 1910 are of' special signi:ficance. Finance is patently 
one 0£ the key sources of' power. Under the Act of Union 
that power was secured completely and virtua11y exclusively 
to the central government 0£ the Union of South Africa. 
The provincial governments of' the Capc 1 Transvaalt Natal 
and the Orange Free State - dependent on grants rrom the 
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Union Treasury and with very limited clireot trucing autho• 
rity - have through their total :financial dependence on 
the central government no real autonomy at all~ The 
centralization of' sovereign power in the Union Parliament 
was £a.r•reaching and, u1 timately, ·to prove beyond l:lmita• 
tion. 
Tb.ose sectio~s of the Act -of' Union which sp.ecif'y in 
great detail how the railways and harbours of' the Union are 
to be administered, and how their rating principles deter-
mined• are \Ulusual' ·"!" and perhaps unique - in constitutional 
law. Zn one respect they might well. be regarded as the 
peace 'terms of the civil war between the separate states of 
South Afr.ica1; 1thereas the peace terms of the same war be• 
tween the Boers and the British had been concluded eight 
year.s previously at the Treaty -of' Vereeni.gtng·. 
In another respect those particular sect.ions were an 
acknowledgement .of.' the crucial importance of' transportation 
to South African economic development. For the common 
market of South Africa to progress as a political economy .• 
it 'ttas neces.sary for its conf'lioting elements to be brought 
within a single polity that would promote the inter-r~l.ation­
ships and inter-connections o:f a unifying market. Mobili. ty 
0£ resources is a :function o:f a market price-system. Trans-
portation not only gives movement to resources but its in-
tensif'i.oation of' mobi.J.ity progressively optimizes the pro-
ductivi.ty of' market-linkage .• 
It is e:ff'icient transport which indeed gives meaning 
to a common market and reconcil.es re,source-utilization w:i.thin 
the market. l:t is an e£f'ectivo polity which conciliates 
human relationships. Wi.thout et':ficiant transportation 
there ean be no linltage of economic activi.t:ies and without 
e:ff'ective political sovereignty there can be no r-ule of' 
1 ~31. 
order. Both are f'undamental to the network of a po1itical 
economy evolving as a peaceful society. 
The constitution of' an expanding, enterprising market 
from out of' the vast separations of' south Af'riea *" the divi-
. sions o:f· its human relationships no less than the disper-
sions of' its natural resources - required an Act of' Union 
that would incorporate the instruments o:f cohesion. A 
unifying political authority as well as a unifying trans. 
portation sarvice was essential f'or a developing social 
system. The Union's Parliament and the South African 
Railways and Harbours were the chosen instrwnents. 
Unfortunate1y the Act of Union bequeathed its legacy 
of' disunion. The political· factor of' Af'rikanerdom was 
unsatie:faea by its inheritance., while the new White polity 
almost immediately addressed itself• first, to limit and• 
f"tnally, to e1iminate the .inheri. ta.nee o-r the Af'rioans. 
\ 
PliAPTER 2 
.TiiE. WHITE POLITY TAKES CHARGE 
CHAPTER 7 
THE 'WIIITE POLITY TAKES CHARGE 
The White's customary right to rule in the economy 
depended on White control of' Parliament and that in turn 
necessitated guarantee by the ballot box. Land-rights., 
employment-rights and voting•rights have inconsequence 
been as much part of' South African economic hi.story as of 
South African political history. Once the Whites of' South 
Af'rica had agreed at their National Convention on the terms 
on which they would constitute the Union Government f'or the 
common market of' South Africa, much subsequent parliamen-
tary and administrative energy was taken up with extending 
land-benefits and employment opportunities f'or the VlUtes 
and in dim'inishing the voting bene:f'its and opportunities 
of the non-Whites. 
To entrench the preferential position of' the Wlrl.tes 
against any egalitarian changed coming from economic develop• 
ment was ultimately dependent on the total di.senf'ranch:ise-
ment of' the non•'Wh.ites. To have the vote was to exercise 
influence through the polity, not to have the vote was to 
incapacitate potentiality in the economy. The vote con-
!'erred economic status and economic status was an open door 
to social status. Hence the political factor never rested 
until it had undone what the imperial f'actor had done. 
Afrikanerdom came to power on its twent:ieth-century mandate 
to disenfranchise those whom the •outside interference• of 
the nineteenth century had enfranchised. 
The pre-Union position had been long-established. In 
the Cape Colony a •citizenship• status had been given to 
non-Whites of' the Cape by Article 8 of' the Cape of' Good Hope 
Constitution Ordinance of' 18.52. That article contained 
no re:terence to race or colour as disqualif'ications and 
the principle was maintained ''hen responsible government• 
was granted to the Cape in 1872, in the Parliamentary 
Registration Act of' 1887 and the Franchise and Ballot Act 
No~9 of 1892. Despite the steady stiffening of' voting 
quali:fica•tons, by 1909 there were in the Cape 142;367 
voters (all male) of' whom 121 ,336 or 85•2 per cent were 
White, 1:3 1 611 or 9• 5 per cent were Coloured, 783 or 0•6 
per cent were Asiatic and 6,637 or 4.7 per cent Af'rican. 1 
In Natal Colony• the Charter of Natal.; 1856, granted 
the vote to all adult males on i»roperty and income qualifi-
cations without reference to race or colour. But the early 
Natal legislators - anticipating by a century the Union 
legislators in using the letter of the law to annihilate 
its spirit - passed Natal Law·No.11 of 1865 which dis-
qualified all Africans, except those exempt f'rom Native 
law• :from exeroi.s:.lng the vote. Consequently; since the 
White Natal legislators decided who might be 'exempted :from 
Native law•, it comes as no surprise that in 1907 there were 
in Natal 23,686 registered voters of whom 23,480 or 99•1 
per cent were White, 1.50 Indiqi, .50 Coloured and 6 A:frican. 
The old Transvaal or South Af'rioan Republic had been 
even more :fundamental. Xts Grondwet of' 1858 clearly stateda 
the people desire to permit no equality between Coloured 
people ·and the lib.ite inhabitants, either in Church or State. 
This was repeated again and again in for instance Law No.4 
of' 1890, which declared: persons of colour, bastards, peD$«ins 
o:f openly bad behaviour and unrehabiiitated bankrupts were 
ineligible f'or either Volksraad. In the Orange Free State, 
the Bloem:f'ontein Convention, 1854, gave voting rights to 
burghers defined as 'all wldte persons• born in the State 
or with residential qualifications. 
The so-called northern principle of the Transvaal-
Free State. was written into the Treaty of Vereeniging, 1902, 
that ended the Anglo-Boer War. When responsible government 
was granted to the Transvaal in December, 1906, political 
rights were given to White adult ma1es only and in June, 
1907, when the Orange River Colony was granted similar 
responsible government, clause Xl'. laid down that voting 
qual.if'ications were •£or every White Britidh subject of' 
the age of' 21 upwards'• 
The National Convdntion had been convened to forge a 
new single polity from the Cape, Natal, Transvaal ·and Orange 
Free State. And although the franchise p:..'Ovision was of 
course a crucial hurdle, it presented no really dif'f'icu1t 
barrier to such skilled negotiators of' constitutiona1 
obstacles as Smuts of' the Transvaal and Merriman of the Cape. 
Before the Convention started both had - reluctantly -
reached the conclusion that if the Union of South Africa was 
to be achieved at all the then-existing f'ranohi.se laws of' 
the several provinces would have to be left unchanged. The 
obstacle was overcome by the relatively-easily reached 
agreement not to put up the particu1ar hurdle at all. 
It would be le:ft f'or the Union Parliament to encounter 
the obstacle and to learn that its removal would requj.re 
decades of oiroumlooution and ultimately subversion. At 
the National Convention itself, the Africans were not of' 
oourse represented directly. Botha as prime minister o:f 
the Transvaal made it clear that the :first duty of the Con• 
vention was to bring about the union of the White races 0£ 
South Africa and any extension of tho •southern principle' 
of a civilized franchise into the northern provinces was 
utterly unacceptable. The committee appointed duly pro-
posed that the existing :franchise provisions in ea6h of' 
the individual. provinces shoul.d continue and without muoh 
debate, this recommendation became the relevant clause 0£ 
the Act of Union, entrenched against simple amendment by 
the requirement of a two-thirds majority 0£ both houses of 
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Parliament sitting together to secure a lawfUl change. 
Another aspect of the :future Union•s electral system, 
that was to have crucial consequences on control 0£ Parlia-
ment and hence on economic development, was the value to be 
attached to the individual vote. One vote, one value had 
never prevailed in any of the constituent colonies or 
republics. The old Cape Colony had substantiall.y favoured 
the rural as against the urban voter - the extreme being 
Victoria East with 445 voters to a parliamentary member and 
urban Woodstock in the Cape Peninsula w:t.th 2 1 691 voters to 
a member. J:n Natal the only truly urban constituencies 
of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were so under-represented -
Durban w:l.th 1,500 voters returning one member against Alfred 
County with 389 voters returning two - that the farming ele-
mcnt always had the decisive say in Natal politics. In the 
Transvaal or old South Af'rican Republic the complete deter-
mination to ensure that political power was always retained 
by the •volk' or A£rik.andr farmers as against the Uitlanders 
of Johannesburg, had been a real factor in both the JaJ11cson 
Raid and the Anglo-Boer War.3 in the Free State alone, 
the rura1 predominance throughout the all-White, a1most 
wholly non-urban, electorate was so pervasive that no 
arti£icial aids vere required to support the farm vote • 
.Amongst those who gathered at the National Convention, 
fanning interests were well to the fore ~th the majority 
of' delegates occupat:l.onally identified as :f'armeirs. Over 
and above the ba1ano1ng of the rural-urban voting values, 
there was perhaps the even more delicate balancing of the 
representative strength o:f' the former colonies-republics, 
now provinces, in the Uni.on Parliament. Discussion was 
heated and occasionally threatened the collapse ·Of' the 
Conventi.on. Section 40 settled an ad hoc division which --over-represented the small.er provinces of' Natal and the 
Orange Free State and provided f'or regular delindlation of' 
constituencies that would allow, &!!ter alia, f'or an under 
or over-loading of 15 per cent either way. 
Although some members ,of' the Convention :intended that 
the loading provision would f'avour the urban rather than 
the rural vote, the reversd application was equally possible. 
Over the years the range of' discretion of an overall 30 per 
cent proved distinctly advantageous to the rural oons:tit• 
uency. The First Delimitation Commission certainly inter• 
preted Section 40 to justify over-weighting of' sparsely 
populated rural districts so that, according to Thompson, 
the main urban areas o:f the Union were given 40 seats and 
the rest of' the country 81; whereas if' each provi.nce.' had 
been divided into equal constituencies those mun urban 
areas would have had. 4D seats and the rest of the country 
·7s. 4 
The election for the :fi.rst Parliament of' the Union 
of' South A£ri.ea was won by General Botha' s Party .. only . 
:formally constituted as the South Af'rican National Party 
in 1911 and· known as the Nationalists, until thie label 
was taken ov4r by General Hertzog when he broke away to 
f'orm his separate Party :in 1913. In the Cape• Botha•s 
P.arty won 29 seats - all. rural and the main1y English-
speaking Unionists secured 12 urban and 9 rural seats with 
one Independent (urban)1 in the Orange Free State, Botha's 
Party (known as the.Orangia Unie) won 16 out of 17 seats; 
in the Transvaal Botb.a1 s P.a.rty (known as Het Volk) won all 
the rural• 1'7, seats and ' urban w.lth the Unionists securing 
12 urban and the Labour Party 4 urban seats; in Natal most 
seats were won by so-styled. Independents. 
Thomp,son, after noting the impossibility of' trying to 
estimate the strength of' the partie.s because. of' the many 
unopposed.· seats and the numerous independents, concludes: 
What the results did show was that, notwith• 
,standing the 'non•rac:ial *' platforms o'f' all the 
partles.9 • there was a very loose correspondence 
between (race• and politics throughout the 
Union. Every di vision won by a Nationalist 
(:t.,e'•"\ Botha•s Party) contained a large nwnber 
of' Afrikaners; every non ... Na:tionalist di vision 
contained a large nwnber of' British South Af'ri·-
oans. The overwhelming majority ot the 
A:f'rikaner electorate had certa:i.nly voted 
Nationalist; the overwhelming majority .of 
British South Africans had certaJ.nl:f voted 
non-Nat.:tonaltst.1 All the Nationalist divi-
sions were rural except three • one in.Pretori.a 
and tU-~e on the,tlitwatersrand, whichfef'lected 
the be gi.nnings of' a town:ward movement of' 
Mrikan.ers; all the non-Nationalist dirt-
s.tons wElre urban except seventeen, which 
were :the only areas where Br:l ti sh settl.e• S 
ment bad ta.ken root on an ·ef'fecti ve .sCJ.ale. 
1'.'he dominant and dominating representa.ti·<>tt o.f' Afrikaans• 
epeaki:rlg farmers was to g:lye a very particular character to 
Parliament t".rom 1910 on; and throughout the decades the 
f'arm.er element, :no l.ess than the A£rikaner element; was 
to exe.rcise a powerful and of'ten decisive influeno.e on the 
,shape ... and pace - of' the development of tho now f'ormal..ly 
unif'ied economy .• 
The .new Parliament - and all-lfuite polity • very soon 
turned' its attention to land· and labour-utilization and 
thei.r interconnections. Oil November 14, 1910, the M:l.:M.ster 
moved to .appoint a Select Committee o.n Nat.ive A£f'a.irs (s,.o. 
3/1910') to investigate the quest~on of: African land settle-
ment with reference to the pro bl.em of' Native .squatters on 
White f't:1.rms; in the second ses.sion of' the First Parl.ia.ment 
the Mines ,and Works Regulation Act No.12 of 1911 and the 
Native Labour Regulation Act No+ 15 of 1911 were passed. 
In an earlier chapter• the South African Way of' Life• 
the manner in which the mining industry of the 'tfi twaters-
rand ach1.eved the almost unique monopsonistic position 1n 
the unskilled (African) labour market was briefly considered. 
In essence the collective aim of the mine-owners, the Chamber 
of 'Mines, was to control the recruitment and remuneration of' 
African labour so as to eliminate inter-mine competition. 
Zn respect of labour from outside the borders of' South 
Africa, the WNLA f'rom as early as 1901 by securing sole 
ri.ghts of' recruitment was able to effect major economies 
in the cost 0£ recruitment. This had required the indis-
pensable co•operation of the governments of' the supply ... - ·. 
terri:fmries or supply-sources. Such •rationalization' of 
supply through •one-channel• oontrol had not however been 
so readily achievable in respect of' Af'rican labour rec:rui t-
ment f'rom within South Africa. At one period, recruitment 
costs had been dot,ble the actual wage bill. 
In order to apply inside the Sou1;h A:frican pol.i ty the 
co.st-reduo:l.ng centralized recruitment organization operated 
outside the South African polity by the WNLA, legislation 
was necessary. lib.at had not been possible under :four sepa-
rate governments, each recognizing its Af'rican labour supply 
as its most valuable resource, became practical politics 
with the establishment of' the sing1~ ~nion Parliament. 
The Native-Labour Regulation Act No.1S of 1911 legis-
lated the con<litions under which the supply of Af'riean 
labourers to various centres of work in South Af'~ca woul.d 
Sa take place. In introducing the second. reading the 
Minister of' Native Affairs (Mr. Henry Burton) declared that 
the South African Government 'in no sense whatever wou1d 
.make itself' responsible :for the recruiting of' natives•. 
But an Act was necessary to consolidate existing laws to 
achieve a simple~ ttnif'orm method and to eliminate maJ.-
practices - especially in respect of' advances - by 
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licensing labour agents and runners t who would be author.ized 
to recruit labour 'f'O:r mining and a.11 other actiVities other 
than f'arming,·:t.rrigation and of' domestic ;service. That. 
malpractices existed, which the .Act would eliminate, was 
true and .substantiated by the welcome given in the debate 
·to it.s provis.ions by T.:t. .. Schreiner• the member f'or ~embu ... 
land and unqueattoned f'riend of' "t;he A:fr:i.ca.ns. . He acknow• 
ledged in refuting accusations of 'slave ·1abourt by Creswell; 
the member f'or Jeppe; that •on the whole, th:e goldf'ields tmd 
diamond :field.s had been benef'ioial to . the .Africans ' • 
The Act however not only helped to end some of' the 
abuses of' the adva.nces-contractL.~g· system and saf'egu;a.rded 
u.nsophist.icated tribal labourers ~gailist the .misrepresenta• 
. ' 
tions of' the unscrupulous (who on oocasli.ons included tr:ibal 
petty obiefs and headmen to whom concession ·t~ees• f'or 
mission to recruit we.re o:f'ten .irresistibl.y iucrative) .• 
Act a.l.$0 contained clause 13(C) which provided thats 
No person (whether the holder of' a licence or 
per• 
The 
p~rmit under thi,s Act or not) sha.J.1 by of':f'ering 
higher wages or greater benef'i ts or other h• 
d.ucements. persuade or attempt to perauadEi any 
natl.Ve wb.o has been law.f'ully recru.tted to desert 
or repudiate having been so recruited or to 
break o.r repudiate .any then existing and binding 
contract.of' service, whe~her or not the contract 
be bl writing .• ,. ~, 
The intention of' tb1.s may have been the legitimate one of' 
preventing an Af'ric.an labourer f'rom brealdng a contract 
!nto which he had knowingly entered and being induced to 
do so by another labour-recruiter or prospective employer. 
But t t ,also served as a power:ful legj.slative re•i.nf'orcemen~ 
of' cus·tom :in .i.nhibiti.ng competition amon.g employers f'rom 
increasing wages and related benefits. Zn partioula~, it 
made completely .e:ffeot.ive the app,li.cation ot' .. the ·•maximum 
av.era.get in the mining ind.ustry. 6 · 
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Very 'shortly atter the Native .Labour Regulation Act of 
1911 became law, the Native Recruiting Organirc:ation (NRO) 
was set up in 1912 by the Chamber 0£ Mines to act as a 
centralizing body f'or the mining industry f'or Urie.an labour• 
reoruitrnent inside South Africa.. It was the sister organi• · 
zation to tb.e Witwatersrand. Native Labour .Association (WNLA) 
. which had :for some years carried out .a similar (and. solely 
authorized f'Uttction) in .respect of'•·reoruitment outside South 
Africa. No doubt the NRO by .dimiili.shing impert'eotio.ns on 
the market supply side· f'or Af'rican tribal labour f"rom~ say., 
the Transkei. did secure a real reductio11 in labour costs .• 
But,1. a:t"tned with the legislative prohibition ·clause 1:J(c) on 
using competition f'rom the detnand side to bring about in• 
creased wage,s or benef'its among recruited African labourer.a, 
the NRO as the instrument of the Chamber of' Mines could 
legally enforce the inter•mine or in.ter-ml.ning-employer 
agreement not to increase·Af'rioan wages above the calcu-
lated •maximum average• of' earning. 
Whether or not the •ma."'imum average' c1ause promoted 
or retarded the economic development of' South Africa through 
frustrating attempts to improve the productivity of' the 
individual Af'rican mine•worker must be left to a later 
chapter. Por _examination tha point here is that though 
the .Native Labour Regulation A.et 0£ 1911 may have contri,• 
buted to •perf'eotion• of' the A:rrican· labour market on the. 
supply side .• it underwrote thG total elimination of oompe ... 
. . 
ti tion on ·the demand s:i.de. 
Ai.most s±multaneously, the f'irst Parliament also 
passed the Mines and Works Act No .. 12 of' 1911. :tn this 
particular case Oeneral Smuts was i.n charge as Ml.ni.ster ·0£ 
Mines. His biographer, Sir Keith Hancock wrote as follows: 
:tn the debate on the Mines and Works Bill., 1'911, 
which Smuts himself' piloted through Parliament, 
Clause 15 0£ the Bi11, when one v.lews it tn the 
long perspective of South African history• was 
explosively political, for it provided the 
means 0£ embedding the industrial colour-bar 
in the law of the Union. Yet Smuts told Parlia-
ment that the Bill was purely technical. That. 
no doubt, was how he saw it. No speaker s-ose 
to point out his mistake. It may well be that 
tho members of the other provinces looked upon 
this Bill as the domestic concern of the Trans• 
vaal. while the Transvaal were so used to the 
colour bar they took it £or granted ••• The 
clause which Parliament did not think worth8 debating contained the ~~erl. of revolution. 
Xt must be accepted that nothing in Smuts' private 
papers nor other avail.able evidence discloses that the 
normally highly percipient Smuts, already known as Slim 
Janni.e, perceived that his technical measure was providing 
£or the adminJ.strative application of the colour bar to 
skilled and semi.•skilled work in the mining industry. 
Yet Clause 4(1)(n) authorized regulations to be made by 
the Governor-Gener.al in respect o:f the grant, cancellation 
and suspension of' certificates 0£ compotenoy to mine 
managers, mine overseers, mine surveyors, mechanical 
engineers, engine drivers, miner entitled to blast and 
such other classes o:f persons employed in, at, or about 
mines; works, machinery as the Governor-General may from·· 
time to time deem it expedient ••• 
The exercise of such administrative jurisdiction to 
implement a .!!!. :facto:· restriction of' skilled and send.-ski11ed 
categories of' minl.ng work to Whites had al.ready been prac-
tised in the Transvaal. Xt is somewhat di:f:ficult to credit 
that Smuts with his knowledge and experience of' pre-1910 
conditions on the Transvaal gold mines did not· recognize 
that he was at least legalizing the continuation of the 
customary colour demarcations o:f mining jobs. It is rather 
more likely and more in character that Smuts was indulging 
in his proclivity for not letting the left hand of the 
14!h 
legislator know ""' or at least publicly acknowledge .... wha.t 
the r.ight band ot the administrator .proposed to continue 
to do.~ 
Certainly Hancock is aorrect that Smuts did not see he 
was .sowing the seeds ot his ow down.fall • and of' the com. 
plete conque,st of the polity by ·Af'rikanerclom. But Smuts, 
howeve.r much the politic.al realist • .is not accorded by any 
of' his bio.grap~ers ·~ t~ an :l.ntel.lectuai intere.st in eoono• 
mic analysis• He was unlikely to 11"aste titne thinking 
through the possible :future carse o:f least ... oost substitu ... 
tion of labour in the _light of ·unpredicted world price-cost 
relationships o'C gold "'.' and to weig1:- the impact of' AU.ch 
' unknoll.-'?1 developments on current political pragmatism. 
Neither Smt,1ts nor Botha• as already noted, had been 
prepared to acc~pt the recommendations of' the Transvaal 
Mining commission (now being pressed with vehemence in the 
parliament~ debat~ .~ tself' by Creswell ) to ~ring a.bout an 
, all..,.Wh:lte labour f'orce f'or both unskilied and skill.ed work 
on the minet'h · But Smuts certainly di.d 1iot intend at th.5-s 
stage that the A:fricans should take on the customary range 
of job categories, which superior White competence had 
. obtained :for i t·self. 'l'be Minister of' Mines surely knew 
tha.:t no f'·ormal. cololir bar reservations of' work were neces-
sary in the MineSJ and Works ~et so lon.g as the more inf'orma.1 1 
and flexible• use of.' regUlations could. achieve tlle same 
purpose. 
. 
The Act, cl.ause 4(2), empowered dlif'f'erent regulations 
to be made in respect o:f 
districts of' the Union,. 
Free s~ate, accordingly,, 
d.if'.:ferent Provinces or mining 
In the Transvaal and the Orange 
RegUlation No.285 prohJ.bited the 
grant of' certif'icates olf competency to ,, coloured per.sons t, 
and certificates granted to t O·Ol.oured persons" in Natal. and 
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th~ Cape were not valid :in the northern Provinces. Other 
' ' 
regulations laid ·down that many types of' work were. to be 
done by 1ihi te men only,. Zn 1920 • the Low Grade Mines. 
Conunission :found the empl.oyment of' White m.e·n was prescribed 
.in thirty ... two occupations on the mines employing over 7,000 
pers,ons.,. while trade union .!n£luence had added another .nine ... 
teen reserved occupations employing over 4,ooo Whites.9 
Smuts, knowt.ngly or unwittingly, was .allowing the WW.te 
trade unions to take more than charge of' the course of mine 
labour deployment to his own eventual political ddf'eat. 
Almost simul.taneously wit!l.the enactment of laws to prevent 
:f.ree eotnpetftton :from advancing the wages and work opportu• 
ties of' trib~ At'rJ.cans, the Botha Government and Parliament . 
moved to stop marke~. forces from extending !and ... ow.ttership 
an,d land-utilization opportu..nities among the Africans. 
The third select comm:t t·tee appointed. by the Union Parli.a ... 
ment, s.c~3 of' 1910, was charged with examining the question 
of A:tr.ioan land settlement w1. th special. re:ferenoe to the 
t squatting• problem,. l'.t recommended· a uniform pol:lcy 
throughout the Union f'or .the settlement of Ah:f.cans on pri-
vate prop~rty and appropriate legislation 9br,oadly on the 
.lines of' the resolutions arr~Ved at by the South African 
Native Affairs Commission·• • 
That Commission; it will be rdcollected, had adopted as 
its f'undamenta1 .proposal legisJ~ative control against 'the 
:free traf'f'ic in land•. It had expressed itself' .of the con• 
olusion that if' thi,e procdss (the mani:f'eat ef"f'ort by tb.e 
Af'rieane; to possess land not counteracted by any reluctance 
on the part of' European holders to dispose of' it) continued• 
while a.t the same time ·restrictions excluded. Europeans .lf'rom 
purchasing within Native area.a, it w·as inevitable that at 
no very distant date the amount 0£ land in Af'rioan. ,occupa• 
tion would be undesirably extended,. 10 
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At a late stage o.f the third session of' the Firs't; Par1ia-
ment; the Government unaxpccted1y introduced the Native 
Lands Dill. 11 The debate, of' exceptional length, makes most 
12 .interesting reading. It ref'1ects the consciousness -
indeed self'.-consci.ousne.ss ... that this was the most important 
legislative act since the Act of' Union itself'. Speaker 
after speelcer drew attention to the non-representation in 
the House of those whose major interest was being decided 
and the great need to have the understanding of the Africans 
and their co-operation, if' not the.ir complete acceptance of' 
the vital propo sale• 
Yet despite the protestations of' good faith and of' the 
honour. of the White mall, of the consEl.quences for our chi.ldr.en 
and our children's children, o.f the ~on-represented, the 
.fundamental principle of' the Bill goes thrf:>Ugh.. The pur-
chase of land in the open market by Africans over the major 
part 0£ South Africa is halted. The distribution of wealth, 
e.s it was most deeply and amotiona1ly identified by both 
W'u.itoti and A:frieans ""' land, is not to be the subject of' 
competition between the White and the Af'ricans. That is too 
impersonal., too risky in al.lowing tho •undesirable extension 
of the amount of' land in Native occupation• (as the South 
Af"rican Native Affairs Com.mission had concluded). Xnstead 
the broad and indeed detailed distribution of rural South 
A:frica is handed over to that indispensible :instrument of' 
the polity, the nominated Commission. 
As evocatively perhaps as on any iater occasion, tb~s 
early debate refl.ects the motivations and aims of' the White 
polity and more especiaJ.ly· o:f the spokesmen of' the Afrikaner-
.farmer. Thus E.N. Grobler (member f'or Edenburg): 
It was impossible to delay the solutiono£>the 
native problem ••• to be sure the Dill di.d not 
go so far as he (the speaker) would have desired 
but at any rate it a:f:f'irmed the principl.e ·of 
'' 
the separation of' whites and blacks • • • At the 
same time he did not like the system .(,f' allo-
cating reserves :for natives •• , the :farmers 
'tfould su.f'fer f'rom lack of labour, and that de-
f'ic.iency would be a. growing one. At the pre• 
sent time the farmer had to ta.foe of'f' his coat, 
his ·children had to g<>· to school• and now his 
workrµen would be ta.ken :from him, and he woul.d 
stand alone ••• Neither could he agree to the 
principle of' the expropriation of' land be.long-
ing to whites in order to increase the size of' 
the native reserves , • • there were enormous 
reserves where the natives could go and live, 
and if' they refused to go there, they should 
' be required ta pay a ·sti.:ff' tax.. Then they 
would go and work f'or white people ••• 1.3 
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And J. van der Wa:Lt (member :for Pretoria District. South): 
lfhen they came to examine history they would 
see that a.11 whites must stand together .• and 
together dra£t a law. Johannesburg had been 
e.stablished as a tow in1886, without having 
any natives in its neighbourhood. To the · 
north of' that town they now :round thousands 
o:f" natives on the f'a.rms·~ The men wcb;•e work-
:b:tg on the mines and the' women did the f'a.rming. 
The Kaf'irs no longer dwelt .in the bushveld 
but .in the vicinity of' the goldf'ie!ds.. Eight 
miles outside Johannesburg •. they could drink 
its much beer as they wanted. Not only sheep 
w~ stol.en but also cattle, and When these 
were sold the mone:wwas used for the purpose' 
of' buyin~ ~::-ound •• • To the east of' Preto'!'.:!a 
also they bought ground• and 1.t was said that 
the money of' the natives was as good as that 
0£ the whites, But the money of' the .natives 
was sto.len money. The nat:ives crone from 
Basuto1and to the Rand; stole and slaughtered. 
cattle,, and then bought land w:lth the money. 1 4 Should not such thinga be brought to an end? ••• 
Anothe.r intl!frpretatiQn was given by P.GiW .• Grob1er (mcimbei." 
£or Rustenburg): 
The hon. member :f'or Fordsburg had stated that 
he did not believe there were many nativE!.s 
who would personally buy 1.and f'or themselves 
•:• • the natives f'irst as a tribe bought the 
ground, and after that three or f'our of' them 
made a plan to buy a farm, ~or a Ka£ir was 
the most absolute communist that existed. 
Individual. natives wore now beginning to buy 
ground f'or their 01m use• The hon. member 
had stated that the economic condition of' the 
native was of' such a character, that he could 
not compete with the white. But did the hon. 
member know that a native was able to offer a 
higher price for ground than the white? A 
native wad ready to pay much more because the 
ground became in fact inal.ienable. His needs 
were not very great, and he could easily exist 
lfith many others on one :farm. That was why 1 the native was able to pay a higher price ••• S 
What an extraordinary •economic man• is this triba1 A:f'ri.canl 
He is the most absolute communist that ever existed but he 
finances hi.s capitalistic purchase of' White man's.land by 
stealing hi.s cattle as a source of' f'unds. He competes 
with the White ·man by paying ~ t:or land because h:is needs 
are not very great, and he competes with the White man by 
taking less f'or Ms labour a.lso because his needs are not 
very great. Undeniably the A:friean competes. 
Market competition was indeed forcing the pace of' econo-
mic de'vclopment and its shape was already beginning to asrume 
that integrating oharacter to which the ethos of' A:f'rikanerd.om 
now instinctively reacted with: Halt. The .£!:.! ~ coour had 
al.ready come from Afrikanerdom's newly proclaimed champion, 
General J.B.M. Hertzog. Breaking with Botha and Smuts, 
Hertzog declared his faith at De Wildt on December 7t 1912: 
The time has come when South Africa can bo longer be ruled 
by non-Afrikaners, by people who have no real love .for 
South .Africa ••• • 16 · 
And it was Hertzog, now no longer a member of Bothats 
Government but already committed to the formation of his 
opposition National Party at Bloemfontein in January 1914, 
who entered the Native Lands Bill debate to express the fear 
of' where competition was J..eading and might Ultimately end* 
•. • the real danger lay in the strong oompeti ti on 
there was today and which there was going to be 
tin the future between native and the lthi te man. 
The 'tihite man began to f'eel this more and more, 
and unless other measures were taken he would 
eventually1 if' the present state of' af'f'airs con• 
tinuad• be pressed out of' South Af'riea or out of' 
a large part of.' South A.frloa, No one could deny 
that as regards Wiskilled labour there was no 
room here at all f.or the white man ,. • ,. They mi.ght 
attribute this to laziness or to lack of skill, 
or to any other cause, but the fact remained 
that the native was the unskilled labourer here, 
and there, where the white mon was sti.11 the un• 
skilled labourer.in this country, it was where 
the native had not yet been sut':ticien:tly trained•' 
Thej.r [the white man 1 s] foundati,on had. been 
taken away f'rom them, because the great f'ounda ... 
tion al. ways lay in the unskilled ·labourer.a and 
those ,closely related to them •. • In these cir• 
cumstance,s,. he empha.ttca.lly declared that it was 
their duty, the duty of th~ white race to pre ... 
serve themselves, to see that the pressures were 
not exercised any further ••• 
It was just as much, i:f not more, in the 
interests of' the na.tives.. lt woul.d take the 
nat.ives not another hundred or two hundred· 
years, but at least :five or six hundred years 
before they had attained the same stage of' 
civilization which the Europeans had attained. 
today. · And should they .in that time allow 
the Europeans to .sink down or. be dz-iven out 
of' the country? They/ would have to admit 
that immediately the white man lef't these 
all.ores. the native would go back inunensely. 
1'heref'ore i. t was essential f'or them to take 
up a strong stand• and see to it that the . 
white man kept his ground • •• 
Many people wanted the native to have the 
vote,. He emphaticall.y repeated what he had 
said. before, that in years and yea.rs to come 
the native· would not have more votes than he 
was allowed today under the Act of' Uni.on .• 
Why not? Simply because they must take into 
account the :feelings of' the people and.these 
f'eelings would not change ,. •. 17 
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Hertzog•s speci:fic introduction 0£ the African f'ranchise 
issue into this Land debate as early as 191:3 is signi:ficant. 
Originally it had been intended by the Government a.iid by 
the Minister, Mr. Sauer, that the key principle of' the Native 
Lands Bill - . the probJ.b:i.tion o·f' market competition :for land 
as between White and Af'rican ... should be applied to all :four 
provinces of' the Union. But the constitutional experts 
point·ed out that to prohibit the :ri~ee traff'ic in land in the 
Cape Province would strike at the property qualif'ying pro ... 
v.ieion in respect of' tho non-discriminatory colour franchise 
of' the Cape, entrenched aga;:i.nst alteration except by the two• 
thirds majority of' both Houses o:f Parliament si.tting together. 
To prevent the Cape Af'ricans f'rom buying and sel1ing 1and 
would make it impossible :for them to hope to achieve the mini .. 
mum .requisite property ownership, which might qual.:tfy them 
to vote on the common role of' the Cape. Henca the .entrench-
ment of' the Cape l.f'rican f'ranchise 3.n the Union made it 
possible to apply the reetrai.nts of' the Native Lands Aot of 
191' to the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal -
'8 ' 
but not to the Cape. 1 General. Hertzog was in due a>Urse 
to make this nexus between the Cape A;Brican vote and the 
land, and the cutting of the Gordian knot, the unalterable 
objective of his .subsequent prend,ership. 19 
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Genaral Hertzog was, however, not yet prime minister 
though he had taken the first step by breaking with Botha-
Smuts and rorming his own political party at Bloemfontein. 
There, in January 1914. the politica1 factor of Af'rikanerdom 
was given organizational structure and the Nationa1 or 
Nationalist Party launched on its ultimately triumphant 
career. The evocative magic of' Paul Kruger passed to 
James Barry Munnik Hertzog. 
In Kruger's time, the explosively adaptive f'orces 0£ 
economic development exerted by the llitwatersrand mining 
industry produced such tensions that the social system of 
South Af'~oa disintegrated into the war of 1899-1902. 
·Throughout the next twenty years the tensions coming f'rom 
the Rand mines continued to be barely manageable until the 
pursuit of' an economically organized mining industry so 
strained the patterns of' established expectations and status 
as to explode in another,minor, 'civil war•. General 
Hertzog had been on the losing side in 1902. He was to 
emerge with ruling authority and power in South A£rica in 
1924. 
Economic exploitation 0£ the extensive but low-grade, 
gold field uncovered in the virgin veldt at a time when 
neither the political system nor the economic system, nor 
hence the social system• 0£ Southern Af'rica had reached any 
measure 0£ sophistication, was not to be achieved in a hurry. 
But neither the capriciousness 0£ capital supply nor the 
inconstancy of labour supply slowed the urgency of producing 
profits. On the contrary they aggravated the problems in 
an era when entrepreneurial zest generally exceeded managerial 
zeal. 
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The economic ddtail 0£ the attempts to maximize pro-
ductivity on the goldmines through the application o:r least-
cost combinations of' labour will be examined later. The 
Witwatersrand mining industry was patently structuring the 
country's political economy. It related party politics 
to welfare economics in a society in which White politicians 
spoke f'or White voters. Iti forced the labour mobilities o:r 
integrating industrialization on the social rigidities of 
disintegrating agrarianism. It was tho political reaction 
of' British trade-unionism and Afrikaner nationalism, the 
combination o:r work-fund restrictionism and grass-roots 
isolationism,to this econond.c rationality that enabled the 
White polity to move from being in charge to being in control 
of' the. South African economy• 
Poor labour relations erupting into violence seem almost 
pandemic to the world's mining industry. The Rand mines 
from an early stage showed no immunity. Mining employers 
on the Rand - as.elsewhere - strenuously resisted recogni-
tion of trade unionism as a legitimate bargaining organiza• 
ti on. By 1913 only one cra.£t union was recognized. Be-
cause of' this or in spite of' this, :lndustrial unionism made 
rapid headway among Vhite workers under the leadership of 
non-South Af'ricans, many of' whom were syndicalists. 
The motivating aspirations, or value-orientations, of' 
such leadership in the contemporary environment of colour-
conscious South A:f'rica were starkly displayed by the evidence 
of' the general. secretary of the Miners' Union to the Dominions 
Royal Commissions 
The Kaffirs ousted the aborig:i.nals ahead of him• 
and the Bantu ousted the Hottentots, and the 
Dutchmen ousted the Kaff'ir, and we are now t~ng 
to oust the Kaf'f'ir f'rom those spheres of' industry 
which we maintain are 1 the proper sphere of' the 
white man ••• Seeing that the average Ka.f'fir is 
bred as a slave, he ha~ no right to usur~> our 
position as a :tree man, or drive us from these 
mines - we have a right to the colour bar. I 
bold that the Kaf'fir should be allowed to get 
free, but in the interim, as he is here only 
as a semi-slave, I have a right to fight him 
and to oust him as the Australians ousted the 
Chinamen and the Kanakas ••• 
questions Then you would f'ight and exterminate 
the Kaf'f'ir? 
Answers No• I would drive them down to where 
they came from ••• He robbed the land from the 
Hottentot, and he should be allowed to stay on 
the land. What we say is that he should not 
be brought here to compete with the white man 1 
on the economic conditions at present existing ••• 
The character of' industrial violence on the Witwatersrand 
during 1913•4 is grimly told in the pages of' the \fitwaters-
rand Disturbances Commission appointed to inqui·re into the 
. 2 
disorders of June/July 1913. This was the strike which 
began at the New K1einf'ontein Mine and ended in the Carlton 
Hotel, Johannesburg. where Botha and Smuts met f'our armed 
.. 
delegates of the Federation of Trade UJrl.ons supported out-
side by thousands of' strikers and hooligans. On police 
information that the mob might sack Johannasburg and perma-
nently destroy the mines, Smuts agreed to the reinstatement 
of the strikers, a judicial committee to inquire into 
grievances and the recognition 0£ their trade unions. 
In January 1914 there was a viole•t eruption 0£ indust-
rial militancy, beginning on the Natal coai m:t.nes, spread-
ing to the rail.ways and the Rand and f'ollow~d by the pro-
clamation of a Union-wide general strike. The cl.assic 
instrument of' syndicalist revolution was now being tested 
in South Africa, writes Sir Keith Hancock in his biography 
of Smuts. But Smuts, who had used the intervening six 
months to establish the Union Defence Force, responded with 
martial law, trained cannon on the Trades Hal.l, the strikers 
capitulated and the syndicalist bubble was pricked. The 
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general strike collapsed and Smuts incurred parliamentary 
rebuke £or summary deportation o:f the strike leaders. 
The inunediate reaction of the White electorate of the 
Transvaal was to give the South African Labour Party its 
first and only (provincial) political majority. Th.is was 
in the Transvaal prov:l.noial. election in March 1914. The 
intensity of conflicting emotions about •true South-
Afrioanism' but in a contoxt unrelated to 'colour•• mani-
fested itself in the abortive and easily-suppressed 
rebellion against the Government in September 1914• after 
Botha and Smuts •took England's side' in the First World 
War.' Though the rebel leaders - who included a :former 
Cabinet Minister and very senior defence force officers • 
received little support in the f'ield, it was from this time . 
on that Botha•Smuts were with increasing bitterness and 
ef':f'ectiveness represented as •traitors to their own peopl.e' 
:ln party pol:Ltioal propaganda. 
Significantly in the 191.5 general election Hertzog's 
National Party, beginning with f'ive seats in the Bouse in 
1912t won 27 consti.tuencies and every seat except one in 
the Orange Free State. The Botha-Smuts party got 95,000 
votes but Hertzog already bad 77 ,000 of the electorate be-
hind him, The political dynamism behind Afrikaner 
nationalism was obvious, though during these years of' 
the Great War its anti-En.gl.ish venom precluded an overt 
political alliance with the South A:frican Labour Party of 
.largely Engl:Lsh-speald.ng trade-unionists led by Col. Cresswell;. 
who served with di.stinct.ion under General Smuts himsel.f'. 
But the Great War over and the beloved Botha dead, the 
now world-statesman Smuts had already a vision and aware-
ness of holisti.c humanity that :fatally exposed his phi.lo• 
sophJ.c and political detachment from the South African veidt 
to the remorseless emoti veness of' Hertzog• s .isolationism · 
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and colour-consciousness. In the March 1920 general 
election Hertzog't s Nationalists with 44 seats out-ranked 
Smuts• own SouthiAf'rican Party of 41 and only a working 
agreement with the al.most entirely Engli.sh-speaking Union-
ists enabled Smuts to survive as a minority government • 
. In th.at same general election the Labour Party of' 
Cresswell achieved its high-water mar.k. total of' .21 seats~ 
This success as much as anything pointed to the future 
course of' South Af'ricatt poli t:tc.s and t,o the conflict be tween 
the art 0£ the possible and the pursuit of' profitability. 
·zn the South At'rican environment of" col,our the :f'ormer was 
undef'ea.table at election time. 
The post-war world-wide inf'lati,on struck critically, 
and potentially catastrophically, at the genera.tor of the . 
South .Af'rioan economy ... the go1d ... tnine.s of' the lH.twatersrand. 
The political impact was a resumption of pre-war industri.al 
stri:f'~ but now even. more identif':!.ed with the '\(ar between 
the classes and the •clash of' ca.pi talism and comr.unism·t. 
A f'ew weeks. b.ef'ore the election of' 1920t the White mine 
. . . , 
workers came out on strike and three days after it was 
settled, 30,000 to 40,000 A:f'rican mine-workers :folle>wed 
their example but with less success in securing increased 
wages. Af'rican industrial unrest continued and a Native 
Labour Un:i.on•s demands in Port.Elizabeth led to violence 
with. serious loss of' 1if'e" ·Shortly after police action 
~gainst a religious seo~:f' Black Israe1ites at Bulhoek in 
the Cape ended in the death of' 300 Af'rieans. 
Turbulence was producing growing violence in South A:frioa 
An .appeal by Smuts for al.l 'mode;t"ate South Africans to joiQ. 
him• at a Conf'erenoe in B1oemf'ontein, which went unanswered 
by Hert!l:og1 s Nationalists, resulted in a coalition o'f' the 
South Af'rioan Party and the Union:i.sts. This combination 
plus growing concern at labour syndicalism gave Smuts the 
overall majority 0£ 71 against the Nationalists 45 and 
Labour 9 in the election that Smuts forced in February 1921 • 
. The potentialities of' Black Peril 5 campaigning. had 
however already shown themselves in the 1920 election, when 
the faked picture of' a Griqua or Hottentot soldier with a 
French bride and a related poem allegedly by smuts welcoming 
the pair to South Africa was widely publicized in the anti• 
Smuts press and in leaflets. 6 Such ob;ious electoral 
ex.pl.oitation of' the most deeply hidden compl.e:x:es of' racial 
emotions was enhanced by the oomparati:v:e1y slow growth of' 
the economy since Union. In human terms this showed it-
self by the continuing decline of a frightening'proportion 
of' the population into poor Vhiteli' and poo,... Blacks. 
The Transvaal Ind:l.gency Commission of' 1908 had found it 
impossible to arr:ive at an estimate o:f tbe numbers of indi-
gent Whites but it was :finn on the main underlying causes • 
a deep-rooted aversion to manual laboµr and the unprogres-
sive :farming tra~ition. It had written that :Lndigency in 
the Transvaal was due to two main causes ... to the attitude 
of' the people towards manual labour and to certain tradi-
tional ideas with regard to the use and ownership of' land; 
and it had stated that no cure £or ~ndigency which neglected 
those two fundamental causes could really be e:ff'eot.t:ve:. 
Poverty will remain. and w:Lll grow worse so long 
as the white man eont:J.nues to regard manual 
labour as beneath him 11 and to remain content 
with the traditional methods of dealing with 
the land • ,. • It is not in the particular law 
or institutions that :Lts roots lie, but :ln the 
habits and outlook of' the South African people 
••• If' health is to be restored to society in 
any part oC South A£rioa, it must be because 
the white people have become alive to the 
necessity of' becoming more vigorous in i.ts 
habits and of' changing t:ns; ideas which have 
dominated it f'or so J.ong. . 
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In its· second interim report, the Unemployment Cormnission 
of 1.921 dealt wi.th measures to prevent the influx· into the 
la.rge.r centre.s of' those Whi tea without ski1led training 
which, sa:id the Commissioners, amounted to an inquiry into 
the •poorr White t problem·. It stated there was no reli-
able estimate of' numbers but put the figure .at 120,000. 
The Commission wrotea 
Its essential charactd.rtstios have not 
changed since the J>Ubl.ication of the Report 
of' the Transvaa1 Indigency Commission of 
1908, that of the Select Committea of 1913, 
and of' the Relief and Grants-in-Aid Commis-
sion Report of' 1916; the only change being 
that it has become more pressing than ever 
before, and it is now so serious a soc~al 
and econok..i.c evil that immediate and oompre• 
hensive measures should be taken effectively 
to deal with it.8 
Ten year.a later,in 19,30, so little improvement had 
taken place that a special grant f'rom the Carnegie Founda-
, 
tion.wae. obtained through the influence of' an American 
eoeiologist appalled by the social prob.lem of' Poor White-
ism he had :found .in South Africa. . Th~ re.sult was perhaps 
the most exhaustive, and sympathetic• ,sociological study 
to be undertaken.in South Africa. The Carnegie commission 
on ~oor·":Whites reported in :five volumes. From question-
naires sent to almost halt' the white schoo1s in the Union, 
covering 72,844 families, 17•5 per cent of' families were 
classi£ied as •very poor•, i.e. supported largely by 
charity in cities or existing in dire poverty on f'anns .• 
J::f we apply the same percentage to the total 
E'uropean population .. just over 1;800,000 in 
1931 ... more than 300,000 (as a conservat.ive 
estimate) of' the white population were 1very 
poor•. These f'igures were obtained in 1939/30 
bef.ore the ef:fects of' the present depression 
were so not1ceab1e., 10 
1,58. 
The joint observations declared that the problem was pri~ 
marily a :failure of' adjustment to modern conditions ... due 
in a measure to inadequate education in the rural areas 
and went on:a 
With many of' the poor, a very marked tendency 
to dependence• especially on the State,, has 
been created. This attitude was not formerly 
characteristic of' the people. · The sense of.' 
dependence is very noticeable in such matters 
ass the gratis provisiot1 tor the board and 
education of' children, sometimes even of' books 
and clothing; child welfare; providing the 
unemployed with wotk ; provision o:f food f'or 
housing; provision of' land and stock on 
easiest terms; gratis care of' the sick and 
aged; relief' of' distress d.ue to cata,strophio 
events; advances on f'a.m produce; protection 
against.the competition of' the Non-Europoan 1 . 10 especial.ly of' the native 11 on the labour market. 
The Connnission declared itself' to be oonvinced 
· that much of' the assistance is given .in such 
a way as to have a demoralizing of':fect on 
~oor Whites and so increase the dif'f'iculty 
of' their rehabilitation. It cause.s loss 
of' indepd.ndence and may imbue them with a 
sense of' in:t'eriority, impairs their industry, 
weakens their sense of' responsibi1ity, a."1.d 
helps to make them di~bonest. 11 
But the poor Whites had votes. And the Carnegie Com-
miss:i.on• especially Professor Grosskopf', who was respon-
s:ible :for the volume on economic aspects• had the academic 
integrity to state baldly t'1hat was conunon knowledge but 
normal.ly neither polite nor politic to acknowledge& 
Since 1910 party politics ha~e hr.ought about 
more and more harmf'ul results. Prnctical1y 
all the White .indigents have the vote, and 
in several constituencies they hold the 
balance. Public men, who do not realize 
their responsibility or onl.y consider elect-
ion chances. have increasingly created wrong 
ideas and foolish expectations in the minds 
of the poor. Men who are returned on the 
strength of election promises arc obliged 
to use al.l their personal and political 
influence to obtain something. 
The dangers and tempations are greater 
in a country like ours where the constitu-
encies are small (in 1929 on an average 3057 
electors :for each member of' the Legislative 
assembly). Instead of a healthy sense of' 
civic duty, a tendency seems to develop to 
make use o:f the vote :for personal interests. 
Nearly every parliamentarian should be able 
to cite·oases of men threatening to vote 
f'or his opponent, i:f he could not procure 
this or that ~or them. 
And then, goes on Pro:fessor Grosskopf': 
A large proportio.n of' the poorer settlers 
on state land in the northern Transvaal 
are firmly convinced that they owe their 
land to a de:finite politioal party, and 
the~e:fore consistently vote for.the party 12 under whose rule the allotment too~ place. 
The insuperable di:f:ficulties 1 which faced the Commis-
sion appointed under the Na ti vo Lands Act o'f' 191 3 in ac-
quiring additional land by purchase :for Africans in f'ulf'il-
ment of' spec:l.f'ic Parliamentary promises (which is elabora-
ted in the text later) t arose f'rom this eri tioal inter-
connection between the Poor White value-orientation towards 
land and his highly persuasive vote. 
In his Soeiologica1 Report, Part V of' the Carnegie 
Commission on Poor:i Whites, the Rev. J.R. Albertyn of' the 
Dutch Reformed Church was if' anything more blunts 
The Poor White Commission. in almost every one 
of' liundreds of' interviews with the poor through ... 
out the whole Union put the follow:ing question 
to the man after hearing his grievances: •Wel1 1 
what in' your opinion is the solution o:f your 
troubles?• And in almost every ease the reply 
was •The Government must do this or that', un-
ti1 the matter became al.most l.udicrous ••• So 
conspicuous is this habit of expecting too much 
f ' • 
:from the State, that even v.isi tors :from other 
oount1"ies have been struck by it, A well-
known sociologist from America a.f'ter a visit 
of' .some months to our country e.xpressea him• 
self' as f'ollowsa •~ith the possible except-
tion of' Russia• I know of' no country where 
dependence on the Government is greater than 
in South Africa ., 0 tl.3 
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In a special section on the.Inf'luence of' the Poor Man•s 
Vote on the State•s Policy, tho Rev, Albertyn saidi 
:tf · it were the law that any indigent person 
receiving a certain measure of' state reJ.ief'; 
would automaticall.y lose _his vote, the ef"forts 
f'or hin rehabilitation would be less preju .. 
diced. The :fear of' disenfranchisement ·would 
also act as a whol.esome deterrent against the 
seeking of' State a.id. and ,as incentive to self' ... 
help., At present, however, even the person 
who :ls tot.al.ly dependent on the State :for his 
existence, has the vote•. and so .at least one 
of' the mea:ns of' breaking down the $pirl t o'f: 
·dependency remains inoperative. 
But the law did not so exclude any White male,, b.01;-1ever 
poor; whiie Parliament was aJ.ready mov~ng towards the ex• 
clusion of' every non ... llhi te t however rich. The disenf'ran-
ehisement of all non-Whites was to occupy Pa.rl.iament more 
than thi'$'ty yea.r.s and it was orlly :l.n 1956 that the Cape 
Coloured voter was to lose hie htmdred-yea.r old right on 
the common roll, But by 1924 the l.J'hito polity ht:l.d t~en 
unchallengeable control of' economic de~elopment of South 
Af'rtca ... cdrtain1y of its shape . if.' not of' .:i. ts pace• 
The combi.nation of' the voting power of' the poo;r rural 
WbJ.te and the urban skilled llhite p:tes.ented the.ir respect• 
ive leaders~ Hertzog and Cresswell, apparently widely 
differentiated by their ideologies, with, the prospect of' 
power .• I:t required only th~ir Pact to oonvert ilshe pro .... 
. spect into the prize• The increasing f'ailure of the poor 
'Whites, almost entirely Af'rikaans ... spea.ki.ng, to adapt to 
change strengthened every year the minority influence of the 
Nationalist party and its 1eader, Hertzog; the increasing 
resistance of' the urban skilled Whites, mainly though not 
entirely English-speaking, to the consequences of change 
extended the marginal political influence of the Labour 
Party and its leader Cresswell. In due course the combi-
nation of' minority with marginality added up to majority. 
An anecdote of the time ·tells more than chapters ot: elu-
cidation. Hertzog and Crosswell 'were too busy hating 
Smuts to worry about such trifles•, i.e. Labour's views on 
the socialization of the means of production. Cresswell 
had addressed in English a meeting on the Platteland on 
socialism and trade unionism and at the conc~ueion of his 
speech Mr. Louis Karovsky, a Labour extremist but a great 
personal friend of Tielman Roos (lead~r of the Nationalist 
Party in the Transvaal), rose to give a shor:t summary in 
Afrikaans of what had been aa:Ld: He stated as £ollows: 
'The leader of' the Labour Party has just explained that his 
policy is to put the nigger in his place and to repatriate 
all Asiatics•, There was wild cheering and Col. Cresswell, 
who knew insufficient Afrikaans to understand his interpreter, 
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was carried shou1der-hi.gh to hi.scar'. 
Such a bal.d :Lnterpr4tation of the motivations of the 
leadership 0£ the South African Labour Party wou1d be unfair. 
But the degree 0£ physical violence with which White labour 
on the Rand was only too prepared to resist a competitive 
market in mining labour, or the application 0£ least-cost 
substitution by an industry in a price-cost squeeze, could 
leave no politician - as distinct perhaps :from a statesman -
in doubt of what would secure the plaudits and votes 0£ a 
White electorate. 
The Department of Mines and I;ndustries in its annual 
report £or 1913 had drawn attention to the syndica1ist 
character of' the trade union moyement o:f the time. It 
quoted :from a study of' the trade union movement in south 
Africa and of leadership •views' as :follows: 
Labour produces all capital ••• whereas capital 
is entirely dependent :for its existence and use 
on labour ••• the Labouring Class is now edu-
cated and combined suf'f'iciently to take the 
place in the world to which ~ts majority en-
titles it, to rdverse the f'ormer position, to 
rule the country and the civilized world, and 
to dictate conditions o:f serv.ice, justice and 
1if'e to the 'Upper Class•, who wil.l then be re-
duoe.d to their proper position o:f servants to 
the masses ••• the above f'acts being demon-
.strably true and axiomatic, it f'ol.l.ows that 
it is the moral and religio~s duty of' every 
workman to be discontented with his »resent 
iot, and in every way to aid the exertions ,of 
his J.oaders .in overturning the existing order 
of things by any means in their power, in 
order that the new structure of' society may 
be built on i t.s ruins• 1 .5 
The Mines and Industries Report connnenteds 
•The above creed, which is not over-stated, 
represents what is believed to be th• ruling 
motives o'f: many Labour leaders • • • A similar 
t'eeling .is widoubtedly moving everywhere in 
the world, but it is extraordinarily accentu-
ate~ in this country, [both) by the aristo~ 
cratic :feelings produc~d in the white workers 
by their soctal superiority over the c~lo~ed 
workmen • ·~ • .5 
The most graphic account of the 19.22 Ran@~ Str:i.ke 
appears in the biography of Smuts by Sarah Mi.llin. 16 lts 
revolutionary character is most authoritatively evidenced 
i.n the Martial .Law inquiry Judicia1 Committee appointed by 
the Smuts Government af'ter :lt had been intensely oriti-
cized in Parliament. The chairman of' thi.s Committee , 
"f• Lynedoch Graham, noted that his dxamina.tion was inhi-
bited by the simultaneous judicia1 proceedings against 
many strikers. 'i'lle Judicial Committee found that the 
coal mines .stopped work on 1 January 1922, and work ceased 
on the gold mines, power stations ancl: town engineering 
shops on 1 O January. l 7 
A resolution ·Of the Central Strike Committee o:f the 
South A:frican Industrial. Federation (in an undated circu• 
1ar), the Judicial Inquiry reported, read: 
Whereas it is desirable and imperative that 
Commandos .of the f'ollowing three sections 0£ 
the white community, inhabitants o:f the Union 
of' South Africa, be itmnediately :fonned and 
raised with the object of protecting the 
interests of' all white workers namely (a) 
Strikers• Connnandos, (b) Unemployed and 
(c) Employed • 
.And ·whereas i.t: is essential and the time hae 
arrived to f'undamentally establish tlds 
country as a whi.te man's country: it be re• 
solved: 
That Commandos of' 8.11 sections o:f (a) 
strikers (b) unemployed (c) employed 
of' the white connnunity of th~ Rand be 
immediately formed with branches in each 
town.ship under of'f'icers to be elected by 
each platoon ••• 18 . 
Following this, the Judicial :tnquiry found thati 
The Movement spread like a f'lame and upon 
the outbreak of' the Revolution in March there 
was scarcely a township along the Reef' without 
its Commando [with.elected of'f'ieers with ra.nlt 
badges, signal.l:i.ng corps, exerc.iscs in bombing]• 
By the 9th of March a General Sta.££ had been 
established, ••• it is stated that.as the move-
ment greli the personnel of the f'orce al.so 
changed ••• the moderate element amongst the 
strikers • •. withdrew f'rom it , •. It is also 
stated that at the outbreak ,of' the Revolution-
ary Phase of' the strik4• the bu1k of' the men 
forming the rank and file of' the Command and 
practica.ll.y all the Commandants, were Dutch 
South Africans who have adopted the politics 
of the Nationalist Party,19 
Percy Fisher, a member of the South African Commurrl.st 
Party and the leader of the Council 0£ Action, ~ndulged 
in numerous inf'l~atory speeches, which included• 
A man had suggested that General Smuts shoutd 
be shot.. He told that man to go and k:tl.1 him 
himseJ.:f' •• • We are out .to win this :fight and 
by God we will~0i:r we have to raze Johannesburg to the ground• , ... 
Towards the end 0£ February a secret meeting 
was held in the Tow.n Hall; Boksburg, of: all the 
Commandants on the .Rand at which he (Percy 
Fisher) was present. At this meeting • •. the 
Commandants were instructed to report how many 
.men had arms and had .explosives, and at the 
same meeting a proposal was unanimously carried 
that a South African Republic be :formed and 
that the present Government be overthrown..• 
Mr .• Waterston M.L~A.., the Judicia1 Inquiry 
:round, associated l.>.imself vi th the -movement 
and was styled General o.c. Commanding Brakpan 
Commando. On the· .5th February Mr. Waterston 
bad attended a meeting ,of' some 3,000 persons 
in the Town Hall of' Johannesburg and proposed 
the f'ollowing resolution: 'That this mass 
meet:l.ng of' citizens is o:f opinion that the 
time has arrived when the dominati.on.of'·the 
Chamber of Mines and other financiers in south, 
.Af'r:l.ca should cease, and to that end we and 
the members of Parl:l.aJilent assemble in Pretoria 
tomorrow to proclaim a South African Republic 
and immediately to form-a Provisional Govern• 
ment t'or this country.' The resolution was _ 
carried practically unanimously and the meet-
ing termi.na.ted with the singing of' the Red 
Flag and the Volkslied.,21 
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• • • On the 1 Oth 0£ March the :Brak.pan commando,. 
now Wlder the command of another officer; since 
Mr,. Waterston was attending Parliament, marched 
to the mine, attacked it and kil.led :f'our of' the 
of':f.ioialstas well as the commanding of'.:f'ieer and 
three special police and one native ••• 22 
Throughout the disturbances the casua1ties numbered 153 
killed and . 534 wounded. 
The Commission said it was informed that, o.t: the labour 
:forces employed upon the Rand at the outbreak of' the ,strike; 
7S per cent were Dutch South Africans, a considerable major-
ity o:f whom were stated to belong to the po1itioa.l party 
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knoWll' as the Nationalists.; To thesu men, went on the . . 
Commission, the cry of' a White South Af'rica made a profound 
impression; :for in the Northern Provinces of' the Union the 
. . 
prejudice against the black races of' South Africa is sti11 
extr@me. gncroa.cbment by coloured men upon any.form of 
work which has h:f.etberto been per:formed by Europeans, in any 
. . 
industry, is .jealo.usly sa.f'egua.rded ••• 
The cry of' a lfui te South Africa, and the f'eel ... 
ings it aroused amongst a large body o.f' worl<:ers, 
were skilfully exp1oited by the Trade Union 
leaders and by certain political parties ••• 
Whether the leaders of' the strike movement were 
genuine in the belief' that under the proposals 
of' the Chamber of' Mines, . the f'uture of the white, 
workers 1n South Af'rica was threatened by the 
black man is open to grave doubt, but that most 
of the followers were under this impression.is 
beyond question .••• 2.3 
Even the Church added f'uel to the smouldering 
f':iro.. On January 19 the Rev. Oosthuizen 
addressed a meeting at Brakpan estimated. at 
2,000 and is rdported to have saidt 'Their 
forefathers had f'ought :for-a White South A:trioa 
but upon,the 15th December, the Chamber of' Mines 
had deolifdd there should be a black South 
Af'rica.2 
Again on 3 February, at a meeting in the To1m Hal.l, Johan-
.nesburg, the Rev. Hattingh i.s reported to have said: 
The Government is only prepared to do what the 
Chambe.r of' Mines told them. In order to .f'ill 
their pockets; the Chamber of' Mi.nes were murder-
ing the workers; if' the colour bar was abolished, 
the souls.as well as the bodies of' the workers 
woUld be murdered and the authority ~~ the White 
race .in South Africa w&t¥e to an ena • :> 
The Inquiry Commission also reported evidence of' deliber• 
' a.te1y organized attacks on Af'rican 1.es:i.gned •to stampede them 
and to give the impression that a native r.ising on the land 
was imminent' but the Commission :found that 
the behaviour of the natives before and during 
the disturbances was most exemplary., and that 
.there :is no evidence~ upon whi.ch any reliancci 
,: can be placed, that .any o:f them gave any ooea• 
sion f'or the assaults made upon them, notldth-
sta.nding the wanton and unprovoked attacks to 
which they had been subjected on numerous ocoa-
sions, 26 
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Martial law and vigorous action by Government f'oroes 
restored law and order, Percy Fisher and M. Spendi:ff'~, 
professed Communists and the 1ead.ers o-£ the Council o-£ 
Action 'tfhose object was 'the abolishment of' ca.pi ta.lism•, 
both committed suicide in Mareh.1 The details .of this 
crisis phase in South Af'ricats economic development a.re 
analyzed subsequently.. 'l'he account here* with :l. t.s exten• 
sive quotations Crom o:f'f'i.cial and non-of'f'icia1 sources, is 
not intended to over.emphasize the excitability of' language 
and political extrovertism but to give an autben.tioated 
impression of' 'the :i.ntera.etions between racial :feeJ.ing.St , 
the uninhibited struggle for pol.i.ti.oal power and the 
crunch of' economic stagnation. 27 
The economic malaise and its tensions are :ref'.l,ected. in 
the Report of' the Unemployment Commission o:f 1921 appointed 
to inquire into the extent, causes and remedies for unemploy-
ment·, ru.1.d means of' preventing the .in:flux f'rom country to 
towns of persons without skil1ed training. It :found that 
Whites t'roqi 1;he country were attracted to towns by money 
wages which 
appear almost :fabulous ••• he [the ·rural poor 
White] has no notion o:f house rent and the 
increased cost of' l.ivi.ng that awa.its him, and 
i.s, therefore.; not .deterred by any such con•. 
siderations. Letters :from irresponsibles in 
the urban centres to their r@latives and 
:friends in the ·country telling them of high 
wages, 'pleasant lif'e, plentif'ul. opportunity, 
play no smaJ.1 part. in attracting f'rom the 
country simple folk to whom they are addressed. 28 
This Unemployment Commission found that a push effect 
was being exerted in the country-side by the J.ack o:f educa-
tional and training opportunity, the want o:f suitable land-
£or cultivation• and the insecurity of tenure, the natural 
conditions of' adverse climate and sub--div1sion of' farms 
resu1ting in population pressure. 29 Al.though the Commis-
sion was to recommend that the State should t'aci1itate J.and 
purchase f'or and by this class of' 1\!'h.1 te bywoners; there was 
no question of applying those measures of' •inf'lux control•; 
which later became the key :feature of' government policy to 
prevent the almost identical pull-push e:ff'ect on landless 
poor Africans entering the turban areas"• 
The poor White's might not have training nor evGn educa-
tion nor still less property. But they did have votes. 
No actor on the local political stage knew more instinctively 
how to interact with the emotions of' Anglo-Boor War de.feat 
and despa.i.r., .of Black Per:i.l :f'oars and competitive f'rustra• 
t.ions; no one was more sincerely and completely convinced 
that the Whi.te polity must' take charge o:f south At"rican than 
General Hertzog, Nationalist Party leader. ,:JO Tllls last con-
;.riction was undoubtedly hel.d by many other leading pol:i.tica.1 
actors, incl.udi.ng Col. CreSS\'lell, tho Labour Party leader 
and long-time champiott. 0£ all-'Whi te labour po.licies. 
The po1.i ti cal implications 0£ the Rand Strike o:f 1922 
had indeed been perceived c.1earl'Sf enough by the Secretary 
of' the Communist Party. w.H • .Andrews in a letter to another 
Communist Party member in .tu:t.stralia wrote: 
The political aspect of the strike is disclosed 
by the ralmrochement between the Labour and the 
Nationa1ist Parties, loose and unof':fic:ial at 
present; but it is possible it may develop into 
a work:i.ng agreement on the lines of oompleje 
autonomy and i.ndepden.ce for Sou.th Af'riea.3· 
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Perhaps because he had so recently ocoupied a leading 
role on the much greater stage of' world politics, Smuts 
was more conscious of' the larger social system in which 
South Africa and the Rand gold.minds were but a part. His 
experiences in the British War Cabinet and at the Peace 
Conf'erence in Paria'had clearly convinced him of' the vast 
interconnections of' human society and especially of' the 
interconnections of' the British Commonweal.th, including 
l.ndia. He could comprehend the relationships of' the City 
(of' London) and the Rand• and indeed of' the Rand goldf'ields 
and a collapsing world order. He - unl.ike any other South 
African statesman bef'ore or since - had also had an on-the-
spot view of' Communism and a disintegrating society under 
Red or syndicalist leadership• when sent on a m:tssion by the 
British Government to Hungary and to meet with Be1a Kun.:32 
In such an atmosphere, the politicall.y :fateful by-election 
0£ Wa:kker.stroom was held on 5 April 1924. No constituency 
in South Af'ri.ca at that date perhaps mirrored more clear1y 
the working-out o:f social process. •It is noteworthy that 
at the Ceneus o:f 1921•, wrote Professor Grosskopf in his 
economic analysis of' Poor Whiteism in South A:frioa, 
Wakkerstroom probably the most important sheep 
district in the Transvaal was the only distr.1.ot 
in that Province which showed a decrease :i.n 
European5~ population. Between 1911 and 
1926 the white popu1ation 0£ Wakkcrstroom de• 
creased by more than 26 per cent.33 
Sheep and their more crfectivo shepherding by :fencing, dis• 
placed people in Wakkorstroom, Transvaal, as they have done 
elsewhere during the centuries and the White rural popula-
tion decl.ined f'rom 5,047 in 1911 to '.},988 in 1926. 
As a campaign-ground £or vote-catching, it was ideal 
country for the exeroase of ideology. The story 0£ the 
battle is crisply and frankly told in the biography of 
Hertzog by o. Pirow: 
Smuts put up his strongest candidate, Mr. 
Alfred Robertson, a local man and Admini-
strator o:f the Transvaal Prov:'.lnce. This 
gentleman was A:frikaanS-speaking and a popu ... 
1ar and succe ssf'ul farmer. · He had only 
·one vu1nerable .spot viz. his record in the 
Anglo-Boer War. The Nationalists decided 
to hit him ·where he would :feel it most and 
put up against him Mr• A• S • i1audc, an un-
knotm f'armer but a. man l'tho had been shot . 
to pieces in 1900 and lost the use o:f both 
legs• Every newspaper in the country-took 
part in the campaign and the South Af'rican 
Party money f'lowed .like water. But nothing 
could stop tbe crippled xcterani he W()ll by 
a majority ·or over 200.3 
. 
On 7 April 1924~ Snruts disso.lved Parl:iament and in the 
June 1924 election his South African Party was overwhelm-
ingly de:feate.d. The Nationalists won 63 seats, the Labour 
Party 18 and the Smuts .supporters 53. Smuts hi.mself't and 
three of' his Cabinet Ministers, were defeated at the polls .• 
Hertzog•.s National.ists and Cresswell •s Labourites formed 
their Pact Government and :from the very beginning lef't no 
doubt that the White polity was now in control of' the economy 
and intended to take a very f'irID hand with the exerc~se of' 
econoJ},lic rationality or least-cost substitution in the 1abour 
market. The .application of' J.cast-cost substitution in the 
mining industry, which led to the 1922 Rand Strike, had been 
~ade possible by a Court decision declaring ultra vi.res the 
clause in the Mines and Works Act o:f 1911 that had reserved 
:foertai.n occupations :for lfu.ites on1y;, The Mines and Works 
.Amendment Act of' 1926 restored the lega1i. ty ·Of' the colour 
bar .in the mining industcy and the •civi.lized labour• po1ioy 
of'. tho Pact Gov~rnment established the letter and spirit o:f 
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the new poJ.itica.l. economy of' labour in South Africa • 
. Prime Minister Hertzog showed soon and clearly his 
understanding of' the legitimate limits of' political labour 
in South Africa. As part .0£ the electoral agreement be-
tween Hertzog and Creswell, the South A:frican Labour Party 
was initially to be given two Cabinet seats and a third as 
soon as a saparate Department of' Labour should be established. 
In.due course Mr. Walter Madeley, chosen as its nominee by 
a Labour Party Council vote, ·was accepted by Hertzog as the 
third Minister but given .the apparently innocuous post ot: 
Minister of' Posts and Te1egraphso When Madeley however 
showed. more interest in dabbling .in· trade union matters and ... 
against the speci:fic request of' Hertzog ... received a deputa• 
tion f'rom the Af'rican trade.union, the :CCU; the Prime Mini• 
ster dismissed the errant Madeley.36 
This hastened the break-up of' the South .A£r.ican Labour 
Party into Creswellitc and Councilite :f'actions • .37 It was 
however more than a f'a~tional squabble~ It was already ,. 
clear that Af'rikaallS"'speaking workers would :f'ind their pol.:i.t:l.-
cal td~ntiftcation with Afrikaner nationalism, which had 
given legi.slative and administrative proof" of' its intention 
and its ability to promote the interests of 'White workers, 
who were voters, against non .. white workers, who were not.· 
voters. 
The next general. election campaign of' 1929 · made this 
' evident. Smuts in a speeoh at Ermelo., Transvaal, in January 
1929, indulged in. that kind. of' vi.sonary exercise Which won 
him world .stature but made i. t on1y too easy :for Hertzog to 
knock him o:ff' his local pedestal. Smuts thought f'orwards 
to the creation of a vast African f'ederation of' .states, of' 
which the Union would f'o.rm one• The re.sponse of' Hertzog 
was swi:ft and politically annihilating. He ¢0wttered wi.th 
his f'amous - or notorious ... B1ack Manif'esto. Smuts was 
attacked as a man•who puts himse.l.f' :forward as the ape>stle 
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of a black ka:ff'ir State, of' which South Af'rica is to form 
so subordinate a constituent part that she will never know 
her own name no more•. 
Hertzog's Nationalists with 78 seats had an overall 
majority ove~Smuts•s South African Party, 61, and both 
wings of' the Labour Party, 5. Although Hertzog honoured 
his old alliance with Labour by giving Cres1-rell and another 
Engl.ish-speaking Labourite two Cabinet seats, therd. was no 
doubt of' tho triumph of' Nationalist ideology in 1929. 
In a critical respect, however, 1929 was not 1924. At 
tho earlier date Hertzog's :first victory coinc·ided with the 
t 
end of the world depression following WorJ.d War :r and his 
Finance Minister, Mr. Havenga; was to enjoy an exceptiona1 
run of fortune•s favours. The rate of economic growth, 
though not outstanding, was nonetheless adequate to carry 
the extra costs o:f, f'or instance, 1 civil.ized labour' on the 
South African Railways and also the specia1 basing-point 
price system to launch the high~cost public utility of the 
Iron and Steel Corporation. 
But lato in 1929 economic development was running out in 
the world at largo. The subsequent i.mpact of' the Great 
Depression on South Af'rica•a export industries - gol.d-min:lng, 
wool., f'ruit• sugar, maize • was so severe that the polity 
ttould have to acknowledge the ad.apti. ve coercions f'rom the 
economy. The 'gold standard crisis' not on1y exposed tho 
very vulnerable i.ntereonneotions between South Africa and the 
City (of' London} but a1so that the .ideol.ogy of' White South 
African.ism had a. strong streak of' material.ism. 
The party political intrigue that ensued makes a fascin-
ating chapter.in politics as the art o"f' the possible. When 
Smuts with the magnanimity 0£ the ph.il.osopher rather than 
the pride of the politician agredd to serve under the 
. premiership of Hertzog, the f'usion of' the warring factions 
of' tbe White polity was consummated in the United Party. 
Dr. Malan, drawing ever closer around himself' the mantle 
' 
of' Af'rikanerdom1 took '.Ideology into Opposition there to 
sit like patience on a monument until yet again the strains 
of economic growth on institutionalized culture shouJ.d result 
in another interchange.of' power' in the White polity. 
For the time being., howevert this extraordinary:.··· poli-
tical response to the economic pressure of' the Great.Depres-
sion gave the new United Party of' Hertzog-Smuts f'or the 
first time the critically strategic., more than two-thirds 
parl.iamentary majority. With f'our.-fif'ths of' the seats in 
the House of' Assembly, Hertzog as United Party premier wa.s 
at last able to break throueh the entrenched enf'ranoh:i.sement· 
of' the Afric.ane in the Cape. This is the objective to which 
he sedms to have been committed f'rom the time the provisions 
of' the Land Act ot: 1913, that established the :framework 0£ 
segregation, could not be applied to the Cape Province be-
cause of' Section 3.5 of' the South Africa Act, 1909. 
The first Union Parliament of' 1910 had forthwith super• 
:,i.mposed the law over the market for J.and and :for mining• 
employment. To the extent that the law was initially in-
et'f'ective i.n appropria.t.ing the land-market and the employ• 
ment-market f'or Whites., the political factor sought and 
gained White votes to strengthen the law and weaken the 
market. l.n everyparl:iamentary election. throughout the 
years; Af'r.ilcanerdom sought a mandate f'or segregation, :ror 
aparthe:td, f'or separate development · ... for the extension of' 
the administered society over the market economy so that the 
struotur~ o:f the South Af'rioan social .system should never be 
de:fitted and oond:t tioned by the ra.te ot' economi,o deve.lopment 
and the concomitant social progress of' the non-Whites; 
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To the degree that the franchise rights of' the Cape 
Africans protectod their f'reedom of: contract in the market 
:for land and jobs, so t'9-e political factor in the:rperaon 
of General Hertzog and the Nationalis·t Party he f'ounded set 
itself' to diminish those rights. To the extent that the 
franchise rights of' the Cape Coloureds, on the common roil, 
similarly protected their freedom of' contract in the market 
for - more particularly urban • land and jobs 1 so the poli• 
tical factor of Dr. Malan and his Re-united, or Pur~f'ied, 
Nationalist Party set i tsel:f to nulJ:f.t'y those rights. To 
the extent that representation of' the Af'rican peop.i.Q·$ ~y 
their own communal.1y elected three Houses of' Assembly, and 
four Senate. members secured a voice in the po1ity, so the 
poli tieal £actor o:f' Mr. Strijdom and baaskap national.ism 
set itself' to eliminate those Native representa.tives. 
To the extent that Smuts from 1;imo to time tried to give 
some token of' parliamentary recognition to the Indians of 
Natal. so his own political influence in his own Party dimi-
ni.shed until it contributed to his electoral. eclipse in the 
critical post-war 1948 General Election. The decades of' 
the political :factor in action had enabled the Union Parlia-
ment to take up and eliminate the ten.uoust attenuated fran-
chise rights of' the non-Whites. And to do so in a m~er 
that, had the 1909 National Convention to constitute the 
Unioh t'oreseen, would have made a unified South Af'rice..n 
polity and Union Parliament still-born,. The Whites by way 
of' the vote f'irst took charge and then unchallengeable con-
trol of' the polity. 
But what had happened to the network 0£ economic 






Even if' it is accepted that economic development is a 
consequence of' interaction, it remains a constant non-
academic - even perhaps academic - belief' that there must 
be a philosopher•s stone which starts the process of' trans-
muting dross into gold. It was South Af"rica•s remarkable, 
i:f" not indeed unique, good fortune that it could start quite 
litdrally with the gold. 
What came to be regarded as South Af'rica•s special pro-
blem in economic development was how to prevent the gold 
from reverting to dross. 
Entrepreneurial investment, capital accumulation, techno-
logica1 and social change began with the finding of' gold. 
Here was surely the most strategic variable of' all f'or a 
model of economic growth. But the very dynamic of: the 
Rand goldmines never ceased to plague the expectations of 
the elite of' South A:f"rica - stimulated and tortured alterna-
tively by those expectations. 
Those, whose expectations were po1itically represented 
by Hertzog and Creswe11, saw the gol.dmines as attracting to 
~he Rand a vast number of the •send-civilized'• These 
African tribesmen by their very presence and willingness to 
work f:or •\Ulcivi1ized' wages, would make it impossible £or 
South Africa to survive as a ''1hite man's country•. Others, 
who took a more hopeful view of: what had been accomplished 
by van Ribeeck's 1652-boatlaad of Europeans in peopling a 
sub-continent, were more concerned to safeguard against the 
day when all the payable gold ore was symbolized as dis-
tinctly tulpayable mine-dumps. Their view of' the future 
working relationship between White and non-Whit~was from 
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the economic development aspect more rationally economic. 
Xf the maintenance of White civilization in South Africa 
haunted the nightmares and dreams o'f' political man, so the 
maintenance of mining profitability haunted the dreams and 
nightmares of economic man. That one group's nightmares 
may be another group• s dreams has already been touched on 
in the prdvious chapter. The fears that least-cost substi-
tution :tn the gold-mining industry would begin by destroying 
the economic colour bar and thereby open the possibility for 
the elimination of social and political colour bars enabled 
Hertzog~creswell to win political power from Botha-Smuts. 
A more consistent fear was the need to find a substitute 
:for the goldmines as the dynamic of sustained economic growth. 
Patently the gold provided the energy :for take-of':f' - but how 
ensure that the economy continued dynamic? The almost 
complete approval .of' White South At'rica in the early 19oo•s 
:f'or unification expressed the conviction that over and above 
the vital need for •White un:lty•, a single political control 
cou1d more effectively promote the growth of' the economy 
through diversif'ication • 
.Anxidties about how to promote the well-being of' the 
peoples of' the newly constituted Union of' South Africa were 
well-fowtded and serious. Viewed as at 1910, the economy 
of' South Af'rica must have presented to disinterested and 
interested observers a pretty problem in skewed development. 
Unf'ortunately to write a detailed: economic geography of' 
the new po1ity is not possible. As the Dominions Royal 
Commission on Natural Resources and Trade declared feelingly 
in 1914: 'An.other •• • dif':f'ioul ty which meets those who are 
concerned with agriculture conditions in the Union is that 
there are no adequate statistics to help them.• 1 Indeed 
as one reads the two volumes of' evidence to this Commi.ssion., 
doubt grows as to tb.e validity of almost all contemporary 
data other than for the mining industry. No agricultural 
survey had been undertaken and the so-called agricultural 
census of 1911 was admitted by of'f'icia.ls to be •most un-
reliable'. Though a hydrographic .survey was under organi-
zation in 1914, ·the Union Director of Irrigation, gue.ssed 
to the Dominions Royal Commission that •only 5 per cent in 
all• of' the land 0£ South Africa was sui tabl.e f'or agricultu• 
ral crops; whether unde.r irrigation or as dry-farming, and 
that the balance of 95 per cent was essential.ly pastoral 
2 land. 
The Union Secretary for Agriculture was unable to .say and 
unwilling to guess at •what extent of' land would be available 
for closer settlement within the next ten years•. 3 No soil 
survey had as yet been started. No statistical data what'0-
4 ever was available in respect of manufacturing industry. 
In regard to mining, there was a great deal of' detail on 
operating performance and resu1ts but in fact the.potential 
of the mineral deposits and even of the gold ores was largely 
guesswork, where it was known at all.5 ~e :frustration 
which the Do•inJ.ons RoyiU. Commission repeatedly experienced 
in trying to give factual content to South Africa• s re-
sourc~s must be regarded as in itsei:f a serious obstacle to 
economic development. Statistical and :factual knowledge 
is ~ritical part of' the inf'ra•structure and the neglect 
and parsimony o:f South Af'rican Govermnents in relation to 
gathering and publishing basic data was one not unimportant 
:factor in the slow rate of :r.es.ourc4 utilization.9 
The illumination which :follows is therefore as much· im-
pressionism as real.ism. The first Union Parliament was 
taking political direction of' 5,973,394 people of' aJ.l. races 
of' which 1,276,242 were White, 4,019 1 006 were. African or 
Bantu, 152,309 Asiatic and 525,837 Coloured• according to 
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the census of 1911. The White popu1ation had evidently 
increased by about 1.50,000 on1y since the previous census 
of' 1904. There were in 1911 on1y 12•6J persons to the 
square mile of'· South African land ... area, of' whom 2.70 were 
lfhi.te and 9•93 non-White. Only f'ive towns had more than 
20,000 White persons each - they were Johannesburg with 
119,9.53 Whites (237,104 total), Cape Town 8!),44J 'Whites 
(161,759 total), Durban .34,880 Whites (89,998 total), 
Pretoria 3.5,942 Whites (57,674 total), Port El.izabeth 
20,007 "!bites (:n,063 total). 
One-quarter of the White population was nevertheless 
occupied in these five towns. Tho 1911 census gave the 
ocoupa t:lonal classif'ications ... of doubtful accuracy - of' 
the White population throughout the country to be prof'es-
sional 59,721, domestic 290,560; commercial 81,6271 
.agricultural 192,4241 ind.Ustrial 143,255 and indef'inite 
10,745; dependants 492,959 and unspecif'ied 4,951. The 
very great majority of' non-Whites were shown as engaged 
in agriculture or as domestics or as in industry (i.e. 
mining). 
There were in 1911, too, 163,257 White scho1ars in 
'.),873 schools and 1,36,om non-White. ·scholars in 1 ,999 
schools. The number recei~ing higher education amounted 
to 1,171 and total. expenditure on education was £1,597,062. 
No attempt was made to obtain any oomplcte data f'or the 
Union•s agricultural praductio'.4 uuti: 1918 a""l.tl bef'ore then 
f'igures were adnd.tted.ly 'incomplete, inadequate and in some 
respects misleading•. Sheep and wool was perhaps the 
oldest and certain1y the most important source of' income 
f'rom the land. Woolled sheep increased f'rom 11,800,000 
in 1904 to 21,800,000 in 1911 and the weight of' the wool 
clip exported had grown from about 40 million lbs in 1875 
to over 100 million lbs in 1909 - values of' course fluctu-
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ated wi.dely .• As a.t the time fbe Dominions Roya1 Commission 
• was reporting, ostrich :feather exp·orts were second only to 
that ·of wool but this somewhat esoteric pastoral pursuit had 
an ob~ious high risk facto~ associated with the fashion pre-
ferences of' Europe•s ar:t.stooracy. Moha:i.r, maize~. hides and 
skins, :fruit, wine contributed more promise than performance 
to the country's export trade. 
Mineral exports dominated, being in 191J over 80 per cent 
o:f the total•· The signif'i.eanoe of' gold and diamonds to the 
living standards of South Africans is indicated by the fail-
ure of' this vast expanse of' land as late as 1910 to :feed even 
its sparse population. There were relatively large imports 
of mutton (nearly 3! mill.ion lbs in 1911) and of' p:i.g products 
(nearly St million in 1911). Although the domestic wheat 
crop was put at .350 mill.ion lbs in 1911, more than 210 
miilion lbs of' whaat and wheaten products was being imported 
to feed the White population. Though sugar cane oultiva• 
tion had begu.n in Nata1 as early as 18.50, in 1911 imports 
stil.1 totalled more than ·36,000 tons. Tea, too, though 
grown in Natal., was imported to about 75 per.cent of' con• 
aumption. Viticulture which had begun with the Huguenots 
in the Western Cape nearly 250 years ago had, through many 
vicissitudes; declined :ln quality standards until. in 1914 
the wine and brandy exports a.mounted to less than £10,000 
while imports of' £100,000 were needed to satisfy superior 
tastes. 
In Schumpeterian terminology, it could almost be said 
that in more than two and a ha1f centuries no 'development• 
at all had tal(.en place in &gi>icu.lture; l'.f <•: by develop-
ment ~e shall understand only such changes in economic lif'e 
a.a are not f'orced upon it f'rom without but arise by its own 
initiative f'rom within•,7 then most of South African agri-




'(:5.n itself' without development, is dragged .along by the 
·. . . . .· •. 8 
changes in the outside world' • Some growth perhaps there 
may have been but virtually no development through the ear.ry-
ing out ·Of new oombi'l.ations of productive means 1 in 
Sohumpeter• s concept .of the mechanism· o:f change .• 
The Schumpeterian entrepreneur or innovator of' develop• 
ment is the one tv-ho carries ·out these new combinations ... the 
in.troduction ·Of .a new product or the addition of' a new 
.quality to an existing goo·d,. the introduction of a new method 
of producti·on or marketing, the opening of' a new market 
whether or not it existed heretofore., the conquest of a 
hitherto unexploited though perhaps known source of' supply 
. ··Of raw materials, the oarry~ng out ·Of' ,a. new organization 
f'or any.activity.9 
The role .of' the external .entrepr.eneur and f'ore:i.gn capit;µ. .... 
the 1 Uitlander' •in· the development of South Af'rica•a 
mineral resources Crom 1870 is of' course well known, tThat 
is not genera.1:1Y recognized is that the carrying out of' new 
combinations in land-utilization - both pa,stora.1 and. crop ... 
cultivation·- in South Af'rlca almost f'rom the earliest· times 
untS.J.. at least 1910 was also very .largely the innovating 
eff'ort of' newcomers to. South Africa. 
As Goodf'ellow had emphasized in his study .of· agriculture 
in South ~:frica during the last quarter of' the nJ.neteenth 
•century, thd. almost complete abso~ce o.f contact with either 
.markets or scientif'ic agricultural practice meant that the 
value . of nearly a.tl· the I.and was unlcnown. According to 
.Good:fe1low the Karrooin its natural state had been able to 
de!;elop resources of' soil through vegetation· .appropriate 
to the action Of' Water on its 1SUrfaCe. but its great poten ... 
tial had been destroyed or ignored·by fai1ure to control 
the moV'etnent of' sheep over the steadily denuded V'eldt. 
A Mr. Southey by experiment.a on Karroo .I.and. in paddocking 
~.....---~l - --,-..--· ·--· _, --~- -- ---- ~ --~--. ~--- ~- ~--
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oircumscribed, the economic growth o:f' South Africa by 1910 
was not encouraging to those who saw it either as the latest 
of' His Majesty's Great White Dominions or as the only home 
o:f' a new White J:ndependent Nation. It was perhaps even more 
than discouraging to the many millions who 1 tho1..tgh described 
as •natives•, were virtuallyexoluded f'rom a vote in the new 
polity o:f' their native land. To con.temporary observers, it 
must have required neither the non-availability of statisti-
cal data for national income calculation nor the depressing 
evidence of' the 'rransvaal Indigdncy Commission nor the report 
o:f' the Economic Commission of 1914 to see that gross output 
and income per head in the Union of' South A£rica were un-
acoeptabl y low. 
With the never-stilled Cassandras to draw attention to 
the •wasting assets 1 of' the mines, the compu1sion .to force 
agricultural and industrial growth by changes f'rom wi.thout 
must have been powerf'ully strengthened in the minds o:f' the 
polity by the scarcely evident development coming :f'rom within. 
Given the economic geography of' South Af'rica at the time 
of Union, it was believed by some acute observers that trans-
portation could make a positive, even decisive, contribution 
to development and diversif'ication. 12 The negative contri-
bution.which the separate railway svstems as the instruments 
o:f' political autonomy had made to pre-Union conf'licts has 
al.ready been examined. Reoogni ti on of' the negative pa.st 
and the positive.potential lay behi.nd the great care given 
by the Miinor Kindergarten to try to ensure that a wiified 
railway system f'or a unif'ied South A:frica would <serv-e· 
as a ori tical f'actor :in preventing development relapsing 
into underdevelopment. 
The non~political controi and operation of' the South 
Af'rican Rai1ways seemed of' the essence. Hence th€ unusual 
incorporation of' certain basic principles of' railway manage-
ment into the Act of Union itself' • The constitutional 
. guarantees to provide :for, the business operation of the key 
.instrument ·Of' the country• s economic growth aimed to en ... 
trench .a non .... poli tica.1 management a.g.ainst a likely political 
"interf',erenoe. Hence section 126 of' the South Af'rica Act 
provided: 
Subject to the authort ty of' the Govern.or.:..a.eneral-
. 4,n. ... counc:Ll, the control and management of' the 
railways., ports and harbours of' the Union shatl 
be exercised through a boa.rd consi.sting of' not 
more than three commissioners 1 .who shall be· 
appointed by the Governor~General•in-Couneil, 
and a minister of' State, who shall be ch.airman. 
And the very neltt section 127 proceeded.t 
The railway,s, port.s an.cl harbours of' the Union 
shall be administered on business principles, 
due regard being had to agricultural and in-
dustrial development ldthin the Union and pro• 
motion• by means of cheap transport• of" the 
aettJ.ement of' an agricultural and industr.ial 
population in the inland portJ.ons of' a.11 pro-
vinces in the Union • • ~ 
While to spoll out *busines.s p:ri.noipl.es•, this section 127 
went straigb.t ont 
•• • So far as .may be, the total earnings shall 
be note more than are su:ff'icient to meet the 
necessary outlays f'or working, maintenance, 
betterment, depreciation, ~d the payment of' 
interest due on ca.pi tal not being ca.pi t:al 
contributed out o.f Railways and Harbours 
revenues; and not including ~Y sums pa.id 
out of the Consol!.dated Revenue FUnd in 
accordance with the provisi·ons of' secti.ons 
1 30 and . 131 ••• 
With hindsight and perhaps f'oreid.ght of' the ingenuity of' 
South A:frican p.oiiticians in ,c~rcumvent:J.ng the spirit of 
the law. sections 1 '.30 and 1.31 tried valiantly to provide 
i. ts letter. The potential divergence of interpretation 
between (.a) d~termining total earnings not to exceed 
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necessary outlays and (b) promoting development through the 
settlement ot' the interior was anticipated, Section 130 
prov:i.dedt 
Every proposal. for the' construction o:f' any port 
or harbour works or ,of' any .line of' r,ailway be· 
:fore being submitted tb Parliament shall be con-
sidered by the Board, which shall report thereon. 
and shall advise whether the proposed works or 
line of' railway should or should not be con-
structed. It' any :such works or line shall be 
constructed contrary to the advice ot' the Board, 
and if' the Board is o:f' the opinion that the 
. revenue derl ved. t'rp~ the operat~on of' s.uch 
·works or 1ine witlri;e suf'f'icient to meet the 
costs ~:f working and maintenance* and of' inter-
est on the cap.ital invested therein; it shall 
frame an estimate of' the annual loss. which, 
.in its ,opinion, will result f'r.om such operation. 
Such estimate shall be examined by the Controller 
and .Auditor-General, and when apprpved by him 
the amollllt thereof' shall be pai.d over a.nnuaJ.ly 
f'rom the Consolidated· Revenue Fund to the Rail-
way Fund • •• 
And to make proof' positive, Section 131 saidt 
It' the Board shall. be required by the Governor-
General .... ::J.n ... CoW'lcil or under aftY Act of Par.lia .. 
ment to provide any services er i'ac:ilities 
e.i ther gratui tousl.y or at a rate of' ch~ge 
which is insu:ff'icient to meet the costs .in• 
volved in the provision of' such services or 
f'acili ties• the Board shall at the end of' each 
f'inanc:tal y2ar present to Parl.iament an. account 
approved by the Contro11er and A:ud~tor-General 
sho·wing, as nearly as can be ascertained, the 
amount of' the 1oss .incurred by reason 0£ the 
prov-ision of' such services and f'aci:l.it.ies, 
and such amount shall be paid out of the 
Consol.idated Revenue Fund to the Rail.way 
and Harbour Fund. 
These sections of' the South Africa Act were devised and 
virtual.J.y written by non-South Africans - by the Milner 
K:inde~garten and more especiall.y Phi.tip Kerr and R.H. Brand. 
As R.H. Brand had put :.tt: 'A .s.ingl.e idea, the prevention of' 
political. jobbery and the administration of' the railway.s 
185. 
and harbours • •• on commercial pr.inciplES run through all 
the railway provisions .of' the constitution ·• •• it. is an 
attempt to save democracy t'rom itself• t 
J3ut the problem of' sat'egttarding South Africans f'rom other 
South A:fr!l.ca.ns was no~ so x-ea.dily accompli.shed. Neither the 
attempt to entrench ·•business princi.ples' in the management 
of' the ra:i.l,·1ays and ports nor the attempt to entrench the 
f'ranchise of' the non-Whites was to survive the remorseless 
erosion by politic al action. 
ln re.spect of' the administrat:i.on ·Of' the South .African 
Railways and Harbours• the detail. and manner of' political 
.manoeuvre is elaborated in s.H •. F.rankel •s study of' .The Rail-
way .PoiieY of' SouthAfri;ca. 13 
Amending legislation did not s·o much. open the way to 
' . 
political jobbery as remove any restraint on a. ministerial 
interpretation of' what constituted business prine1.ples ~and. 
appropriate development of' the economy by the i.nstrument of' 
the state-owned transportation .system. The party political 
abuse.of the South African Railways and liarbours was probably 
na worse· ... it was certainly no bett~r ... than :J.i:; the inevit-
able f'ate of' any major nationalized undertaking. :Indeed 
the abuse dtld not have to await the legal demotion of' the 
Board of' Conunissioners to the creature of' the Minister. .It 
began tvith the f'.lrst session of the Union Parliament when 
nearly f'i.£ty •petitions~• £or branch .rail lines ltrere presented, 
and a great 1ma:ny more tor rate reduottlons. 
Nor was the Government i tseJ.f' slow to adopt that f'J.e:xi-
bili ty of' definition of' capitalization, depreciation and 
renewals which permitted the evasi.on of' the .f'ormal obl.tga-
tlons of' the Act 0£ Union .not to overburden the South Af'rican 
Railways and Harbours with excess debt ·charges or unload 
from the Central Government the responaibl.l.ity f'or f'inding 
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necessary capital. According to Frankel, the excess capi.tal-
i~ation of' the south African Rai1ways and Harbours amounted 
to about £13,0001 000 or an annual excess debt charge of' 
£4.50t000 by the Central Government against the South African 
14 Railways and Harbours. 
Dubious procedures in respect of depreciation allowances 
and the renewals f'und permitted excess depreciation pr.ovi.sion 
to be diverted for the purchasd. of' new rolling stock, which 
would otherwi.se have had to be met :from additional capital 
f'unds subject to parliamentary scrutiny.1.5 Ministerial un-
willingness to f'aae Parliament ·with .requests f'or desirable 
additional capital not only curtailed appropriate development 
but the Minister of" Railways intervened continuously to direct 
the expenditure of voted capital. 
Flagrant parliamentary bargaining in respect of branch 
line extensions resulted i.n the Railway Board submitting to 
/ 
to Parliame:n:t reports/ on proposed new lines-; of 
railway couched ti.n .the vaguest possible terms, 
and containing'astoundingly inaccurate estimates 
.... In 1926, .out of 70 branch lines, only 10 
showed a net prof'it. 32 paid working expenses 
'but were unab.le to meet f'ull interest payments, 
while 28 showed earnings which lrere not even 
able to cover working expense.s. The total 
losses on these lines, after the
6
payment of 
i.11.terest, amounted to £526,596.1 
Opportunism and jobbery :ln the fifty-year-old admi.ni• 
stration of' the South African Railways and Harbours can no 
doubt b~ parallelled :f'rom the experienoe of other state-
owned transport systems.. Venality i.n vote-buying was not 
the prerogative o'f any South Af'rican pol.itical. party.. In 
a Parliament elected by an almost exclusi.vely White elector-
ate and with a distribution of" s.e.8:ts heavily J..oaded in :favour 
of' farming areas, no party was ignorant of: or immune to the 
possibilities. Since, :for example, both parties when i.n 
power carried drough.t-stricken stock· to f.resh pasturage 
idthout charge, neither had anY particular inter,est i.n 
reminding the Minister of Railways of· his st.atutory obliga-
tion to recover the costs :from the central :revenue. 
In respect of employing White workers for unskilled labour 
,in place of lower ... pa.id A:fz.icans, the Botha-smuts administra-
tion d.id ensure that the Central Government paid over the 
dif':f'e.rentia.1 cost to ~he South A£rican Rail-ways and Harbours. 
But with the uninhibited implementation of' the civil.ized 
' labour policy by the Hertzog-Creswell Pact Govermnent 1 the 
excess cost was evidently too embarrassing to be re:fleoted 
in a direct charge against the Central,GQvernment, By 1927 
the Railway Board itself had minuted to the General Manager 
of' the South African Railways and Harbours that the addi.,. 
tiona,1 cQst of' the civilized labour po~icy was not required 
to be recorded separa.te1y even by the South Af'rican .R$.ilways 
and Harbours itself',. 
. 
Pa.spite the petty and not-so-petty jerrymanderin{h the 
problem of' what would constitute the object::l.ve realization 
of' managing the South At'rican Railways in accordance, with 
business principles and of' giving due regard tG the agri ... 
cul.tural and industrial development of the 1.nterior was a 
very real and very complex· one. The :failure of' South 
Af'rtcan:farmere and manu:facturere to meet the demands o:f 
the Rand market was generally attributed to the want of the 
indispensible communication ... transportation system. 
The pre ... Union railway construction bad ... for good and 
obvl.ous reasons ... concentrated on linking the ports with the 
diamond fields and the gold mines. .But it had in conse ... 
quence :failed to link potential south Af'r.ioan sources of' 
supply with the existing market. To encourage the poten"" 
tialtty of' such supply into the actuality 0£. demand was now 
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open to the uni:fied South African Railways Administration. 
Not to embark on the additional rail-line bu:ilding and not 
to adopt the appropriate raJ.lage rates might well have seemed 
to ignore the eonetitutiona:tly .... imposed responsibility to 
manage the rail system on bu~iness principles with due regard 
to agricultural and industrial development. 
·Given the dif'f'iculties of"' raising the necessary capita1 
for new construc~ion and equipment; the optimizatt·on of' in-
vested capital was a complex responsibility of' management. 
Interf'erenee by successive Railway Ministers, excessively 
aware o:f party politics, resulted .in major wastage and leak• 
age. But the theory of' railway rating itself' raised most 
complex princi.ples on which to base the practice of' the 
South Af'ri.can Rail.ways even without such vote-motivated oom ... 
plications. 
At 1910 what would have been the most appropriate and 
desirab1e rates structure? To being with there was the pre-
union rating structure; which had been evolved by the sepa-
rate colonial administrations to preserve their respective 
market positions in a decidedly imperfect market. There 
was the modus vivendi. undertaking with Portuguese East Africa 
to be observed. To ensure a continuation of the vested-
interest division of tra:f'f:i .. c was clearly in the spir:it of' 
Union and an obligation that no management; however ,animated 
by business principles, could have ignored. But what are 
business principles :ln railway rating? 
In fairness :Lt must be acknowledged that no theoretical 
unanimity has probably been achieved even to-day - and in 
the early part of' the century a thoroughly business-like 
management could have :found much academic support :for the 
val.ue-of'-service principle or charging what-the-traf'f'ic-will.-
bear. Though the worst malpractices of' discriminating 
monopoly in railway operation in the u.s.A. had already 
brought anti-monopoly legislation; it still seemed a power-
:f'ul argument that by all.owing the rai1,.,ays to charge what 
the tra.f'f':tc would bear, more and not less tra:f'f'ie would be 
carried. 
The argument rested on the economics of' overhead costs 
and the consequent economies of' spreading such overheads over 
the maximum demand that oould be generated by dif'f'erential 
prices related to different elasticities of demand. .J:f' 
demand f'or rail transport would continue from particular 
railway customers at however high a rate, whereas no demand 
:for rail.age would come into being :from other customers e"cept 
at a much lower rate, would not both groups benef'ite by 
charging different rates? A low rate to bring into being ... 
or allOlf to continue - the demand :for raila.ge :from the latter 
group, who could arid would pay only that low rate, did none• 
theless generate this additional rail tra.1'.f'ic. This addi• 
tional ra.i.1 traf'f'ic made a contribution to overheads of' the 
railways, which theref'ore did not have to charge the t'ull 
total ot: those overheads against the f'irst group of' rai1way 
customers, who would cont~nue to demand ra.ilage at however 
high a rate• Hence, because the overheads could be spread, 
the high rate would at least be less high,, 17 
By di:f'f'erential or discriminating rates; both groups o:f' 
rail. users ... those who could af't:ord high rates and those who 
could not af'f'ord tliose rates - would benefit. 'l'he total 
revenues of the rail. ways would be gre.ater and the rail ways 
would presumably ,earn greater prof'its. 
For the South Af'.rican Railways Adm.:l.n:l.stratio.n the aigni-
:ficanoa o'£ this theoretical case f'or dif:ferential. or d:is-
crimina.ting rates to the constitutional obligation to operate 
on business principles and to promote the development of' 
agricu.ltural and industrial South Africa was clear. Good 
\ 
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theory f'or once seamed to go hand in hand with good politics. 
Elaborating the claesif'ication of' goods so that each ciass 
of' trafi'ic would :fall into the rating group which it coul.d 
and would pay sdrved everybody's best interests • each group 
of' railway customers as well. as the natl. onal interest of 
deve.lopment of the .economy through div4rs.i:fication. 
A measure of' co-incidence between. say, farmers and the 
low rate group on the one hand and, say, the Rand gold mines 
and the high rate group on the other hand was, f'ro:m the 
Government's view, an even more gratifying coincidence of' 
good practical politics and sound theoretical economics. 
But was the economic theory as good as the practical politics? 
One had only to study the composition of' all South Af'rican 
Parliaments and the constituency delimitation arrangements 
to know that to class.i:fy all agricultural products and needs 
in the low-rate groups 1-raa good politics. To classify all 
the needs of the mini.ng industry in the high-rate groups was 
certain1y not bad politics. To classi:fy South African manu. 
f'actured goods at special rates below the rates charged f'or 
ra;Lling the identical imported goods over exactly the same 
mileage was also better politics than charging non~pre£eren­
tial rates. 
To devise a scheme o:f distribution rates so that goods 
would pay the same ra.ilage bill whether sent 700 tniles from 
inland manufacturing Johannesburg or sent 300 mi.lee in the 
reverse direction from coastal importing Port Elizabeth was 
also good po.lit:i.cs. Very low rates to promote the export 
of' beans, barley, compressed fodder and f'orage, kaf'f'ir corn, 
oats, peas, potatoes, milled ka:f':fir corn and maize, wheat, 
and f'ruit ranked as exceptionally good politics.. Was this 
highly complicated classification of' rates, however, sound 
railway economics? 
The theory is that dif:ferential pricing in the case of a 
monopoly is in the interests rof all groups 'of consumers of' 
the monopoly product. if' its supply is subject t> decreasing 
average costs. Under such circumstances discriminating 
monopoly may, it is ar&"U.ed, yield a large output than non-
discriminating monopoly. 
A ra.il.~y system was long regarded by some economists 
as the classic example of' such a monopoly. Rail rates based 
on the value-o:f'•Service to the rail ... user as distinct from 
rail rates based on the cost .... of ... service to the railway company 
would, it was argued,, increase the total amount of' rai.1 trans-
port supplied and bougllt. J:t would permit full uttlizati.on 
of' the capacity of the South Af'.riean Railways, for instance, 
.so that this State-owned enterprise earned the maximum 
revenue· f'rom its existing ra.11 ... system at any given time. 
S1mul.taneously it would e.nable all current and prospective 
.rait ... users to make use 0£ tb.at rail•.system to the lim:i. t of' 
the indi'Vidual user'.1 s abili.ty to pay :for rail.age• 
The value•o:f.-service ratting or chax"ging what-the ... tra:ff':lc-
will•bear meant ... according to thts theory ... that no tra.f'f'ic 
paid .more than it i1aa abl.e to pay, No traffic was not 
o:f'.f'.ered or not accepted because it was unable to pay the 
rate charged against it. 
lf' the theoretical argument f'or such a. rating system was 
valid, then it was indisputably a highly desirable method :for 
the development ,of the agr.icultural and industrial. interior 
of' South ~f'rica. It would :facilitate.a f'low 0£ goods from 
dispersed sources of' supply to concentrated markets of' demand. 
Xt would help to link the vast e.xpanses of' grazi.ng and crop-
lands., e.specially, wt th the highly centralized consWlli.ng 
market of' the Rand and• by way of' the ports, \d.th the worl.d' s 
greatest consuming market at the b.eart o:f the Bri ti.sh Empire. 
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Hence the economist in 191 O who accepted the theory of' 
value-of'.-service railway rating might, all pol.i tics set aside, 
reasonably havd seen the South Ai'rican Railways and a diff'er-
ential rating systEim as the most important instrument f'or 
the simultaneous development and diversification of' the under-
developed and skewed-development economy of' the new pol.ity. 
Was he right in h:is theory? 
In his Economics o:f Wel:fare, Pigou seems ·ef'f'eatively to 
expose the f'allacies on which the theoretical case :for dis-
criminating railway rates had been based by •railway econo-
18 mists'• Among the latter, Taussig had argued that when• 
ever a very large f'ixed plant is used f'or varied purposes, 
the in:fluenee of' joint costs or joint supply eJterts itself'. 
The ini:tial capital sunk in the railway system and the largest 
part o'f: the operati.ng expenses". according to Taussig, repre-
sent outlays that are common to all· or most of' the tr·a:ff'ic ... 
. . 
these eosts are regarded as equa11y incurred to a.id in carry-
ing every item 0£ tra~fic • 
. Taussig•s case was that joint supply. operated wherever a 
large mass of' suplementary costs exists together with the 
fact that the plant is used for varied purposea. Wirl.le 
Taussig admitted that ,joint supply. and hence joint costs, 
cannot appear where the plant is used to produce a single 
homogeneous product• he asserted that, in regard to the 
conditions of demand, the railage of tons 0£ different 
goods (and even the railage of the same goods for different 
u1timate use) are diff'erent. non-homogeneous services of' 
•products•. 
But Pigou emphasized that 'true• or econoud.cally signi-
ficant jointness of supp1y, such as to result in differential 
prices even under competition, depended not only on large, 
common supplementary costs. :It was also of' the essence 
that each addi tiona.l unit o:f' investment must be such that i:t 
could not increase the supply of' one product without simul-
taneously and necessarily increasing.the supplY, of' the other 
product or products. If the additional investment could be 
used to increase the supply of one product .or the supp.J.y of' 
another product, then the products were in alternate and not 
joint supply. 
'If' investment in in.creasing transportation services is 
such that it can be made to increase or facilitate the supply 
of' transport f'or one market or another market, i.e. :for one 
class of transport-user.s or another class o'f: transport-users 1 
then a particular supplier of' (:i .• e. i1'lvestor in) transport 
will off'er his service to the higher-priced rather than to 
the lower-priced market. It' there is more than one supplier 
of' transport; if there is competition and .not a monopoly, the 
competitio.n between these suppliers will tend to bring trans• 
port rate.s or prices in the higher-priced and lower-priced. 
markets towards a single 9 uniform price covering the long-nm 
cost of service. 
The e.ld>orati1on of detail of' this complex argument is not 
immediately relevant. 19 What is relevant is that the 
theory of' railway rating did not lend quite the indisputable 
economic argUment claimed. :for the discriminating rating pol.icy 
adopted and i.ntensif'ied over the years by the South African 
Railways Administration. 'Wl:tat is even more relevant is that 
when technical progress made available cost-reducing road 
motor transport 9 a dubious railway rating theory had been so 
compowided by politics as a result cin an extraordinary prioe-
diversifioation between high-rate and low-rate rail tra:f'f'ic. 
This in turn brought about such a delicate bale.nee in the 
financial viability of the South African Railways that the 
Government• with the immense and intricate political stakes 
vested in monopolistic railway rating and railway operating, 
found :Ltsel:f compelled to restrict compeititve road motor 
transport to an extraordinary extent. 
To operate the South Af'rican Railways on business prin• 
ciples \d th due regard to tha agricultural and industrial 
development of the interior was not to be achieved by the 
SAR Administration, beginning in 1910, charging what the 
traf'Cic would bear. Charging the Rand gold mines high rail 
ratef'i!I on all their stores and needs• charging Transvaal and 
Orange Free State farmers low rail rates on all their 
supplies. and requirements, charging manuf'actured goods high 
rates' and raw materials low rates certainly brought about a 
rd· .. distribution of' the country• s re sources. But did tliat 
re-dist1'.'ibution optimi.ze tb.e rate of' economic development as 
distinct f'rom inf1uencing the shape of' development? 
· It is not a social gain, as Pigou had pointed out, if' a 
railway company by temporary low prices develops the traf'f'ic 
from on4 district at the expense of d~stroying their traffic 
:from another equally well-situated district. ln thi.s re-
spect low-rate development rail rates have the same justifi-
cation or lack of' justification as protective tariff's. A 
re-distribution of' the utilization of existing resources is 
not development in the sense of' net growth. Even i.f' hither-
to unemployed resources are given employment by the protect-
ion either of pref'erential rail rates or customs tarif'f's, 
it is the optimization of the deployment of all resources 
which promotes the most rapid rate of development. ,. 
It is not possible 2 ante quantitatively to prove opt:L-
mizat:i.on of' re.sourcc-deploym.ent and .f$ 2.ost judgment must be 
even more qualitative. In the absence o~ all political 
considerations, ~t would still have been an excdptionally 
complex task to invest very scarce capital in the South 
African Railways and Harbours system so as to optimize. the 
rate of' over .. all development of the resources of' the Union 
of' South Af'rlca. Tbe single most important resource was 
the gold of' the .Rand. Gold-mining was both the magnet 
for the investment of' foreign capital and the generator 
of domestic .savings. Capital accumulation and capital 
investment was highl.y correlated with prof'i. table gdd output. 
Costa increases that dimi11ished current or prospective 
2rof'itablc gold output would seem to have.reduced the rate 
of' over-all development of resources; cost decreases that 
increased current or prospective p,ro:fitable gold output 
would seem to have optimized the rate 0£ over~all development. 
Tho exact •excess burden' which Frankel calculated was 
placed on the Rand goldmines by the monopolistic railway 
rating policy of' the South African Railways, in its pursuit 
both of' political advantage for governments and of' promotion 
of' the ~ricul tural and indu.strial development of the interior 
of S~uth Africa, may be a matter of' dispute. What can 
hardly be doubted is that South Af'rica•s economic development 
had wa:i ted for decades and perh.aps f'or two centuries on the 
dynamic o:f an expanding market. Capital investment :t.n 
diamond and goldmines brough such markets into be1ng, first 
in Kimberley and then, much more significantly, in Johannes-
burg. 
<Phe market of' tho Rand was the integrating £actor of 
South Af'rica•s social system - of its economic r4lation-
ships no less than of' its politica1 relationships. It was 
the overwhelming factor in integrating the relationships 
between White men and Black men. 1t was indeed the patent 
~ntegrationist implications of the Rand in respect of the 
Africans that led to so much consideration of' and concern 
for raiiway development as a more acceptable altarnative of 
1:i.nking the country's supply-potential with market-demand, 
whether in dome·stic or export markets. 
The Dominions Royal Connnission, reporting in 1914 on 
South African agricultural prospects, suggested that the 
most promising line of' advance ·was· in scientif'ie stock• 
raising. It looked to the time when •south Africa will at 
least be ~reed from the reproach of being unable to supply 
its own wants in the way of' butter. milk and meat (and) .it 
tnay even be enabled to enter the worid.i s markets as a eom-
peti tor with Australasia and the Argentine•. 20 The Com-
mission noted the large increase in numbers of woo1led sheep 
and the prospects of a growing export of' f'leece .of improving 
qual.ity. It recorded the many· optimiati.c expressions of' 
opinion that the maize-growing potential of' South Africa was 
unexcelled by any other country in the worldt the admirable 
opportunities .for the development of' :frui. t-farming in. many 
regions, and the prospects of' wine and brandy exports if' 
quality standards could be improved and maintained.. It 
seemed especially interested in promoting a.11 extension o:f 
cotton cultivation to which it devoted much detailed cons:.tder-
at:i.on. Tobacoo•g:r.owing also had· f'av.ourable pro.spec ts subject 
to quality-improvement. The outlook f'or extended tea• 
cul. tiv.ation \-t'as in the Commission ts opinion unfavourable, but 
it looked f'orward to Nat.a1•s sugar :!nctustry meeting the Union's 
total domestic needs within,a. lf'ew years; though •i.t does.not 
appear that South Africa wi11 ever compete in the wor1d 
market.• 21 
Finally., the Commission desired · · 
to add one general observation• • • • We l-rere 
struck with the comparative indif'fe.re.nce; or 
want of enterprise, which prevails in bring-
ing the various agr:i.cultura.1 products, part:i• 
eularly wine, tobacco, and :fruit to the notice 
of consumers outside the Union, or preparing 
them in such a f'ashi.on as best to meet the 
requirements of' importers overseas •• • Ve 
notice that only £850 appears in the esti• 
mates for 1914-1.5-f'or the High Commission2f's 
0£f'ice, f'or advertising and exhibitions. · 
In its general programme of new-line and branch-line 
construction and in the class.i:fication of' farming needs and 
agricultural produce in the very lowest-rate groups,· the 
South African Railways heavily sv.bsidized the distribution 
costs of' the South Pfrican agricultural industry to help it 
in achieving its contribution, the potential of which had 
been sketched in the Dominions Royal Commission Report, to 
the co~try•s economic development. 2 3 
What was the statistical record ten to f'i:f'teen years 
af'ter Union - about 1920 to 1925, at which latter date a 
major change .in the control of' the polity had taken place 
wi.th the advent of' the Pact Government? 
The country was certainly less dependent on imported 
foodstuffs. The progress towards greater outputs from 
pastor.al - and crop-farming would seem to owe much to the 
major impotus g:i.ven by the First World War. , The 1914-18 
War both forced the domostic market to seek its supplies f'rom 
domestic'""grmm produce and• also, power:f'u.l1y stimulated the 
external demand from Britain for critic al suppl.ie s of' f'ood 
and agricultral raw materials. But the table below indi· 
cates tnat post-war price declines brought sultatantia1 set-
backs, suggesting that South African farming broadly had not 
yet secured :its competitive,- position through increasing 
productivity. 
Imports of' beef' valued at £30,553 in 1910 and over 
£80~000 in 1913 had by 1919 become exports of' £1.138,000 
but ~apidly fa11ing away to £118,000 in 1924. Butter pro• 
duction which in 1910/1911 was about .11f mil1ion lbs had 
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No, 0£ Livestock and Crop Production on Farms and Holdings 
occupied by Europeans, Asiatics and Coloured Persons (in-
£.luding Stock and Production of Natives on such Farms but 
excluding Stock and Production of Natives in Native 
Reeerv~s, Locations, Mission Stations and Native Farms)s 
Year Cattle Woolled Other Wheat Maize 
No. Sheep Sheep 1000 lb. 1000 lb. 
No. No. 
1904 3,500,553 11, 820, 6.'.35 4,,501,868 141,739 722, :119 
1919 .51575,488 23,548,130 4,934,370 478,7.'.34 1,734, 118 
1924 6,664,059 24,187,914 4,526,160 352,698 1,666,426 
Year Cotton Tobacco Sugar Tea 
Unginned 1000 lb. Cane Leaf' 
lbs, Tons 1000 lb. 
1904 - -
1919 1,418,611 14,183 1,258, .'.302 5,744 
1924 10,003,285 10,676 1,918,560 3,515 
(N.B. The above figures are taken for the Union Year Book 
No.8 for 1910/1925, The accuracy of these agricultural 
censures is questionable and no agricultural census data 
are available as at Union c. 1910. It must also be remem-
bered that figures for 1904 are shortly after the Anglo-Boer 
War and are at a low-point, tending to over-state increases 
in later years). 
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nearly doubled to 21t million lbs by 1918/19 and then fell 
back slightly to under 21 million lbs by 1923/24. A small 
amount of net importation of' butter continuod to ref'leet 
ad.verse years of' drought. Imports of' bacon fluctuated 
from £220,000 in 1910 to under £2t000 in 1918 and back to 
£67,000 in 1924 with imports dwindling except again in bad 
seasons. Total wheat grown at home increased f'rom :362 
million l.bs in 1910/11 to over .500 million lbs j.n 1918/19 
and fell back to 358 million l.bs in 192.'.)/24 •. Im.ports of' 
wheat were still substantial - in 1910/11 being 193 million 
lbs and 287 million lbs in 1923/24. Maize production and 
exports • analysed in greater detail in the next chapter -
f'luctuated widdly in consequence of' climatic conditions. 
Wine exports were i.n 1911 96,000 gallons valued at 
·£21,944, in 1919 452 1 021 gallons valued at £121 1 897 and in 
1924 about 500,000 gallons valu~d at £75,000. Brandy exports 
f'luotuated similarly and in 1924 were £46,192. Fresh f'rW.t 
exports grew :from £60,000 :in 1911 fairly steadily to 
£464,ooo in 1924. 
The broad picture emerges that progress was slow and 
only the long established wool-fanning sector was making 
gains signj.ficant in both relative and absolute terms. it 
would seem :fair to contend that many.years o:f subsidized 
transportation costs f'or agriculture had not enabled it to 
reach the point of take-off' in'to sustained growth. Cer-
tainly heavy corttinued dependence on the Government land 
bank and the commercial banks for both mortgage :financing 
and short-term crop financing suggests little net capital 
formation 1n South Af'rica•s agricultural industry. 
In his pioneering calcu1ation of' national income, which 
of necessity involved a large element of' estimate f'rom in-
adequate data, R.A. Lehf'eldt put the net income f'rom the 
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agricultural sector at £29,000,000 in 1918 .. a period of' 
peak prices - g:i.ving a figure of' £174 per head of' economi-
cally-active rural 'Whites but substantially less if' wives 
24 . .· and dependants a.re included. Lehf'eldt though sympathetic 
to the role of'Jarming in the South African economi.c develop-
ment and optimistic about its prospects, nonetheless acknow• 
ledges the generally unprogressive tradition and character 
of f'arming as latd. as the nineteen-twenties: 
Un:fortunately for the hi.story of' this country 
the settlers, living isolated lives and with 
no educational facilities, and morally weakened 
by dependence on the labour of a subjugated race, 
have £ailed to adp.pt themselves at all readily 
to changed circumstances. The descendants of 
the early pastoralists should have adopted new 
methods of :farming which produce more f'rom a 
given area; but usual1y they know no method 
0£ !'arming except what their fathers practised. 
Attempting this on inadequate·pieces of'
6
land; 
many have been reduced to destitution.2 
Indeed the alarming vi.anal evidence· of rural poverty, 
re£le6ted in the continuously growing numbers of Poor Whites, 
led W.M. MacMillan to publish The South African .Agrar:lan 
Problem and,I:ts Histor.:Lcal Development to warn that South 
A:frica was repeating in the twentieth century the social 
process of' eighteenth-century England. The •cash nexus• 
was turning South Af'rican farming away f'rom subsi.stence 
production and giving it a market orientation and in the 
course of' this development, many tens oC thousands of' the 
bY'~oners were transferring their landless poverty to urban 
unemptoyment. 26 
Whatever the detail. of' raib.,ay rating theory and practice, 
the general conclusion J.s inescapabl.e,. After :fif'teen years 
of' ef'f'ort by the po1ity through ·the i.nstrument of' the South 
Af'riean Railways Administration to make the South African 
economy less dependent on the Rand gold mines and to diversif'y 
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its income .... producing sources, South Africa was in 192.5 
decidely more rather than less a mono-economy of' gold. In 
absolute terms, the production figures for agriculture are 
unimpressive with the single exception of' woolled-·sheep 
£'arming .. 27 
Low-cost - often below-cost - railway rating for the 
farming sector had not encouraged the agricultural and in-
dustrial development of the interior. MacMillan, indeed, 
noted that •neither Natal. nor tho l!estern Province • • • has 
either much of.' the bijwoner tradition or o'f' the peculiar 
"Poor Whites" problem, but both of them are great producing 
centres•. 28 It was the interior where the process of 
rural de-population among the Whites was yielding an alarm-
ingly increased rate of social degradation. 
Indeed the essen.tial characteristic of' the South Afri.can 
Railways rating di£f'4rentiation may well have retarded rather 
than promoted resource-utilization in tho fanning interior. 
By classifying agricultural raw materials, and raw materials 
generally, in the lowest tariff classes and made-up or manu-
factured goods in the highor-tari:f:f classes on the so-called 
val.ue-of' .... service principle, manufacturing tended to l.ocate 
itself' adjacent to urban-consumer markets rather than rural. 
supply areas. 
Industrialists wore ind.uced through least-cost rational-
ity of' minimizing railage rates on their high-rated, made-up 
products to establish their f'actori.es :in Cape, Town, .Johannes-
burg and the Reef' towns• and .:i.n Durban. It was relatively 
cheaper to rail the low-cost raw material.s :from the farms 
and the coa1 mines" It was only many decades 1ater that 
the central.izing rather than the decentral.izing consequences 
of the south African Railways rating po1~cy came under 
examination and criticism £rom a Government, now alarmed 
by the entrenched economic power of' the concentrated. urban-
industrial region& of' South Af'rica to attract tens .0£. 
thousands oC Africans :from their rural homes. 
CHAPTER 10 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND 
There are six key propensities, generalizes w.w. Rostow, 
which operate on the process of' economic growth. They 
summarize, he claims, the ef'f'ective response of' a society 
of' itd environment. They are the propensity (i) to develop 
f'undamental science (ii) to apply science to fundamental ends 
(iii) to accept innovations (iv) to seek material advance 
1 (v) to consume (vi} to have children. 
A sketch of the environment in which the society of 
South Africa struggled and stagnated has been given in 
earlier chapters. What is most striking in respect of' 
those who occupied the land or went trekking in search of' 
more land was thd absence of' five of' Rostow•s sik key propen-
sities. Only in respect of' the sixth - to have children -
did South Af'rica•s agrarian population, non-llhite and White, 
have a high propensity. But this in face o~ the low and 
almost non-existent propensities to develop and apply science, 
to accept innovations and to aspire to increasing material 
consumption was an unfavourable rather than a :favourable 
factor for economic growth. 2 
In a paper given to the S.A. Association for the Advance-
ment 0£ Science, 1908, F.B. Smith, the then director o:f the 
T:tansvaal Department of Agriculture and later :first secre-
tary o:f the Union Ddpartment of Agriculture, gave a pene-
trating survey o:f prevailing •propensities•.' He noted 
that the past seventy-five years had been characterized by 
a remarkable development of the agriculture of' the majority 
of' the countries inhabited by Europeans, particularly in thd 
newer countries like the u.s.A. 1 Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Argentine. Not only, he said• had the yield 
of the soil been enormously increased but the range and 
variety of' products had been greatly extended and quality 
vastly improved. 
Unf'ortunately, he f'ound that South Africa had not shared 
in this general advance: 
For various reasons the Europeans who settled 
in South Af'rioa did not apply themselves to the 
development of' the soil with the same zest and 
dogged detennination that they had displayed 
in acquiring it ••• Consequently, whil.e agri• 
culture was making such gr~at strides else-
where, here it moved so slowly as to appear 
almost stationary ••• Without wishing to be 
unjust to the farmers ·or to reflect upon the 
natural resources of' the sub-continent. it may 
be saf'ely asserted that there are f'ew parts of 
the world occupied by Europeans which are so 
little understood f'rom an agricultural point 
of' view or in which farmers are exposed to so 
many risks and dif'f'iculties as South Af'rica, 
or where judged by the standards attained else-
where, both as regards the science and the art, 
agriculture is in such a backward condition ••• 
In many respects our f'armdrs are in a worse 
plight now than they have ever been • • • a 
collection of' pests has been accumulated that 
f'or variety and virulence could scarcely be 
equalled, and certainly not surpassed, by any 
country in the world ••• 
Smith, as others had done beCore, re£erred to the £ailure 
of' a large and thinly populated country like South Af'rica to 
f'eed itself', importing in 1907 nearly £Si million o:f meat, 
pouJ.try, eggs, butter• cheese, condensed milk and like pro-
duce. Although he argued that the urgency o:f the problems 
con:fronting agriculture, above all the control. of' contagious 
diseases, was in itself' sufficient justification for bringing 
about a closer union of' the sub-continent, Smith emphasized 
that there had been no lack o:f monetary aid to the :farmers 
o:f South Af'rica in the past: 
Taken together, it is probable that during the 
past twenty years more money per head of' the 
rural popul.ation had been devoted to the relief' 
I 
l 
of the f'armers in South A:frica than in any 
country in the world •. • not only is there 
little to show for this expenditure as re-
gards advances in the theory and practice 
of agriculture or in other directions that 
make f'or progress, but it is to be :feared 
that in some respects actual harm has been 
wrought; for instead 0£ :fostering a spirit 
of independence and initiative and thrift 
amongst the :farmers, they have been induced 
to rely upon the Government :for everything ••• 
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Undoubtedly, it was the non-scientific habit of mind and 
approach which, added to the want of communications and market-
ing awareness, made the great majority of South Africa•s rural 
population land-occupiers rather than farmers. The essentiaJ. 
stimulation of the key propensities to develop and apply 
sciertoe 1 to promote innovation and consumption standards 
would have to come from the polity.5 Even the critical 
aaVings f:or productivity-,generating investment did not until 
a much later stage come from within farming itself. 
As early as 1858 the federation-minded Governor, Sir 
George Grey, had recognized that the inertia, ignorance and 
inef'f'iciency of a population, which had deliberately .isolated 
itself' :&om the external world, could be overcome only by the 
ef'f'orts of' a centralized government. The task of' moderni-
zation could however be tackled only when uni£ication was 
:finally achieved in 191·0. The financial input f'rom the 
polity from then on was continuous and massive - but net 
increased output from the land elusive and illusive. 
Between 1910 and 1935, eighty-seven bills relating to 
the land were enacted by Parliament • a Parliament in which 
£'armer-members were a high proportion. in all. political 
parties. Almost all these acts aj.med at giving permanent 
assistance by way of' scienti:f':i.c environmental improvements. 
land grants. land acquisition and improvement, f'inance, 
furtherance of co-operation. 6 Every one of these acts was 
in practice f'or the beneficial aid of' 'White farmers and 
would-be f'arniers. The financial input.from the polity f'or 
permanent capital improvements (irrigation schemes, land 
settlement schemes) tloantl f'rom the Land Bank for private 
capital improvements, short-term f'arm credit. assistance by 
expertise th.rough agricultural research colleges and stations 
was overwhelmingly; if' not exclusively, oonf'ined to land 
t.mder lfh.i te ownership. 
South Af'rioa, as de IU.ewiet noted, caine increasingly to 
be farmed f'rom the legislative capital of' Cape Town and the 
admini.strative capital of' Pretoria. The titles of' the f'irst 
six of' the eighty-seven acts of' permanent assistance were the 
Agricultural Pests Act No.11 of 1911, the DiseasEls of' Stock 
Act No.14 of 1911, the Dipping Tanks (Advance.a) Act No.20 of' 
1911, the Irrigation and Conserv~tion of' Watd.rs Aot No.8 of 
1912, the Land Settlement Act No.12 of 1912 and the Land 
Bani~ Act No.~8 of' 1912. They express the recognition that 
the task of modernization of South Af'rica•s social system 
related to land-utilization was dependent on the e~ternal 
political factor. 
Xnnovating entrepreneurship from within the f'arming 
oommunity 9 or co11ectivity of land-occ.up:lers; was patently 
inef'f'eotive in promoting agricultural development in 
Schumpeterian terms. The propensities to develop and apply 
science f'or material advance of' land productivity wdre con-
fined to perhaps a dozen cheque-book• part-time farmer-
~:l.nanciers. The determinants and variables of' capital 
accumtt1ation and investment, that would inore,a.se the economic 
output of' the land in Arthur Lew:t.s•s •old :fashioned sense•, 
were also dependent on governmental intervention. 
While undoubtedly £armer-representation in Parliament 
•made agrioul ture the :fa.vour.i te and special charge o:f the 
State•, 7 the stream ·Of' legislative and administrative ef'f'ort 
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to place men upon the land, to conserve water and finance 
water conservation, to conquer environmental. and entomo-
logical adversity, to promote co-operative marketing, was 
in principle' supported by most White men. They voted f'or 
it as the apparently logical pursuit. of securing the f'uture 
0£ the White man in South Africa, which tho Native Land Act 
of' 191.3 had f'undamentally identified with guaranteeing the 
owner.ship in perpetuity by Whites of' most ot the land o:f 
South Af'rica. 
That Aot laid dolat that no Af'rican; except with the 
special sanction 0£ the Governor-General., may purchase or 
even hire land other than in certain' scheduled areas' • The 
scheduled areas included only the Native Reserves long secured 
to Africans by old Treaty rights or other express enactment. 
This l.and area was essentially the minor fraction o'f' South 
A:frica, which tribal agglomerations had succeeded with the 
last-resort intervention and support of' Downing Street in 
preserving against the more powerf'ul pre~sures o:f the White 
man. The :fraction was virtually unanimously aoknowleged in 
the parliamentary debate of' the Native Lands Act to be mani-
festly inadequate and unjust. 
This epoch-en.tl:Lng and -making 1913 Land Act was duly 
passed with tervent so1enlltlty as an interim measure to main-
,tain the status guq of' land ownership •until the passing of. 
a de.f'inite; comprehensive and final measure based upon the 
report of' the Commission :for the appointment o:f which pro-
vision was made in Section 2 o:f the Act.• The function of 
this Natives' Land Commission was to del.imit -the areas to\be 
set aside :f'or White and African occupation; recommending what 
equitable 1 :further provision' o.f' land :for Af'rlcan settlement 
should be released. But it was to be nearly a quarter .. 
oentury be£ore Hertzog's Native Trust and Land Act of 19j6 
proposed to add to the 1913 scheduled areas signi£icant 
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:further areas known as the •released areas'; within which 
the restrictions upon the purchase of land for African settle-
ment would be removed. 8 
Although the Natives' Land Commission under section 2 of 
the Act of 1913 was strictly limited to delimitation of areas, 
the chairman, Sir William Beaumont, addressed a minute on 
policy issues to the Mini.star of Native Af'fairs.9 A reading 
of the Beaumont Minute reveals the extent to which both 
Whites and Africans looked to the polity rather than to the 
market as the decisive determinant in the allocation of the . 
scarce resource of lands 
A very general impression prevails that the Act 
contemplates a sdgregation - complete or partia1 
- of the Native races throughout the Union. The 
impractibility of such an idea makes it di.fCicult 
to understand how it has come to be entertained. 
It probably owes its origins to tho Cree use 0£ 
the term segregation without any definite idea 
as to what is meant by the term. The error, 
unfortunately, has 1ed to considerable miscon-
ceptions in the minds 0£ the public, and more 
especially among the Natives, as to the nature 
and scope of the work of the Commission ••• 
The views taken 0£ the Aot by Europeans vary 
very considerably. Some a1together disapprove 
of' the principle 0£ the Act, and consider that 
Natives should be f'ree to purchase land where 
they like, al.lowing economic forces to take 
their way. Others think that the Native Re-
serves are quite sufficient, and are averse to 
Natives being allolred to acquire more land. 
Between these extreme views, there are many 
modifications. Farmers are chiefly interested 
in the supply 0£ labour ••• they view with appre-
hension the establishment of large Native areas, 
where Natives could easil.y obtain land and so 
free themselves £rom the obligations which 
attach to residence on private farms. 
Some are in favour of reserves, provided 
they are under Government supervision, with 
some sort of' compu1sory obligation to works 
others £ear that unless the natives• require-
ments are ;reasonably met, the Natives will 
migrate f'rom the locality or Province, and 
the.tr 1abour will be lost; others think that 
provision should be made only f'or those Natives 
who bav4 r.a.tsed themselves to a position of 
independence# mo.st, though by no means .atl, 
even tn the Orange Free State" viet1 the Act 
as a. necessity.; and regard it as designed to 
do away with the share .. system which has so. 10 
largely adopted in many parts 0£ the Union •. • 
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The CoJnmission also met large deputations of' chiefs; headmen 
and Af'ricans at every centret 
; 
••• Some have bee:q. under fear that the areas 
already reserved to them would be taken away 
or at least curtailed3 others;, that the 
Government intends· to extend the reserved 
areas; · others, that there is to be a. general. 
segregation of' Vhi tes and Blacks so as to en+ 
tirely separate the two raoest involving; as 
it ~uld1 a general movement of peoples,; others, 
again, regard tho Act as violating promi.ses 
made to the Natives by the Imperial Government, 
and as dep:t'iv:ing them .o:f rights which they had 
hitherto exercised and enjoyed,' amt they claim 
the r.igbt to buy land anywhere .. 
The light in which the Natives of' the Orange 
Free State regard the Act rdquires special men• 
tion; because in that Province ther.e is a con• 
sidera:bie body of' Natives who have f'or years ... 
some of' them all thei.r lives - lived as inde"" 
p~ndent tenants under the share system on pri-
vate lands, and who are now threatened.with 
sudden and summary e.jeotion. These Natives 
complain bitterly of' the ~n:foreement of' the 
Act be:fore they have bad. time or opportunity 
to consider bow it !l.s lj;kely to a:ffect them. , 
or to make represent.ations respecting it to 
the Government. They consider it 'unf'air to 
subject them to ejectment bef'ore provisi.on 
liae been m~de £or Native areas to which they 
might remove or to find places where they 
might go .•• • But the great mass 0£ the Native 
population in all Parts of' the Union are look-
ing to the Act to rel.ieve them in two parti• 
culars ... the :f'.irst .is to give them more I.and 
f'or the.:lr stock, and the second is to secure 
them £.ix;t ty of tenure , .... 11 
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The intensity of' the value-orientatiom atta.ebed to land 
by both l1hi te.s and Af'ri.·cans .:i..s impregnated throughout .the 
Beaumont Minute. 
It is not too much to say that the Aot has been 
mis:lnterpreted and misrepresented by Europeans 
and Natives alikeJ and that, so far as the 
Natives are concerned.; this had the ef'.f'eot of' 
creating suspicion, distrust and anxiety in 
every part of' the Union.12 
Although the Commission tried hard to allay the mis• 
apprehensions of the Africans, the Beaumont Minute recordCi}d 
tha.t unfortunately a considerable number of' White landowers 
had since the coming into .force 0£ the Aot ejected Africans 
.from thoir lands. 
Some'ha:ve done so under the impression that the 
Act necessitated itt others because the Aot 
offered en. good opportunity to get rid o:f' Native 
tenants who were not rendering suf'f'icient labour. 
A large number ,of Natives have been so removed 
both from Crown lands taken up by Europe.ans and 
t'rom private l.ands; and many more are under 
notice to quit, especially i.n aentres where 
farming is more intensive. Many of' the Natives 
so ejected have been led to be1ieve that it is· 
the duty of' the Commission to set apart lands 
to which they might remove. 13 
Between the passage of' the Act in 1913 and the report of' 
the Native Land Commission in 1916, the outbrealt ·of' Wor1d 
·war l: had patently exercised an ,exogeneous. stimulant to land-
utiltlzati·on. Rising market demand f'or :food-stuf':f'a and 
agrioul tural raw materials, especially wool; was making land 
more valuable and monetary inf'lati.on was steadil.y increasing 
~ . ~ 
land values. Furthermore the White :f.armere a1ready had 
some :first f'ruits ,0£ *making .agr:loUl ture the :f'avouri te and 
special charge of the State•. 
Under such condi t:l.ons it was obvious th01.t the * further· 
provision' of' land. :f'or Af'rican purchase, enjoined by· the Act 
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through the recon:nnendations of tho appointed Commission, 
would not be made on any signif'icant scale. Where f'urther 
African land purchases irore sanct:l.oned under the spec:i.al 
powers given to the Government in areas suggested by the 
original Beaumont Commission or the subsequent local commit-





The •further provision• recommended by the Beaumont 
amounted ·to an additional 17t700,000 acres which 
brought the total area of' "Native 1and• to 
I 
acres in all.. But between 1916 and 1936, when 
the Native Trust and Land Act 11as passed together with the 
measu.re :finally disenfranchising the Af'ricans of' the Cape 
Province., the ac:tual extent of' adtiitional. land provided was 
negligible. 
The intervention of' the pol!l.tical factor. into the a.lloca ... 
tion 0£ land as between the Whites and the .Af'ricans does not 
of' course begin with the Native Land Aot of' 1913. For three-
quarters of' a century before then, ·either the British Crown 
in the Cape and Natal or Trekkcir Vol.kra.ad.s in the T.ransvaal 
and the Orange Free State had added right to might" 
In the Cape Province the tr:J.bal inhabitant.s were driven 
f'Urtber and f'u.rther back wttil they finally became consoli-
dated in the region of' the Kei. River (in the Crown lands 
known as the C:lskei and the Tra.nske:l); althQugh the Af'ricans• 
legal. right. to acquire land in the Cape was maintained by the 
special f'actor 01" the.:Lr entrenched f'ranchis·e rights until 
1936. l:n Natal• Crowh locations and mission reserves were 
set a.side for exclusive occupation by Af'ricans in accordance 
with the reserve policy first ~ritroduced by Shepstone in 
1846-t..7 and climaxing in 1897 with the annexation of' Zulu-
land, o:f' which about three-f'~:f'ths ·was placed. under the ZUlu-
land Native Trust. 
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In the Orange Free State, the Volksraad :from the begin-
ning took tho view that the whole state was exclusively a 
WGite area with Africans prohibited by law f'rom purchasing 
or hiring land - the Native areas of Tb.aha 'Nchu and 
•ri tzieshoek not being originally part of the Orange Free 
State. The superior military and diplomatic skill or the 
Basutos secured for themselves the Protectorate of Basuto-
land. In the Transvaal the Africans were driven back rrom 
the localities in which the trekkers settled but were allowed 
to continue in occupation where the Boers coul.d not, or 
would not, develop. The Volksraad under prodding f'rom 
British. 'AUzeraintyt provided legal ownership of' reserves 
in the northern ~ringes amounting to some 3 per cent or the 
total Transvaal land area. Bechuanaland was retained pri-
marily f'or African ownership by the proclamation of' a British 
protectorate and similarly with Swaziland, ti<ough in the 
latter cases large-scale alienation took place to 'Jl.1.i te 
concessionaires. 
At the time of' 1,nion, 1910, the land area reserves f'or 
Af'ricans (excluding the protectorates) amounted. to 23,500,000 
acres or some 7.13 per cent o:f the total area of' the country. 
This constituted roughly the scheduled aroa in terms 0£ the 
Native Land Act o:f 1913 - the territoria1 extent o:f A.frican 
ownership o.f the rural land of' South Africa as delimited by 
the political :factor. It could not be extended except in 
so :far as 'further provisiont• might be recommonded by a 
Commission and accepted by a Parliament elected by an exclu-
sively , hi te electorate, other than in the r_:ape Province 
where Africans might quali:fy for the :franchise. It was 'this 
franchise qualification in the nape, in part dependent on 
land-ownershi.p, that prevented the legal extension of this 
Act of 1913 to the Cape. 
For almost a quarter-century Parliament virtually never 
implemented any 'further provisions• of land. The political 
argument was that ao long as A.t'rican f'ranch;ise rights in the 
Cape were linked legally to the right to buy land anyvhere 
in the Ca~e (i.e. in •white areas), no ~arliament would 
h~nour the undertaking of' 1913. That understanding had been, 
once the principle was adopted that the racial.ownership of' 
. . . 
land. was a. political and not a market decision,· to implement 
aru.lequitable and j1iet allocation through a Commission as the 
. instrument of' the polity... Al though. ~and ownership might 
be 4~tt.'lrmined by legal enactment of political power, land• 
utilization and land ... occupation oont~ued to be no less in-
t'luenoed by the pursuit of' optimizing productivity as inter• 
pre ted by land. ... <nmers. 
A graphi,c pen-picture of the land of south A:frica as :.l t 
evolved. in sooio•eco.nomic terms down unti.1 about I 9:30 is 
given by W.M, MacMillan in his Com:ele:x: South Af'rict!;• 14 
MacMil1an made one of the -:first independent statistical sur ... 
veys of' the broad .interconnections between land-ownership• 
land":"utilization~ and land-oooupation and. between land and . 
labour. His ge.neral conclusion was that 
the lh.o1'e'sale appropriation o:f what was once 
Native land enormously increased the dispersal 
o:f the European population, thus killing any 
'hope o:f' really sound white agriculture, while 
the ·•e.:ictermination• of' Natives yet left sueh 
mas·ses of' them at the beck and call of farmers 
as to perpetuate t'he illJef'fects of' earlier 
colonial .dependence on al.ave- labour. 1.5 
The encouragement given by land ... acquisition sanctions to 
. basic environme.ntal f'actors of soil and water made extensive 
agriculture the en.tranched. White tradition; the compulsion 
exerted by 'White land-aoquisi tion on the A:fri.cans was to 
:force the .ad.option of such intensive• non•tradi tiona.1 1 agri• 
cultural prac t:f.ce w.:t thin the limited tribal territories as 
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,._ to result in a degree of' malnutrition that sometimes .approxi-
mated. starvation. Extensive agr~·cul ture in the Wh1l. te 
areas contributed to the alarming increase of' .Poor Wh:i tes, 
intensive agrioul ture .in the tribal reeervee to the pro.lif'er• 
.ati·on .of Poor Blacka .. thottgh tb.i.s alarmed only the •ka:f:f.ir• 
boettes ·t •• 16 
The. Beaumont Land Commis,sion estimated. in 1916, that of 
' ' 
a rural total of 3,880,554 M.ricans, there were slightly more 
than half' or 2,.290,000 who l.1ved on Reserves, mission re• 
serves, Crown lands or on their own privately•owned £'.arms. 
Of' thi·s total rural African population, 1,264,;593 lived on 
land occupied by Europeans and 32.5~179 on land owned but un• 
occupied by Europeans. 17 MacMillan calculated certain den• 
si ties of' population f'rom the 1921 census. The average f'or 
the Union as a whole was 14 • 64 to the .square mile• and tor 
predomi.nantl.y or e.:xelusively Native areas: Tran.eke! as a 
whole ,58:• 59; Glen Grey 4'• 1 J; Herschel 5.'.3•.54; Kingwilliams-
town 7@•01; Zul.uland 24•<?61 rest of' Natal. 35•76 ranging 
f'rom 51 •"J7 in OamperdOli'D. to 150•65 in I~and.a. 
Thus ·at that time the esaentiall.y Af'rican, and almost 
complete.ly non-urbani:l;ed, districts of' the Transkei and Natal 
had .a dertsi ty of' popul.ation har41y exceeded by even the highly· 
urb~12:ed Rand'' 
On•the most generous shotd.ng• the density of the .'.3;387 sq. 
mil.es (out o:f. a total 110;540 sq. mil.es) 0£ de.signated Native 
J:'eaerves in the Transvaal was f'rom 70 to 90 the sq. m~l.e. 
For the Orange Free State,. the adjoining Basutoland ..: some-
times regarded as its •Native Reserve• .-. had f'or its inhabit ... 
able area :from 42 1•44 to 120 persons tQ the sq. mile; 'tthile 
:l.n the Free· State .itself. only 244 sq .• m:i.les out of' the· total 
50,000 sq. mil.es was ·•reserved' for the African population, 
who :in fact numbered over 4l1.o,ooo and. lived as share ... :rarmers -
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ill.egally or tinder legal exemption ... or as labourers on 
. . 18 Free State White.,..owned farms. 
Since mining was regarded as a wasting ass~t and since 
the land was ident~fied a.s thl! only permanent asset, it seemed 
irrefutably logical. to true the income•stream :from the gold"'" 
mines ... so long' as it lasted - f'or investment•f'unds to develop 
the productivity. of' the land, owned and :farmed by the White 
man. 19 In twenty-:five years from 1910 to 1936, Frankel 
estimated that the State spent over £71,000,000 f'rom loan 
.t'tmds, and over £41,000,000 :rromrevenue f'or (tifhite) agr:t ... 
culture. Furthermore 1 nearly £20.000.000 (a large part o:f 
which was spent on irrigation) of that £71 1 000,000 had to be 
wri.I. tten-o:ff' or classed as irrecoverable,· wtdle another 
c20,ooo,ooo of the loan :f'und expenditure was in f'act f'or 
:farmers-assistance, f'armers• special re'lief' measures and 
relief' o:f distress. Nearly £.33;000,000 of' the total loan 
lfUnd expenditure came f'rom mining revenues credited to loan 
account with the balance c,oming f'rom State borrowing., :?O 
On the other hand, the assistance given by the Uni.on 
Government· :for agricultural development in the Nati.Ve Re-
sE!rves in the period 1910-34 was limited to a grant. 01· 
£49,,000 f'rom loan t'Un.ds and £346,000 f'rom revenue f'or f(lnci.ng 
and dipping-tanks, together with a sum of £228;821 f'or land 
purchases. 21 J:n respect of' communications development, the 
South Af'rican Rail.ways had built by 19.30 :f'.or the Native, areas 
one single li.ne of' rail way running to a dead-end at Umtata 
an.d at st. Johns there was a port open to a very small coast ... · 
l 
. . . . 22 
.ing steamer at f'avourab e spring-tides• 
The attP.mpt by the State to inf'luence the economic geo-
graphy of the country through r.ailway development and ra.:llway 
. rating has been analyzed in an earlier chapter. The ef'f'orts 
oi' the State to control !.and-ownership and d:irect land-utili-
zation have been indicated above. What had the political 
factor achieved in respect of the economic development of 
the country at about 1929t that breaking-point in world 
economic growth? 
The heavy expenditure on veteri~ary science and agri-
cultura1 education had undoubtedly transformed the poten-
tialities of the land, though resistance to change nnd inno-
vation inhibited the translation into actualities. Thus, 
for instance, sheep-farming - on~ or the o1dest and the most 
important source of income from the land - as late as the 
192o•s remained attached to practices that threatened irre-
versible destruction of vegetation and resultant soil ero-
sion. tb.e Drought Investigation Commission of 1922 noted 
that, though a large portion of South Africa was dry long 
before the arrival of the White man, since the 1'1hite man has 
been in South Africa enormous tracts of country have been 
entirely or partially denuded of their original vegetation 
with the result that rivera, vleis.and water-holes described 
by old travellers have dried up or disappeared. 2 3 
This Commission concluded that stock losses due to drought 
could be :fully explained without presuming a decline in mean 
annual rainfall, for which ~t could find no evidence in recent 
historical times. From 'the vast amount of evidence placed 
before it ••• only oOe conolusion can be drawn, namely, that 
the severe losses of the 1919 drought were caused principally 
by the faulty veldt and stock management•. 24 The Commission 
found that kraaling or concentration of sheep at certain 
fixed places at night was •ractised by most Whi.te farmera, 
with the rare exceptions of those £ew who permitted their 
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Kraaling results in reversing the natural timing of' f'eed·-
ing and resting times• necessitating much driving o'£ stock 
and increased :f'ood requirements with resultant stock-deb:i.l.:i.ta-
ti.on aggravated during drought. KraaJ.ing and. concomitant 
over-stocking l.eads to mechanical. destruction o:f vegetal 
covering due to trampl:i.ng and the consequent soi.l-erosion. 
But kraaling remained decade af'ter decade the standard prac;... 
tice and f'ew sma.11 ... stook f'armers in South Af'rica had by the 
time of' the Drought Commission adopted paddocking, wh:tch 
permits essential grazing control and vel.d management under 
arid conditions 25 as pioneers .in South Africa had demon-
strated more than f'if'ty years back. 
The •most promising l..:i.ne of' advance• f'or south A.frlca•s 
.agriou.l tural. development was *scientific stock-raising' t as 
the·Dominions Royal Commission in 1914 had endorsed the expert 
evidence and its own observations. From the time o:f Union, 
the State had undoubtedly made its contribution to the 
development and application of' science but the slowness with 
'Which tho majority of' stock-farmers accepted innovation was 
hardly consolidating the advance. Although land•Va.lues 
were rising ·for extensive pasturage in consequence of State 
assistance, sheep and cattle, were displacing people on the 
land rather than realizing tho hopes of' the Dominions Royal 
Commission that South Af'rica•s pastoral production might be-
gin to rival and challenge that of' Australasia and the 
Argentine. 
It will be recollected, too, that the same Com.mission had 
recorded the many optimistic expressions of opinion that the 
maize-growing potential of South Africa was unexeelled by any 
26 other cowitry in the world.. State assistance had parti-
cularl.y concentrated on aiding this sector of the country• s 
interior agricultural development by an export-development 
railage rate. As early as 1907 a £lat railage rate of' 10s. 
per 2,000 lb of maize was patently below average-cost and 
probabl.y below marginal•oost. But it served to promote an 
export trade in maize and provide a freight-load for a large 
number o:f rail trucks returning empty to the coast, after 
their forward journey o:f del1vering imports from the coast 
to the Rand. 
This return-journey movement is indeed a genuine example 
o~ joint-supply, which justified the charging of di:ff'cren-
tial prices or rates. A l.ow-rate :for the export-m~ze 
traffic was defensible so long as the rate covered the avoid~ 
able or prime costs of' maize-transport; it was even desir-
abl.e so long as (a) there was no better or more remunerative 
altd.rnative f're:ight to provide tra:ff'ic f'or othcrWWse empty 
truck-movements and (b) the volume o:f maize traffic was not 
so stimulated by the below-cost transportation that the South 
Af'rican Railways were led to incur additiona1 capital invest-
ment to handle the resu.J. tant maize tonnage. 
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In the course of time neither of' these latter condi-
tions was satisfied. A railage rate :for bulk-maize that 
was maintained at an e:f:fecti.ve rate of' 10s. per ton :for 
decades f'ell f'urther and f'urther below average- and even 
marginal-costs. In 1925/26 it was calculated that the 
actual average earnings on a.11 maize f'or export amounted 
to 0•27 pence per ton per mile. 27 This near-elimination 
o:f transport costs £rom maize-marketing naturally encouraged 
an increasingly.dispersed and extra-marginal cultivation o:f 
maize. In addition the State gave other direct and in-
direct .financial encouragement so that maize cul. tivation, 
except when drought or pests intervened with near-cata-
strophic resu1ts on production, expanded greatly and was 
financially ;uncontrollable. Parliament from time to time 
had to authorize large sums through the Land Bank to write 
of'f over-adv'ances made to mai!l;e•:farmers when world prices 
slumped. 
Within a few years maize-produotion :for export had been 
so 1developed' that i.t no longer merely :filled otherwise 
empty freight-trucks returning to the coast. More and more 
trucks had to be diverted f'rom other net .. revenue producing 
:freight, and then the basic movement of' f'orward, ... and return ... 
f'reight reversed .itsel:f .so that the S.A. Railways had to 
accept the costs of' the continuous return haulage o:f empty 
trucks :from 'the coast to the interior maize triangle. Fin-
ally the s.A. Ra::i.lways was led to incur. the heavy capit.ali-
zat.:i.on of an extensive elevator system f'or bulk-handl.ing o:f 
28 the maize crop. 
Sheep- and maize-farmers were not, of course, the only 
sections of agricul turc to be increasingly :fanned f'rom Cape 
Town and Pretoria, Dairy-produce.~ meat, sugar, t'ruit• 
wheat, wine and spirits, tobacco may perhaps be more appro-
priately included in the political economy of £ood discussed 
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in the following chapter. 
How did the political economy 0£ land-utilization af'f'eot 
the long-term distribution of' population? 
The popul.ation movement out 0£ agricu1ture into so-cal.led 
secondary and tertiary occupations is 0£ course part 0£ the 
process of' economic growth. 2 9 South Af'ri:ca was fortunately 
to foll.ow this social process. It was• however, the un-
sought and unappreciated consequence of' State policy which 
contrariwise £or decades clung tenaciously to its avowed 
objective of' promoting a •back to the land• development 
policy for the Whites. State contributions to land.acquisi• 
tion and land•improvement aimed at increasing the number of' 
-Whites on the land, but the working-out of' the measures had 
the reverse res~ults. Poor Wbiteism aa a malady of' rural 
unemployment and depopulation was being deepened by the pro-
cess that stimulated land-values. Concurrently the State 
aided the relative f'inancial strength to lncrease their land-
holdl.ngs of' those farmers., who were abl.e end wi.lling to imple-
ment improved te chni.que s • 
Thus jackal-proof' fencing and paddocking of' sheep gradu• 
ally supplanted kraaling among the more pr~gressive farmers, 
of'ten helped by State grants and loans for fencing and water ... 
conse+"Vation. Economic rationality then dictated that 
White bywoners should lose customary rights to •run• the~r 
own animals on the f'arm-ow.tJ@r• s controlled grazing lands. · 
The disp1aced were indeed the White.bywoners who contributed 
no labour rather than the African •squatters•, who by f)Ustom 
and enf'orced :lnmobil.ity di.d rend.er labour (often on a non• 
cash basis)• 
The decline in the White rural population :f'rom 1910 was 
most marked in the sheep-rearing and, to a l.esse:r. extent the 
maize-growing, distr.icts. From 1911 to 1921t the whole of' 
the Central and Eastern Cape and the adjacent Southern and 
Western Orange Free State showed an absolute decrease ~n the 
numbers of llh1tes, while in other districts o~ the Orange 
Free State, Natal and th~ Transvaal only the sb.i:ft :from the 
farm to the local dorp or village avoided a total decline of 
the rural White popul.ation. 
The tempo of urbanization and rural depopul.ation was 
cons:iderably incroased f'rom 1921 to 1936, when capital invest-
ment in min.:1ng and manufacturing industry began to speed the 
rate or. economic development - more especially after 1932 -
and urban employment. Out of' the 104 magisterial., i.e. 
census districts, of' the Cape Provi.ncct no less than 61 
districts showed an absolute decline in their rural popula-
tion; in the Orange Free State, 26 o:f the 33 rural districts 
showed absolute decreases in rural population. In Natal only 
9 out o~ the 33 districts and in the Transvaal on1y 7 of' the 
41 districts recorded absolute losses in rural population. 
H.A. Shannon made a caref'ul analysis o:f trends; trying 
to reach behind the essentially legal dif'f'erentiation between 
urban (possessing any f'orm of' local government) and rural (not 
having any f'orm of local government). 30 He :round f.or the 
whole period 1904 to 1936 the rise in White popu1ation possess-
ing local goverrun.ent had been greater ( 100 1232) than 'in 
White population not possessing local government (100:131); 
and the rise in the really large urban areas of' over 101 000 
Whites still greater (100:296). On a basis of' di£f'erentia-
ting as an urban!.zed area those local government areas with 
more than 2,000 Whites and as non-urbanized areas those with 
less than 2,000 Whites, Shannon constructed the table bel.owJ 
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'Urbanized' and •Non-urbanized• Po~ulation Trends 1 
1_204• 12J6 I South Africa (excluding Native Territories 
and ZulUl§!!d 
'Urbanized' 1 Non-urbanized• 
E N c A T E N c A T 
(a) Total population = 100 
1904 10•7 .5•9 3<3 1•0 20·8 15•6 54•5 7•2 2•0 79•2 
1921 11 ~ .5 7•9 3•2 0•8 23•3 14•7 5'.3·6 6•2 2•1 76•7 
1936 13• 1 11•2 3•7 1•5 29•6 11•.5 .52•0 5•7 1•1 70•4 
(b) Each Racial Group = 100 
1904 40•3 9•8 31•0 .:35. 0 - 59•7 91•2 69•0 65•0 
1921 43•8 12e7 34•1 27•2 56·2 87•3 65•9 72•8 -
1936 53•3 17•7 39•3 .57~2 46·7 82•3 60•7 42•8 
(c) •Urbani.zed, and •Non-urbanized' Each = 100 
1904 .51•0 28·4 15•7 5•0 100 19•7 68•8 9• 1 2•4 100 
1921 49•3 33•7 13•7 3•3 100 19•3 70•0 8•0 2•7 100 
1936 44•4 J8•0 12•4 .5•2 100 16•3 73•9 8• 1 1 •6 100 
(d) Each Section in 1904 = 100 
1904 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1921 1 §1 185 136 102 155 1.'.31 137 119 147 134 
1936 242 372 220 288 278 144 186 154 116 173 
(N.B. E = Europeans or l!b:itees N = Nat1ves oJ' Africans; 
c = Coloureds; A = Asiatics; T z: Total). 
1'hese basic and substantial population shif'ts of' a11 
races f'rom non-urbanized agriculture into urbanized mining-
industry, and at the most rapid rate of' all into tho Wit-
watersrand area, ran counter to the most deeply-held belief's 
and wishes of.' Af'rtkanerdom. The conf'rontation by an urban-
ized Black proletariat was increasingly regarded as a mortal 
threat to the institutiona1ized culture of' the Af'rikaner 
·people. More immediately there was competition between 
Poor Whites and Poor Blacks :for unskilled jobs, while the 
operation of' least-c,ost substitution in mining and manu-
facturing was striving to re.duce the exceptional spread o:f 
5 (or more):1 between skilled (White) wages and unskilled 
(A:fricnn) wages. 
Through these decades economic stagnation was slowly 
.quickening into economic growth, as indeed, mirrored .in the 
geographical and occupational .sbif'ts o:f the population. 
But the economic development was producing motivations and 
aspirations regarded as increasingly :foreign to the South 
~f'rican way of life.. To manage the tensions o:f economic 
change and to maintain the soeial patterns o:f the past, the 
Paet.Goverm:nent of' Hertzog-Creswell had been voted to polit-
e~ power. , Then the wor.ld econo~c deprossion had imposed 
such a crisis on South Africa's economic growth as to compel 
the new party political combination of' Hertzog-Smuts in a 
United Party. Now Prime Minister Hertzog was quick to 
' . ' 
recogni.ze how the :fortuitous J.ocal political. working-out o:f 
the world's economic misfortune provided his decisive policy 
opportunity. J:n one combined exercise of parliamentary 
power he would bring segregated land ownership in the Cape 
within the Native Lands Act of 1913 and secure the final. 
e1imination· ·Of' the Cape African common f'ranchise. 
Almost :from the Union's f'irst pa.rliaDlenta.ry session, 
Hertzog had seen the social system of South Africa not as an 
unacceptable unity o:f European and African but as the segre-
gation of' 'White man's land and Blaclt man•s land. Hence the 
manner of' his intervention into the debate of' the Natives 
Land Bil1 as :far back as 1913 with his emphatic warning 
against any extension .o:f the Af'rican vote and his prophet1c 
awareness of' his ow.n mission to bring the Cape Province w.tib.in 
the Land Act by destroying the common :franchise rights of' 
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the Cape Africans. 
The Nat:i.ve Administrative Bill of 1917 1 introduced by 
.Botha; aimed to val.idate the Beaumont Commission's recommend-
ationi; for the lines of' permanent terr:t tori al !and-allocation. 
:It was aborted by the Government's law-adviser's opinion that 
in making it impossible :Cor an African to acquire and hold 
·1and in the Cape Province,. on which land-holding the Cape 
A:f'rican•s entrenched franchise quali:f'icat:ton depended, a two• 
thirds majority of both Houses of' Parliament sitting together 
would be necessary.. :In the debate on the withdrawn Bill, . 
Hertzog made i.t clear that the Cape f'ranchise 1 which stood 
in the way of' • f'inal t territorial seg:t-egation 9 would have to 
go. 
Xn July, 1926, Prime Minister Hertzog published his :four 
•Native Bills1 embodying his eoluti.on of' the •Native Question''. 
They provided for the repeal of' .section .35 of the South Af'rica 
Act and removal of' the Africans (though not the Coloured) 
f'rom the ord.inary voters• roll., the disenfranchisement of' the 
Cape African voters, special African repre sen ta ti on in Parl..ia-
mcnt through seven (White) members in the House o:f Assemb1y -
elected by Government nominees of' promi.nent Africans - with 
restricted ri.ghts except on schedul.ed African matters• A 
GeneX"al Native Council was to be consti. 'L-uted f'or the· whole 
of' the Union with 50 members - 15 nominated and 35 elected 
by the same government-nominated electorate. 
Simultaneously the Native Land Act Amendment Bill was to 
provide the :final. solution to the land question with the 
addition to the existing .scheduled areas of' released are.as, 
.in \fhich Africans and non ... Af'rieans might acquire ownership 
subject to such acquisition being land adjoining land al• 
ready held by members of' the .same race. Generally the aim 
was to prevent· 'White islands of' land in Black areas, and vice 
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versa. Any land held by Africans outside the scheduled or 
rel.eased areas could be exchanged f'or Crown land within 
scheduled and released. areas. A Native Land Purchases and 
Advances Fund was to be created to assist Africans in land 
. :u 
improvement and land-acquisition f'rom non-Africans. 
Tbe four bills were made ihter-dependent in respect of' 
enactment. The Natives Land Act {1913) Amendment Bill. ot: 
1926 aimed to make :final throughout the Union the principle 
of' terr.itorial segregation as the sovereign l.ow of the land 
rather than allow the land to remain the continuing subject 
of' the sovereign, colour-blind market. The prondse of 
additional released land to the .Africans was the major 
inducement to the Africans to surrender voluntarily their 
entrenched f'ranchise.32 
The Af'rloans rejected out of' hand all proposals that 
might involve surrender of' the Cape A:frican :franchise in the 
inter-locking of the four proposed bills, which did not in-
deed get beyond the first reading stage in Parliament. 
Hertzog spent :from 1927 to 1935 implementing the essence of 
his bills which were considered by 
over eight years.33 
numerous Select committees 
~ j 
J 
When Hertzog won 
in 1929 to secure an 
I h:l.s 'Black Manifesto• general election 
over-all majority of' the Nationalist 
Party, the Women's Enf'ranchisement Act, 1930, enf'ranchised 
a.ll adult White women (but not Coloured -\\i'O"men. despite 
Hertzog•s repeated asBurances) without qualifi.oations. 34 
Enfranchisement of' adult White women of: course diminished 
the Af'rican male vote• then numbering 1.5,780 f'rom 3•5 per 
cent of' 452,472 voters to 1•4 per cent of' 889,173 voters.:35 
From 1930 to 1935 the Joint Committee sat to work out 
agreed non-party l.egislation governing land al.location and 
A:frican pol:i. tic al representation. In his book, already 
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cited, Tatz g:tve.s valuab1e and il1uminating detail o:f the 
p:1:1oceedings 0£ the.Committee from the unpublished records 
36 . -
of Senator Nicholls. Senator Nicholls of' Natal was con• 
vinced that Natives would trade the Cape f'ranchise f'or the 
£30 million f'und proposed :for A£rican development in the 
Reserves and additional land purchase.. His proposals :formed 
' 
the basis of' the 1936 leg:J.,slative settlement, 
The 19'.36 legisla~ion combined the Representation of' 
Nat.ives Act and the Native Trust and Land Act. The f'irst. 
No~12 of 1936, removed all Africans :tr.om the common roll• 
existing African voters being placed on a separate, special 
register which would elect three members of' Parliament {the 
Native Representatives). It also provided :for the election 
of' :four Senators f'or f'our Native electoral areas by indirect 
communal vote, and for an advisory Natives Representative 
Council. 
The Native Trust and Land Act, No,18 of' 1936, established 
a Trust with funds to be provided :from time to time by Parlia.• 
ment f'or the objects of: land-purchase in the rel.eased areas, 
land-improvement in the scheduled and acquired released areas, 
and generally to promote the well-being of' Af'ricans in the 
schedul.ed, and released areas. The Act ended 1 £ree tuaff'ic 
in land' i.n the Cape Province, since ~he entrenchment ot the 
old :franchise rights of' the Africans of' the Cape had now been 
expunged. The Native Land Act of 1913 had originally sch~d ... 
uled about 21,.000.,000 acres and the Native Trust and Land Act 
of' 1936 proposed to re1ease a :further 15,000,000 acres in 
which Africans might acquire land-ownership rights - always 
provided the purchase funds were made avail.able •. 37 
From 1937 until 1940, when all :further l.and purchase was 
suspended because 0£ the Second World War, Parliament.had 
voted C.5 million and the Trust.had spent about £4t million 
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on land purchase of some 2t million acres. But the war 
created :financial and administrative <li.f:fieulties and 
:further land acquisition by the Trust practical1y ceased. 
Once again, under war-time demand :for food-stuff's and 
agricultural raw materials and war-time :irif'lationary :finance, 
land-values rose so that 1fhi te land-owners became increas-
ingly unwilling to sell. In·1944 the Chairman of the 
Natives Representative Council responded to increasingly 
vehement criticism by African members of' non-implementation 
of' land-purchase by declaring that the price of land was too 
high and 'it was an absurd thing• to purchase land at that 
stage~ 
The polity had decreed the division of' the land between 
the Whites and the Mr.ioans, f'.rom 1913 when 'f'ree traf'f'ic :in 
land' was prohi.bited except in the Cape Province until 1936 
when the prohibition ~as eff'act1vcly extended to the Cape as 
well. :tn 1913 the areas scheduled for African ownersbJ.p 
amounted to some 7 per cent of' the total area of' the country: 
in 19.36 the polity proposed to releaS.e about another 6 per 
cent so that the ~inal share 0£ the land 0£ South Africa 
under African ownership would be about 13 per cent. 
But the market still operated in the $leased areas until. 
the land was actually purchased by the S.A. Native Trust, 
and by 1940 onwards the market had practically compel.led. the 
Trust to cease its purchases on behalf' of' the pol:l.ty.38 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE PRICING OF FOOD 
While the land•hungry, disenfranchised Af'ricans waited 
for the Greek kalends, White farmers voted themselves legis-
lative powers to fix the prices of what their lands could 
be encouraged to yield. To be fair, there are very few 
countries in which polity-determined food prices have not 
taken over from market-determined food prices £or the benefit 
of.' improving the incomes and capitalized land values of the 
£arming community. 
The individual farmer selling to a perfectly competitive 
market supplies as nmch as he can produce .in the expectation 
that the market ... demand price will not be inf:lueneed by the 
amount he supplies. Under oerta:in conditions of relative 
inelastioity of market-demand, these expectations of all the 
:farmers together supplying their total produce results in 
such a fall in market•demand price as to make the price re• 
ceived by the individual f'armer a sad disappoi.ntment to his 
hopes. 
At this stage the help of' the polity will be sought to 
separate the demand-price :f'rom the market-price and to f':lx 
the :fo:nner higher than the l.atter.. At this stage• too• 
however the individual f'armer selling to the now imperfectly 
competitive mark.et stil.1 supplies as much as he can produce 
in the expectation that the pol.ity•f'ixed price will not be 
inf'luenced by the amouht he supplies. These expectations 
(unless the conditions o'£ relative inelasticity of demand 
have unprediotabl.y changed) o:f' all the :f'armers together 
supplying their total produce results in more being supplied 
than the market will now demand at the polity-price. The 
unsold quantities now become a sad disappointment to the 
individual :farmer•s supplies. 
At this next stage the a.id of' the polity wi.lil be needed 
to separate the amount supplied to the market £rom the amount 
produced f'or the market. This will usually involve segre-
gating one market from another market - the home market in 
which the domestic polity has sovereignty and the foreign 
polity in which the export market has sovereignty. 
:In the home market under the sovereignty 0£ the polity 
the amount supplied to that market will be not more than will 
be demanded at the polity-price. The balance of' the supply, 
which is the remaining amoUJ.1,t produced, will then be sold in 
the £oreign polities at their demand price&. 
Separating amounts supplied to the domestic market from 
amounts .supplied to export markets so that the higher polity-
price in the domestic market compensates £or the lower market-
price in the export markets, means ruling how much of' the 
individual f'armer•s total produce is to be sold on the domes-
tic market and how much on the export markets. 
Whether the process can be halted at this stage of' con ... 
trol will depend,. once again, on the course of' development 
of' the inelasticities of demand in the domestic market and 
the export markets. I:f' the inelastioities should be inappro-
priate, then the f'inal and now unsought aid of the polity will 
be reached in instructing the individual f'armer how much he 
! may producejl 
The process of' market-demand pr.ices evol.ving into polity-
f'ixed prices by its very nature proceeds through delegated 
1egislation to administrative jurisdiction (so that polity-
f'ixed prices are sometimes called administered-prices). 
The instrument of' the polity typically is the board of' con-
trol., whose objective is orderly marketing - the more order, 
the more controi, then more disorder, so total control. In 
its ear1ieet phase, the polity may exert no more infiuence 
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on market-demand price than to suggest voluntary quality-
standards and then to impose compulsory quality-standards. 
The subsequent stages towards a polity-price system o:f total 
control, as outlined above, may be a flow or a f'ast process, 
depending on how wide is the divergence between the ruling 
market-price and the desired polity•price - and how much 
inf'luence Canners have in Parliament. 
:In South Africa, a1though White :farmers had a dominant 
influence from even before Union this was concentrated initi-
all.y on l.and•acquisi ti on and labour•availabili ty. Af'ter 
Union the farmer-vote was also exercised to powerful and far-
reaching ef':fect in establishiflg polity-rates :for rail trans-
port.2 It was in the nineteen-twenties that polity price• 
f'ixation began and culminated in the agricul.tural marketing-
board control.a of' the ninetten-tl:rl.rties - these latter years 
being when the times of trouble in world agricu1ture were 
aggravated by the times of trouble of" the worl.d economy as 
a whol.e. 
A paper read to the Economic Society of" South Af"rioa by 
J.G. van der Horst in 1932 traced the course of' South African 
legislation, with its origins in Roman-Dutch law concepts 
of property-rig~ts, as it set out to compWe the conditions 
of' farming in South A.f'rica to obey the law rather than the 
market. 3 
The earl.iest l.egisl.ation :for the control of an agri-
cultural industry was passed in 1914. It :l.mposed quality-
grading standards on export frui.t and the entire regulation 
o-.t export f'ruit came under the Fruit ilxport Board in 1925 
atid its instrument the Fruit Exchange.No export fruit could 
be sold except as sancti.onod by this Board. In 1926 a 
Perishable Products Control Board asswned the powers of' 
both the Fruit Export Board and the Fruit Exchange and no 
export of' fruit could be effected unless in accordance with 
a contract· made by or with the consent of the Board, ·whoso 
whose administrative costs were to be .met by a compul.sory 
levy on all export fruit. 
Similarly in respect of' dairy produce 1 co.ntrol began in 
• 
1917 with quality standards for export butter :followed in 
1918 by registration of all creameries and cheese factories 
with power.a to close sub-standard factorids to conf'irm to 
quality- and he al th-regulations• J:n 1925 the Agri·cul tural 
IndustrLes Adv~cement Act provided for a levy on all butter 
produced • the proceeds being available to the Minister to 
any purpose f'or promoting the dairy industry. In 1926 only 
those creameries and cheese :factories were registrable which 
obtained their cream from other persons unless such factories 
belonged to co•operatives or inco~orated associations. 
SimUltaneouely export o:f dairy produce was placed under the 
entire control .of th~ Per.:tdhable Products Exports Board, with 
all export contracts to be made through or with the consent 
of this Board. This was then followed by a 1930 law to 
establish the Dairy Industry Contro1 Board. 
This last Board was empowered to control not only those 
exports that the producer wished to export but to determine 
what proportion of dairy produce must be exported compul-
sorily by.every producer. Price-fixing powers were now 
conf'erred in addition to quality-quota export controls. 
Minimum prices to be paid for cream and milk by· a creamery 
or cheese £actory w~re made legal minima. The Board could 
compel any cheese or butter factory to hand over to its 
specified quantities of its output for export; it was 
authorized to make a levy on all dairy produce produced and 
use the t'unds eor subsidy o:f export. 
Subsequent 19.32 legislation extended in detail the 
administrative jurisdiction of the Dairy Industry Control 
Board to pay bounties on al1 exports and establish oompul• 
sory export quotas to be handed over at prices and places 
£or delivery by the :factory to the Board. The Board ex-. 
ported the del.ivered produce, paying net proceeds to the 
factory owner. Should proceeds not cover expenses, the 
Board could recover the def'i.eiency f'rom the factory Olm.er 
by legal action. Furthe:nno:r.e, should the :factory owner not 
deliver :for export his assigned quota, the Board. had autho-
rity to purchase a similar quantity e1sewhere, export it and 
recover the cost and loss f'rom the defaulting owner. 
Meat marketing followed the pattern. It began in 1917 
with legal ·quality-export standards and in 1923 a bounty was 
paid on exported beet' to the producer .• In 1932 a board was 
tiven 'al.most unlimited powers• of' control'o:f the meat trade. 
The Meat Industry control Bodd got powers to f'ix the number 
of' sl.aughter animals l.aw:f'Ully sold on any day, or during any 
period, at any place• The Boa.rd might f'ix the number of' 
slaughter animals f'or lawf'Ul transport :from one place to an- . 
other and f'ix arbitrarily the highest price f'or which meat 
could be sold in any area. 
In 1924 Cape Province wine farmers were prohibited from 
selling and manuf'aoturers :from buying any wine f'or distill.a-
tion except through the co .... operative K.W.V. Such authority 
extended to non-members of' the K.w.v. During 1931 and 1932 
stat~s required compulsory exports of' ma:i.ze ... and tobacco• 
quotas as determined an4 authorized by the Min:l.eter of' Agri-
culture. Ii.very trader-dealer in maize and tobacco must be 
licensed, make returns of his transactions and execute any 
compul.sory allocated export quotas. An amending Act ex-
tended the compulsory export-quota to any f'armer-producer 
rith 1,000 bags of' his e>wn mealies le:ft on his hands af'ter 
a given date. 
Legal powers fixed the price of' wheat to be paid by 
wheat-buyers to ppoducers and imports of wheat and flour 
might be allowed only at appropriately higher-price or pro-
hibited entirely, S~gar ~ollowed its own course of de-
tailed regulation with absolute controls over sugar-cane 
areas for cultivation. 
As van der Horst concluded, in respect o:f the principal 
agricultural products 
the rights left to the owner of' property are 
the right to consume it himself and the right 
to destroy it. The rights which give rise to 
its value in exchange have been.or arebabout 
to be• taken away :from him, and f'or the most· 
part vested in
4
boards subject to the control 
of' a minister., 
Though considerable numbers of' South A:f'rican :farmers had 
handed to the polity critical powers, thei~ objective was 
of course the reverse of diminishing their ownership rights 
in their land - the overa11 division of' which as between 
White South Africans and Black South Africans had preoccu-
pied much of' their history and parliamentary time. The 
South African farmers had in4eed now ca1led upon their local 
polity to save them f'rom the world market. The Western 
World• s tecbnol.ogical developments of mechanJ.zed 1arge ... sca1e · 
farming and the soientif'ic oontr:t.butions of' biology and 
chemistry were interacting with a wave of' industrial and 
agricu1tural protection.ism to bring about apparently irre-
versib1e price declines f'or f'oodstu:ffs and primary raw 
materials. Economic nationalism so narrowed the world 
market :for agricultural produce that national polities tried 
unilaterally to isolate their own landowners and peasants 
:from the deflationary cha.in-reaction by self'-def>eating 
export dumping to maintain a consequent disappearing inter-
national trade in such produce. 
For reasons that are the very stuff of White-Black 
· relationships in South Africa, the home market for South 
African farmers - especially of food crops - appeared un-
changeably undynamic. No voice of authority (economists 
of the time having voices but no authority) suggested that 
African demand for food might be elastic. Only e~port 
dumping in combination with virtual import prohibition 
suggested~tself as an answer. At le~st as the ans~r, in 
terms of political economy, to save an unacceptably large 
number of White land-owners from being compelled to yield 
their ownership not to the Africans, a fate from which their 
polity had already preservdd them, but to the mortgagors, 
an eventuality from which they hoped passionately their 
polity could rescue them. 
The Carnegie Commission had calculated the long-term 
mortgage indebtedness for South African agriculture as a 
whole in the period 19JO to be about 35•8 per cent of the 
land value. In 19)J J.G. van der Horst, when putting :for-
ward his van der Horst Plan of Government-:tunding of long-
term farming debt estimated mortgage debt ~ot to exceed 
5 £120,000,000. The Government Commission to Inquire :Lnto 
Co-operation and Agricultural Credit rdgarded £100,000,000 
as a more :fair f'igure but this d:ld not of' course include an 
unkno'Wll a.mount of' short-term debt, much of it unsecured to 
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maligned country-storekeepers. 
The chairman of this Committee was P.R. Vi1joen, the 
Secretary f'or Agriculture and subsequent chairman of the 
Nationa1 Marketing Couµcil. Dr. P.R. Viljoen wa~ to be-
come the most influential pract:l.tioner of' •planned agri-
culture.• and also the central. f'iGUre of the highly contro-
versial. debate over the complete elimination of' market-
demand prices and its replacement by a polity-fixed price 
system, a~ it cuiminated in the Marketing Act of' 1937.7 
This ·Co-operation and credit Commission of' 1934 may be 
looked upon as the la.st o:ff'ieial attempt. to see sel:f-help 
rather than etatism as the source of' economic development 
of' the land and' its ut.ilization. It concluded that agri• 
cultural co•operatives, despite the inh1biting stubborn 
individualism of non-co-operators and past poor management, 
were necessary and, essential. £or the sourtd promotion of' 
agriculture .in the Union. It nevertheless went on record& 
Compulsory co-operation or compulsory sale 
through one channel by means of' a. board of 
control, both of' which have as object the 
:fixation and control of prices, is econotni-
ca11y unsotmd and socially unhealthy and 
while it may temporarily benefit producers, 
it will inevitably lead to over-production, 
maladjustment .of supply and demand and an 
ultimate collapse of prices. Price control 
schemes :in other countries have proved that 
price levels cannot be artificially mainted.ned 
since inoreased prices mean increased product-
ion and increased production means lower 
returns. 
The experience in the Union with price con• 
trol measures in two of its major agricultural 
products 1 tobacco and wine., substantiates the 
view that this f'orm of' control is undesirable 
and not in: the best interests of' agriculture .• 
Further, price control schemes have character-
istics which are harmful to that independent 
spirit of' self-help which :ls so essential in 
the building·Up of' a viril.e and vi1igant 
.nation.e 
But even brave words have sometimes to be eaterrn in a 
later humbl.e pie. The compulsive pressures 0£ political 
economy - those pincers of ·:farmers• votes and farmers• dimi .. 
nishing incomes ... were very soon to compel Dr. Viljoen as 
Sc!orctary :for Agriculture to detail the recipe £or the pie 
to be digested by Parl.iament as the Marketing Act .of' 1937. 
This Act was the enabling measure for compulsory sale through 
one channel marketing-control boards with unrestricted price-
:fixing powers.9 
The Marketing Act No •. 26 of 1937 established a National 
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Marketing Council with offic.ials of' the Department of' Agri• 
culture ~ ·Officio chairman and deputy chairman and three 
other government .. appointed • :fuil-tim.e members. The powers 
0£ the Market.ing Council were virtually unlimited to secure 
the unstated objectives of the Aot·but objectives implicit 
in the powers. Hence the Council ooUld examine, report, 
drai't and submit any scheme, defined as a set of' rules for 
regulating the marketing o:f .any product within the Act. It 
could examine and amend any existing scheme. On the Mini· 
ster's instruotionst i.t could in'Vestigate or have investiga-
ted marketing conditions in any province or in general or j_,1 
the conditions relating to any particular product or rul.ing 
on .any market. l.t could recommend the prohibition or the 
regulation of' the importation of' any product generally or 
from any part~oula.r countryJ it could r4commend the prob.i-
bi tion or regul.ation of' the exportation of' any product 
generally or to .any particular country. 
The Council had appropriate powers to enforce its· deci-
sions and though required to ascertain views ot:, for instance, 
the.Board of' Trade and :tndustries, and take note of' the 
advisory and consul tat.:lve Consumers• Advisory Committee and 
of' the advisory and consultative Producers' Advisory Com-
mittee, the Marketing Council was in f'act subject to no 
limitations on its .legal authority other than to the Mini-
ster of Agriculture, 
A marketing scheme, which might also be initiated by any 
association of f'artner-producers or regulatory board in addi• 
tion to the Marketing Council itself, must detail. the pro-
duct, area, class of producers and traders covered by the 






mined by a regulatory board pennitted unrestricted varia ... 
tions as between di:ff'ere.nt classes of' producers and traders. 
all of' whom could be made .subject to levy ... payrnent. Subject 
to audit, the admin:t.stration and control of' the levy fund 
was entirely under the control o.f' the regu.lat?ry board. 
The scheme.might provide that no producer or trader might 
sell the 1controlled product unless registered with the regu-
latory board in accordance with its rdquirements. Tb.e regu-
latory board might determine the max:tmwn quantity of' any pro-
duct that, during any period :fixed by the board, could· be 
brought into or mmoved out of' any area def'ined by the board; 
the maximum quantity which might be sold or of':f'ered for sale 
on any day 1o·r during any period at any market or other place 
.specified by the board. The board., :furthermore; had com-
plete powers to trade• acting as agent .:for receipt and sal,e 
0£ the related product; to conduct a poo.1 for the sale of 
the .product on any tei-rns of" grading, pa.eking; storing, pro-
cessing,. marketing., advertising and transporting; to finance 
the operations o.f the pool; to exercise detailed, compul ... 
sory powers of export with rights to impose special export 
leVi,e s and operate equaJ.ization ftlnds. 
The regulatory board might call £or any inf'ormation in 
re.spect of the product f'rotn any prod.uoer, trader or processor. 
It might :finance on any terms any undertaking :for marketing 
or processing the product concerned. It might advise on any , 
aspect ·Of grading .•. standardization, packing., brand; it might 
advise the prohibition, control or regulation of import or 
export ·i:>f the product and .. £or good measure ... on all matter.a 
relating to the market:lng or proe_essing of' the product. 
The board had powers of' physic.al invE!stigati·on of' prcm.tses 
and of' examination of' records 0£ producers. 
But the powers of the regulatory board might be even 
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f'urther ex.tended to ensure, .if' needs be, complete control .of' 
the market of' the p.roduct to '\fhich the so heme related• The 
board might buy the product .:from any source and treat such 
purchase in .any manner as it deemed f'i t. I:t could then sell 
in its original f'orm or a.f'ter proces.sing or it could r.e:frain 
f'rom sell.ing.. With the Minister• s approval, the board might 
prohibit any producer f'rom selling that product or any class; 
grade, quantity or percentage except as determined by ~he 
board to any purchaser or through any. channel other than that 
determined by the board. 
The· board with the .approval of' the Minister might from 
time.to time prohibit anY producer f'rom selling the regulated 
product he has produced or EU1Y trader in any grade, class or 
quantity (whether in its original f'orm or partly or wholly 
processed) at a price other than a pri.ce .fixed by the board 
or below or ,above that price f'or any particular class, grade 
of' quantity of' such product.. The board might even prohibit 
entirely the sale of' the product except under permit Sis sued 
by the board. 
The Minister in respect of' any proposed scheme might at 
his discretion submit such a Sche~e t6 be voted on by pro .... 
ducers (no~ traders or consumers) concerned.. Although the 
scheme .re1ated to al.1 producers or £armers., White and non-
WbJ.te, only Ubite farmers had legal voting rights and non ... 
White producers or :f'anncrs were compelled to accept the 
term's 0£ the .ado:pted. schemct. A three-f'if'ths maj,ority of' 
White £armer-voters' producing more than half' of' the total. 
quantity of' the product during the preceding three years 
f'or a scheme was su:f:ficient ·to extend the ;Scheme <.to all. 
The Marketing Act was thus a consolidating measure of' 
the past and an enabling measure f'.or the future. Though 
the academic economists were moved to intense di.sapproval., 10 
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the plblity-prices were ef'f'ective. Mal.nutrition was and 
remains the heaviest burden on economic growth :from the 
11 polity-pricing of' food. 
s.n. Frankel claimed it could be shown that, :Crom 1930 
to 193lt, the taxP.d incomes from all farming were ~c 1;t.1al~y 
less than the co ~t oi' the artif'icial measures (subsidies, 
relief and related measures) incurred by the Central Govern-
ment to the agriculturists. In 1933/34 fanning incomes 
subject to tax were only 1•6 per cent of' the total taxed 
incomes of' the Union, due both to special exemptions and 
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to the low net incomes obtained 'f'rom agriculture. 
C .s. : :ichards made an attempt to calculate the coats o'f' sub-
sidies, quotas, tariff's and special assistance to agriculture 
in South Africa for the year 1933. He put the figure at 
between £7t million and £8t million. 13 
As a Schumpeterian innovation in marketin;:, the entre-
preneurial achievements o:f the control boards remain at best 
unproved. Academic opinion was exceedingly critical. By 
the nature of' the dynamic procesR, it is difficult i:f not 
impossible to prove that the marketing boards increased or 
reduced the costs oi' rr:arketing. Costs, which are the re-
flection or foregone opportunities or alt4rnatives, cannot 
be established if the other opportunities were inhibited or 
the alternatives prohibited. 
The so-ca1led rationalization o:f marketing did not 
achieve or even contribute to 'farming in accordance with 
the natural controls•. It encouraged a high degree of re-
striction and nc,ar-monopoly in some classes of' :food distri-
bution and processing. In the early years 0£ operation o:f 
the control boards, fluctuations in market supplies ~re so 
accentuated as occasionally to compel panic corrective 
action to secure imports ror totally-exhausted stocks. 
Perhaps the most interesting judgment on land-use in 
South Africa under White ownership was made, however, in the 
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Report of' the Reconstruction Commi ttoe of' the Dep'artment of' 
ul 14 . . 4 t ' Agric ture. This 19 J Report undertaken a. the request 
of' the Cabinet' Committee on Post-War Reconstruction sought 
•to f'ocus attention on matters which are of' importance not 
only to the present generation but more particularly to 
generations to come 1 • :It may tberef'or~ be regarded as ex ... 
pressing the basic convictions of' the Department of Agri ... 
cu1 ture ... its aspirations f'or the future and towards the role 
of the polity in respect of' the economy in general and a.gri-
cul ture in particul.ar .• 
The Report noted that in 1936 the Union's population was 
about 101 000 1 000• of' which the Whites numbered some 2,000,000. 
The 19.36 census had class.i:fied about 3.5 per cent of the White 
popu1ation as rural and about 77•5 per cent of' the non~Wlrl..te 
popu1ation (including the Africans in the Native Reserves) 
as rural. In 1939 it estimated that there were 104,ooo 
White-owned f'arms, comprising an acreage of' some 100 million 
morgen (and an acreage of' Native Reserves o:f some 10 mi.ll.ion 
morgen). At an average of' £) per morgen the White-owned 
farm land waa·vaJ.ued at £300,000;000 plus stock valued at 
c107,ooo.ooo plus movable assets of £20,000,000 or a total 
of' £427,000 9000 (or £457,000,000 if' the Native Reserves are 
incl.uded). The average net income :from agricultural. pro-
duction .f'or the year.s 1936/37 to 1938/:39 the Report cal.cu• 
lated at £44, 270,000 ·per year •. 
It commentdd that in the light of the fact that approxi-
mately 64 per cent of' the gainfully employed population was 
then engaged .in fanning, 'it is disconcerting that sinoe 1934 
the contribution of all branches of South African agriculture 
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to the total national income has not exceeded 13 per cent.• 
But the benef':1.te accruing to the nation f'rom agri ... 
culture cannot be assessed in terms 0£ meoney ••• 
the £0!rming population also makes a most valuab1e 
psychological and spiritual contribution to the 
essential elements 0£ the nation. There is a 
great dif'f'erence between town and country, both 
sociologically and economically. By having a 
£air1y large percentage 0£ people whose mental 
outlook embraces a love for the soil and live-
stock, for rural pursuits and outdoor life, in 
fact for things stable and permanent and £or 
the whole biological process which is unfolded 
on the f'azm every daY:t a steadying inf'luence of' 
great val.ue :ts exercised on th~ economic and 
social lif'e of' the nation • •. 1o 
Unfortunately, went on the Report; wrong and unbalanced 
methods of' using the country•s basic agricu1tural resources 
had arisen because 0£ the commeroial.ization of agriculture 
since the development of urban demand after the mining dis• 
coveries. 
The activities of' the :fanning cornmun:f. ty have 
beon guided largely by market demands and not 
by soil demands, with the result.that over 
wide areas land has been greatly exhausted ••• 
Unstable farming.practices are manifested in 
various ways, chief among which ares the 
abuse of.the natural veld by injud:l.cious burn-
ing, overstocking and i.mproper management ••• 
the extensive and of'ten indiscriminate plough-
ing up of veld £or the production of grain and 
other cash crops, without due regard to the 
maintenance of tilth and f'ertility, particu-
larly to be condemned in marg.ina.l areas where 
crop production is at best a gamble; the over-
concentration on cerea1 farming areas not 
naturally suited to this type of' :('arming; 
and the neglect of systems of' diversified 
f'arming in which stock play a more prominent 
part. 1·1 · 
The whole question of land abuse is closely 
l:.lnked up with economi.c considerations • ,. • It 
is true that wrong or bad £arming is a very 
import.ant contributory f'actor, but a funda-
mental dif'f'iculty is the fact that the man 
on the land has been caught in the vortex of' 
an economic ,system not of' h:i.s maki.ngt which 
in a large degree compe1s him to expl.oit the 
agricultural resources in order to enab.le him 
to meet his commitments and at the same time 18 to maintain a reasonable standard of living. 
In brief, the seni.ar o££icials and directing minds of 
the Departm.ent of' Agriculture - who were also the senior 
officials and directing minds in the National MarY.~ting 
. C~:mncil - reject.ed production in response to market-demand 
as the aim or justification of' 1and-uti.lization. Food 
would not appear to be a £unction, or at least the main 
:function, of' farming. The motivations of' £arming could 
only be directed by the values of' market-demand at an un-
acceptable cost in the erosion of' the natural. soil and the 
hlllllan soul ,. 
Indeed as the Report exhumed South A:frican agriculture, 
it .became more and mo~e obvious to its authors that the re• 
• ·, construction of its remains could be entrusted to the polity 
. ·. 19 
a1one. After cataloguing the dismal disabilities - the 
low, uncertEU.n, extremely variable rainfall, the frost, the 
denudation of soil aggravated by dust storms succeeding 
torrential rains; the l.ess than six per cent of' cultivated 
land area and less than f'ifteen per cent that ever could be 
cultivated; no inland waterway.a; droughts that cause enor• 
mous losses; stock diseases; insect pests and P.lant diseases 
of' malignant varietyJ the poor prices; the unsatisf'actory 
marketing and distribution; the over-capita1.ization of' 1a:nd 
f'rom the farmer's love 0£ land and the non•f'armer•s love of' 
tax-evasion; ,the uneconomic sub-division of 1andt the un-
benef'iciall.y occupied land; the inadequacy of the State 
agricuJ.tural services and.the apathy of i"armers towards such 
services - the Report conc1udod: 
J:t is .clear f'rom the f'orogoin.g that farming in 
this country is one long, hard struggle against 
heavy natural and economic odds.20 
Others, including academic economists, had over the 
years observed - in perh~ps less lugubrious language - the 
f'actors making f'or re1ative1y high-cost f'arming in South 
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Af'riea and had been led to recommend investment policies to 
:facil:t tate a movement :from the land. The Report howd.ver, 
after noting that the Marke.ting Act of' 1937 might well be 
looked upon by producers as their •magna charta•, 21 declared 
that •what is wanted is a new charter f'or agriculture in the 
light of' the experience gained •••' 22 It then proceeded 
to write the new charter f'or Cabinet approvai., 23 
The march of' veld deterioration; fertility de-
pletion; erosion and desiccation over al.l parts 
0£ the country points unmistakably to the wide 
prevalence of unsound or exploitive f'arming, 
which is· ill-adapted to the natural. controls 
and characterized by inef':ficient or abusive 
methods of' using the land. A great deal o:f 
exploitation follows as an inevitable result 
of economic pressure on the land ••• Appro-
priate action has to be taken to de al with 
these economic issues ••• [but] the crux of 
the problem, however, lies in the. actual systems 
and methods of land use ••• 
The imposition of' c~rtain restrictions in re~ 
gard to land use and the prohib:ition of' def':!.• 
nitely injurious practices will obviously have 
to be considered in this connection, as also 
will positive measures f'or the encouragement 
or enf'orcement of sound .land use ••• 
Within certain broad limits the system .Qf 
f'arm:i.ng pr.actised has depended' largely on the 
predilection and financial standing of' the 
particular £armer and the markets and prices 
avail.able f'or tho products. The temporary 
success of' systems, that in the long run prove 
to be ~11-judged., has l.ed to a :fairly general 
belie~ that• where the natural contro1s a.re 
not completely inhibitive, any type o:f farming 
can be practi.sed i:f the :fanner is ef'f'icicnt. 
The point missed is that ••• one i.s dealing 
with long-term e:f:fects wbJ.ch may not show up 
until many !ears and even generations have 
passed ••• 2 
In a.dditlon to the positive soi!l, veld and water conser-
vation measures by subsidization o:f individual. f'armers, 
selected by and under continuous control o:f Departmental 
o~ficials, special. legislation was reconunended :for restrict-
ion or prohibition o:f erosion-promoting practices. HarmfUl 
practices listed :for Departmental field restrict.ion and pro-
hibition included (i) veld-burning timing and :frequency~ 
(ii) over .. stocking (iii) categories and techniques 0£ slope-
cultivation (iv) grain monoculture (v) drainage and ploughing 
of vlei's for crop production.. For possible Departmental 
decision., the Report listed in addition (vii) limitation 0£ 
goat and sheep farming in particular regions and (viii) limit-
ation of cultivation, not only in marginal. and sub-marginal 
but also in recogni.zed crop-production areas, to ensure 
efficient management. As the :final complement of' conserva• 
tion, there should be powers f'or the expropriation and perma ... 
nent protection of selected areas 1 which, for one reason or 
another, are considered unsuitable :for :farming•. 
Reclamation measures 
by tho Department should without doubt be the 
.main method o:f' approach. While private initia .. 
tive shou1d not be discouraged, landol\lller.s are 
often at ~serious disadvantage ••• This implies 
in e:f':f'ect the establishment o:f a new reclamation 
scheme under which the Department 1vould supply 
all the necessary labour• equipment and super-
vision :f'or the carrying out o:f' approved ~grks 
on private farms as well as town lands. 
The capital cost would be financed by tha State but •the 
.landowner would be debited with a definite percentage o.f the 
working cost.,· say 25,. .33f or even 50 per cont• 6 2 .5 :rt is 
essential; the Report considered, •that t'tle Department shou1d 
.. exorcise i.ts o·wn initiative in tho choice of' areas where 
reclamation works are to be undertaken•. 25 
A tru1y :fearsome picture o.f' loss of natural :fertil.ity of 
the 1and, and even o:f the foreseeable desiccation of South 
Africa, was built up in this Report. There is, however, no 
hint that land-utilization as it had developed had anything 
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to do with (a) the divis.ion of' the l,and· by the po:lity as be ... 
tween White and African so that one-:f'if':th of' the population 
had ,secured something more than 1 oo, mil.lion morgen and f'our-
f'i.:f'ths of' the population something less than 10 mil.lion 
morgen and (b) the polity-price ,system evolved by the control 
boards and the National Marketing Council. 
' 
Market demand for foodstuffs and agricultural raw mater-
ia1s was i.nd.eed regarded as a £w:idamentally malignant f'aotor: 
For centuries the £armer had been subject to the 
whims and caprices .of consumer demand. :tf nature 
blesses ,his lands and :fl,ocks, he £inds that b.i.s 
products are not wanted; it" he turns to something 
:for ·which there is an apparent demand he is f'aoed 
w:t th consumer apathy and low prices , ••• During 
all the years the f:a.rmer has had no assurance 
that the food and raw materials 'W.n.tng t"rom the 
soil by bis energy and., 1,abour would bring in 
suf'ficient for a l:i. ving .• 26 
Small wonder that the Report no~ed 1 in the Union, the 
Marketing Act of' 1937 may well be looked upon by producers 
as their "magna char.ta"'~~ 2.7 The· Department of' Agricul. ture 
however was unpersuaded that State price f'ixation was in it-
self' suf'f'icient authority or e:ff'ective power f'or the economic 
development of' land. 
Price fixation, as a security measure to the 
farmer, logically pre ... suppoees control and 
direction of' production ••• Dependent ·as agr1• 
culture is upon natural forces which may give 
plenty in one season and l.i.ttle in the next, 
strict control of production becomes dif':ficult 
and if' not well-n.igh impossible., especia1ly 
lmen .international demand al.so enters. Con-
trol can only take the form of' direction. 
Here the control board systern Will be able to 
lend itself' to direct the pt'oduction of a 
particular product ••• 28 
While the Report was not ,quite prepared to recommend 
outright nationalization of' the land (though evidently.muclt 
impressed with Soviet-type powers to control and direct 
produoti.on), it had ·no such :l.nhibi tions in regard to f'ood ... 
distribution and food-manufacture. 
But contro1 should go further than the mere 
raw product and should extend to the food pro-
cessing industries which are vital to the needs 
of the nation. Price control alone will prove 
insufficient and ultimately the :food processing 
industries·themselves shou1d be state-owned or 
at least owned and operated by public bodies. 
Private ownership oC mills, creameries, canneries 
and other food processing plants has led to 
waste:f'ul utilization of resources and exploit• 
ation of the public ••• Food procossing is a 
national matter which should be dictated by 
the needs of the people and the necdssity ot: 
such processing to avoid wastage, as in f'Wi:t 
and vegetablas,. and cannot be lef't to private 
initiative whe~~ a monetary gain is the main 
consideration. ~ 
The classical vie~ of etatism 3o_is in respect o~ South Africa 
nowhere more .f'ascinatingly evidenced than in this Report of' 
the Reconstruction Connnittee of' the Department for Agrioulture-
Starting in the f'!lrst decade. of' the century to provide a 
state, scienti:f'ic-educative service (a. genera1ly unquestioned 
i'unf?ti on of government)• the Department of' Agricul. ture assumed 
increasing powers over marketing and - when required to report 
on f'undamcntal policy f'or the post-war future - proposed 
state-manu:faoturing of' food products. This basic rejection 
of' private initiative in marketing and manufacturing was in 
esAence a claim that the polity should be the sovereign in-
fluence over economic development. It was pursY~d to the 
most remarkable recommendations of' tMs whole revealing 
Report - the proposa1s :for the valuation; occupation and 
olfllership of' f'a.rm lanct.31 
Since agricultural. production :for the market has 
bdcome predominant, £arming has largely been 
commercialized ••• Land, too• is thus evaluated 
by the farmer on the prices now rul.ing for the 
products he intends to raise on the land he is 
buying ••• It is generally accepted that over 
capitalization o.f the land is one o:f the greater 
evils, on the economic side, of' our agriculture. 
The dif':f'icul ty 1 however; is to f'ind e:f.fecti ve 
means of' preventing it ••• whether the :f'ixing 
of' a mortgage limit by law is contemplated or 
not, a Bureau of' Farm Values appears to be 
essential f'or any really constructive social 
and economic agrarian policy ••• 
Such a Bureau of' Farm Values would have to 
build up a card index (caref'ully catalogued) 
••• in which would be collected all relevant 
:facts pertaining to every piece of land pri-
vately held under separate title •o• Any 
material changes a:f:fecting the productive 
value of' a given piece o:f land would have to 
be currently noted. The preliminary ca.rd 
data would be obtained :from various existing 
official sources, and would gradually have to 
be expanded and made more complete, particu-
larly by reports f'rom f'ield o:f't"icers o:f the 
Department• 
The Bureau o:f Fann Values should be con-
ceived as an impartial scien.ti:fic institute 
f'or the collection of' the most accurate and 
complete in:fonnation on the :fundamental. f'aots 
connected with the true farming value of' 
every piece of' land used, or usable, for 
pastoral, agri~~ltural, and f'orestry pro-
duction. As such it would soon become in-
dispensable to Departments like those of' 
Agriculture, Lands, Irrigation, Social Welfare 
and Finance (particularly in connection with 
the activities of' the State Advances Recover-
ies Of'f'ice and the Land Bank) • The Bureau 
would bring up.a sta:ff o:f trained and exper-
ienced valuators of' agricultural l.and • •• 
(and) the valuations of' land in different 
regions would soon be reduced to unif'orm 
criteria and measures of' value. 
Such a conception of' vaJ.uation of' all agricul. tural land, 
card-indexed and cross-ref'drenced, might well come from a 
text-book on Sovi.et agricultural plannin~. It· is certainly 
somewhat startling to encounter .it .in an of'f'icial poli.cy 
white ... paper of a South A:frican government de.pa.rtment. But 
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the ruling minds in the Department of Agriculture had clearly 
come to a total rejection of the market as a determinant of 
economic development. 
Although at first sight the proposa1 that the 
State should be the sole mortgage creditor may 
appear somewhat radical, there :ts under our 
conditions only one really ef':fectivo way of' 
checking inf'lation of' land ·values and prevent-
ing excessive mortgage indebtedness; that is 
by eXpand:i.ng the present Land. Bank into a 
National Mortgage Loan Bank having the sole 
right of granting loans against mortgage on 
agricultural land •. • 
If a·National Mortgage Bank were to have 
the sole right of' advancing money against farm 
bonds, and ~£' in fixing the amowit of' the loan 
the Bank were obliged to wo:rk on the assess-
ments of the Bureau of' Farm Val.ues, the exist-
ing evils of' overcapitalized :farm enterprises 
could be practically removed • •. Moreover, it 
should be possible to lay down a ru1e that a 
person buying land outright at a higher price 
than that assessed by the Bureau o-£ Farm Values, 
will thereby be restricted in subsequently 
particip.ating in any othdr f'orm of' Government 
financial assistance to farmers. · 
FinaJ.ly, lfhil.e the Report oonc1uded•as f'ar as the Union 
is concerned, it is considered that the system of' private 
land ownership should be retained as the bas.is of' our agrt-
cul tural production•, the Report recommended legal restrict-
ion of' un'l:>ene:fic.ial occupation of' f'arm J.and, in the sense 0£ 
large holdings which are not e f'f'ecti vely used in the national 
interest, or land that is held idle :for specu1ative purposes. 
If' f'urther propo.sed nationa1ization of' land on a voluntary 
basis, and also expropriation in the case of' J.and unstt!i.:table 
for £arming by Europeans and of land which should be re• 
served by the State as grazing areas onJ.y.32 
This curious combination 0£ f'undam.entalism and colloct-
:lvism had, however, already been overtaken by the intensified 
rate 0£ economic development, which was the concomi.tant of' 
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war.time cbange and resource-utilization. Prices of' food-
stu££s and agricultural raw materials soon reflected tho 
intensified pressures of' war-time demands. Long-term pur-
chase contracts by tho British Government for all South 
Africa's exports of' wool, .sugar, maize, and much o:f' its 
citrus-crop reduced the marketing problem to one of' physical 
shipment., 
Even more significant was the rapid expansion ot: domestic 
war-time empl.oyment and increased wages so that a substant.ial 
~ncr.ease in total and per capit~ consumption of most agri• 
cultural produce had by early 1942 trans&~rmed the entire 
problem~ 33 It was no longer a question of limiting sup-
plies to :force prices up but of' limiting demand to lceep 
prices down. Tho Minister of' Agriculture became Controller 
of Food and the Secretary for Agriculture acquired in addi• 
tion to the chairmanship 0£ the Nationa1 Marketing Council 
the alias ·of Deputy Food Controller. 34 Such dual.personal-
ities imposed seY:~re strains and Smuts• War Cabinet was , .. 
f'inall.y induced by consumers' clamour to separate the Food 
Control Organization :from the Department of' Agriculture,. 
The Government, however, resisted pressures ~or food• 
rationing .• 35 It r~mains a Cabinet secret whether it was 
the formidable administrative dif':ficulti·es or the perhaps 
greater embarrassment of' the highly-discriminating points-
allocation to Whites and non-Whites that 1ed to ration books 
being printed but never implemented. But these years from 
1940 to 1948 had made it very evident that the reconstruction 
of' agriculture al.ong- the lines of' bureaucratic collectivism, 
as proposed by the Department of' Agriculture, would frustrate 
the new dynamic of' economic development that had the poten-
tial o~ carrying the South Af'rioa economy and its social. 
system f'rom its completed tak:e-of'.:f into its drive to maturity. 
The Smuts Cabinet discreetly aought the support 0£ other 
authorities. inclined to a more holistic view 0£ the place 
of agriculture in the poat-var economy. Under the chair-
manship of' Dr. H.J. Van Eck, the Social and Economic Planmng 
Council was invited to atate how it envieaged •The Future 0£ 
!<'arming in South Africa• • .3
6 
TABLE l 
Yield &D Quini!J;• 2er HegtEe 
1928- 19.3.3 1934 1935 1936 1937 19.38 
32 
Maize !ave} - - -.Argentine 19•3 15•9 20•1 19•6 18•9 1,.0 -
Australia 16•3 1.5.' 17•2 1'•7 19•3 1)•4 
U.S. America 15•.5 14•2 9•9 1.5•1 10•2 17•8 17•4 
South A£rica .5•0 7•0 5•7 .5•4 8•2 .5 •7 8•9 
1928- 19)3/ 19:34/ 19:35 I 1936/ 19J7/ 1938/ 




United Kingdom 21•9 24•1 2.5•2 23•4 20•6 20•6 25•6 
Germany 21•1 24•2 20•6 22• 1 21•2 22•6 27•4 
u.s. America 9•7 7•5 8•2 8•2 8•2 9• 1 8•9 
Argentine 8•8 10•7 9•4 9•4 10•6 8•2 11•8 
A.uatralia 7•8 s•o 7•2 7•2 8•3 9•2 7•2 
South A:f'rica .5. 4 6•5 5•9 5•9 5•1 3•9 .5. s 
(south A.f'rica: White crop a only - overall crop• lover). 
TADLE 2 
Cattle Products. 19J7t in '600 cwts. 
Cattle 
(I OOOs )Nos. 
Australia 13,078 
New Zealand 4,506 
South A£rica 11,407 
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It provided dismayi.ng but hardly-contestable evidence 
of' the relative high-cost, low productivity of' South African 
1and-utilization, both arable and pastoral, reflected in the 
comparative tables .• 
The Planning Counci1's Report asserted that the policy 
of self'-suffioiency and f'orced.export pursued by the Depart-
ment of' Agriculture had not only failed to optimize land-
util.ization but introduced serious distortions that delayed. 
adjustments to increase output.Pe~ capita in :farming. 
The 1941 popul.ation census gave the cash incomes of' 
White f'arming :fami1i.es. Al.most half' the owner-occupiers 
had money incomes o:f less than £200 per year; of the tenants 
more than half' had money incomes of l.ess than £100 per year, 
while among the bywoners more than halt: e arried 1e ss than £.50 
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paeh per ye~. The earnings of' Af'rican f'arm-labourers in 
the immediate pre-1939 years, inc1uding payment in kind, 
ranged from C13•2 to £27•6 per year. Coloured farm-workers 
11~ the Western Province wheat-areas at the same period earned 
between £40 to £60 per year, including payment in kind. 
The position of agriculture in the Native Reserves was 
even worse. . No reliable calculations are available but an 
off'icia.1 Commission (1944) suggested a figure of' just over 
£17 annual income for a £ami1y of' £ive ::tn the Transkei. 
Fif'ty years af'ter important consumer-markets had come 
into being in the mining areas, thi1"ty years af'ter the unif'i• 
cation of' South Africa and the sustained financial assistance 
of' every kind, the productivity of' farming in South Af'r~ca 
made it patently t the sick organ 01:' the cotllltry• s economic 
body•• The intervention of the pol:i. ty had equall.y patently 
inhibited for two generations the intensified mobility and 
empl.oynient of' both White and non-White population. 
The reMdeployment of' the country•s White labour resources 
slowly shook of'f the constraint of its tback~to-the-land' 
complex. The growth factor 0£ urbanization exerted in-
creasing influence. Fr.om 1926 to 1936, 150,000 Whites of' 
rural origin moved to urban areas. The capital investment 
in South .A.f'rica•s gold-mining and manufacturing industry 
; 
that stimulated the mobility of both Whites and Africans was 
a1so the solvent f'or the £ul.ler employment of' the ·whites. 
But the polity, reluctant to accept that the same process 
was also inexorably urbanizing the Africans. was committed 
by the whole institutionalized culture o:f its White elector• 
ate to resist wi.th rigidity fossilizing into :lnf'lexibility 
the f'~ller empl~ent of' the non-Whites. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR 
The unified polity, setting out with renewed resolution 
in 1910 to promote the wealth of' White :farmers, never recog-
nized norc even understood that this was related to increas-
ing incomes of' non-White consumers as a function of' their 
growing productivity as workers. The impersonal co-ordi-
nation of' resource utilization through the market to promote 
economic development was uncomprehended. 1 But .its influence 
on colour-class relationship.s became increasingly suspect so 
that economic development itself' came to be questioned as 
the destroyer of' the institutionalized culture of' the •volk'. 
The electoral weight of' rural Af'rikanerdom was deployed 
to secure control of' the polity :for A:frikanerdom, so that 
Afrikaner nationalism might direct the .executive and admini-
strative authority within the polity to shape the adaptive 
compulsions ot: economic deve.lopment. 
The agents of production, wrote Alfred Marshall in the 
classical tradition, are oommonl.y classed as Land, Labour 
and Cap.ital. In respect of' land, legislative enactment 
established that legal ownership of' about 87 per cent 0£ the 
national terEitory was secured for members of' the White 
electorate. In respect of' the second agent, Labour. the 
division of' the labour market so that the Whi.tes secured a 
.leasehold in perpetuity on all better-paid jobs was a more 
complex task of' frustrating economic rationality. In respect 
of' the third agent, Capital, though nationalization of' the 
gold mines was espoused by some influential leaders of' the 
Nationalist Party (apart f'rom earlier slogan-makers of the 
South African Labour Party), the most deep-rooted almost ... 
emotional Afrikaner attachment to land-ownership inhibited 
the socialist heresies though it did not preclude a growing 
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extension of state-capitalism. 
So long as the economy continued almost untouched by or 
unre.sponsive to market determinants, that is :for nearly two 
hundred years af'ter the establishment ·of' the supply-station 
at Cape Town, the pursuit of' productivity through least-cost 
substitution was desultory. The dynamism of' such economic 
rationality in the allocation and employment of' the scarce 
resource o:f labour became disruptive· o:f institutional.ized 
culture, of' the Africans :first and the Whites subsequently, 
only when the country's economy was energized out of' its near-
stationary self'-su:f:ficiency. 
As the economy was· stimulated by the mineral discoveries 
and related capita1 investment into a progressive interaction 
within an exchange- ·Or market-economy, the pursuit of' pro-
ductivity exercised increasing!:y :far-reaching adaptation on 
the whole social system. :tn the earlier stage, non-monetary 
customary terms of' labour service 2 persisted even after the 
gradual irrtroduction of' a cash or market economy - more par-
ticu1arly in the Transvaal, where monetary media of payment 
hardly existed until the gold discoveries. Capitalistic 
forms of' economic activity hencef'orth emphasized productivity 
with the concomitant specialization and divisio.n of labour. 
The consequent clash with tradition and cu.stomary rights 
centred on the utilization of' African labour. 
The gold-mining industry was the focus of' this conflict 
of value-orientations. It was here, predictably, that eco-
nomic dynamism became political dynamite. It was here, 
inevitably, that the integrating effects of' economic develop-
ment, of' Schumpeterian change and innovation, exerted their 
cri tica.l challenge. And it was here that the challenge was 
taken up by the political parties so as to maintain the 
social system in accordance with the ins ti tuti·ona1ized cul .. 
ture of' the dominant White electorate. It is the detail oJ. 
least-cost substitution as implemented and :frustrated in the 
gold-mining industry which provides the most significant 
chapter in the record o~; the political economy o:f labour in 
South Africa - both f'or the political scientist and :for the 
economic analyst. 
By the time o:f Union, the pattern o:f labour utilization 
in the Rand gold-mining industry had been established in its 
essentials.3 Those essentials reflected the realities o:f 
the labour-market - the economic and the extra-economic. 
avri:f erous 
The pro:fitable exploitation of' low-grade,/rock-earth under 
contemporary conditions o:f primitive mechanization necessi-
tated massive application of' unskilled human energy. Such 
human energy was present in Southern Af'rica in the :form of' 
tribal Africans - present but inhibited in its availability 
by the social system of' tribalism. Essential. labour skills 
were virtually not present at all in Southern Af'rica. Hence 
gold•mining management had, in addition to attracting capi-
tal, to concentrate on attracting labour - unskilled labour 
f'rom Africa, which was Black, and skilled labour :from Europe, 
which was White. The market determinants of' demand and 
supply operated to establish the structure of' wage-rates and 
the institutionalized values of' trade-unionist Europeans and 
tribalized Af'rioans hardened the matrix of' expectation-
f'rustration. 
A gap was :formed between the wages and working conditions 
of' skilled artisans, largely immigrants from Europe and con-
sequently White and relatively few, and the wages and working 
conditions of' unskilled labourers, migrants f'rom Africa and 
consequently Black and relatively numerous. It was :formed, 
it must be emphasized, in accordance with the market real.-
ities of' demand, supply and marginal productivity. It was 
these market realities which in 1894 employed on the Trans-




month (plus the cost of' compound 
month) and about 5,400 Europeans 
. 4 £21 per month. 
260. 
:feeding of' about 
at an average wage 
But the gap that was f'ormed by market realities became 
the gulf' of' institutionalized culture and, finally t the 
chasm of the South Af'rican social system. Skilled worl-.:ers 
for the new mining and manufacturing actiVities were recruit-
ed from overseas, mainly f'rom Brita.in. Branches of' British 
craf't unions were soon :f'ormed. In 1881 the .Amalgamated 
Society of' C.arpenters and Joiners was established , between 
1886 and 1893 branches of the Amalgamated Society of' Engin-
eers; the lronmoulders• Society.in 1896 and in 1902 the s.A. 
Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association :f.or mine ... (not 
railw.ay) employees. A strike on Crown Reef' Gold Mine in 
1902 was sucoe,ss:ful under the leadership of' a Joint Mechanics' 
Commi. ttee and f'rom this Committee was .11.aunched the Wi twaters-
rand Trades and 
duetrial aims. 
af'f'iliated most 
Labour Council ltith political as well as in-
In 1911 a Transvaal Federation of Trades 
of' the Transvaal empl.oyees• associations.5 
Membership of' thes4 trade unions and political organiza-
tions of' labour was exclusi. vely White. Though their opera• 
tions and activities extended of' course beyond the goJ.d mines 
and beyond the Witwatersrand, the concd.ntration of' coll.ective 
barga.i.ning and of political agitation by trade un.ion action 
was on the gold-mining industry and in the Rand. The 
Chamber of' Mines both as employers and as •capitalists' was 
the f'ocus ·Of' labour-market variables and constants, which 
encompassed .among others the world price of' gold, yields on 
the international market f'or risk capital, trade unionism· 
and social convention. 
Hence the Economic Commiss.ion of' 1914 was directed by 
the Botha Government to inquire into wages and working condi-
tions and the cost of' living more particul.arly on the Rand, 
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and also into the general question of' establishing minimum 
6 .. . . . .. 
or subs.istence wages. The Report of' thJ.s 1914 Commission 
with its illuminating data on contemporary conditions brings 
out clearly the extent to which •conventionai\~~ecessities', 
'involw:tary employme.nt•, 'pre:ferrdd idlenessil ~·:x;eroised their 
. : '. \ 
ef'f'ects on the supply-price of' Whi. te labour. \\ .\ 
The Commission noted thats '· 
lo• working class lif'e in South Af'rica is 
rendered unavoidable expensive in numerous 
ways ••• the white man is expected and ex~ 
peets to be domiciled in a :fashion unmistake· 
ably superior to that .of' the non-White • • • 
a man must ride daily to work since he rarely 
lives near it, cost of' amusements and recre-
ation is high, education is costly ••• medical 
expenses are exceedingly high ••• the cost of' 
a natl:ve (servant) must be reckoned as a part: 
of' the artisan ts actual cost of' 11 ving in 
South Africa - one might say as a part of 
his necessary OQst of' li~ing in a not over-
strained sense."' 
Af"ter stressing the limitations ·Of' such statistical cal-
culations, the Connnissi.on published the d"'ta below f'or circa 
8 1913. 
Index Numbers of' Money Wages of' Skill.ed 
Artisans 
Johannesburg 100 
South Af'rioa (else- 80 
where) 
England & Wales 
France 













••• a family which migrated f'rom Johannesburg 
to England and maintained its old standard of' 
of' house-room and consUDlpti.on of' f'ood would 
f'ind the costof' :food a.g.d housing reduced in 
the ratio of' 100 to 52.~ 
'The wages(for White miners i.e. supervisors) paid on the 
Witwatersrand' the Commission concluded •are unquestionably 
very high, but it does not :follow that they are excessively 
high when the nature and conditions of' the work are allowed 
f'or • •.' 10 It f'ound that 'social conventian has set its 
seal on customs•. 
The spread. betwee~ White skilled and Black unskilled 
wages and working conditions was established by the market 
realities mf demand, supply and marginal productivity. In 
due course the gulf was buttressdd by social convention, 
barricaded by militant lihite trade unionlLsm and increasingly 
:fortified by the White polity af'ter 1924, when the South 
African Labour Party became the minor partner in the Pact 
Government of.' General Hertzog. Hence when the Economic 
and Wage Commission of' 1925 came to its conclusions (some 
ten years af'ter the :first Economic Commission)·on compara-
tive wages and living costs, it wrote a 
To sum up - our comparison of' money wages in 
different countries showed the leve1 of urban 
· ·skilled rates to be high in South Af'rica .. f'ar 
higher than :ln any European country, higher 
than in Austral.ia, about as high as in Canada,. 
and exceeded onl.y by·t, the United States of' .America. 
When we allow f'or dif'.:f'erenee s in the purchasing 
power of wages and compare re·al. wages the advan-
tage of' South A:f.rica over Europe is reduced, 
but remains considerable; weal wages being 
about 40 per cent abov~ the highest European 
level, namely, Loncon •a• Taken. in connection 
with the oapaoi ty to pay of indu.stry in the 
dif'ferent countries, the rates of' wages in 
South Africa are :relative! y .f'ar higher than 
i~ any other country. 
The explanation is obvious: the rates of' 
wages tttat we selected f'or compari.son ••• 
were the rates of' a smal.l minority of' workers 
••• they were the rates of' white workers, 
while the great majority of' wage-earners in 
South .African industry and agriculture are 
natives• coloured or Asiatic ••• In other 
words, the explanation of the remarkable f'act 
that the rates of' wages which we took are 
above the average income per occupied person, 
while in other countries the corresponding 
rates are usually about half' the average in-
come, is to be f'ound in the characteristic 
of South African wages that we noted first -
the wide spread, a spread several times as 
great as in any other country, between the 
highest and the lowest rates of' wages. The 
rates of' mechanics, buildi.ng artisans, miners 
and printers are the rates of' a small skilled 
class of' urban trhite labour.11 
The early scarcity of' skilled workers on the Rand un-
doubtedly helped to add a powerf'ully conventional concept of' 
White man's money-wage to the even ear.Dier and stronger social 
convention of' 'kaff'ir's work'• Furthe:rmore, while White 
trade unionists applied al.1 the pressures of' militant collect-
ive bargaining so as to secure a monopolistic position in 
the skilled labour market, the Chamber of' Mines had through 
the centralization of' its rdcruitment and application of' the 
•maximum-average• wage agreement for African workers esta-
blished a monopsonistic position in relation to its unskilled 
labour f'orce • 
Within the gold-mining industry, consequently, the imper-
fections in its labour market f'rom an early stage made it 
increasingly un1i.kely that wage-rates reflected marginal pro-
duci tivi ty of' labour. It was these imperfections that criti-
cally influenced working costs, and. through such working 
costs, the marginal grade of' ore it was prof'itable to mine 
at ruling, f'ixed gold-price. 
Repeatedly during the history of' the South Af'rican gold-
mining industry, commissions of' inquiry were appointed to 
consider working costs as a seemingly inexorable break-even 
2 crisis threatened the early closing of' marginal mining. 
The major issue was labour-costs, though other aspects such 





tariff's and taxation made their regular· appearance• In 
the next chapter the signi:f'icance 0£ gold output to the rate 
of the countryis economic development will be exa.min,,ed but, 
from ·1886 until at least 1940, that it was the decisive and .. . . 
overwhelmingly important variable seems hardly disputable. 
What ha.s, however1 be·en hotly debated .for .sixty years 
wi·th no consensus .is the e:ff'ect -of' the Chaml;>er ·Of Mines policy 
-0£ centralized. :r.ecrui tment and wage-f'ixation of' its African 
labour,. 1 ·3 Centralized recruiting by the two of'f'ioiat agen-
I 
cl.es., tb.e Witwatersrand Native Association and the Nat:l:Y'e 
Hecruiting Corporation,, as .o.laborated ea.rl.ier., was intended . ' 
to reduce.costs of' recruitment. As an organizational method, 
.it was doubtless more ef'ficie.nt and there:fore less costly 
. . . J 
than the heterogeneous rdcrui 1ting techniques it replaced., 
But recruitment costs arEl patently a function -0£ the attraot-
i venes.s of' wa.ge ... ~orking conditions. to prospective workers. 14 
The Native Re-crui ting Corporation, apart rrom operating 
the monopsony on behalf of' the C'q.amber of Nines f'or the Rand 
gold ... mine,s in South Africa and the then British Protectorates, 
also laid do'Wll the wage-rates applicable to all. Africans em-
. '-
ployed on the gold-mines. Times-rates f'or d:i.ff'erent oate-
gories -of work could ,not be .exceeded by any mine ... empl.oyer, 
and earnings trom piece-work were limited to a .maximum average 
not ·to be ·exceeded unde.r pe~ty o:f a. f'ine to the 'black-1eg1 
mine. . ; 
In b,r,ief'; there is· a single beiye:.t' of' A:frican l.abour f'.or 
the gold-mines; who by agreement exciude wage-rate competi-
tion among themselves :ror such labour. Thel.abour-ma.rket 
£or African workers in gold.mining ·.is thus monopsonistic. 
Furthermore as opPosed to this 'singl.e buyer', Af'rican mine-
workers ard prohibited f'rom any :form of' trade-union combina-
tion on the ,supply side and in terms .of' the pass-l.aws are 
subjected to criminal prosecution f'or any breach of' lapour-
contraot. 
Since there is no permiss.ible alternative to this monop-
sonistic condition, its effect on labour productivity, work-
ing costs and gb.ld output must therefore be a matter{>f' opi• 
nion. 1.5. Only subjective evidence is necessarily available 
on. this important f'actor or determinant of the rate -of South 
Af'rica•s economic development. 
The Chamber of' Mines vielV'point from the earliest days 
(though individual mining industrialists have dif'f'ered) i.s 
that the Africans• demand for money income is inelastic. The 
amount of' work the African-miner is· prepared to of'f'er is a 
function of his earnings but since his earnings are pre-
determined by his :fixed income-target, he will work only. f'or 
the time necessary to secure that f'ixed income-target. Thus 
the Nati.ve Recruiting Corporation told the Economic and Wage 
Commission of 192.5:: 
The social and economic position of' the native 
is such that he is abl.e to satis:fy his needs by 
intermittent periods of' service. Generally 
speaking, the nat1ve postpones going out to work 
until the last possible moment, and the possess-
ion of' additional f'Unds merely enables him to re• 
main in idleness a further period ••• The Corpor-
ation is convinced that any increase in the level 
of' native w.ages would be followed, to only a 
small extent, by an increase .in the native stand-
ard of living; that the main result woul.d. be 
that native would work f'or a shorter period 
th.an at present; and that consequently the 
native· labour available to industry in the Union 
would be reduoed.16 
It will be noted that the Chamber of Mines was contending 
that the reduction in the supply of A:frican labour in response 
to an increase in wage-rate (i.e. the so-ca1led backward-
sloping supply curve) applied not merely to mine labour but 
to the over-all supply of African labour in response to the 
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demand by industry in/general. Undoub ted.l y White :f'arme rs 
were even more f'irmly convinced that to increase the Af'rican 
17 f'arm-labourer•s wage was to reduce the supply. 
The implications of' such a backw.ard-sloping supply curve 
f'or Af'rican labour, if' it con:f'ormed to the :£'act.a, for the 
rate of' economic development of South Africa, were patently 
highly significant and f'ar-reaohing, It implied that a 
competitive market on the demand side f'or Af'rican labour 
would. through higher wage ... rate.s contract the total supply of 
African labour, and hence diminish gross national product. 
It justified the monopsony formally operated by the Chamber 
of Mines as wel1 as the •taoit-under$tanding• on non-compe-
tition f'or labourers among White farmers in that lower wage-
rates for African workers expanded the total supply of' such 
labour, and hence preswnably increased gross national product. 
It implied, further,, that until. the critical change in 
income-leisure preference could be effected among the great 
mass of' the African popul.ation, the inelastic! ty of' their 
demand f.or money-income .inhibited (or even prohibited) an 
expansion o'f' a major sector of' total market-demand f'or South 
Af'rican manufacturing industry and agriculture. 18 Xf' the 
White polity desired to stimulate the rate of' economic develop-
ment; then it became a desirable objective of' polity to 
stimulate money-earn:Lng among the .Af'ricans. The spokesmen 
for manufacturing industry, anxious to pro~ote the domestic 
produot1on of' manuf'actured goods, were indeed persi.stent and 
consistent cri tic.s of the low wage-policies of' the mining 
and agricultural industries. 
There is e,reidence that the tribal Af'ricans did .not lack 
money consoiousness. In the absence o'f' such money-conscious-
ness there woul.d, for instance, have been neither purpose to 
nor need f'or the abortive attempts by the mi.Ding companies :Ln 
the eighteen-nineties, to eliminate wage-competition -,;;'or 
African labour between the mines. 19 In f'act the reports 
of numerous Commissions conf'irrn that money-consciousness 
among African mine-workers was percipient to a degree. 
The Economic Commission of 1914 analysed the piece-work 
system as applied to African labour on mines, classi~ied as 
hammer-boys, machine-drill boys, lashers and trannners and 
surface boys. It reported that notwithstanding the strenuous 
nature of hammer-work, it was eagerly sort after because 
•hammer-boys make much more than the average rate of' w.ages 
and are paid according to capacity•. It not~d how machine-
driil boys respo.nded to a bonus-eystem and also the response 
.of' lashing-tramming gangs to a task-bonus. 
But the maximum average-penalty compelled the mines not 
to exceed the average of' 2/3d. per shift and the Commission 
commented: 
Your Commissioners £ee1 no doubt that the product-
ive powers of' the native ar~ being held in check, 
whi.l.e at tho same time a sense of' in,1ury is being 
gdnerated by the device of' the maximum average in 
particular, and in general by a failure on the 
part of the gol.d mines to pay nat.ives more fre-
quently on a system which furnished an incentive. 
To the system o:f' piece rates :for 'White '"orkers 
there may not infrequently be objections, but 
these objections do not carry the same tieight ~n 
the case of the native. He is at that stage of' 
industrial development in which the crude incen-
tive o:f gain is an important, if not indispen~ 
sable, educational instrument ••• The native 
desires to be pai.d according to his strengthi 
and he complains of' the small amount he earns. 
Your Commissioners understand that the question 
of an extension of' piece-work :f'or natives is 
closely engaging the attention of' the gold-
mining .industry, and are convinced that much 
can be done in this direction to increase the 
ef'f'iciency 'o:f' native labour. 
They agree with Mr. Taberer (o:f' the Native 
Recru~ting Corporation). who stated he pre:f'erred 
piece-work (for natives) in the interest of' the 
mine, of' the native, and of' the industry. 
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The same Commission further reported that the maximwn 
average day's pay of' 2s. 3d. is •especially felt by the 
natives as a grievance• and that there were 'general and 
bitter complaints of' rate-cutting and other.· methods of re-
ducing earnings, and of under-payment for superior work as 
clerks and boss-boys•. Indeed f'rom the Report of' the Native 
Grievances Inquiry .of 1914; 20 it is patent that tribal Afri-
can labour showed acute perception of the detail of work• 
organization that af'f'ected piece-work earnings. 
Hammer-boys, paid at piece-rates for every inch-depth of 
ho.le drilled, complained that they were required to do lash-
ing, i.e. clearing the working-place of' broken rock produced 
by the previous blast before they could begin their own 
piece-rate work of boring holes :for the next blast. (l: 
have•, said the Commissioner while rejecting most complaints 
as exaggerated, 
come across a mine where 90 per cent of' the 
natives employed were hammer-boys. There 
can be no doubt that, in that case at 1east. 
practically all the lashings must be done by 
hammer-boys. It is observed that the employ. 
ment of' hammer·boys to do l.ashing is., in a very 
large number of cases, a plain breach 0£ con-
tract.21 
He also quoted :from c:ircular No.5.5 of' the Native Recruiting 
Corporation that: 
:it has always been considered inadvisabl.e to 
~nsert a clause in the native contract having 
reference to the (lashing work) •• • as it is 
£eared it may needlessly alarm them as to what 
they may· be compelled to perform; and so ad-
v4rsely a£f'ect our recruiting operations. 
The Commissioner noted that on mines where labour was 
organized so that lashing was scheduled adequately in advance 
of' hammering, there were no complaints. 
Again, at the City and Suburban,, the lashing 
boys go down an hour before. the hammer-boys 
·and clear out the stope s, · .so that the hammer ... 
boys do no J.ashing at all. Thi.s has been 
going on for the J.ast :four year,s and has given 
no rise to dif'f'icul ty ... • ,It may be worth not ... 
ing that this mine succeeds in doing without 
recruited, labour; it has no dif'f'iculty in 
:f.illing up with voluntary boys .• •• 22 
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'l'b.ere were complaints .of' insu££icient drills to, a.ccom• 
plish hole-.drillling e.i ther through poor store s•organiza.tion 
or deliberate under-.issue .of drill,s to save steel J of' in• 
suf'f'icient candles to perform tasks thereby :f'or:feiting pay. 
A perpetual source of' complaint was that the White miner-
supervisor had sole, unfettered authority .f'or marking or non-
.marking of tickets wMch served as basis £or the African 
labourer's wa.ge .. calculation and record of number of shifts 
worked so that there might be partial or. total loss of' pay. 23 
Af'rlcan mine-workers patently showe,d.no lack 0£ money ... 
consciousness in relation to the operation of' piece .. work 
earnings. Such money-consciousness was not necessarily in-
compatible with the Chamber of' Mines contention that the 
tribal African's demand f'or money ... ,incorne was .ine.lastic and 
that they were tar.get ... workers.. K@rui awareness of p.ieee-work 
incentives may have implied a desire to achieve target-
earnings earlier ra.ther than later, and thereby satisfy their 
leisure-preference. Since the African miner contracted to 
complete a specific number of shifts· bef'ore he cou.td J.egally 
return home, ma.:x:ittdzing hi.s e.arnings from greater producti.-
vity during the time'-period of' his contract did not enable 
him to reduce time-spent at the mine i~ that pa.rticul.ar 
contract. But experience o.f' high~r-earnings to be achieved 
through his great.er productivity might possibly .influence him 
to contra.ct :for fewer shifts in .subsequent service-contracts• 
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Such nicety of' calculation implies a f'airly high degree 
of' sophistication inlwork-attitudes. 24 The Africans made 
complaints to the Commissioner on the general level of' earn-
~ngs and their rates of' pay. According to the evidence of' 
the Chamber of Mines, the then (1913) schedule of'le.ges 
showed a general increase of' underground rates but with 
little change in surf'ace rates since their a.greed uni:form 
schedule of' May 1897. However the Commissioner commenteds 
'On the other hand I am told that the .schedule of' 1897 repre-
sented a reduction of' approximately one-third on the scale 
previously in force; if' so wages were higher in 1896 than 
they are now (1913)•. 2 5 
The common complaint, said the Commissioner, was there 
was no increase of' pay :for long service with its accompanying 
increased ef'f'io1ency. T 
The real grievance of' t·he native on this point 
is the colour bar, wtich blocks practically all 
his opportunities for promotion·· He argues -
and I see no flaw in his reasoning - that if' he 
can do the same work as white men, there is no 
reason why he should not receive the same remuner-
ation. That in many instances he can do it and 
in some inst~ces is actually doing it• admits 
of no doubt.2 
It was indeed the approach o:f the Chamber of Mines to 
this crux and crunch o:f the colour bar that suggests some 
equivocation on 'the backward-sloping supply curve' :for Afri-
can mine labour. Under a gold price-working cost squeeze ... 
that :from time to time threatened the very life of marginal 
mining, the Chamber o;f Mines moved purp0:se:fully and reso-
lutely towards least-cost 1ab6ur utilization. It aimed to 
advance some Af'ricans to higher categories of labour, that 
is to realize the potential of their productivity. At such 
increased marginal productiv.ity, African mine-workers would 
have merited and received higher wage-rates. And at such 
times, the Chamber of' Mines does not appear to have advanced 
the argument that the Af:L"icans' allegedly inelastici ty of 
money ... income demand would have made it impossible or dif'£i-
'cul t to :find a supply of" Africans :ror advancement. 
'l'he White miners in their. trad~-unions assuredly had no 
doubts about a supply of' African miners being forthcoming :for 
·jobs D.£ ·higher marginal produc~ivity at related pay. The 
pres.sure of trade-union collactive bargaining, occasionally 
exploding in pre-1914 strikes, was continuously exerted 
against 'dilution of' labour• through attempts to widen the 
range of A..frican-per:f.ormed jobs. During World War z, Su.ch . 
pressure was J:'d.laxed when 1!3-rge numlfors of.' White miners en-
listed and by common consent some semi-skilled underground 
jobs; such .aa drill ... sharpening, were no longer excl.usively 
demaroated as White. 
The more extensive emp.loyment of non-Whites; )'artioularly 
Af'ricarts, in the gold-mining industry during. the :t'irst World 
War year:s led to the Jul.y, 1918• .status Quo Agreement between 
the Chamber of' Mines and the South Af'rican Industrial Feder•· 
ation to maintain the then prevailing job-demarcation.be-
tween Wh:i. tes and non-lfui te s • The potentiali tie.s of' least-
cost substitution. were evident to mining management. As 
war ... and post-w.ar i.nf'lation .o:f costs embarrassed exploita-
tion of' increasing areas .of' low-grade• aurif'erous rock-
ea.r'til\y the pursuit of' economi.c rationality by the Chamber of 
Mines became an imperative. Such pursuit would patiently 
be res:.i..otee by the whole force of' trade union tradition sup-
ported by Af'r:i.kaner ·ideology. 27 
The po1i tioal conf'lict and. challenge that led .fro.m the 
1922 Rand Strike to the 1924 Na.tionalist-Labour Pact Govern-
ment has been related in an earl:ier chapter. The realities 
of'· gold-mining operation and its signi.f'.icance to the m.te of' . 
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economic development of' the country at this period emerge 
cl.early f'rom the Report of the Low Grades Mines Commission 
1919/20, appointed as a matter of great urgency by the Govern-
ment. It was to inquire into gold mines currently working 
at a loss or small• diminishing pro:fi t; the ef:f'ect o:f their 
closure and what acti·on could be taken by the Government; 
the position in the mining industry of' the, Nativenand 
Coloured workmen and the more e:ff'icient utilization of' the 
available Native labour f'orce. 28 
From mid-1914 to 1919, working costs rose f'rom 17s. 5d. 
per ton milled to 22s. 9d. A parliamentary select committee 
had reported that in the last quarter of' 1917, 14 mines were 
working at a loss or working profit of' 2s. per ton or less. 
The.Low Grades Mines Commission Interim Report of' September, 
1919, stated that three of these mines ·had already closed and 
a f'urthe r 11 mines had become marginal. The marginal mines 
•constitute, from the employment and expenditure point of' 
view, roughly one-half' of the Witwatersrand gold-mining 
i.ndustry•. 29 
The detail of work-organization as given by this Commis~ 
.sion is highly instructive i.n relation to the prbblems and 
prospects of' re-organization, which had least-cost substitu-
tion as the objective. 
The White miner is the :first to enter h:i e work-
ing place in the morning. His last act on the 
previous shif't was to light up his f'uses for 
blasting, and it is now his duty to see that 
the p.lace is saf'e enough for his gang to 't'lork 
in bef'ore letti.ng them commence their tasks. 
He enters with a :few natives, dresses down 
pieces of' rook which might :fall and endanger 
life and limb, and generally makes the place 
secure ••• He then admits the remainder of the 
natives, points out the position and direction 
of the holes to be drii1ed, assists in the rig• 
ging up of machine drills• and gets the work 
well. under w.ay. 
When he :feels that he can safely leave the 
natilles to continue their tasks; he proceeds 
to the place ~here his explosives are stored; 
prepares his cartridges, f'use and detonators 
for blasting, returns to the working place to 
see the f'inish of the procesa o'B drilling., 
fetches his explosives, sends the natives out, 
charges up his holes, places guards to prevent 
persons entering by mistake, lights up his 
fuses, either in person or by means of' natives 
acting under his immediate eye, and proceeds 
up the shaft to be hoisted to the surface. 
The natives in his gang will have rigged up 
the machine drills; done the drilling, and 
shovelled the rock, broken by the previous 
day•s blast, to the bottom of' the stope to be 
.transferred to the trucks, and generally done 
all or nearly all the manual work required ••• 
• 
The white tram.mer, waste packer and timber-
man, similarly will do the .supervision of' the 
native ts work, lending a hand where required 
and being generally responsible £or the safety 
of' the native ••• There is a good deal of' 
eJ.asticity .in the extent to which native labour 
is utilized in the actual operations to be 
carried out. One White man will do a good 
deal of' the manual work himself', where another 
would content himself' with directing. 
One principle is, however, practically univer-
sally observed and that is that every native or 
coloured person haa to work under the supervi-
sion of a White man who is not an off'icial. 
A shif't boss, for example, is not permitted 
to.set half' ... a-dozen natives on any job, such 
as tramming or shovelling, but must place them 
in charge .of' some White man; who is responsible 
for their sai'ety and for the due performance of' 
their work. This restriction is due primarily 
to custom and partly to mining regulations 
which, ai·though primaril.y intended :for the 
preservation of safety, have in eourse o:f time 
come to be regarded by White workers as their 
bulwark against the demand 0£ the natives to 
be a1lowed to do work now only entrusted to 
whites. Those regulations and customary 
restrictions constitute what is generally 
known as the •colour bar• ••• 30 
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It is patent that in respect o~ underground operations, 
the White •miner• was essentially a supervisor and that he 
was total.ly opposed to any work re-organization which, in the 
process of reducing working costs, would 'dilute• the custom-
ary demarcation of White supervision. As the Commission 
reported: several witnesses representing the views of White 
workers have said that rather than give way on the colour 
bar, they would pref'er to see the low grade mines closed 
down, despite the resulting unemployment and misery which 
31 such a calamity would cause • • • 
Such opposition extended even to the detail of opera-
tions which, while in the Commission's opinion not involving 
•any diminution in the number of skilled or unskilled under-
ground 'White workers• , would allow for t experienced natives 
to charge up and blast' or f'or 1 special blasting gangs of' 
Whites with native assistants'. Customary pract:ice, :for 
example, dictate~ that Africans proceed underground f'irst 
and crone up last and that they must work within the time 
limits and supervision o:f White gangers. Hence the Af'ri-
. cans' ef':fective shif't was much shorter than the 8 hours .. 
shift of' ·white -workmen and was estimated to amount to not 
more than-~ average .o~ about five hours.32 No estimate 
seems to have been made of' the signif'icance of' this single 
£actor to total output but its substantia1 reduction of' wor.k-
output hardly requires the nicety of' calculation by latter-
day • operations-.research'. 
It is highly .signif'icant, however, that the viewpoints 
expressed on the one side by the majority of' the commissioners 
and on the other side by the minority (the trade-unionist 
members of' the Commission) gave as much weight to the extra-
economics as to the economic.33 
The majority; after noting the opposition to the 1egal 
colour bar in the Mines and Works reguJ.ations by ea.r·J.ier 
Commi.ssions (the Transvaal Indigency Commis.sion, 1908, the 
Economics Commission, 1914, the Relief and Grants ... J.n ... Aid 
Commission 1916, the Native Grievances Inquiry Connnission, 
1914) said& 
While not agreeing entirely with the reasoning of' 
our predecessors we are o:f' the opinion that the 
legal restrictions now in :force should be abolished. 
From the point of view of' abstract justice as be-
tween man and man, there is nothing to be said in their 
favour ••• It may be argued that, i:f the J.arger 
section of' the people wish to and are able to en-
force the effective colour bar, this may as well 
be incorporated in legal enactments ••• It is, 
however, doubtful whether the majority of' white 
South Africa .supports the colour bar, and even 
if it did, it might yet hesitate to incorporate 
this f'eel.ing in a statute or other legal provi... , 4 sion which conf'licted with its sense of' jus~ice ••• 
The trade-unionist mi.nority members said: 
The Commission should have as its aim the adjust-
ment of' outstanding views. so as to arrive at the 
ma.ximwn amount of' a11 round satisfaction rather 
than at a pronouncement of' just and equitable 
theory. hopelessly inapplicable to existing 
circumstances •••To give something to the Native 
with which he is in the main little concerned 
about, but which takes f'rom the white workers 
something which will certainly excite their 
£eelines beyond dangerous limits, is surely 
lacking in wisdom, however possessed of' theo-
retical justice ••• 35 
This Low Grades Mines Commission 0£ 1919/20 t-tas also 
greatly concerned about 'the serious shortage of' native 
labour•. According to the Chamber of' Mines another 40,000 
A:frican workers were necessary to ensure that all mines could 
be worked to the full capacity of their reduction plants, i.e. 
that average costs per ton milled wou1d be significantly re-
duced by employing more labour on the existing .fixed-cost 
capacity. 36 The Commission therefore examined the view 
that •the insuf'f'iciency of' wages paid ••• is one of' the 
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serious shortage o:f native labour ••• t 
Since 1911 the Commission found the average earnings »er 
shift of' all Africans employed in the Witwatersrand gold-
mining industry to have been: 
1911 1 /11 •3 1916 1/11•1 
1912 1/11 •6 1917 1/11•1 
1913 1 /11 1918 1/11•!) 
1914 1/11-,7 1919 2/0•3 plus a 
1915 1/11•4 long-service bonus of.' 5/-
per month 
The Commission noted that £rom 1914 to 1919, the remuneration 
of' White miners was at lea.st 40 per cent higher with reduced 
working hours. A similar percentage increase for African 
workers would have involved the mining industry in an .in~ 
creased cost of' over £2 mi1lion per annum. •While such ai. 
large increase is out of the question, even a small.er one 
has been rendered more difficult by the concessions to White 
employees and other increases in costs ••• ·, 37 
The Commission was ~n no doubt about the money-conscious-
ne ss of the A:fri.can mine-workers.. The wage question, it 
wrote• is a matter of aotue concern to the native worker and 
his demand is insistent that he should be placed on a :foot-
ing which wi11 compare not unfavourably with the purchasing 
power of' his pre-war earnings. 
bears close scrutiny ••• 38 
The equity of' this demand 
But the Commission, a.nd the Chamber of' Mines, was still 
haunted by the belief' that increased wages could not induce 
an increase in the tota1 supply of Af'rican labour. 
It is true that the wages paid on the gold mines 
have i.noreased on1y to a slight extent since 
1911 but unless a suf'.:ficient supply of' unem-
ployed natives is obtained :from present sources 
of' supp.ly, an increase in wages on the gold 
mines would merely divert natives f'rom other 
industries.' 
These would then increase their rates of pay, and, in the 
long run, although natives• wages had been increased all 
round, and the distribution o'f: the natives among employers 
perhaps altered, the total number of 'natives employed by 
the industries of South Africa would not have increased 
appreciably, and an industrial crisis ~ght result • .ii- • • 39 
So the Commission unanimously recommended •the temporary 
modification of the existing prohibition on employment of 
natives from north of latitude 22° South•. After 1913 1 the 
Government had prohibited the employment of such Central 
African migrants because of the extraordinarily high morta-
lity rate but it '\~as now argued that medical advances made 
previous mortality experience •extremely unlikely•. 40 
The expectatiou-frustration matrix of labour utilization 
and labour organization was indeed coming under stress and 
strain in the gold•mining industry. The compulsions of 
change were being exerted on the industry and the South A£ri-
can economy as a whole, now under the severest pressures 
from the world's post-war depression of the nineteen-twenties. 
The sharp deflation in the general price-level was felt 
especially by the £anners, whose burden of indebtedness be-
came increasingly onerous. The period from mid-1920 to mid-
1922 was a major downard swing in the South African trade 
cycle. ~1 
It was the fluc~ations in the gold premiwn that caused 
the most serious alarm regarding the country's economic 
development. Up to 1914 the gold price had held steady at 
84s. 11d. an ounce but in the years just af'ter the First 
World Var it moved between 130s. and 95s. The working costs 
of the Rand gold mines rose from 55s. 1d. per oz in 1913 to 
6Ss. 11d. in 1918 and by 1921 were 76s. 5s. Wo:rl{.ing profit 
of £12•1 million in 1913 fell in each successive year to a 
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recor~ low 0£ £6•7 million in 1919, recovered in the next 
two years but with the drop of the gold price to 95s. per oz . . 
in December 1921, the working profit of the gold mines foll 
' '42 
again to an ominous £7•8 millions ~or 1922. 
In his annual address in March• 1920, the Chamber of Mines 
Pr4sident had foreshadowed that if the gold premium disappear-
ed 31 mines, employing 14,400 Whites woul.d become unpayable. 
In an anticipatory Keynesian calculation, the Chamber's Presi-
dent put the indirec~ effects as: '••• it would probably be 
correct to say that the Rand with a spending power in.South 
Africa of about £28,000,000 per annum and a productive value 
of about £)6;000,000 per annum supports a quarter of a 
million Whites and a million Natives.• 43 
In November, 1921. a series of conferences between the 
Prime Minister, the Minj.ster of Mines and workers• repre-
sentatives proposed certain amendments to the mining regu-
lations, which would increase the ef'f'ectiva working time 
underground of' the African work force. The Chamber of' 
Mines, sensing strangulation by the price-cost squeeze, 
urged on the South African Industria1 Federation (recognized 
by the Chamber in 1915) a more flexible work-reorgan.3.zation 
including modification 0£ the Status Quo agreement. 'l'he 
Chamber undertook to maintain a fixed ratio of' one White to 
10•S non-Whites but the workers• Federation replied with a 
demand for a ratio of' one White to 3•5 non-Whites applied to 
the gold-mines and to all other industry except agriculture. 
When negotiations failed, the White miners struck on 
10 January 1922. A ~neral strike was called on 7 March 
and was ended on 16 March. The detail of this 'minor civil. 
war• and its political consequences have already been re-
lated. The str.ike itsel.f' failed and work-reorganization 
followed. A Mining Industry Board appointed on 15 April 
1922 9 concluded that there was no necessity f'or continuance 
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of the Status Quo agreement and that its abolition after 
the strike was f'ully .jusi tif'ed; that it was not desirable 
to establish by law the ratio o.f' White to Af"rican labour in 
the Transvaal gold-mines; and that it could not reconnnend 
that di:fferantiaJ. systems of' wages and overhead.charges 
should be brought into practice on the gold•mines. There 
followed a: (temporary) elimination of a number of White lainers ,1 
a substantia1 reduction inwage-cost, an increase in the 
scale of operations and in the mining of lower grade ore. 44 
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terms of reference covered the implications o:f the more 
:f1exibl·e working-regulations of' the mines on the immediate 
and long-term relationship of' White worker to A:frican worker 
on the mine s •' 
The Commission addressed itself' to regulation No.102(1) 
which had replaced the old regulation 106(7)(a). The essen-
tial dif'f'erenc9,it f'ound, was that the new regulation enabled 
any competent person, including an A:frican boss-boy, to make 
sa:fe underpo:und working-places. In consequence Af'rican 
miners need not have to wait :for the supervising White ganger 
or miner bef'ore starting ef'f'ective working of' their shif't, 
which according to the Government Mining Engineer was thereby 
increased f'rom five or six hours to the :full eight-hours. 
'. •·•' Though evidence • ••' does· not in .:5 ±ts entirety support 
the conclusion that the amendment has brought about a.n in-
crease in accidents • ;. • th.e risk is somewhat greater with 
the new regulationJ 2 declared tha'pommissi-0n which accord-
ingly recommended a revision of the new regulation to ensure 
tha~ making-sa£e a working place was to be entrusted only to 
certi:fied miners. And, there:fore, it reconnnended a def'i~ 
nite limitation o:f the numbers o:f such working places re-
quired from the examining miner• 
The extended passages below indicate the general line of' 
approach of' this Commissiont 
On the evidence there:fore as to the working of 
the regulations • •• we have come to the conclu-
sion ••• that they are :frequently, and in some 
cases habitually; contravened. ln entertaining 
it, we regret to f'ind ourselves in disagreement 
with views expressed by the Government Mining 
Enginee·r and Senior Inspectors, but the grounds 
on which those views are based appear so unsub-
stantial and the evidence against their accept-
ance so cogent, that we are compelled to reject 
them. We think too that the primary cause of' 
the contraventions that occur l.ies in a practice, 
to which we shall. repeatedly have to refer, of 
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The year 19a4 was indeed a high point of' achievement in 
the operating experience of' the Witwatersrand gold-mining 
industry. Working prof'it of' £14.6 millions was the highest 
recorded f'rom 1911 tm~il 1932. Though the complexity of' the 
determinants of' the prof'itability of' an industry like gold-
mining must caution against drawing conclusions, the profit 
perf'ormance that accompanied relaxation of' colour-bar re-
straints on ap»ropriate deJloyment of' labour is suggestive. 
The 1924 peak of total working profits, £14•6 millions, was 
achieved on the basis of' a profit of' 31s. 4d. per oz and 
10s. 4d. per ton milled. From 1911 witil the major in-
crease in gold price in 1933, such indices of' prof'itability 
were not exceeded. 
Despite this empirical. evidence in relation t.o the rate 
of' development in the industry, which clearly operated as 
the prime mover of' the country•s economy, it was organized 
White labour and not the Chamber of' Mines who successf'u11y 
l.aid claim to be the Fourth Estate. Col. Creswell l.ed the 
White politi.cal wing of' the White trade unions into the Pact 
Government under General Hertzog, as Prime Minister and 
leader 0£ White Af'rikaner nationalism.· With the White. 
polity taking firm control, both the maximization of' product-
ivity in the mining industry and the shape of economic develop. 
ment generally were soon subjected to the motivations 0£ the 
White electorate. 
The Hertzog-Creswell Government served immediate notice 
that least-cost substitution in mining operations was un-
acceptabl.e in principl.e and in practice. The Mining Regu-
lations Commission was appointed in October, 1924. 1 Its 
extending the .sphere of' the European miner's 
responsibility beyond what we conceive to be 
its jus tif'iable l.imi ts ••• 
This tendency results f'rom the obligation 
tq increase .output at a minimum. 'of working . 
costs. Combining with another vi.~. the marked 
advance during recent years'in the e:f:f'iciency 
of' the native boss.boy. its has been instru• 
. mental in so :far extending the European miner•·s 
responsibility as virtually to reduce his con• 
trol over the work of his native.s in many cases 
to a mere shadow, they looking upon their boss• 
,boy rather than upon him as their real super•· 
visor ••• 
The process of' .gradually enlarging the scope 
of' the European miner's responsibi:lity must 
needs briUg in its wake 'another viz. an in-
creasing employment of' native·labour in spheres 
formerly occupied exclusively by Europeans. and 
this we think exercised an equally bane:ful in-
£luence .in the cU:rection 1.n which t.te are endeavour-
ing to examine • • r~· 
Tq,ere are certain speci:f'ie occupations on the 
mines such as winch•driving and loeo ... driving in 
which it is possible to perceive .in the clearest 
light the displacement of Europeans by native 
workers,, but apart from this• general widening 
of' the European miner's sphere of' responsibility 
has resulted in ntany nati.ves i.e .• boss~boys; be ... 
J.ng entrusted .with duties that Wtire .f'ormerl y 
perf'ormed by Europe ans •••. Throughout .the minea, . 
natives are being set to do work that f'or its 
ef'f'icient· carryt!\g out reqUire.s on the part of' 
its performers ·l'l regard f'or sa.JetY; a ~ense of' 
responsibility and a capacity to exercise con-
trol over others, with which not-even the most 
exceptional emong their numbers are endowed; 
and secondly that in course of' time the supply 
o'f: competent European miners is ·substantially. 
reduced, a circumstance whi.ch is natura11y. 
utilized :for oont:inuing the system •• "9·3 
urgent 
What aroused the/concern o:f the Commission was the ernpi ... 
rica.l evidence :f'n>m the Messina Copper Mine, which in July 
1922 had been exempted by the previous Smuts Government :from 
' . . . . .' 
re~l.ations which restrictecf: certain mining occupations to 
certif'ica.ted miners~ 
The ground upon whicfu the application for 
such exemptions ••• was solely the economic 
one that in their absence all operations on. 
the mines in question would have, by reason 
of' excdssive working costs, to be discontinued 
••• the e:ff'd.ct of' the exemptions being granted 
was in the space of a :few months considerably 
to increase the ratio of native to European 
workers on the Messina Mines (for years 1915/ 
21 the average ratio was 13 to 1, and from 
1922 to 1924 it rose to 29 to 1). 
The comparatively enormous displacement of 
Europeans by natives in actual breach, as we 
think,of the regu.lations which is reflected 
in these £iguree has not been proved to have 
had any adverse effect upon the sa.:fety or 
health conditions in the mines where it has 
occurred. This circumstance, however, "t'/C 
do not think :falsifies the conclusions al-
ready set forth witl'ltt-eference to the general 
e:ff'ect on safety and health conditions of' 
the employment of native in place of' European 
workers, and is to be accounted :for by an ab-
normal degree of' vigilance exercised both by 
the Inspectors and mine officials to avoid 
accidents during what was naturally regarded 
as an experimental period. 
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To this Commission such evidence permitted of' only one 
conclusion. which it proceeded to drawt 
Of' such conditions (transgression of regula• 
tions) the one that cries out most insis• 
tently :for rectification is the practice of' 
assigning to the European miner an area of 
supervision and responsibility too wide :for 
him ef'f'eotively to control • •• As to the :form 
modi:fivation should take, we would suggest 
that the average l.imits 0£ the European 
mincr•s area of' responsibility should be con-
side~ably curtailed and that, in the interests 
of' health and safety, the employment of' natives 
be restricted to the lower grades of' mining 
occupations, ail posts involving any exercise 
0£ supervision over others being confined to 
European workers, since mine natives in the 
present state of' their devel.opment and the 
terms of their relationship with Europeans 
are unf'.itted to occupy them • .5 
It was, however, when the Mining Regulations Commission 
turned to its second category of terms of reference - the 
changing ratio between Europeans and Africans in mining -
that its arguments most clearly reflected the viewpoint that 
•the interests of' White civilization in South Africa are not 















Table showing Emploxrnent Ratios on Rand Gold Mines 6 
No. of Euro- No. of' Natives Ratio Tons Treated 
peans em- employed (millions) 
Ji!lox;ed 
23,272 181, 100 7•7 24•0 
23,196 188,2.52 8· 1 2.5•6 
22,388 179.563 8•0 25•7 
20,403 164.009 8•0 25•7 
21t738 193,007 8•9 28•4 
21,8.57 200~582 9• 1 28•.5 
22,079 1so,v77 8•.2 27..:J 
22.328 177,800 7•9 24•9 
22,529 168, 181 7•4 24• 1 
21,672 173,598 8•0 24•2 
20,542 170,365 8•3 2J•4 
13,556 158,.306 11•6 1.9·6 
17,357 176,180 11•1 26•8 
(1922 .. Year of' major strike} 
The association o:f high tonnage treated with high ratio of 
Africans to.Whites wil.1 be noted. The Chamber of' Mines in 
its evidence attributed the 1923 output· to the improved effi-
ciency of' machinery achieved during the years and to the dis-
charge of' a •considerable number of redundant and inefficient 
men• :following on re-organi2:ation after the 1922 strike.7 
The Commission accepted that drill-sharpeni.ng and rock-
drilling machinery had improved but did not 'admit' that the 
. . . 
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elimination 0£ considerable numbers of European workers •has 
. been a necessary consequence'' • 8 The argument. of' the Com-
mission was developed as tollows:. 
• .• • bef'ore 1914; in Which· year ·drill_. sharp-
ening machines began to come into use, one 
1vhi te man, as sis te <;l by two lia ti ve s; would ••• 
. sharpen approximately 100 machine drills • •. 
1d th advent 0£ .drill-sharpening machine it 
was possible tdthin the same· time to sharpen 
600 such drills. Instead, however., .of the 
European being placed in charge of' the· machine, 
hi.s services, be:i:.ng considered superf'luous, 
we·:rM" .:fb:iqut!.ntly dispensed with, and those of 
one natitve assisted by two othars brought · 
into operation ~ • • In justification of' the 
·dismissal of.the European. drill.:.sharpener. 
it has bee.n. urged by ·the. Ch,amber of Mines 
that •dril.1 ... sharpening is n0w !rt no sense 
a skilled occupation justif'Ying the employ.:.. 
ment of Europeans,, but with this oonten .... 
tion we cannot agree, and ve.nture to think 
that such employment wou1d have.been 
att~n~edby bett~rresults9than are at pr?sent being obtained ., • • . . 
. The Commission declared that· ther~ was the aante ,.·trend in 
. res.pect 0£ ttock•drilling machinery with •the previ.ously tin• ,. 
skilled native. converted into the semi ... sld.l.led native work-
· 1ng a machine, and the retrenc}:unent·on·the ground of' redun-
. dancy of' the E~opean ,sup~rvis~r•. 10 It n<>ted that the 
main d..evelopment had been th~ extension ·of the .European 
miner's sphere of' responsibility and . 
his dismissed .co.•worker cannot truly be said 
t~ have bec,ome redundant ~ •.. the decrease in 
the number o:f European. employess, which has 
gone hand in hand. with an inore ase in 'the 
quantity of' ore handled, while the number 
of' natives has remained practically constant., 
we are unable to attribute any other cause 
.than a deliberate. policy; consistently 
pressed during the perl·od ttnd!!!r r~view., of' 
displacing Europeans in f'av.our o'f: cheap 
coloured labour. 11 · 
After analysing the oategorie s of semi· skilled work, ·the 
Commission sunmted ups 
The substitution of native for Europe.an workers, 
Which we have attempted to show; has proceeded 
along the directest lines in connection with 
r<:>ck-drill.ing, drill•.sharpening; winch-driVing 
and loco-driving, we have no doubt will tend to 
spread to many other mining occupations of' even 
a skilled nature.. We find ourselves unable 
to share the view of' several 'Witnesses, who gave 
evidence on behalf of the Chamber o:f Mines and 
oC a previous Commission (the Mining .Industry 
Boa.rd, 1922) that a process which has f'lour ... 
ished for years back in the. sphere of semi-
skilled occupations is going suddenly ~d imme-
diately to stop at the highly artificial line• 
which is drawn to separate these :from what we 
may call the skilled. 
Experience of' the rapidly advancing ef'f'ieiency 
of' the.natives, eu1led :from every other region o'f: 
industrial acti.vity, it is impossible to believe 
will be tmconf'irmed in that of' mining a.lo.ne ••• 
The ·circumstances, that have paved the way :f'or 
the inroad of: natives upon Europeans in what 
has been termed semi-sk:llled ·work• are to bEl 
found in the enormous advantages the f'ormer 
posses.a over the J.atter and the natives' almost 
phenomenal advance in ef:f1ciency during recent 
years ••• 12 
And £inal.ly1 
In:finitely the most serious result• however, of' 
the policy .puttsued during recent ye.are, and :far 
transcending all others in importance, is the 
elimination it seems bound,.if' unchecked, to 
bring about of' the European worker f'rom the 
entire range of' mining occupations_.1:3 
These ,extensive passages from the· Mi.ning Regulations 
Commission of' 192 . 5 are not so :frequently referred to as the 
more :familiar denunciations of' the •economic colour bar• in 
the oft-quoted Commissions of' enquiry into South Af'rica's 
economic prob1ems and performance. Bette.r known, thus, are 1 
It has been c1early proved to us that the re-
striction of the native to the sphere of un~ 
skilled work cannot be permanent ~. • we are 
opposed to any Government action which is de ... 
·signed to protect the white men against reason• 
able competition from the coloured races ••• 
.any action on the part of' the State· lihioh would 
have the result of' suddenly throwing large 
numbers of natives out of employment in order 
to ease the position :ror the white man woUld, 
in our opinion, be unjust ••• (Transvaal In.di• 
gency Commission, 1906-8). 
But in our opinion any measure which seeks 
to place a permanent artificial barrier by 
legislation in the way 0£ a co.loured man im-
proving his position according to his capacity 
is very dif'f'ioult to justify or maintain. 
Further. we feel assured that no such measure 
could by it.self' be permanently e:ff'ective ••• 
so long as conditions are permitted to exist 
which cause natural 1aws and economic forces 
to be operating in the opposite direction (the 
Mining Industry Commission, 1907·8); 
He (the native) is increasing in working ... 
ef'f'iciency., obtaining education and advancing 
in material wants ••• Y.our Commissioners are 
of' opinion that there should be no lega1 
barriers to prevent natives, or others of the 
non-w11ite population, from engagin$ in any 
work above the grade 0£ unskilled (the Economic 
Commission, 1914). 
We also agree ••• in rejecting the proposals 
that the Government should assist to improve 
the white man• s pos.ition by ••• fixing the 
ratio between the number of' white and coloured 
labourers in all employment .••• such artif'ioal 
methods will do more harm than good. So f'ar 
f'rom remedying the evil they aggravate it; 
they encourage the white man to rely upo~ 
artificial a.ids rather than upon his own re. 
sources. They a1so inter:f'ere with the opera-
tion 0£ the economic p;rinciples on which alone 
a true and lasting solution of the problem 
must depend {the Relief and Gr.an.ts-in-Aid 
Commission, 1916); 
The re.@.lt grievance of' the native on this 
point is the colour bar ••• He argues ... and 
I can see no :flaw in the reasoning • that i£ 
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be can do the same work as white men there .is 
no reason why he should not receive the same 
remuneration (Native Grievances Inquiry Com ... 
mission, 1913-14) g 
••• we are of' the opinion that the legal 
restricti,ons now in f'orce should be abolished. 
From the point of' view of' abstract justice as 
between man and man there is nothing to be eaid 
in t'p.~ir favour .••• It may be argued that .if 
the larger section of" the people wish to and 
are able to enf'orce an ef'f'ective colour bar 
this' may as well be incorporated in legal 
enactments, sin~et whether .it is just or not, 
it is the will. of' the people. It is, however, 
doubt:f'ul whether the majority of' white South 
Africa supports the colour bar, and even·i:t 
it did it n1ight yet hesitate to incorporate 
the :feeling in a statute or other legal pro'!" 
vision which confli.Cted with 1. ts sense o:f . .. 14 justice (the Low· Grades Mines Commission, 1920). 
The legislation 0£ the nellt :forty year.s, that is :from 
the accession to power of' the Pact Government in 1924 until 
to date, leaves no doubt as to what was the will 0£ the 
White polity.. Whatsoever the scripture of the labour colour 
' ' · bar to be :found in all the texts o'f'. economic analysis (inter ... 
preted so fatth:fully, irre:f'utably and prophetically in so 
many oommissiw?ns of' enquiry), the White po.lity found its 
author:i;zed version in the Mining Regulations Commission. 
The Mines and Works Amendment· Act was passed as Act No.~S 
of' 1926•·15 .. ·I~ re ... os~abl.ished the Mines and. tforks Act. of' 
1911, as one .of' the earl.i.est expressions of the polity's 
·Objectives. The minutiae of' work--organization .in the mines • 
. , , prb.vided by legal. rule and administrative decision, .secured 
f'or the White mine-workers the job-categories designated as 
'White ~Y the same trade-union! organizations. 16 ·· 
The 19.22 Rand Strike and the Mines and Works Amendment 
Act of' 1926 did more, however, than determine the £uture of 
labour utilization and a.iiocation in the gold-mining industry. 
290. 
The manifest motivations of White labour, whose numbers and 
composition increasingly ref'iected the absorption of •Poor 
Whites• as Afrikaner industrial workers, made it evident 
that the maintenance of' the patterns of the past wouJ.d at 
all times complicate the management of' the tensions 0£ the 
future. 
However much economic development might interact with 
change, not competition nor least-cost substitution, nor 
economic rationality.nor economic devel..opment itself' was 
ever to be accepted as either the dominant value~orientation 
or the decisive determinant of' the South A:frie.an labour 
market .. Indeed.the polity never accepted that there should 
be a single labour market of' both White and non-lihite labour, 
17 all reality.to the contrary. 
Though·the polity in 1910 had· rejected the majority 
recommendation of' the Mining Industry Commission of' 1908 to 
adopt its White _-labour policy as the ~ gua !!2!! of' the 
maintenance of White·-civilizat:l..on in South Af'rica, from 1924 
onwards l.abour legislation and administration had two basic 
objectives. The first was that the White worlter should be 
safeguarded aga:i.nst what the Mining Regulations commission 
had described as •the enormous advantages' o:f' the A:f':r.ican 
worker. The second was that the 'inter-dependence' of' 
Wh~te and non-White labour should not imply a non-differen-
tiating integration. Tho s~parate identities of' White and 
non-White labour categories should never be so amalgamated 
in or by a single labour market that separate racial cate-
. . . 18 
gories, as legally elassi:f'ied on the Population Register, 
should be fused in or by a si.ngle social system. 
It wi.11 be recollected that Creswell had been the main 
protagonist of' the •White-labour policy• on the Mining In ... 
dustry Commission of' 1908, 19 but that f'irst Botha and then 
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Smuts had as prime ministers made policy unti1 Smuts was 
def'eated by the combination of' Hertzog-Creswell. It was 
, Creswell now, as Minister of' Labour f'rom 1925, who fashioned 
the letter and imbued the spirit of' industrial ... wage legis ... 
lation. 
The letter and spirit of' the Industrial Conciliation Act 
No .11 of' 1924, of' the Wage Act No. 27 of 192.5, of the admini-
stration of the Apprenticeship Act of' 1922 have been acutely 
analysed a number of' times. 20 Their operation on the South 
Af'rican labour market (and ipso :facto on the rate and shape 
of' South African economic developmen~) is a lengthy and com-
plete study in itself'. Interaction between adntinistered 
wages, labour demand and labour supply must probably def'y 
even mathematical precision. 
The general consequences of' such interactions were per• 
ee.tved as early as 1925 in the Majority Report of' the Eeono-
21 mic and Wage Commission. The wisdom is still wise, what-
ever 1ater sophistication of either micro-economics or 
macro-economics mi.ght adds 
Whil.e def'inite exclusion of' natives :from the 
more remunerative :fields of' employment by law 
was not urged upon us, the same result would 
:follow a certain use of' the powers of' the Wage 
Board under the Wage Act of' 1925, or of' other 
· wage-f'i.xing 1.egislation.. The method would be 
to fix a minimum rate for an occupation or craft 
so high that no native would be likely to be em-
ployed. Even the exceptional native, whose 
e:ff'iciency would justify his employment at the 
high rate. would be excluded by the pressure 
of public opinion, which makes it dif'f'icult to 
retain a native in an employment mainly reserved 
:for Europeans. 
The significance of' such a policy is that it 
would extend still f'Urther, to a11 skilled and 
responsible work, the conditions observed in 
the mining and some other industries where there 
is a skilled white class, receiving a relatively 
high rate 0£ pay :for their work accompanied by 
the payment of'' a low rate for all other work • • • 
The ef'f'ect o:f such a policy would depend on 
the level of' minimum r.ates fixed, and on the 
range o.t' employment brought within its scope .• 
'If' the rates :fixed were on a level with the 
skilled rate fixed for builders and printers 
by the recent agreements enforced under the 
Industrial Conc.iliation Act, .the ef'f'ect would 
certainly be to exelude all nati~es, but also 
to exclude many Europeans, eince industry ~.th 
its pre.sent .output cannot a£f'ord to pay more 
than a small minority .of' its per,sonnel rates 
as high as these, a.."l.d it is unlikely that the 
:forcing up of' wage rates would le ad to any• 
thtng like a corre$pondillg increase in ef:f'i· 
ciency ••• 
The precise e:f.fect o:f fixing legal minimum 
rates .in Qccupations at present :followed by 
natives at a level much above the present 
nat.ive rates .is diff'icult to predict in detail. 
The general tendency, however, would certainly 
be to restrict the :fi·eld of' native employment, 
and so to crowd the natives into the already 
re.stricted fields in which they have a monopoly 
of' employment• In these f'iGlds the low rates 
ruling would be still further depressed, and 
the gap between the rate.s for skill.ed work· 
(don(l by Europeans) and unskilled work (done 
by natives), between rates in industry and 
rates in agriculture., woul·d be st:ill further 
tddened ••• 22 . 
Interaction within the South Af'rica.n labour market was 
of' course subjected to i.nteracti.on between the labour market 
and the markets f'or all other variables of the production 
£'Unction .. and to interaction between the production function 
and the consumption f'unetion. Furthermore; all such endo• 
genous and exogenous interaction has taken place :i.n an eco~ 
n.omy which, so f'a.r t'rom being t closed.•, is generally recog• 
nized to be as involved in international trade as heavi.ly 
and as sensitively as any other. country .in the l-torld, Inter-
national trade during these f'our decades, f'rom 1924 to date, 
has in itself' come under cataclysms of' change• Any 
.. ,·· 
co.incidence, theref'ore, be tween the predicted co11sequonces 
of' attempted control by the 'White polity of the market f'or 
labour on South Af'rica•s rate of' economic development and 
the actual course of' development would indeed be co-incidenta1. 
Yet the later course of the political economy of' labour 
utilization and organization has fol1owec..i. a pattern, which 
was foreshadowed. 
Collective bargaining by White labour and :frUstrated com~ 
bination by A.:f'rican labour pr-:>duoed the characteristic rigid-
i tiee of' monopolistic competition in the labour market. As 
the pQwer of' monopol.y intensified inf'le:xibi1i ty in wage-
categories, so the power of' competition substituted adapt ... 
ib:i,.lity by wotk•categories. The earnings gap bet-w.en 
skilled high-paid White and unskilled low-pa.id non-White 
and especia.11y unskilled tribal· African, became t'. gulf'. 
ln that gulf' the tens of' thousands o:f Poor Whites :t·loundered, 
their productivity not even approaching the forbiddingly high 
marginal 1ine which the Industrial Conciliation Councils• 
wage-rates fixed f'or skilled work. 
To connect a gap by a bridge of' semi-skills at semi-
skilled earnings is the :function :0£ a flexible labour market 
but to bridge a gul£ may require a more complex, more round-
about capitalistic process. 
South African economic development had indeed to proceed 
by way of' the Great Depression, the epochal rise in gold-
price, the :forced i.ndustrial.ization of' the Second lforld War 
and its aftermath before the gulf' was bridged. Being White 
and enfranchised, poli.tical economy eventually ensured that 
the Poor Whites crossed the bridge and ceased to be t Poor'. 
Being Black and unenfranohised, political economy strove to 
ensure that the Blacks were immobilized al.ong the way and 
stayed 'Poor Blacks • • 
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The violence o:f industrial oonf'lic t on the Rand gold-mines 
was not only decisive :for the re--legalization o:f the colour 
bar in the Mines and Works Amendment Act of' 1926. · :It was 
that violence which led to the establishment o:f formal con-
ciliation machinery to adjust labour disputes. Though ini-
tiated by the Smuts Government; the :Industrial Conciliation 
Act No. 11 o:f 1924 was given its essential admin:i.strative 
interpretation by the newly :formed Ministry 0£ Labour under 
Creswell of' the Pact Government. 23 Such interpretation 
carried the pattern and related earnings of' work-organization 
in the gold-mining industry i~to manufacturing industry. 
The Act applied generaJ.ly to industrial activity, except 
Government undertakings and f'arming and domestic service, 
where labour is organized. It provided for the setting-up 
of industrial councils, subject 1D ministerial approval, to 
. . 
regulate wage•rates and workin~-conditions in the s~ecif'io 
industries by negotiation,. conciliation or arbitration. An 
industrial council is composed of' representa.ti.ves of' regi-
stered employers t associations and of' registered employees' 
associations in the particular industry.. An industrial. 
council agreement, once approved by the Minister of' Labour, 
becomes legal.ly binding on all employers and employees (not . 
merely the contracting parties) in the industry and area 
specif'ied. 
Within the terms of' a particular. industria1 council agree-
ment; strikes are illegal and even outside the terms of' an 
agreement, no strike is legal until appropriate conciliation 
and arbitration procedures have f'ailed. On the evidence, 
I 
this Act has maintained a favourable record of .industrial 
peace in South Africa. J:t is however a matter of' highly 
subjective opinion whether thi.s is the direct or the .in ... 
direct consequence of' the Act. The .industrial. councils may 
bei regarded as making peace between employers and employees 
on opposite sides of' •the capitalist system', or as the 
machinery f'or the establishment of' a bilateral monopoly of' 
Whi~ employers and White trade-unionists within the industry 
te> the more or less ef:fective exclusion of' new entrants. who 
might as interlopers or as dilutees upset a.greed price- and 
wagG!• s tructuro s • ·24 
Hencef'orth the potential disturbers of' industrial peace 
were the unskilled. In so f'ar as they were African, their 
S!l·Jure rights to co11ective bargaining have generaJ.ly been 
curbed by the de f'acto:r :frustration of' their ef'f'ective combi· - -·--
nation. A legal right to :form trade unions is not facili-
tated by no legal. clai.m to recognition as registered trade 
unions, lt was :further .fettered, when a il, f'acto .inhibition 
of' strikes by Af"rican workers becan1~ a de Jure prohibition 
in the Native .Labour (Sett1ement of' Disputes) Act No. 48 of' 
1953. 
But the significance of' the Industrial Concili.ation Act 
to economic development lies more in its eff'ect on labour 
mobility; and to the resistance to change in the labour 
market. 
In essence the industrial council system was intended to 
protect White workers against the competition of' Af'rican 
workers. The original. Act o:f 1924 aimed to 1imi t the bene ... 
f'its of' bilateral bargaining between employers and. employees 
by the def'irli tion of' per.sons declared .!22! to be employee.a 
'Wi.thin the meaning ot the Act and who theref'ore could neither 
participate in nor share the fruits of' 'industrial self'-
government•. In ef':feot all Africans, other than those of' 
the Cape. Province, were declared~ to be employees. Af'ri-
cans in the Cape Province could not be treated on the same 




the pqtentiality of' the :franchise in Hertzog's 1936 native 
legislation. 
The inevitable adjustments by some employers to the conse ... 
quen.t h.1gh-wage industrial council agreements was to substi• 
tute •non ... emp1oyees' 1 ie. unskilled Af'ricans :for •employees' 
i.e. skilled Whites. 2_, Hence the Department of' Labour in 
due course provided amended definitions of' employee, in the 
various amending Acts to prevent suoh substitution and the 
undermining 0£ the fundamental aim of protecting the Wl:Ute 
workers from competition. 26 
•:Cndustrj.al self'•government', more particularly as inter-
preted by the '1abour ... a:r.istocracy' of" skil.led worlcers, natur-
ally concerned itself' with the.conditions of' admiaslon to 
this upper house of' craft unions. 
ally by way of apprenticeship. 
Enf'ranchisoment was gener ... 
Even bef'ore the industrial council .sy.stem was established 
and before the coming to of'f'ice of' the Pact Government, the 
Unemployment Commi.ssion .of' 1921 had yet again dra"-n urgent 
attention to the problem of the Poor Whites - the influx of' 
those •whose lack of training and education, having closed 
the door to every other pursuit ••• drif't to the towns and/or 
are driven to unequal competition ri th the natives .in un-
sk:l.lled 1abour1 • 2.7 The deep, wide f'ear that such •unequal 
competition• would debase Whito living standards led to the 
expressed need f'or a system of' apprenticeship., which would 
both regulate training facilities and ensure that White 
youths obtained the standards of skill to secure them against 
the co1npetition of' non-Whites. 
The Apprenticeshi.p Act No. 26 of' 1922 provided :for no 
formal, legal colour bar. But the specification of minimum 
educational standards, which f'ew Coloured and Indians and 
almost no Africans then possessed., pl.us the requirement :for 
technical .school training, f'aoilH.:ties f'or which f'or non-
lihites did not exist outside Cape Town, was e:f£ective pre ... 
servation of' the skilled trades :for Whites. 28 ln due course 
the apprenticeship committees set up under the Act to deter-
mine conditions of' admission and tr.aining came in ef'f'ect to 
be sub-committees of' the industrial councils ad.ministering 
• industria1 self-go"V"ernm.ent t. 
Wage•rates in the skilled trad~s could be maintained at 
their relatively high level.a and be the more readily incor-
porated in industrial council agreements by appropriate 
limitation of the numbers· or. apprentices. The combination 
of' industrial council sy.stem and apprenticeship regulation 
gave to the White trade unions a power o:f restrietionism, 
which the im16r .. workings of party politics and its inter""' 
connections with trade union politics widerwrote with 
minimum risk. 
These inner ... workings and inter ... eonnections undoubtedly 
provide one of the key chapters in both the po1itical history 
and the economic history Of South Af'r:Lca f'rom 1924 until the 
present day. The importance 0£ this kind 0£ intrigue is 
not to be lllldere sti.mated in .its impact on the labour market, 
and through the labour market on the production ~ction 
and the rate of' economic development. The struggle £or 
power within the White trade unions cannot be recounted 
here but it merits study.2 9 
To evaluate with any precision the contr:tbution o:f 
'industrial. peace• by way of' •industrial sel.f'-govern:ment t to 
economic growth is impossible. It would be unrealistic not 
to give due acknowledgement to the encouragement of capital 
investment; _particul.arly foreign investment in South Africa, 
f'rom the :relative absence~ of' strikes and lo.st man-hours. 
But this enViable record has undoubtedl.y .its opportunity 
coat - the lost opportunities of' all those excluded from the 
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high-paid skilled trades and whose inhibited productivity 
was- and is inealeulab1e., No real.ietic assessment is possible 
but it nonetheless constitutes a •record' 0£ restriotionism 
in comparative industrial relations to be set against the 
other.; more •env·iab.te.! re.cord. of' indu.strial peace. 
The poli tioal :factor had certainly been exerted power-
:fu11y arld ef':feotively to ensure that least-cost substitution 
should not be pursued .in south Af'rica-beyond the boundary; 
set by White.men's prescription on skilled jobs,,lO To 
attempt to maximize productivity by optimizing the allocation 
and. employment .o:f' la.hour without regard to .its colour was to 
transgre.ss this boundary and to try' to impose an. unacceptable 
ada.ptat.ion on the sociaJ. system. ~om 1924 the polity, as 
stated above• never accepted that there should be a s.ingl-e 
labour market ot: both White and non-t<!hite labour, all reality 
to the contrary., 
That part 0£ the labour market Which •organized labour' 
claimed as !lts pre·serve, eithe.r in terms 0€ the Mines and 
Works Amendment Act or the Industrial Conciliation Actt was 
henoef'orth !t:s.reserve. .But •organized labour• did not 
includ~ all White workers. On the contrary •organized 
labour' was so orga;rtized as to iimi t its membership and 
related pre,•emption of' skilled jobs to that restricted supply, 
which ensured money ... wages and real ... wages f'or artisans in 
South Af'J:'i.oa to be· among the highest in the wo.rld. This 
hecessar,ily excluded at that time a major proportion of' 
lihite workers ... and especially the •Poor llhitcs•. 
So the incoming Pact Government .included in .its concern 
the unorganized labour - or. more particulariy,. the unorgan .... 
.. ized •civi.lized 1 labour,. Creswell, the new Minister of 
Labour, had never doubted that White me.n could and should do 
unskilled work, always ;provided they were pa.id as •ciV'ilized' 
men. . His Department of La.bou~ was made responsible f·orthwith 
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:for the 'civilized labour' policy. 
def'ined •civi11zed labour• as: · 
An of':f'ieial circular 
the la:bour rendered by persons whose standard. 
of 1i ving con~orms to the standard ·Of' living 
.generally recomdzed as tolerable f'rom the 
usual· European standpoint. Uncivilized labour 
is to be regarded as the · 1abour rendered by 
persons whose aim is ~estricted to the bare 
requirement.s o:f' the nece~ssi ties of' lif'e a.s 
understood ·among barbarous and undeveloped 
peeptes.31 · .. · 
The Cre.swell letter. clearly expressed the Creswell spirit 
and the spirit hardly" concealed that tcivilized labour•. had 
; votes, while •uncivili.z~d labour• had not. · 
Again the preferential placement of White •civilized. 
labour• at higher wage-rate a in unskilled jobs in GOvernment 
unde.rtakings did not begin with the Pact Government. But 
it was most ·vigorously promoted· by the new Minister' of' Labour. 
Be tween .1924 and 19.33 the. proportion of' White labourers em'!" 
ployed, £or J.nstance, by the S.A. Rulways & Harbours rose 
. . 
:from 9•5 per cent to .39•3 per cent IPld the proportion of 
Af'ricana Cell f"rom 75 per cent.to 48~9 per cent .... the number 
of' Whites increasing from 4;760 to t7,78:3. 32 . In due 
coursa a departmental directive made it unnece.ssary for the 
·extra wage co.st of' th.is policy. of substitution to be cal.cu• 
lated 'f:or publio.a.tion. Though the .Department of Labour on 
- -
occasion asserted that the definition of 'civil.ized labour' 
did not :e:er .!!.! exclude •Natives', inspectors o:f.' the Depart;. 
ment howeve.r stated that under no circumstances. would Natives 
be regarded· as civilized labourers. 
Despite more or les~ v~gorous work.-orea.1;1.on :Ln Govern-
ment undertakings and of':ficia~ employment; the .inf'lux of 
Poor Wh.ttesf'rom rural South A£rica was f'ar too large to be 
so absorbed. The Pact Government unimpressed by warnings 
f'rom, :for instance, the Economic and wage Comm.iss.ion 3:1 or 
' 
JOO. 
the Chamber of' Mines, of' the :impact of' tarif':f' protection on 
mining costs and on the country's exports, introduced its 
Customs Tarif'f' Amendment Act of 1925. An avowedly pro-
tectionist pol.icy to develop manuf'acturing o.1' -secondary 
industry was part of the new Government's solution :for the 
Poor White problem by expanding emplo}'lDent opportunities in 
private industry. 
One o.f' the qualif'ying' conditions :for a f'avourabl.e tariff" 
application was an assurance by the industry that it would 
employ an appropriate ratio of' •civil.i.zed labour•. Continu• 
ation o:r tarif':f' protection was to be contingent on the main• 
tenance of'· such· a ratio.; and Government buying also :favoured 
the 'civilized labour• content in successful tenders. 
--
It was, however, in introducing on behalf 0£ the Pact 
Government the Wage.s Act of' 1925 that Creswell evoked the 
nineteenth ... oentury to_ saf'egu;ard the twentieth-century - and 
•unorganized labour• of' 'higher civilization• f'rom the 'bare 
requirements' of' 'barbarous and undeveloped peoples•: 
1.t is common knowledge that the tendency of' modern 
industry unless controlled and checked .simply 
leads to larger and larger sections of' the popula-
tion being sweated down be1ow the 1ovel of' digni-
fied li:fe. In South Af'rica. we have not got a 
homogenous population. We have two races sepa-
rated by the wide gulf' of' history and civilization; 
a gulf' of' di:f'f'erence in material wants which are 
considered necessary f'or life. The same process 
which leads to sweating in another country gives a 
tendency in this country to eliminate those who 
require the higher standards of' li:f'e ••• :tn the 
competitive wage produoti.on system in a situation 
such as we have here i.n South A:frica, the lower 
civili2:ation will gradually drive out the hi.gher 
civil.ization. 
I believe there i.s room in South Africa for al.l. 
of' us •· •• (but) i:f' our civilization .is going to 
subsist we look upon it as necessary that our 
industries should be gtdded so that they afford 
any men deserving to l.ive according to the Euro-
pean standards greater opportunities for doing so, 
and we must set our :face against the encourage• 
ment o:f employment merely because· it is cheap 
and the wage unit low ••• 
It is mainly; at all. events in its earli.er 
years, in regard to unorganized iabour of the 
sweated industries, and where men can hardly 
look af'ter themselves, that this Act wil.l :find 
its main field o:f ~.vork in the earlier years of 
its existence ••• 3~ 
The Wage Act No. 27 of 192.5 was thus intended to take 
over what the Industrial Conciliation Aot No• 11 ,of 1924 
left out - the administrati1re determination through a W.age 
Board of the wages- and working-conditions of unorganized 
labour, i.e. those who as workers lacked as yet the capacity 
or the organization to engage in 'sel.:f-government in 
industry•. 
There was no mention .of •colour' or •race• in the Wage 
Act a...TJ.d tho :f:J.rst chairman of' the Wage Board, F.A.W. Lucas, 
declareds 
The :first (underlying aim 0£ theAct) is to safe• 
guard civilized standards of living £or all 
. classes of' workers irrespective of' race or 
colour; the second is that the productive 
energy o'f' the oommuni ty is not 1H) be hampered, 
so that :full scope can be given to that pro• 
ductive energy subj~Ct to the securing 0£ the 
first aim.35 
Nonetheless; as detailed by s.T. van der Horst i.n her 
Native Labour in South Africa, in one case only between 1926 
and 1932, was the Wages Board directed to make a recommend-
ation exclusively for unskilled workers; in five cases up 
to 1935 where the Wage Board found it could not recommend 
1 ci~ilized standard' rates; it was directed to make no 
recommen~ation by the Minister of' Labour; and in 1929 an 
amended regulation, requiring all persons .supporting an 
application to the Wage Board :for an .investigation to sign 
it themse1ves, made it impossible for any large body of 
. . 
A£ricans, the least organizecl and the most illiterate, 
ef'f'ecti vely to .apply. 
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Al though by 19.:'.34 the increased sterling price of' gold 
had begun to exert an aooel~rator•multiplier dynamic through 
the gold•mining industry on South Afri~a•s economy, the labour 
market aeemed unresponsive to change. Could it be that the . 
ayst~m of wage-rewarding was imposing the rigidities and 
barriers against which the Economic and Wage Commission had 
warned a. decade back in 1925? 'Cou.ld it be that these ri~d .... 
ities and barriers were exacerbating rather than ameliorating 
the .income-distributio~ between the 'haves• and the 'have ... 
nots'? 361 
'i'he political solut.ion to the gold-standard con:flict, 
whioh f'used Hert~og and Smuts in,o._ .~ .. p.ew United Party, 37 
tended a.1so to diminish the doctrinaire appraJ.sal of' •capital-
! sm •. and .1 socialism' • A booming Johannesburg Stock E~change 
induced a t'Osier .in place of' a redder ·appreciation of' •the 
prof'it-system• in many quarters. .A.:hd a tiew Minister of' 
Labour appointed. an Industrial Leg.islation Commissi.on 38 to 
undertake; iJ:t ef'f'ect, a review of' the· workings o:f' the 
,country• s industri.a.l legislation and its ef't'ect on employment 
and the ·labour market. 
This Commission began by ate.ting tha.t the labour situation 
in South Af'rica had since the earlier days *undergone a radi• 
cal change'. It f'ound th~t in every race 'the existence of' 
di£f'erent grades of' labour and 0£ dif'f'erence in ability must 
be admitted', that this applied to 'Whites 'many. f of' whom) 
are only capable • •. of' doing manual labour• and that Wh.ites 
•i.n increasing numbers aret therefore, entering the ranks of' 
unskilled labou:r::• in the town where they have to eompe te with 
the growing numbers of' non-Europeans' ~ 
The labour supply, it said, thus no longer consists of a 
small skilled White 1.abour force superimposed upon a mass 
of: non-White unskilled 1abour with a low standard of living. 
l>conomic f'orces;it went on, have now drawn Whites into the 
unskilled group, while some of the non-Whites had e1evated 
themselves into the semi-skill.ed and skilled groups. 'But 
nottdthstanding this radical change in the structure o.f· the 
labour supply, the South .African wage structure in the mean-
time remained steadily unaltered'. 39 
Despite legislation and some progress in the provision 
of semi-skilled rates; the Industrial Legislation Commission 
f'ound that the gap between skilled and unskilled wage levels 
40 
had not significantly altered f'rom 192.5 when it had drawn 
such severe strictures :from the Econom1c and Wage Commission. 
The gap was still very much tdder than in the u.s.A., Austra-
lia, Britain, France - where as a rough gt.ti.de unskilled 
earned f'rom one-half' to two-thirds of' the skilled, 
Apart :from di:f'£erences in natural abili.ty, vertical mobi· 
lity had bean so conditioned that the Commission o1aimed the 
higher groups of' skills had to all intents and purposes be ... 
come •non-competing groups•. The existence of' artif'icial 
barriers to the f'ree movement of' labour f'rom one sphere of' 
work to another had resulted, it stated• in the maintenance 
in many industries of the wide gap originally brought about 
by the real:l.ties of' the labour market. The country's 
apprenticeship legislation ruled out the majority of' the non-
Whites, who could not penetrate the contrived educational 
obstacles. Above-age Whites, too, were in practice excluded 
and t there is reason to bel.ieve that in several trades 
apprenticeshi.p :Ls quite unjustified under existing produot.ive 
methods while in others the period of apprenticeship would 
seem to be Ulll1ecessarily long•. 41 Racial prejudice, it 
:found~ backedl to some extent by legislation constituted a 
barrier £or non~lihites: 
These examples of' impediments to the free 
movement o:f l.abour .:from occupation to oceu ... 
pation explain in part. the tremendous diver• 
gence o:f' existing wage rates from those which 
would probably have existed if' everyone was 
free to choose his own occupation and weigh 
up the advantages and disadvantages of' the 
various types of employment. These barriers 
block the outflow :fr.om the large reservoir of 
unskilled labour into channels of employment 
where skil.1 or training i.s a necessary :faotor., 
While it is di:f'f'ittult to climb theladder, it 
is always easy to descend and to fall into 
the ranks of' the unskilled masses and wage 
reg-alation .itself' may result in a .sifting 
and elimination process and even .in positive 
unemployment.42 . 
Indeed the more this Industrial Legislation Commission 
pursued its terms of reference into detailed examination 0£ 
the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Wage Act, the Appren-
ticeship Act an.d their workings; the less enamoured .it was 
of' their ,operation. 
Despite d.!f':f'iculties of' interpreting •adequacy' of: wages 
:for standards of' li"1'ing generaJ.ly regarded as •decent t, it 
bad no hesitation in ·asserting that 1a.rge numbera of' persons 
of' al.1 races were compelled to 
subs~stenee standards and that 
have no proJ:lp'ects of improving 
eke out an e.ldstence on bare 
under 'present conditions 
- 43 th.e i r po si ti on' • .In many 
instances; the Commission dec1ared, representatives of in• 
dustrial counci1s and o'.t trade unions admitted that they 
were not catering :for the interests and needs of' the less 
privileged labour groups and 'they are, theref'ore, creating 
a situation where outside inter£erence with the se1£-
t JC' • d . t b • . ti. -, 44 ,._ governmen o.i. in us ry may . · ecome ampera ve. ....... ... 
respect of' the apprenticeship system 
the evidence points to the necessity for re• 
viewing the lists 0£ designated trades in all 
scheduled industries with a view to el.imin..;. 
a.ting those in which apprenticeship can no 
longer be justif'ied or reduc.ing the pre ... 
scribed periods when the necessary skill 
can be acquired. in shorter periods.. We 
recommend that the whole position be exam-
ined at the earliest possible date and that 
there~ter it can be reviewed f'rom time to 
time. 5 
Twenty-·f:ive years after the White polity had taken charge 
and ten years af'ter it had taken control; this C,omm1.ssion 
could f'ind no comfort in the living standards achieved f'or 
the great mas.s of' the population whether P.oor Whites or Pool." 
Bl.acks. It was unconvinced that wage ... and work-regulation 
by the polity had achieved significant benef'itd but rather 
that restrictions on labour mobil.i ty had depre.ssed standards 
a.nd limited opportunities f'or Whites no less than :for non-
Whites. It was persuaded that '.further control of' labour 46 
mobility and the labour market was not a satis£actory answer,. 
It is the duty of' the State• the Commission declared, to 
ensure that the protection e.f'f'orded by exis·ting legislation . 
. is not abused• before there is an outcry from those who are 
less privi1eged, who, although :fully competent f:or semi• 
skilled work, are being :forced to be sat.isf'ied with tmskil.led 
work. 
The time has, in our opinion, arrived f'or a 
f'ull i.nvestigation to be .made of the dif'f'erent 
industries with a view to ascertaining to what 
extent the failure to make reasonable provi-
sion for semi-skilled labour is ~etarding 
:further industrial development. 7 
The Indttstr.ial Conciliation Act was redraf'ted in Act No. 
36 of' 1937 and the Wage Act in Act No. 44 of' 1937. Though 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937 permitted any of the 
provisions of' industr.:i.al council agreements to be extended to 
persons excluded by the statutory defi.nition of' '~mployee•, 48 
i.e. to Af'rieans, such .Africans were not permitted any repre-
sentat.ion on the industrial council except by an 'inspector'. 
Such an 'inspector• may be appointed by the Minister of 
Labour but he has no •vote• in the Industrial Council~ As 
S.T. van der Horst commented• •such meagre representation 
is not likely to prevent the wages and conditions of' work 
o~ Natives .from being used as a pawn in the game of collect-
ive bargaining conducted in the supposed interests of' Euro-
peans'• 49 
The 'Uage Act of' 1937 seemed to have resulted in a more 
vigorous ef'f'ort to extend minimum wages to larger numbers of 
the unskilled, including a small fraction of urban African 
workers but it remained questionable whether the consequence 
lf'as indeed not to restrict employment opportunities f'or 
A£rioans through wage-rates that were above marginal pro-
ductivity. 50 No legislative changes were made as at that 
time in the apprenticeship system. 
The 1937 revision of legislation did not intensify racial 
rigidities in the labour market in the manner of the post 
Second Worl.d liar revisions (Industrial Conciliation Act No. 
28 of 1956, Native Labour Settlement of' Disputes Act No. 48 
0£ 1953, the frequently amended Native Urban Areas legis-
lation, the Wage Act No. .5 of 1957 and the Bantu Laws Amend-
ment Act No. 42 of' 1964).· But the 1937 industrial legis ... 
lat:ion certaJ.nly did not provide f'or nor encourage the 
'drastic alteration in the wage pol.icy of' the country•. 
Such change, the Industrial Legislation Commission of 1935 
had saj.d •is demanded i£ for no other reason than the fact 
that the grounds on which the unusual disparity was toler. 
ated in the past nave changed and the labour si tuat.ion has 
a1 tered.. t 51 
It was a wider political factor that was to introduce 
and indeed compel a greater flexibility into the South 
African labour market. The determinism of the Second World 
War imposed the values of' a competitive labour market. The 
value-orientations o:f that section of the "White electorate, 
whose every tradition rejected the colour ... blind values o'f: 
such an •unregulated market'• were perforce contained in nine 
years of f'rustrated Opposition. From 1939 to 1948 Afrikaner 
nationalism and Af'rikanordom had to accept a mobility of' 
labour - geographical, vertical, racial ... unique in S.outh 
Af'rican social proee.ss.. It transformed the shape and rate 
o:f economic development, stimulating industrialization to a 
dynamism that restructured. tho country's economy. :rt 
pulled tens of thousands of Africans from rural slu.rn.e into 
urban slums but simultaneously pushed them from a deol.ining 
self-subsistence into a broadening exchange o:f productivity. 
:tt broke down the .contrived division of skill and unslcill to 
establish the Jebensraum f'or semi ... skill. :It made widening 
opportunities f-or so many Whites that they ceased to be 
categorized as 'Poor'. It made categori.es of' operatives i.nto 
which the Coloured and the Indian entered 1d th gr.a.ti:fying 
f'acil.ity. 
So much compulsive adaptation exerted by the ec'onomy on 
the total social system was intolerable. In the post-Second 
World War general election, the llhite .electorate gave a 
majority of parliamentary seats, though not of' votes, .to 
Afrikaner nationalism. From 1948 the Nationa.1ist Government 
made it repeatedly clear that such uncontrolled ad.aptation 
was not indeed to be tolerated. Nothing in the social 
system of' Af'rikanerdom, of' i.ts interpretation o.f the political 
economy of' labour organization, ~ou1d adapt itself to mobi-
lity of' labour and competition - unregulated, uncontroll.ed 
an.d colour-blind ... in the 1abour market. 
